A Revised PFMEA Approach for Reliable Design of Assembly Activities
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- It can be difficult to use the PFMEA information in the overall quality system operation to achieve the goal to improve the product/process design;
- It is not always clear which activities in the process are the most critical to monitor and control;
- It is not easy to define a well-trained and balanced team. There are problems related to the cooperation among team members, especially when they have different personal backgrounds and come from different functions;
- The representation of the cause and the effect chain is not always clear;
- There are difficulties at the co-ordination level.
- Introduction of infographics [13] to represent the results and the relations among the identified failures;
- Mathematical and statistical methods (i.e., Fuzzy logic [14]) to overcome the drawbacks of diversified and imprecise judgments when team members have different expertise;
- Quality Function Deployment (QFD) method [15] has operated through the analysis of the requirement alternatives from a customer perspective helping PFMEA to identify the associated risks for the alternatives.
- To propose a novel PFMEA approach for the reliable design of assembly activities to prevent product defects due to errors during assembly of complex products;
- To propose an integrated method that in addition to implementing recommended actions, supports the design of worksheets, equipment, and assembly line for complex systems, early in the design phase of the product;
- To propose a practical-to-use method, which does not require large investments, implementation of new technologies, and complex additional training.
2. Methodology
2.1. General Procedure
- Identification of the specific steps of the manufacturing or assembly process for analysis purposes. System steps are defined by a set of activities belonging to the same operational area (i.e., acceptance and storage, production and design stage, and quality control phase);
- Where appropriate, splitting of process steps in activities/tasks (where a task is a set/group of elementary activities), and finally in elementary operations.
- The decomposition gives the sequence to properly conduct the analysis: in this way, it is carried out according to the sequential order in which the elementary operations are executed within the process step under consideration;
- Each step of the analysis takes on well-defined boundaries. This aspect is not a limit of the method because, during the analysis of a step, it is always possible to annotate considerations that regard other tasks and elementary operations.
2.2. General Procedure
2.3. Definition of the Design-Job Element Sheets
- It provides, for each activity, a continuously updated module that contains all the fundamental assembly information collected during PFMEA analysis, about the elementary operation, components involved, tools, equipment, and safety aspects;
- It supports the operators to the fulfillment of all assembly operations;
- It is a useful tool for fast and effective training and a synthetic way to standardize the work optimizing the skill transfer to new employees;
- It permits establishing a starting point from which it is possible to improve.
3. Case Study
- The chance of failure (occurrence) is evaluated as a function of the mean time between failures (MTBF) (Table 4). The few available MTBF values collected in the past by the company are then integrated by the experiences of the team personnel;
- The chance of non-detection is evaluated adopting the scores reported in Table 5. The scores are defined following the experiences of the maintenance staff. It is evident that the more visible a failure is, then the more the probability of detection grows;
- The severity of the failure effect is calculated adopting the score reported in Table 6. As one can see, the linguistic judgments are completely devoted both to operator and user safety aspects and to customer dissatisfaction (out of service of the vehicle). More specifically, faults, besides creating malfunctions and disruptions, can also have important effects on the safety of operators during assembly operations and on train users. As an example, loosening or falling of the door leaf can compromise the safety of the operator and/or the end-user. Consequently, the severity index was conceived taking into account the company’s sensibility towards safety issues and compliance with the law.
- The process, activity, and elementary operations involved in the production and assembly processes and the approximate amount of time required for that process, activity, and elementary operation;
- Tools and equipment used in the production process;
- Visual indications about tools, equipment, and documents that can facilitate/compromise the job or injure the worker;
- Recommended actions for operators to avoid errors when working on a specific job;
- The minimum number of operators required for each operation.
- The schematic layout of the plant, as envisaged when the D-JES is being drawn up, with operator and material flows;
- Schematic sketches or 3D images of the product where the operator’s attention must be focused during the execution of the job.
4. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Process Step | Activity/Task | Elementary Operation |
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Elementary operation | Function | Componentsinvolved | Equipment/Tools | Potential failure mode | Potentialeffects of failure | Severity | Potential cause of failure | Occurrence | Current controls (Prevention) | Current controls (Detection) | Detection | RPN | Recommended actions |
Job Element Sheet | Design–Job Element Sheet | |
---|---|---|
Steps | Logical segment of the operation when something happens to advance the job | Elementary operations |
Key points | Any part of the process that can make or break the job, injure the worker, or make any part of the important step easier to do | Recommended actions |
Used by | Tool for the lead, supervisor, or manager of that area | Work instructions that guide the operator in the correct fulfillment of all the assembly operations by making available all the key information collected during the PFMEA analysis |
Illustration | Drawn schematics, pictures, photographs | Drawn schematics, put hand sketches, diagrams, parts, layouts |
Occurrence | Rank | MTBF | Occurrence Rate (%) |
---|---|---|---|
Remote | 1 | >10 years | <0.001 |
Low | 2–3 | 2–10 years | 0.001–0.01 |
Moderate | 4–6 | 6 months–2 years | 0.01–0.2 |
High | 7–8 | 3–6 months | 0.2–1 |
Very High | 9–10 | <3 months | >1 |
Detection | Rank | Criteria |
---|---|---|
Very High | 1–2 | The process controls almost certainly detect the presence of a fault |
High | 3–4 | The process controls have a good chance to detect the presence of a fault |
Moderate | 5–6 | The process controls can detect the presence of a fault |
Low | 7–8 | The process controls have a low chance to detect the presence of a fault |
Very Low | 9 | The process controls probably will not detect the presence of a fault |
Extremely Low | 10 | Absolute certainty to not detect the fault |
Severity | Rank |
---|---|
The nature of the fault cannot cause any noticeable effect to the vehicle and/or to the performance of the system | 1 |
The nature of the fault does not cause any problem or unimportant damage to downstream operations | 2–3 |
The fault causes serious problems to the downstream processes, causing possible stop of the production system | 4–6 |
The fault will cause an out of service of the vehicle or a performance degradation within the field of legal regulation but however, it does not affect the safety or compliance with the legislation | 7–8 |
The fault causes the vehicle to stop, or it compromises the vehicle safety and/or compliance with the law | 9–10 |
Process Step: Installation of Train Access Door Process Activity: Installation of the Lateral Edge Profile | ||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Elementary operation | Function | Components Involved | Tools and equipment | Potential failure Mode | Potential Effects of failure | Severity | Potential Cause of failure | Occurrence | Current design controls (Prevention) | Current design controls (Detection) | Detection | RPN | Recommended Actions | Responsible |
Removal of the rubber profile from the aluminium profile | To allow access to the fasteners | Lateral edge profile / Train frame | Manual operation | Damage of the aluminium /rubber profiles after removal | No door closing. Inability to manually isolate the non-functional door | 8 | Fatigue in the extraction of the rubber profile | 5 | No preventive action | Visual detection action | 3 | 120 | Delivery of the profile in rubber already separated from the aluminium profile | Manufacturing Industrialization |
Tightening the mechanical connections | To ensure the fixing between the mechanical connections | Lateral edge profile | To be defined | Inadequate tightening | No door closing. Inability to manually isolate the non-functional door | 8 | Lack of torque | 2 | No preventive action | No detection action | 10 | 160 | Design team should apply the tightening torque according to document (E02NAACB4) pointing the tightening torque and correct tool (Torque meter wrench TMW 320/250) | Design Team |
Insertion of the rubber profile | To ensure the surface of the door closure side stop | Lateral edge profile | Lubricating oils | Use of aggressive oils | Damage to the rubber profile which could hinder the closing of the door | 8 | Lack of supplier check-list reporting correct lubricating oils | 5 | No check-list | No detection action | 10 | 400 | To insert the correct lubricant into the supplier check list. | Supply Management |
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Braglia, M.; Castellano, D.; Gabbrielli, R.; Marrazzini, L. A Revised PFMEA Approach for Reliable Design of Assembly Activities. Designs 2021, 5, 12. https://doi.org/10.3390/designs5010012
Braglia M, Castellano D, Gabbrielli R, Marrazzini L. A Revised PFMEA Approach for Reliable Design of Assembly Activities. Designs. 2021; 5(1):12. https://doi.org/10.3390/designs5010012
Chicago/Turabian StyleBraglia, Marcello, Davide Castellano, Roberto Gabbrielli, and Leonardo Marrazzini. 2021. "A Revised PFMEA Approach for Reliable Design of Assembly Activities" Designs 5, no. 1: 12. https://doi.org/10.3390/designs5010012
APA StyleBraglia, M., Castellano, D., Gabbrielli, R., & Marrazzini, L. (2021). A Revised PFMEA Approach for Reliable Design of Assembly Activities. Designs, 5(1), 12. https://doi.org/10.3390/designs5010012