Dialectic in Early Proclus and the Unity of the Soul

Abstract

In Proclus’ Commentary on the First Alcibiades, we encounter a conception of dialectic that can be interpreted in terms of the philosopher’s reception of Socratic and Platonic ideas while at the same time being compatible with the relevant Aristotelian conception. We will try to show that this is the case to the extent that dialectic is ascribed a propaedeutic function, aimed both at promoting the search for truth and at practicing and developing persuasive skills that could prove beneficial in theoretical disputes. On this basis, it can become clear that dialectic is related to Proclus’ conception of the soul because it necessarily integrates specific characteristics of partial philosophical disciplines, while, on the other hand, it requires the active participation of the soul as a whole. This means concretely that through the practice of dialectic, the inner differentiation of the soul emerges as a necessary dimension of its coherent unity.

1. Introduction

Proclus Diadochus, as a major figure of Neoplatonism, shows a tendency to incorporate into his thought elements of Platonic and Aristotelian origin in order to synthesize or systematize them. While it may be true that his attitude towards the two great philosophers of the classical Athenian tradition was in general more favorable to Plato than to Aristotle, especially when compared to the orientation of Plotinus a few centuries earlier 1, there is still a need to concretely study his approach to certain problems in order to work out specific aspects of his thought.

In this paper I will attempt to highlight a certain part of Proclus’ work that connects his understanding of Socrates’ discursive practice with his reception of Plato’s dialectic and in a certain way also reflects his positive stance towards Aristotle; it is an issue that has not been sufficiently taken into account so far and for this very reason, in my view, deserves to be studied carefully. I focus mainly on the Commentary on the First Alcibiades, where Proclus develops a certain conception of the propaedeutic and purifying role of dialectic. It can be shown that this conception, on the one hand, sheds light on the common discursive practice within the Late Academy, and on the other hand, provides us with the opportunity to examine its content concretely according to the underlying notion of the soul as a substantially dynamic spiritual-intellectual and emotionally active entity. We thus take into account that, regarding the in-depth study of dialectics, the soul is of particular importance inasmuch as within its realm, the important dual role of the real field and also of the decisive condition of all discursive practice can be recognized. The reconstruction of the unity of the soul through the role of the discursive practice necessarily refers back to relevant Platonic positions—namely, that the unity of the soul can only be conceived of as a consequent and indivisible unity of the philosophical disciplines, as well as unity between theory and practice. These Platonic moments emerge in the last instance not only as the firm ground of Proclus’ philosophizing but also as the first stage of a long trajectory leading to an elaborate and coherently unified approach to dialectic as one of the noblest and yet most controversial philosophical concepts.

2. The Platonic Notion of Dialectic and Proclus’ Stance

Dialectic is developed by Plato in his Republic (Politeia) as a method or universally relevant and valuable discipline aiming at the knowledge of the highest knowable principles and objects, and especially the knowledge of the Good (ἀγαθόν) 2. Accordingly, dialectic as the highest possible discipline presupposes the previous successful acquisition of simpler but similarly demanding levels of knowledge, i.e., the mathematical sciences in general, which are supposed to serve as the solid foundation of the whole cognitive and educational process. In this sense, dialectic proves to be a specific discipline of general importance. This, in turn, means that the distinction between qualitatively different levels of thinking is concretely conceivable only through the evident and inseparable connection with the ontological, epistemological, and pedagogical dimensions of dialectic. All partial dimensions and their interrelations result from the prominence of the Good as the supreme object and source of knowledge; it is noteworthy that the Good is attributed a decisive role in the real world, although on the other hand its ontological status seems quite obscure and the philosopher must overcome the fundamental difficulty of fully grasping it 3. The pedagogical aspects are interwoven with the achievement of practical–political goals in the interest of the city (πόλις) as a whole. The disciples of philosophy, chosen by the founders according to their suitability for the roles assigned to them under the primacy of the eudemonia of the beautiful and ideal city-state (καλλίπολις), must first successfully pass through all the intermediate stages of the mastery of knowledge in order to finally become the ruling guardians (φύλακες παντελεῖς) of the political community as such. This also means that they should be able to deal with dialectic in two ways: they should not only familiarize themselves with its inherent theoretical content, but also develop the competence to face dialectical, i.e., dialogical, discursive, and competitive, challenges whenever necessary 4.

Proclus is explicitly in favor of this part of Plato’s doctrine and comments positively on it, mainly in his Commentary on the Republic. He reconstructs the Platonic arguments in such a way that, at least on this point, one could speak of his Platonic orthodoxy. He points out that the Good, according to Plato, is the cause of every kind of knowledge and the ultimate object of study (πᾶσι τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοῦ γιγνώσκεσθαι αἴτιον ὂν καὶ μάθημα ἔσχατον) and therefore plays the role of the Sun as far as the human vision is concerned. He also reiterates the crucial Platonic thoughts that seemingly open up a gap between the objects and the subject of knowledge, namely that the Good transcends the existence of intelligible beings (τἀγαθόν ἐστιν ὑπὲρ τὴν τῶν νοητῶν οὐσίαν) or that it lies beyond Being in general (ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ εἶναι) or that it surpasses all beings according to its dignity (καὶ τιμιωτέρου τούτων ὄντος). On the other hand, he delineates the importance of dialectic in the appropriation of knowledge. Dialectic proceeds through abstractions (διὰ τῶν ἀφαιρέσεων) to help the intellect of the soul (τὸν ψυχικὸν νοῦν) to envision the Good (πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου θέαν), provided, however, that the fundamental reservations concerning the full grasp of the Good remain 5.

It becomes clear, then, that insofar as Proclus attaches great value and importance to dialectic, he takes a decisive step toward bridging the gap between the subject and the object, which he himself had previously implied. His stance towards dialectic, however, should be sufficiently clarified because of some traces of ambiguity inherent in it. These traces result from his tendency to emphasize the general superiority of dialectic, while on the other hand he seems to explicitly limit its scope to a kind of preparatory stage of knowledge, as he sees it—at least in the Alcibiades Commentary—as a discursive level primarily suited to opening the minds of the disciples of philosophy. This would mean, consequently, that dialectic as such is conceived as a field of philosophical activity that lacks the capacity to transcend certain limitations of the commonly used concepts and, therefore, to ascend to the culmination of the valuable goals of philosophy while, on the other hand, the necessity of its role remains undisputed.

3. The Aristotelian Perspective as a Constituent Part of Proclus’ Conception

In order to search for a solution to this problem, we must at first turn our attention to some specific features of Proclus’ Commentary on the First Alcibiades. This work refers to a dialogue that was attributed to Plato and systematically taught and studied in the Platonic Academy “from Iamblichus onwards” 6, probably because of its propaedeutic character, since its content can be summarized as a well-founded admonition to the students of philosophy to turn to their inner/real self in order to be able to start a genuine philosophical search for answers to problems that they already consider to be important 7. Within this framework, dialectic appears as a resumption of the Socratic art of disputation, because it takes as its starting point the initially and provisionally accepted dubious and mostly erroneous beliefs of its hearers, in order to proceed to their gradual refutation through universally valid conceptions familiar to all interlocutors; this whole procedure is developed under the condition that its final conclusions are supposed to be beyond any doubt. Thus, in order to achieve its ends, dialectic first resorts to commonly accepted concepts, and its further steps are taken by explicitly using the structure of deductive inference (and only under certain circumstances it is advisable to use logical forms that are merely imitative of the real ones) 8.

This leads, according to my interpretation, to the relevance of the concept of the Aristotelian ἔνδοξα for the dialectical procedure. By this term Aristotle means starting points of disputation, which are primarily distinguished as such not (necessarily) by their (partial) identification with the truth but primarily by the degree of acceptance granted to them by the participants of the disputation 9. Such propositions are called probable and convincing (πιθανὰ), and this character, on the other hand, leaves open the possibility that they are true without any strictly logical guarantee. The choice of the ἔνδοξα as starting points of the dialectical discourse suggests a twofold advantage: first, it allows the participation of almost every interested person in the discourse without any insurmountable barriers and second, it implies that the Aristotelian conception of dialectic is clearly compatible with that of Socrates, who was constantly eager to start from beliefs that in most cases turned out to be unsuitable for promising logical investigations.

It should be clear that Proclus in his Commentary on the First Alcibiades does not use the term ἔνδοξα in the specific sense that it has in the Aristotelian Topics. This terminological distance, however, should be considered together with the substantial convergence in the concrete content, since we notice that what determines the function of this very concept according to Aristotle, namely a certain tension between the provisional character of the initial assumptions and the need to arrive at acceptable conclusions through a formally valid procedure, is nevertheless strongly present in Proclus’ text. We see, then, that the δόξα, as the deficient initial conviction of the young disciples, is certainly characterized by its deficiency, but on the other hand, precisely because it is conceived in a negative way, it points per se to its overcoming in the course of a process of purification and liberation from ignorance, paving the way for the arrival at indisputable conclusions 10. In the course of this pedagogical–philosophical activity, the leader and the follower of the dialectical intercourse should always be aware of the specific character and the inherent limits of each logical procedure, as Aristotle explicitly states in his Nicomachean Ethics 11. The whole logical and pedagogical process unfolds between partners in a common philosophical relationship (διαλεκτικὴ κοινωνία τῶν λόγων) who are ready, if necessary, to reflect on what they have already achieved and what remains to be done 12.

The convergence between aspects of the Socratic and Aristotelian dialectic within Proclus’ conception of this philosophical discipline as a specific form of elenctic, purifying and pedagogically elevating discourse, is proposed here as a key to a new reading that can prove productive by focusing on its substantial alignment with distinct elements in Plato’s and Aristotle’s teachings. This refers both to the unity and interdependence of the various aspects or dimensions of dialectic within Plato’s work 13, and to the recognition of the continuity between Platonic and Aristotelian dialectic, despite the fundamental difference in their main intention 14.

4. The Soul as Source and Destination of Proclus’ Dialectic

The peculiar and interesting symbiosis of Platonic and Aristotelian elements that characterizes dialectic in Proclus should not lead us to underestimate the fact that the underlying intention of his project as such remains essentially Platonic. This becomes evident when we consider that dialectic is understood by Proclus not only as the study of mechanisms of organized discourse on debatable issues (cf. Aristotle’s Topica) 15, but also as a concrete way to achieve the eminently pedagogical and socio-politically relevant goal of purifying the soul and gradually initiating it into the superior knowledge of the first principles 16.

What Proclus seems to believe about the positive transformation of the soul through dialectic is essentially consistent with his general conception of the processes that should accompany it. As he puts it again in his Commentary on the First Alcibiades, there are two levels of the soul: The first resembles the Intellect (νοῦς) in principle 17, and by virtue of this quality, it has the capacity to finally become self-sufficient. On the other hand, there is the soul that resembles the body and consequently participates in the merely body-related experiences, while being guided by the desire to seek its own good in things outside of itself; this type of soul is therefore characterized by a relative weakness in so far as it is directed towards the superficial things of everyday life and things of material origin 18. The journey of the body-bound type of soul can ultimately lead it not to self-sufficiency but to an illusory semblance (φάντασμα) of this desirable state 19.

The concept that pervades and unifies the fundamental distinction between the two kinds of the soul is the concept of its self-motion in connection with its concrete manifestation. This means that the soul as such is self-moved (αὐτοκίνητος), but through association with the body it begins to acquire traits of it and thus to be partially moved by external factors distinguished by their substantial (albeit relative) otherness (ἑτεροκίνητος). What is at stake here, for a philosophy that remains quite faithful to key elements of Classical Greek Antiquity, is the preservation of the self-movement as such as a noble quality of the soul. In epistemological terms, the attainment of self-motion amounts to the development of the capacity of self-reflection. This goal, according to Proclus, lies at the crossroads between separate philosophical disciplines and is also important for the dynamics of the soul, because “the task of philosophy is to reunite ontology with epistemology, turning the unconscious self-reversion into a conscious one, in this way helping the soul to resume the self-sufficient status that properly belongs to it” 20. This must be particularly emphasized as an endeavor that characterizes the overall orientation of Proclus’ philosophy, considering that at first sight we are confronted with its tendency to bring plurality to the forefront of its conceptual explorations, as long as “meticulous partial descriptions” within its scope “done from various angles may easily appear as an impenetrable labyrinth” 21.

In view of these problems, it is important to see whether and to what extent Proclus’ early dialectic is able to live up to its own ambitions. First of all, we must consider that dialectic, on the basis of its own fundamental constitutive distinctions, is supposed to make possible the achievement of the necessary equilibrium between different levels of Being and their (intellectual and at the same time practical) appropriation.

In Proclus’ writings in general, we can trace several relevant positions concerning the ability of philosophy to ascend to a level of conscience that decisively transcends all incomplete forms of Being, knowledge, and action 22.

With regard to the role and the significance of dialectic, we have a specific interest in seeing how the attainment of its purifying, enlightening, and practical efficacy has particular consequences for the crucial and dynamic concept of the soul. We maintain that, as the Commentary on the First Alcibiades clearly suggests, dialectic can be seen as a practically relevant intellectual activity that arises from the soul’s quest for the unification of its particular and separate aspects 23, while on the other hand its consistent and successful practice is nothing less than the concrete proof that the unity of the soul is indeed attainable. The different moments of dialectic, which tend towards a determinant unity, also help us to see clearly that a comparable approach is appropriate for the soul as well: its different levels are the precondition of embarking on the search for unity, while on the other hand the primacy of the superior, noetic part is the ultimate guarantee that this unity is not only necessary in a logical sense, or vital for the preservation of the differentiated whole, but also realistically and practically possible 24.

In any case we must develop and maintain a sophisticated awareness of the complexity of the whole and the peculiarities of its parts, in so far as “we must guard the due limits of the soul, and neither transfer to it accounts of perfection derived from corporeal things nor drag down to its level those derived from divine entities—provided that we want to interpret (properly) the Platonic philosophy without reducing the philosopher’s word to our own (at first insufficient) conceptions” 25.

5. Outcome and Perspectives

In conclusion, we maintain that a concrete study of Proclus’ conception of dialectic in connection with practical aims 26 could make it possible to define explicitly the relations between the various subfields of his philosophy and to shed new light on certain questions concerning the overall orientation of his thought within Later Neoplatonism, in the broad context of which the concept of the soul is always of particular importance.

Beyond the immediate conditions that determined Proclus’ thought in his time, as well as its immediate reception 27, his conception of dialectic has a certain significance that transcends his era, since it was developed in order to achieve a certain balance between Plato and Aristotle and to reconcile the respective antagonistic standpoints of the great philosophers of Classical Antiquity. Accordingly, we see that Proclus clearly shows his intention to argue in favor of the positive Platonic standpoint, while on the other hand, the Aristotelian approach also plays an undoubtedly substantial role in his thought. In this respect, dialectic plays a strategic intermediate role in the constellation of philosophical disciplines and methods, for on the one hand it arises from a conception of philosophy as the highest and at the same time broadest field of knowledge in inseparable connection with ethical principles, and on the other hand it helps the philosopher to arrive at a critical evaluation of his own contribution to the conception and the achievement of the high aims of philosophy. Dialectic can thus refer to the conditions of the verbal struggle to (eliminate objections and) obtain recognition for one’s own opinion (Geltendmachen, as Arthur Schopenhauer puts it) 28, but it transcends decisively the practical and external determinants of philosophical discussion in so far as it is essentially motivated by the quest for truth.

What is remarkable and remains important beyond Proclus’ era is that he succeeded in keeping alive the positive orientation of Plato’s dialectic, while also dealing with elements of the Aristotelian legacy. It was this positive orientation of the Platonic dialectic that, in the course of the history of philosophy, was later to be subordinated to a rather negative function that owed its origin to Aristotle under the influence of the Sophists, namely with regard to the predominance of the concern to decide the discourse (on practically every possible occasion) in one’s own favor by concentrating solely on appearances, without including the struggle for truth and its exigencies 29.

G.W.F. Hegel, many centuries later, was a prominent philosopher of the modern era who developed a positive conception of dialectic within his system, rediscovering and transforming key elements of Plato’s legacy. In my view, it is no coincidence that in the work of the great German philosopher, one can observe both a positive activation of the old and controversial concept of dialectic and a positive assessment of the philosophy of Proclus, who had also relied on the relevant Platonic concept 30. This may be of particular interest for an interpretation of Proclus’ philosophy that does not hesitate to recognize and concretely examine far-reaching philosophical relations and complex currents of thought. On the other hand, such comparative approaches must take into serious consideration a variety of factors, above all the richness and the multidimensionality of the concepts involved, as well as the substantial differences between different ages, and that is why they should be the focus of further in-depth studies.