The Kennedy Plan: The Role of Rhetoric in Overcoming the Cuban Threat During 1961

Abstract

President John F Kennedy faced an impending crisis upon taking office in January 1961. The revolutionary threat of Cuba held the potential to spread to several neighboring countries. This crisis was the product of decades of neglect from successive US presidents, that ultimately invited the USSR into the region and fell to Kennedy during his first year as President. Kennedy sought to recast the image of the US in the hemisphere to inoculate against the example of Cuba. The cornerstone of this plan was the Alliance for Progress, a substantial program of economic assistance from the US to Latin America. However, that program has widely been criticized as a failure. Rather than reflect on the economic and social limitations of the Alliance for Progress, this paper will evaluate the diplomatic impact of Kennedy’s approach in forming the anti-Cuban coalition in the first year of his presidency. Kennedy successfully changed the Latin American attitude towards the US prior to the releasing of any substantial economic aid. Therefore, this paper will argue that “The Kennedy Plan” was a diplomatic success that reduced the threat of Castro’s Cuba in the context of the Cold War.

1. Introduction

Fidel Castro’s revolution, against the authoritarian government of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, posed a significant regional diplomatic challenge for the United States (US) and its allies. Since the end of World War II (WWII), the US had openly backed authoritarian regimes, including that of Batista in Cuba, to avoid addressing the longstanding issue of economic assistance to the region. As the US positioned themselves against Latin American1 democracy, social progress and economic independence, Castro’s example threatened to lead many other Latin American states towards armed revolution and potentially, in time, towards alliance with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). This paper offers a critical reflection of the “Kennedy Plan” to inoculate the region from the example of the Cuban Revolution by rhetorically siding with democratic leaders in the region. Most historians would define this era of US diplomacy as the Alliance for Progress (AFP). However, the AFP has widely been criticized as a failure. Despite offering US$20 billion in economic assistance loans during the 1960s, Latin America was no more economically independent or democratic, and few of the social goals of the Charter of Punta Del Este were achieved, by 1970. Therefore, this paper will distinguish the diplomatic and economic ambitions of Kennedy’s regional policies. The primary objective of the Kennedy Plan was to reverse the image of the US in the region and to remove Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS).

This paper will contribute to the scholarship on the Kennedy administration’s handling of the Cuban Revolution and the origins of the AFP. Stephen Rabe (1999) argues that Kennedy’s Cold War “obsession” served to “mutilate” his otherwise good intentions for the region (p. 199). Concluding that Kennedy “genuinely wanted to help the poor of Latin America and confidently assumed that… the United States could accomplish its goals in Latin America” (Rabe 1999, p. 196). But “the administration notably failed, however, to build prosperous, socially just, democratic societies” (Rabe 1999, p. 196). Edward Jamison (1980) examined the US campaign to remove Cuba from the OAS. He argued that the US sought to insulate itself from the accusations of unilateral intervention which followed the Bay of Pigs intervention. He suggests that Castro’s open declaration of ‘socialism’ in May 1961 played the defining role in creating OAS solidarity against Cuba (Jamison 1980). More recently Loureiro (2023), examined the link between AFP resources and the destabilization of the Brazilian government of João Goulart. He suggests aid was used in political ways and that while the amount of US aid to Brazil doubled under Kennedy most of it was channeled away from the central government. While Loureiro (2023) implies that the AFP began honestly and then “went off track” in 1963, this financial assistance was likely always a tool for American influence. Michael Dunne (2013) synthesizes an array of secondary material to suggest that Kennedy, and indeed Cuba, provided impetus to expand an economic package of assistance which began under Eisenhower. This paper will critique this by highlighting John Foster Dulles’ repudiation of multilateral aid in 1959. Ultimately, this paper will suggest that the aid provided in 1961 was designed to court votes in the OAS in 1962, with specific focus on those democratic countries who had abstained or obstructed at the previous vote in 1961.

Some historians view Kennedy’s regional policy as a significant shift. For example, Richard Scheman (1988) argues the “Alliance was an aberration in the long history of US indifference and neglect of its neighbors” (p. 3). Herbert Parmet (1983) agreed by stating, “the Alliance held out a middle way in Latin America, [through] the promotion of democracies” (p. 98). O’Brien (2005) extends this idea by stating that Kennedy “offered a vision of America that seemed to restore its historic position as the exemplary nation, a model for those countries that would aspire to liberty and wealth” (p. 880). Meanwhile, Jeffrey Taffet’s (2007) detailed investigation of the AFP acknowledged, “while it was not the only reason, fear about Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution was a consistent anxiety that motivated US policy makers to pay greater attention to Latin America” (p. 11).

Serious analysis of the AFP shows its structural failure. Scholars like Taffet (2007) who examine the economic functions of the AFP often point to modernization theory and the influence of Walt Rostow. Rostow sought to further integrate the Latin American and US economies through targeted development of key industries and reasoned that this would lead to a growth in living standards throughout the continent (Taffet 2007). Levinson and De Onis (1970) document the outright failure of the AFP with detailed statistical analysis. Latham (2000) continues to claim that the failure was due to the enormity of the task and the incompatibility of modernization theory with the challenges of the hemisphere (p. 90). Jorge Dominguez (2008) points to “neglect in addressing economic inequality” as a core reason for Latin American underdevelopment (p. 98). The rhetoric of the charter of Punta del Este addresses this as a core issue, but the economic program of the AFP did not. Victor Alba (1965) suggests an interconnected cause of failure as it did not unseat the oligarchy that was “the great force of immobility in Latin America” (p. 96). Worse still, Andre Frank (1970) examines United Nations (UN) Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA) data to conclude capital drain was a feature of economic relations between the US and Latin America throughout the 1960s (p. 186). Moreover, very few scholars view the AFP as an economic success, and it certainly did not lead to an expansion of democracy. This paper will suggest that Kennedy created an aura of optimism during 1961 to draw Latin American leaders, and their people, towards the US and away from the Cuban example.

The paper will also engage with the diplomatic records on the planning for the AFP. The Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) planning documents demonstrate the immediate departure from Eisenhower’s personnel, policies and attitudes towards democracy in Latin America. They also demonstrate a diversity of opinions and advice coming into the young President during 1961 and early 1962. The fixation on the Cuban question is evident throughout with the AFP inextricably linked to US policy objectives. The other very clear point is that leading officials—most notably Treasury Secretary C Douglass Dillion viewed Latin American expectations running beyond US intentions for economic assistance. These documents have been freely available for two decades; however, critical reflection provides interpretations that differ from that of work produced decades earlier, most notably the work done by Stephen Rabe (1999) at the end of the century. By integrating new research from contemporary historians along with the established literature, this paper will pursue a reinterpretation of the motivations of the Kennedy administration toward Cuba during 1961, concluding the success of the Kennedy Plan, despite the failures of the AFP.

The term Kennedy Plan began as a warning from US Ambassador to Mexico Thomas C Mann, on 19 October 1961. Mann was an influential member of the Latin American bureau who became Undersecretary of State for Inter-American affairs soon after Kennedy’s death (Kunz 1997). He reported that most Latin American leaders viewed the meeting at Montevideo in August 1961 as a sequel to the famed Marshall Plan (Mann 1961). That is, the leaders, particularly the democratic leaders, of Latin America thought that Kennedy’s policies would bring significant economic assistance. This is supported by Levinson and De Onis (1970) who state, “Latin America still hoped for something like a Marshall Plan” (p. 49). While that was not Kennedy’s primary intention, and Treasury Secretary Dillon states that the US would not provide that level of support, his success was in allowing the OAS leaders to believe this notion through repeated comments about the social and economic development of the region, including the Charter of Punta Del Este itself (Kennedy et al. 1961). The Kennedy administration did not change the fundamental economic relationship between the US and Latin America. Its talk of social and economic progress was primarily to be self-directed with limited financial support coming through the AFP (Dillon 1961). The priority for 1961 was isolating Castro. Inasmuch, the Kennedy Plan successfully reasserted US regional leadership against the challenge of the Cuban Revolution without altering the foundation of US foreign policy in the region. Once that goal was achieved, the AFP changed direction. This was not an aberration; it was by design. This paper begins by outlining the challenge Kennedy faced in Latin America upon assuming office.

2. The Friendship of the Dictators

The US economic policies towards Cuba and broader Latin America created the conditions for the Cuban Revolution of 1956–1958. This was showcased when violent protests directed at Vice President Richard Nixon in Lima and Caracas during 1958 denounced US foreign policy in both substance and style (Rabe 1988, pp. 100–4). The US had long rejected the type of economic support commonly associated with the Marshall Plan (Coleman 2008, p. 54). That level of economic assistance provided to select allied Western European nations, would both be costly to US taxpayers and limit the opportunities for US investors. The US also sided with the region’s despots in open defiance of Franklin Roosevelt’s wartime proclamations promotion of democracy (Gellman 1979). While the US had long spoken of liberalism, democracy and freedom, their support of Nicaragua’s Anastasio Somoza, The Dominican Republic’s Rafael Trujillo, Cuba’s Fulgencia Batista, Venezuela’s Pérez Jiménez and Peru’s Manuel Odría, along with their role in the overthrow of Jacabo Árbenz in Guatemala, placed them on the side of despotic rule in the hemisphere (Szulc 1959, p. 191). That is, some form of revolution was inevitable in 1958. Speaking in 1950, deposed Venezuelan leader Romulo Betancourt (cited in Alexander 1962) commented,

Those people are mistaken who believe that in Latin America only the communist minorities are resentful of the foreign policies of the United States…it is not understood why the friendship of the dictators who will disappear is preferred to that of people who will remain.

(p. 138)

That is, people will not suffer under tyranny and poverty indefinitely. In most of Latin America that change was led by liberals who emulated New Deal policies. However, the unpopularity of the US position became a direct security challenge when the Castro’s Revolution seized power during 1959 (Benjamin 1990, p. 143). While Cuba is a small state, the hemispheric enthusiasm remained widespread at the time Kennedy took office in 1961, as was the growing cooperation between Castro and the USSR, which expanded after the Bay of Pigs (Goldenberg 1965, p. 311).

The US had asserted its dominance over the Latin American republics since the start of the twentieth century, a process that accelerated during the Cold War. Cuba was made independent from Spain, through the Spanish-American War in 1898; however, the prolonged US occupation and the Platt Amendment of 1903 undermined its autonomy. The Platt Amendment meant that US businesses could freely operate without the consent of the Cuban people and if a Cuban government were to act in a way unfavorable to such American business, then the US government would intervene (T. Roosevelt 1904). It also reinforced the colonial class structure that supplied cheap raw materials to the US market at the expense of Cuban independence. The US extended this control to every country washed by the Caribbean Sea in the era of “Gunboat Diplomacy”, following the “the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine” in 1904 (Lafeber 1983, pp. 19–74). The inescapable outcome of which was pro-US, pro-business, authoritarian regimes that were deeply unpopular with their people. When revolutions broke out in Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, or Colombia the anger was spread between the authoritarian government and the US which were known to be supporting them (Lafeber 1983).

President F. Roosevelt (1933) sought to alter the US image through his “Good Neighbor Policy” from 1933. However, this policy had in-built contradictions. While the US abrogated the Platt Amendment, asserted non-intervention as a principle, and increased payments to Panama for the use of the canal, Roosevelt’s primary objective was to grow US trade and influence at the expense of European, primarily German, merchants operating in the Caribbean and broader Latin America, there was no attempt to promote regional democracy (Steward 1975, pp. 1–27; Gellman 1979). In fact, non-intervention was a tool to ingrain authoritarian rule in the region. For example, the Latin American states that signed Reciprocal Trading Agreements with the USA, under Franklin Roosevelt, were primarily despots, who had often recently seized power from a civilian government, as was the case in Batista’s Cuba (Steward 1975, pp. 1–27). While Roosevelt’s support for the authoritarian Batista regime seemingly went against the rhetoric of the Good Neighbor Policy and the Four Freedoms Speech, America’s pre-war economic needs outweighed their commitments to such rhetoric. This contradiction often left US presidents and their diplomats in awkward situations. For example, when meeting Dr Ramon Grau San Martin, the democratically elected President of Cuba in 1933 and 1944, Roosevelt quipped “And to think that I did not recognize you eleven years ago” (Ameringer 2000, p. 18). By not recognizing Grau in 1933, Roosevelt condoned the military coup of Batista in 1934. Batista again executed a military coup in Cuba in 1952, condoned by Harry Truman, leading a young Fidel Castro away from civilian politics and towards the armed rebellion (Ameringer 2000). The US did not prioritize democracy or economic development in Cuba, or wider Latin America, and this played a direct role in creating the environment in which Castro and similar movements emerged.

3. No Marshall Plan for Latin America

US foreign policy in Latin America was defined by its economic position of dominance. The topic of substantial economic assistance had emerged on several occasions after WWII. Many Latin Americans thought that the wartime commitment of providing vital commodities, and in some cases limited troops, to the Allied effort, would earn them loans and technical assistance once peace was achieved (Smith 1994, p. 44). At the 1948 Bogota Conference, which founded the OAS, then US Secretary of State, George C Marshall declared that there would be “no Marshall Plan for Latin America” and that “European recovery…was a prerequisite for Latin American development” (2008, p. 54). In doing so, Marshall confirmed that Latin America would remain an underdeveloped raw material producer for the foreseeable future. America’s choice to support European development over Latin America was clear. Rabe (1999) identifies, “between 1945 and 1960, the small European countries of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands had received more foreign aid from the United States than had Latin America” (p. 11). The region’s population was about ten times greater than those states, and the needs for economic development were even greater. The outbreak of the violent protests called the Bogotazo, following the assassination of the nationalist politician Jorge Gaitán, and the perceived threat of communism diverted regional attention for the next few years (Randall 1992, p. 189; Braun 1985, p. 135; Trapani 2017, p. 354). The establishment of pliable anti-communist and pro-US leaders through the region assisted Washington in delaying the issue of economic assistance. However, to achieve the collective condemnation of Guatemala’s democratically elected Jacabo Árbenz government as ‘communist’, at Caracas in May 1954, the US agreed to a larger economic forum the following year in Rio De Janeiro (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1982, pp. 139–52).

Regional leaders converged on Rio in 1955 with great enthusiasm. However, the Eisenhower administration had stated their Latin American economic policies in the National Security Council (NSC) document 144/1 (National Security Council 1953), as “Encouraging Latin American governments to recognize that the bulk of capital required for development can best be supplied by private enterprise… [and the] reduction of trade barriers under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program…” (pp. 10–11). US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, claimed “an economic treaty [was] not necessary to further [US] objectives in Latin America” (Rabe 1988, p. 95). While Dulles may have been correct, the way the Eisenhower administration delivered this message compounded resentment. The US refused to assist in Latin American economic and social progress as it did not view their prosperity in its national interest. This attitude, however, caused some conjecture within the US State Department and outright opposition amongst the Latin Americans. Dulles noted privately, “[it] was sometimes a bit embarrassing to win votes by a margin of one, along with the despots of the region” (Rabe 1988, p. 75). While Dulles maintained that the ends would justify the means, for others like the State Department’s Latin American specialist, Roy Rubottom, Rio was considered “one of the worst failures of any conference we’ve ever had” (Rabe 1988, p. 79). Meanwhile, the Brazilian delegation, led by João Carlos Muniz explained,

During World War II, Latin Americans had believed that the vast resources of the US were going to be brought to bear on wide and rapid economic development in Latin America—but since the war there has been an intense process of disillusionment throughout Latin America.

(cited in Rabe 1988, p. 89)

Figueres (1955, p. 11) also published the following in the Journal of International affairs,

You cannot isolate the problems of democracy in Latin America, or elsewhere, from the economic and social struggle… [efforts at development] may take place in two different manners: either as a separate continent and civilization, independent of the United States, or as part of the general hemispheric effort. In my opinion, the only possible course is the second.

Many Latin Americans had, quite justifiably, come to believe that the US favored militarism over democracy and oligarchic land tenure to economic reform (and Kinzer 1982, pp. 139–52). Eisenhower bestowed the US Legion of Merit to Pérez Jiménez and the Peruvian dictator Manuel Odría (Szulc 1959, p. 191). The US did not hide their affection for authoritarian rule in the region. They repeatedly ignored warnings such as Figueres’, and moved to an updated National Security Council (1956) directive, 5613/1 calling for “political, economic, or military actions deemed appropriate” to combat any threat posed by the USSR.

The proliferation of anti-US attitudes manifested in vocal and violent protests across the hemisphere. In 1958, protesters in many Latin American nations expressed their outrage at US policy towards Nixon, most violently in Lima, Peru and Caracas, Venezuela (Rabe 1988, pp. 100–4). In Caracas, protesters threatened Nixon’s life by spitting and kicking his motorcade and temporarily preventing its escape (Nixon 1978, p. 191). Nixon did not view this as a reflection of US policies. Instead, his memoirs show his conviction that this was orchestrated by international communism. Nixon (1978) told Venezuelan leaders,

It’s time that [Latin America] sees some graphic evidence of what communism really is… The men and women who had led the riots could not be loyal to their country because their first loyalty was to the international communist conspiracy… Those mobs were communists led by communists, and they have no devotion to freedom at all.

(p. 191)

This demand was met by the interim Venezuelan government of Wolfgang Larrazábal. When Nixon returned to the airport several days later, teargas filled the streets (Szulc 1959, p. 239). But Venezuelans were not the only opponents to US leadership in the hemisphere. The continued advances of Castro’s forces in Cuba through 1958 demonstrated urgency to many in the US government. Seeking answers, the US Democratic Congressman Charlie Porter invited the Costa Rican José Figueres to explain the anger in Latin America. Addressing the inter-American affairs subcommittee on 9 June 1958, Figueres stated,

You have made certain investments in the American dictatorships… when [US] boys have been dying, your mourning has been our mourning. When our people die you speak of investment… people cannot spit at a foreign policy… But when they have exhausted all other means of trying to make themselves understood, the only thing left to do it spitting.

(Ameringer 1978, pp. 146–47)

Regional outrage was evident to some within the US government. However, by viewing any dissent as Soviet propaganda, the Eisenhower administration was both unable and unwilling to alter their policies towards the region.

In a private letter to Eisenhower, the Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek claimed that the Caracas protests were the “product of years of neglect” (Alexander 1991, p. 109). Kubitschek utilized the perceived communist threat to place Brazilian development within the context of the Cold War. This was a calculated move where he claimed that the “continued economic development of the Western Hemisphere is vital to the winning of the Cold War” and that no military would protect the region should “the great masses in Latin America continue in poverty and disease” (Alexander 1991, p. 280). To persuade Eisenhower to grant economic assistance, Kubitschek worked with the Argentine Arturo Frondizi, the Colombian Alberto Lleras and the Peruvian Manuel Prado. They proposed Operation Pan-America (OPA), in 1958, as an economic alliance that required external economic assistance. Kubitschek stated that OPA would “Obtai[n] a level of living per-capita, which permits the beginning of a process of a cumulative and autonomous growth with local resources, to a satisfactory level, without brusque or institutional alterations” (Alexander 1991, p. 288). According to Kubitschek, “Dulles showed himself as a tenacious arguer, intransigent, almost incapable of reaching agreement. He put forth his points of view, and from there was no way out” (Alexander 1991, p. 281). Dulles was pushing the democratic leaders away, towards a model of economic development independent of the US. Dulles’ refusal to provide economic leadership caused Brazil to chart a path of economic nationalism. Kubitschek promised “fifty years’ progress in five” (Sikkink 1991, p. 134). This “developmentalism” was also advocated by Argentine President Arturo Frondizi, who declared after the 1958 election, “Our triumph will be a great step forward in the struggle against colonialist imperialism and native oligarchies who throughout the continent have always blocked national development and the fraternity of the people of the Americas” (Sikkink 1991, p. 85). The biggest economies of Latin America were advocating economic nationalism at the expense of US leadership. Then, in late 1958, the Cuban dictatorship of Batista fell to the Castro’s Revolution (Pérez-Stable 2012, p. 67). As the region celebrated the success in Cuba, it became evident that the US was losing its hold over the hemisphere due its unpopular policies of supporting military dictatorships and denying basic economic assistance. The US was perceived to be on the side tyranny, oligarchy, and poverty and therefore unable to provide opposition to the Cuban position.

4. A New Attitude

Kennedy presented a different view on the Latin American problem to Eisenhower and Dulles. In a speech delivered to an audience in San Juan Puerto Rico in December of 1958 he stated,

The gap between North America and Latin America in terms of living standards, in terms of wealth versus poverty, grows greater instead of smaller; the gap in terms of economic power, in terms of domination versus independence, grows even greater.

(Kennedy 1958)

This acknowledgement was unique in and of itself. He further advocated US support of the OPA and went on to state,

And perhaps even more important than the contents of such a program is the attitude with which it is devised and carried out—the attitude with which we in the United States regard our neighbors to the south. In the final analysis, I think this question of attitudes will prove to be more important in improving or worsening relations between the United States and Latin America than dollars, tariffs, and treaties of friendship.

(Kennedy 1958)

This was a calculated message to Latin American democratic leaders. Kennedy was proposing a shift in attitude more than a shift in policy. He was offering friendship to new democratic leaders. A small shift in policy was required to back up the clear shift in rhetoric, combatting the significant appeal of Castro.

Events in Cuba during 1959 and 1960 pushed Castro and his revolutionary cadre closer towards communism and an alliance with the USSR (Schoultz 2009, p. 84). Even more disturbingly for the incoming Kennedy administration, The Cuban Revolution was widely supported by many in Latin America. Many pro-democratic individuals, including Figueres and Betancourt, and governments contributed finances and refuge to the revolution (Ameringer 1978, p. 154). This enthusiasm for the Cuban Revolution led to public celebrations in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Chile (Goldenberg 1965, p. 311). These celebrations were not primarily pro-communist, as most Latin Americans viewed the revolution as an “autochthonous product of the continent [that had been] aroused in [the Cuban] people” and held the potential to “spread to other Latin American countries” (Goldenberg 1965, p. 311). Moreover, the revolution was about more than Cuba. This revolutionary potential was also realized, albeit in different ways, with the ousting of dictators in Peru and Venezuela during 1956 and 1958 respectively. The tenets of Castroism were integrated into other standing political movements, including social democracy and populism (Alexander 1964, p. 52). Upon visiting Havana in 1959, former President Lázaro Cárdenas criticized his successors in Mexico, asking “did they believe in revolutions, or didn’t they?” (Alexander 1964, p. 312). The Brazilian President Jânio da Silva Quadros bestowed the highest military award upon Guevara. His successor João Goulart was also criticized by the US for pro-Castro domestic and foreign policy.

But inroads into this hemispheric anti-US solidarity existed too. To Washington’s advantage, the ideological divergence between the Latin American liberals and Castro occurred soon after the revolution. Guevara invited Figueres to Cuba and on 22 March 1959, he addressed the ‘worker’s palace’ alongside Castro (Ameringer 1978, p. 154). Figueres congratulated the revolutionaries but urged them to promote democracy and reject communism. Figueres (cited in Ameringer 1978) advocated support for the US in the Cold War and democracy as “the only source of permanent sovereignty for the people” (p. 154). As he spoke, the head of the Cuban trade unions, David Salvador (cited in Ameringer 1978) interjected with, “we cannot be with the [US] who today are oppressing us” (p. 154). Castro addressed the crowd with a refutation of Figueres’ suggestions. He then suggested that no revolution had taken place in Costa Rica. Democracy, he asserted, had not liberated the people. In March 1959, “the break between the democratic left and the Cuban Revolution occurred on a public stage” (Ameringer 1978, p. 155). The US eagerly exploited this ideological rift. Figueres and Betancourt viewed Cuba’s leadership over the anti-dictatorial movements in neighboring Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic as a threat to their regional influence.

Figueres embarked on a US lecture tour in April 1959 where he met with the likes of Adlai Stevenson, Richard Nixon, Milton Eisenhower, Nelson Rockefeller, and Roy Rubottom. In meetings, he suggested that “the resistance to my suggestions for understanding with the United States seems in a large part from communist infiltration, but it is also a logical reaction to the sufferings endured under the dictatorship” (Ameringer 1978, p. 156). While in the US, he also addressed the Institute for International Labor Research (IILR), speaking at length with Sacha Volman, who Figueres would later discover was a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent (Ameringer 1978, p. 169). The IILR gave US$100,000 to Figueres to start the Institute for Political Education (IPE) in November 1959 (Ameringer 1978, p. 169). The IPE sought to mold future leaders and to “determine their ideology in light of their principles, lessons, experiences and achievements of democracy in service of the people” (Ameringer 1978, p. 169). Figueres also worked with the CIA agent Cord Meyer in July 1960 to establish the Inter-American Democratic Social Movement (IADSM) as an “effort to help integrate the popular political parties, and the labor and student groups that are fighting the democratic battle in Latin America” (Ameringer 1978, p. 169). In 1960, Guevara addressed a group of Venezuelan students, suggesting that they should organize a revolution against the Betancourt government. Robert Alexander (1964) referred to this as “the final ideological break” (p. 146). This break was influential in the South American decision to remove Cuba from the OAS. Support for the Cuban Revolution reduced gradually. However, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador protected the Cubans from US-led resolutions to excluded them from the OAS throughout 1960 (Schlesinger 1965, p. 780). Support for Cuba did increase following the Bay of Pigs incident but fell drastically following Castro’s May 1961 adherence to Marxism-Leninism.

5. A Tide of Social and Political Change

The Latin America of 1961 was starkly different to that of 1955. Not only had Batista been removed in Cuba, but the broader tide of social change was advancing in the late 1950s. Kennedy sought to exploit the division between the Castroists and other democratic populists by providing the positive incentive of economic assistance during 1961. To briefly survey, whereas in 1955, military leaders ruled over all the region except: Mexico, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia, a steady return of democracy and populist politics came to the region. In Brazil, Kubitschek was elected in 1955 by modernizing the populist rhetoric of the deposed Getulio Vargas (Skidmore 2010, p. 140). In Peru, democratic elections occurred in 1956, with Victor Raul Haya De La Torre and the APRA movement supporting the conservative Manuel Prado to legitimize the democratic institutions in preparation for their 1962 electoral campaign (Betrum 1995, p. 447). Democracy also returned to Argentina in 1958 with the election of Arturo Frondizi; however, the exclusion of Juan Domingo Peron and his supporters was a limitation in legitimacy (Szusterman 1993, p. 71). In Venezuela, a revolution against the authoritarian Perez Jiminez resulted in the election of Romulo Betancourt from 1958. In Colombia, the brutal civil war ‘La Vionencia’ was ended in 1958 with the election of liberal Alberto Llargos Camargo (Simons 2004, p. 40). Moreover, Latin America changed immeasurably in six short years. There were still significant military leaders, especially in Central America, but votes at the OAS now required the support of the ten democratic governments. In many of those democratic countries, there was significant anti-US feeling by the start of 1961. Some of the anti-US voices were pro-Cuban, but not all. Kennedy confronted revolutionary anti-US attitudes by working with those democratic leaders who opposed the Cuban Revolution. Moreover, these ten democratic presidents become the central target of the Kennedy Plan. As democracies, the leaders needed a justification to back the US resolutions without stoking the Castroist critique in their own nations. Many were also vulnerable in their relationship with the military.

Figueres wrote Bentancourt early in 1961, “A prophecy of yours is going to be fulfilled, the United States will have to reach an understanding with us, the Latin American Liberals, instead of blindly prosecuting us” (Ameringer 1978, p. 169). Many moderate democrats wanted alliance with the US and agreed on the threat of the USSR. They modelled their revolution on the New Deal and rejected communism. Kennedy’s special taskforce on Latin American Problems, led by Adolph Berle and Arthur Schlesinger stated,

That the present ferment in Latin America, which facilitates Communist penetration, is the outward sign of a tide of social and political change the United States cannot and should not check. The United States can help well-disposed Americans (of whom there are many) to direct the transformation into channels that are, or ought to be, acceptable to it as well as beneficial to the people involved.

(US State Department 1961)

Hence, Kennedy sought to convince the region’s democrats of two basic facts. Firstly, he needed to prove that he preferred democracy to dictatorship. While this seems an obvious point, Eisenhower had actively promoted authoritarianism by working closely with the likes of Somoza, Francois Duvalier, Batista and Trujillo, to name a few. Kennedy sought to legitimize his pro-democracy credentials by removing the much-hated dictatorship of Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. Kennedy sought to confirm that he was different to his predecessors, albeit in a manner which proved he was not. The CIA worked with opposition groups to depose Trujillo and on 30 May 1961, Trujillo was ambushed and assassinated (Rabe 1999, p. 39).

Secondly, Kennedy sought to change the image of the US State Department by placing Dr. Arturo Morales Carrión as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Schlesinger 1961). It was highly symbolic to place a Puerto Rican into a leading diplomatic post in 1961. Kennedy sought to demonstrate that his administration did not hold the prejudice evident within his predecessors. However, Morales’ leadership of the Latin American bureau was, according to a conversation with Arthur Schlesinger, hampered by entrenched cultural bias among leading State Department employees. Morales reported of his staff,

They do not understand that our policy can succeed only as it enlists the support of the democratic left. They have no sympathy for the democratic left. They are uninterested in the intellectual community of Latin America or in the labor movement.

(Schlesinger 1961)

Rhetoric and messaging were the essence of Kennedy’s public policy. By sending Morales to alter the image of the State Department, he was signaling that his government was different. He also wanted to show he was different. Kennedy was, of course, the first Catholic US President (Parmet 1983). His wife Jacqui was fluent in Spanish and able to address Latin American audiences and greet Latin American leaders (Leaming 2001).

1961 was a very stable year in Latin American politics. Quadros democratically replaced Kubitschek in Brazil. However, Brazil faced a stark economic challenge in 1961 that ultimately led to Quadros’ August resignation and the ascension of Goulart. Goulart was viewed as a populist and accused of collaborating with the communists to keep power (Skidmore 2010, p. 142). Goulart had an uneasy alliance with his military which led to decreased presidential authority (Loureiro 2023). Elsewhere, democratic elections occurred in Mexico and Chile that did little to change the balance of power in either nation. This stability allowed Kennedy to build relationships with the existing governments and speak directly to the people who were desperate for a new America. Kennedy’s (1961a) rhetoric encouraged the Latin American leaders and their people. His actions in the Dominican Republic demonstrated his sincerity. The idea of an AFP was a significant departure from the foreign policy of Eisenhower. Kennedy and his advisors adopted ideas from the Latin American democrats themselves and emphasized them through the ‘Charter of Punta del Este’. He built on the region’s moderate leftist tradition, which previous administrations had criticized and worked to dismantle. In Mexico, the Party of the Institutionalized Revolution (PIR) emphasized nationalism, liberalism and “radical social policies” (Gonzalez 2002, pp. 222–35). In pre-revolutionary Cuba, the Party of the Authentic Revolution emphasized “nationalism, socialism and anti-Imperialism” (Ameringer 2000, p. 44). In Venezuela, Accion Democratica promoted, nationalization, social reform and unity against imperialist finance (Hellinger 1991, p. 51). In Peru, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance advocated “nationalism, anti-imperialism, and social security” (Stein 1980, pp. 162–63). Therefore, the August 1961 AFP reasserted those very ideas. The charter committed to agrarian reform, commodity price reform, nationalism, education, women’s rights, worker’s rights, and class mobility (Organization of American States 1961). For some, this was evidence of the US commitment to regional reform. For others, the good words reasserted the US financial commitment to the region.

The AFP was much more effective than the US initially believed. It firstly performed as a propaganda program that required little physical commitment. Not only did it “sterilize the example of the Cuban Revolution”, but it also convinced several influential Latin American leaders that the US was committed to fundamental change (Guevara 2006, p. 24). The US ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, collated the Latin American response to Kennedy’s speech in a March memorandum to the President. He informed Kennedy that his speech had “a profound impression in Latin America—the most favorable since Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy” (Stevenson 1961). Stevenson’s survey is of Latin American leaders and diplomats, rather than the public. The US Intelligence Agency (USIA) confirmed this view, identifying one Colombian who called it “the most significant contribution to Pan-Americanism in one hundred years” (Cull 2008, p. 195). Moreover, the chief objective of the Kennedy Plan was achieved in March 1961 without a single dollar of aid or a substantial commitment to altered policies.

The momentum was, of course, interrupted by the Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961. This well documented event saw a group of CIA trained Cuban exiles launch an invasion on “Playa Giron” on the coast of Cuba on the night of 17 April 1961 (Castro and Fernández 2001). While the plan was prepared during the Eisenhower administration and overseen by the continuing CIA director, Allen Dulles, Kennedy’s culpability has been revealed by David Barrett (2019). According to Barrett (2019), Kennedy told US journalists that “our restraint” towards that “unhappy island” “is not inexhaustible” and hoped that the invasion would prove successful (p. 5). However, once it was clear that the invasion had failed Kennedy sought to distance himself, saying,

There is an old saying that victory has a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan, and I wouldn’t be surprised if information is poured into you, in regard to all the recent activities. Further statements, derailed discussion, are not to conceal responsibility, because I am the responsible officer of the government.

(Kennedy, cited in Barrett 2019, p. 8)

The Bay of Pigs was a public relations disaster. The US had failed to overthrow Cuba. They were also clearly involved in the campaign leading, leading to regional outcries. Protests decrying US imperialism broke out in Moscow, Warsaw, Cairo, Tokyo, New Delhi, and most significantly in Brasilia and Mexico City (Beschloss 1991, p. 118). The fate of the Kennedy Plan hung in the balance.

6. The Alianza Para El Progreso

Kennedy got on the front foot with a good-will tour to the region that went significantly better than Nixon’s three years earlier. Despite the weaknesses of Kennedy’s official AFP program, his charisma ensured crowds of Latin Americans of his intentions. His speeches were crucial to selling both the AFP and the Kennedy Plan. In Bogotá he asserted, “The Alianza para el Progreso is a phrase…all of the people of this country…are going to see filling this field in the next months and years” (Kennedy 1961b). President Alberto Camargo asked Kennedy, “do you know why these people are cheering for you?” to which he explained, “it’s because they think that you are on their side against the oligarchs” (Simons 2004, p. 48). But of course, the peasants were wrong. The Kennedy Plan did nothing to disturb the power of oligarchs. In Mexico, Kennedy suggested that the AFP was ideologically aligned to the Mexican Revolution as both strove for “social justice and economic progress within the framework of individual freedom and political liberty” (Kennedy 1962). For two centuries, the US had looked down upon Latin America. For the first time, the US had elected a president who would visit Latin America, speak to its leaders as equals while a First Lady spoke fluently in Spanish to the people.

The messages coming from the embassy in Mexico City were glowing. Thomas C Mann (1961) reported,

The prestige and integrity of the Kennedy Administration are deeply committed to an all-out effort to make this program successful. Indeed many Latin Americans already refer to the program not as the “Alliance for Progress” but as the “Kennedy Plan”… If we have the courage and insight to stick to our stated objectives, an increasing number of liberal, strongly anti-Communist Latin American leaders with growing public support will begin to line up beside us. If we exert a great effort now to build fruitful relationships with the rising new political generation, we may even, after a few years of extremely frustrating and explosive change, be able to stand on a much more solid political structure in this hemisphere which will be of inestimable value in dealing with the rest of the world.

Kennedy’s rhetoric was forging alliances prior to the physical commitment of US resources. By siding with the democrats, the US was shifting its image in the region. Secretary of the Treasury, C. Douglas Dillon, meanwhile, was pragmatic about the capabilities of the AFP. He realized the impediments and limitations of US policy commitments. Dillon advocated a modest growth rate of 2.5 per cent per annum throughout the 1960s and tried to manage expectations (Dillon 1961). While the US provided significant capital investment, the majority was to be accumulated domestically. Dillon encouraged Latin American leaders to rely upon “self-help” to achieve most of their economic development (Dillon 1961). As this was a program to shift attitudes rather than a long-term solution to entrenched problems, immediate effects were required. Dillon envisaged Washington’s role in funding small ‘visual’ projects in ‘communist’ threatened regions, as “these measures will have greater political ramifications” (Dillon 1961). In 1961, the US foreign investment in both Brazil and Argentina was significantly higher than in 1962 or 1963 (Sikkink 1991, p. 212). Moreover, capital was used to reassure leaders of long-term American commitment and to court votes against Cuba in January 1962.

7. Tragic and Perhaps Absurd

The goals of the region’s liberals and democrats were set down by the inter-American community in the 1961 Charter of Punta del Este. Agrarian reform had been central to many Latin American revolutionary movements. The US had opposed programs of land reform in Mexico, Venezuela, and Guatemala during the early Cold War to protect their capital interests and ensure reciprocal trading bonds.2 This made for a curious about-face in the 1961 ‘Charter of Punta del Este’, which claimed:

To encourage… programs of comprehensive agrarian reform leading to the effective transformation… of unjust structures and systems of land tenure and use, with a view to replacing latifundia and dwarf holdings by an equitable system of land tenure so that… land will become available for the man who works it as the basis of his economic stability.

(Organization of American States 1961)

Mexican Agricultural Professor, Edmundo Flores (1963) suggests the US position on land reform “is tragic and perhaps absurd: it wishes to entrust what is nothing less than a revolution to the very group… which in its own interest must block it” (p. 7). The US did not set out a plan to achieve or enforce this agrarian reform which, ultimately, did not occur on a large-scale.

Latin America’s dependence upon the revenue derived from their export economies made it susceptible to the global fluctuations of commodity prices. The vulnerability of, specifically, coffee and sugar prices to global depreciation, prioritized the concept of commodity price stabilization (Berle 1962, p. 8). The comparative advantage of developed goods over raw materials caused a divergence in wealth that followed the division of labor. Latin American leaders, such as Kubitschek, had attempted to create cartels to control the distribution and sale of specific raw materials, such as coffee, from the region. Accordingly, the AFP granted the Latin Americans’ idea for commodity price reform through the mechanism of the common market:

To strengthen existing agreement on economic integration, with a view to the ultimate fulfilment of aspirations for a Latin American common market that will expand and diversify trade among the Latin American countries and thus contribute to the economic growth of the region

(Organization of American States 1961)

A Latin American common market was detrimental to US trade and investment, as it would increase the price of primary commodities. Yet, the US did not change its economic relations to Latin America despite the rhetoric of increased prices and a common market.

Latin Americans also advocated sweeping social reforms to alleviate poverty and to increase class mobility. In 1953, the US National Security Council had labelled these reforms as ‘impractical’ and ‘dangerous’. But many of those “impractical idealists” decried by the Eisenhower administration, were Kennedy’s new regional allies, most notably Figueres and Betancourt. Therefore, in 1961, the AFP agreed to the following aspects of the social democratic revolution:

National programs of economic and social development…in accordance with democratic principles…; women should be placed on equal footing…; Institutions in both the public and private sectors… including labor unions [should] be strengthened… [so] that social reforms necessary to fair distribution of the fruit of economic and social progress [can] be carried out.

(Organization of American States 1961)

The US was articulating standing Latin American beliefs to the Latin Americans to convince them of Kennedy’s new vision. However, the mechanism for payment was lacking. Institutions such as education, health, and social security require government revenue through tariffs and taxation. Stronger unions and class mobility require the capitalist class to sacrifice their profits to redistribution. The oligarchs and foreign corporations were not going to willingly submit to higher taxes or wages. And without those mechanism, the charter’s proclaimed goals were practically impossible.

8. Virtually Costless Exercise

The long-term effectiveness of the AFP was less significant inside the Kennedy Plan. The purpose was a shift in attitude and the isolation of Cuba. According to Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles, who sought to differentiate success from the quantity of money, stating,

For the United States this is a dramatic, necessary, and yet virtually costless exercise. Moreover, such reforms will make sense to the American people because they stem from such well-accepted convictions as to the proper nature of society as that a man should own his land and home and that the burden of taxation should be distributed on the basis of ability to pay. Sometimes there are suggestions that pushing for social reform abroad means espousing some “radical”, [anti-US] doctrine; in fact quite the opposite is true.

(Bowles 1961)

That is, the US mission to Montevideo in August 1961 was about perceptions more than substance. The US was attempting to prove it was on the side of democracy. In practice, the US was committing not to intervene against democratically elected governments as they had done in Guatemala in 1954. They were committing to offer less military and economic assistance to authoritarian regimes, as they had done in Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Cuba throughout the 1950s. They promised to have friendlier relations with democratic governments like Mexico, Costa Rica and Venezuela. But for the most part, Latin American leaders associated Kennedy with the economic assistance of the Marshall Plan. And their support for the US against Cuba was on that basis.

Cuba necessarily described the “Charter of Punta del Este” as a piece of propaganda. They sent Ernesto Guevara to oppose the charter’s creation in Montevideo. He asked the delegations of Latin America: is this “our America or theirs?”, recalling the famous warnings of José Marti (Guevara 2006). Guevara identified the AFP as a direct response to the Cuban Revolution and would not exist otherwise. Despite Guevara’s appeals to regional solidarity, the Latin Americans committed to the US’ position in the global Cold War. Cuba had lost its standing within the Latin American progressive community, as liberals chose promises of economic assistance over regional solidarity. Many Latin Americans believed that the US would commit large amounts of capital and deliver social and democratic revolution to the region. The capital did come through the AFP; however, it was through flawed development loan schemes that did not substantially improve the quality of life in the region (Taffet 2007).

The Kennedy Plan was a success for the US. On 21 January 1962, Cuba was voted out of the OAS with the six states choosing to abstain rather than to continue defending Cuba and risking their places in the AFP (Stern 2003, p. 17). As Richard Goodwin (1962) reported back from the OAS meeting,

During the early stages of the Meeting, there developed a unanimity of opinion that the point of major importance to the OAS was the clear incompatibility between the Marxist-Leninist nature of the Castro regime and the principles and objectives of the inter-American system.

Six countries; Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico abstained from the vote and argued that full exclusion should be carefully studied rather than immediately applied (Goodwin 1962). The only two resolutions that passed without abstention were the hemispheric rejection of communist, that is Soviet, aggression and the “strong reiteration of the importance of the Alliance for Progress” (Goodwin 1962). Moreover, the nations who had rejected Cuba’s exclusion in August 1961 were now willing to place the hope of economic assistance over Cuba’s place in the inter-American community. Within months of Kennedy committing to the Charter of Punta del Este, Cuba was banished from the OAS. Many Latin American people were enthusiastic about the potential of AFP due to Kennedy’s rhetoric. Kennedy was greeted by cheering crowds in Caracas, Bogotá, and Mexico City. This notoriety was achieved without any concrete strategy to achieve the social and democratic revolution proposed by AFP. In fact, the enthusiasm reached its pinnacle prior to the beginning of the AFP. By 1963, that impression had faded. But the Kennedy, and Johnson, administrations were unfazed as their original objectives were achieved: the Cuban Revolution was inoculated; the majority of the Castroist insurgencies had occurred and failed; the hemisphere became increasing controlled by the military; the US increased its military training, aid, and influence in Latin America through its School of the Americas; leftist and nationalist development policies were eradicated; and overall, the US had created a new version of political and economic stability that allowed their trade and investment to thrive regionally (Gill 2004). While it had not met the stated objectives of the AFP, the Kennedy plan was a successful piece of public policy that paved the way for continued US leadership for the remainder of the Cold War.

9. After Kennedy and Conclusions

Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, on 22 November 1963. His successor, Lyndon Baines Johnson was less enthusiastic about the AFP, especially given the security crisis caused by Cuba had passed, after the dramatic missile crisis (Colman 2012, p. 164). Cuba was contained by the end of 1963, hence, the original objective of “the Kennedy Plan” had already been achieved. Despite Johnson’s claims that Latin America was “among the highest concerns of [his] government” and that the AFP sought to “improve and strengthen the role of the US” in Latin America, the region was downgraded in importance (Colman 2012, p. 164). Johnson purged the State Department of liberals, promoting Thomas C. Mann, who had criticized the AFP and given it the monicker of the Kennedy Plan in the months following the Montevideo conference. The unabashed anti-communist installed the 1964 Mann Doctrine which highlighted four key points: “(1) To foster economic growth and be neutral on social reform; (2) to protect US private investment in the hemisphere; (3) to show no preference, through aid or otherwise, for representative democratic institutions; and (4) to oppose communism” (Kunz 1997, pp. 145–46). Mann believed that all US loans should advantage US hemispheric interests, which justified the large loans given to authoritarian governments, and the wave of military coups that followed 1964.

The Johnson administration returned to the economic philosophy of the Eisenhower administration, in defense of the Monroe Doctrine (Smith 1994). The AFP Charter required Latin American states to pursue free-trade economics. Free trade was antithetical, however, to one of the key issues for Latin America—commodity price reform. The US viewed the paying of a fair price for Latin American resources as “a medieval concept” (Oliver, cited in Galliano 1973, p. 1). The AFP’s support of modernization theory increased the export capacities of dependent states. While this could temporarily support employment, and produce government revenues for social services, it did not address the fundamental problem of development in Latin America. Latin American economies were forced to further deregulate their control over commodities in exchange for AFP funding. Most AFP funds were used for immediate visual ‘humanitarian aid’ and grants to ‘friendly regimes,’ with loans for long-term development coming a distant third (Robock 1963, p. 141). Perhaps the biggest flaw of the AFP was the lack of planning. Many states did not produce effective estimates for development projects. Accordingly, the US gave several contracts to US firms to construct visual projects such as ports, rail, road, and to a lesser extent schools and hospitals in the region. These visual projects further enmeshed the dependent economies into the world system. Far from revising their place in the international capitalist system, the AFP merely reasserted it. Had Kennedy remained President for eight years, things may have been marginally different. However, there is little evidence that Kennedy and his team were ever committed to a Marshall Plan style program in the region. Instead, the Kennedy Plan was designed to remove the Cuban threat—and that was a resounding success during Kennedy’s Presidency.

The attitude of the US President towards a region, such as Latin America, plays a significant role in determining the success of regional strategy. The example of Kennedy is not unique in the study of US foreign relations in Latin America. The extent of US influence over the Latin American militaries, economies and political institutions gives the US president incredible influence. This paper has argued that there was a segment of Latin America’s ruling class who wanted favorable relations with the US. They believed that the US could be a positive force in the region by removing their support for military dictators and instead supporting progressive change and providing economic assistance to the region. Close examination of contemporary Latin American politics can demonstrate that this sentiment still exists. While the US are often criticized for their policies, and indeed their attitudes, towards Latin America, there is still an appetite for progressive change. This was again revealed with the election of Barrack Obama in 2008, which coincided with another regional revolutionary moment. While the Venezuelan government of Hugo Chavez was an ardent critic of George Bush, comparing the US President to Satan at the UN general assembly, he enthusiastically welcomed Obama and claimed he wanted to be friends with the new President (McCoy 2009, p. 156). Obama’s policies differed in style from George W Bush, or later Donald Trump, but much of the economic pressure on Venezuela remained. He utilized the rhetorical style of Kennedy to foster closer relations with more moderate Latin American leaders. In conclusion, Kennedy’s successful campaign to isolate the Cuban Revolution from the OAS is a defining accomplishment of his presidency and should be separated from the economic failures of the AFP.