“The Analytical Engine has no pretensions whatever to originate anything. It can do whatever we know how to order it to perform.”—Ada Lovelace
“Natures black box cannot necessarily be described by a simple model”—Peter Norvig
“We categorize as we do because we have the brains and bodies we have and because we interact in the world as we do.”—George Lakoff
2. Performativity, Proprioception and the Limits of Disembodiment
3. Assembling Nonconscious Cognizers
3.1. Technical Nonconscious Cognizers
4. Suffering Technical Cognizers
“God’s divine immaterial spark, our reason, entered into us and connected with us, this process is responsible for the fact that only we humans possess something that goes beyond the purely natural world, which is why only humans possess the subject status,”. (p. 3)
5. Limitations and Further Research Streams
Conflicts of Interest
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The Foundational Research Institute defines suffering risks as: risks where an adverse outcome would bring about suffering on an astronomical scale, vastly exceeding all suffering that has existed on Earth so far .
AI that benefits from being able to interact in the physical world through robotic technologies such as advanced sensors, actuators and motor control units.
This core consciousness requires a particular level of complexity of the brain and a specific connection to the nervous system and senses. Humans have been shown to have it (from 4–5 months) .
One of the ways to test for this level of consciousness is through the Mirror Test which is a measure of self-awareness developed by Gordon Gallup Jr. in 1970. The test gauges this self-awareness by determining if the entity can recognize itself when encountering its reflection in a mirror . Nine nonhuman animal species were also able to pass the mirror test: bottlenose dolphin , killer whale , bonobo , Bornean orang-utan [68,69], chimpanzee [70,71] (after 1 year of age) , Asian elephant , Eurasian magpie , pigeons , and the Cleaner Wrasse .
This selective attention tests requires subjects to count the number of passes between a basketball team and are asked to determine if there was anything special about the video. However, the ‘specialness’ of this video is that during the scene in which players are passing the ball, a kickboxing gorilla comes on screen, yet it remains unnoticed by many. Still, this gorilla remains clearly in the cognitive field of the observers. The consequences of this test show that cognition and consciousness are differing (albeit co-varying) phenomena.
AL refers to the use of biochemistry, robotics and simulations to study the evolutions and processes of systems that are related to natural life .
Naturally, autopoiesis is a biological capacity, strictly speaking the concepts of autonomy, self-maintenance and reproduction could in theory be interpreted as a capacity that can be possessed by a sufficiently advanced AI. This can feasibly be done through the marriage of advanced deep neural networks, machine learning (with variants of genetic evolutionary) and perhaps embodied with access to advanced molecular manufacturing technologies [94,95,96]. Still, this differs ontologically from the autopoiesis mentioned here.
κλέπτει Ἡφαίστου καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς τὴν ἔντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρί—ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἦν ἄνευ πυρὸς αὐτὴν κτητήν τῳ ἢ χρησίμην γενέσθαι—καὶ οὕτω δὴ δωρεῖται ἀνθρώπῳ. τὴν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν βίον σοφίαν ἄνθρωπος ταύτῃ ἔσχεν, τὴν δὲ πολιτικὴν οὐκ εἶχεν: ἦν γὰρ παρὰ τῷ Διί. τῷ δὲ Προμηθεῖ εἰς μὲν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν τὴν τοῦ Διὸς οἴκησιν οὐκέτι ἐνεχώρει εἰσελθεῖν—πρὸς δὲ καὶ αἱ Διὸς φυλακαὶ φοβεραὶ ἦσαν—εἰς δὲ τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς καὶ Ἡφαίστου οἴκημα τὸ κοινόν, ἐν ᾧ (Protagoras 321d)
There usually was and still is a categorically dualistic ontological separation between humans and solely natural beings. This is most dominant and apparent in legal frameworks, with the exception of Argentina, which, on October 18, 2014 recognized the orang-utan named Sandra as the subject of (some) human rights in what turned out to be an unsuccessful habeas corpus case .
A form of speciesism which is markedly similar to racism and sexism.
Stefan L. Sorgner criticizes the notion that higher-consciousness (self-consciousness) is a necessary condition for personhood. Similarly, he makes the further, and more controversial step that sentience is not required either for the affordance of personhood .
13 There is a difference, however, in that the AIs exposed to the mirror test are (obviously) not quite like humans or animals. The first time they encountered themselves they had to be told that what was being reflected was themselves. This provides a reason against the possibility of AI consciousness (not nonconscious cognition however).
Fetal metabolic acidosis is a strong chemical predictor that is done by taking small blood samples from the fetus itself. It is more reliable than cardiotocography which has shown to produce more false positives .
A cursory example would be a sufficiently advanced care robot giving a patient a prognosis given certain symptoms where the patients either disregards such advice or does something that is contrary to such advice. Doing so opens up questions that such a cognizer might realize as being punitive. The logic is that is debases the cognizer’s very reason for being.
Effective Altruism organizations broadly aim towards this goal. Particular focus on the long-term reduction of s-risks by and for AI has been undertaken by the Foundational Research Institute .
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