The Kennedy Plan: The Role of Rhetoric in Overcoming the Cuban Threat During 1961

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

 

I Generally I support this article and agree with its conclusion.  The argument is clearly made, and I agree with the conclusion, but there are technical annoyances and questions of interpretation and historiographical “proof” too.

 

 

1. There are quite a few irritating technical errors. Block quotes are not indented or otherwise indicated in the text. This is an elementary error enough to drive this reviewer to distraction.  (Maybe due to the platform). It really should be up to the editor to make sure the text is properly vetted for technical errors before being unleashed on a reviewer -- Block quotes should be indented. 

 

Next technical point, the prose is sometimes unclear due to occasioned mistakes in missing words etc. It needs more careful proofreading.

 

Also, the name Thomas C. Mann appears at line 42 as if he is an actor in the story but he is not identified  at any point in the article text.  He should be identified as should everybody. I had to go to the internet to remind me that he was the US Ambassador to Mexico under JFK, and later an Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs under LBJ.   

Note also that Line 541 refers to   “Undersecretary of State Charles Bowles,” whereas the real figure was “Chester Bowles” --  well known to students of the Kennedy years, but causing confusion here.

 

 

2. The argument, in so far as I can make it out, is that The Alliance for Progress (AFP) was a move to inoculate Latin America against  repeats of the Cuban Revolution or, to put it another way, to contain the outcome of the Cuban revolution.  Further, it is argued that there is rather more style than substance to the AFP policy and that the effects of this Kennedy administration manoeuvre were to convince Latin Americans that the US was helpful and sincere in bringing about moderate progress without actually doing very much to address the key economic problems of  inequality, in land distribution, the problems of commodity prices and international trade,  and the like.  In other words, the AFP was rhetoric without much reality  of change to it. And yet it was successful in reaching the Kennedy administration’s actual goals to isolate Cuba within the Association of Latin American States by having it expelled. Six states abstained but the writer does not say which ones, and whether they supported Cuba’s inclusion but were afraid to dissent.  (In other words, were these states also influenced by an American hegemony).

 

3. Evidence and Interpretation. I found this plausible but without knowing more about the reception of the policy in Latin America it is hard to say if the objective of the research has been  I think we need to know a bit more about the social and ideological bases  of the political class in those Latin American countries that supported the plan, and about the voters in those countries. How come they were so easily hoodwinked and gullible as to expect serious progress?  Unless, of course, they were part of the same set of political and ideological interests that the U.S. administration  represented, e.g., supporters of American foreign investment in the region.

 

I don’t think this is a particularly surprising or earth-shattering argument but I didn’t get a clear sense of exactly how innovative this interpretation actually is. Surely it should have been well known  already. If not, why not?  Am I just too cynical?  Not enough is done by the author to demonstrate the value  of the new interpretation as an advance in understanding of US policy toward Latin America in the Kennedy years. If  “the diplomatic motivations of 1961” [line 84] have in fact not been dealt with by other historians, I’d be surprised, but I’m not an expert on this. You really need a Latin American historian expert for this point.  In any case, the gist of the historiography should be  spelt out a bit better, at least by making clear near the beginning the overall point of its direction in relation to the interpretation of the author of this article. Viz:  “The existing scholarship argues …; in contrast, I shall show that >>> “

 

 

 

4. This work is almost entirely based on secondary sources. There appear to be almost no government archives or private papers used to shed light on the episode, except a few available online. So, it seems that thismight be a significant interpretation of events but it’s unfortunate that more Latin American voices were not used. Without them, this article remains quite US-centric.

 

5. The writers documents various assessments of the project but to do so more convincingly it would be necessary to at least do a better job of explaining why his or her interpretation is better than the existing knowledge. So, there are thus both technical difficulties of style and presentation, but also worries about how new this interpretation is. I did not get a strong sense of the historiography, which needs to be more clearly critiqued.

 

Author Response

Dear Reviewer 1,

Thank-you for the time and consideration. I appreciate the opportunity to resubmit based on the quality feedback that I received from the editor and both peer reviewers. I appreciate the overall comment,

• I Generally I support this article and agree with its conclusion.  The argument is clearly made, and I agree with the conclusion, but there are technical annoyances and questions of interpretation and historiographical “proof” too.

I have addressed the following concerns:

1. There are quite a few irritating technical errors. Block quotes are not indented or otherwise indicated in the text. This is an elementary error enough to drive this reviewer to distraction.  (Maybe due to the platform). It really should be up to the editor to make sure the text is properly vetted for technical errors before being unleashed on a reviewer -- Block quotes should be indented. Next technical point, the prose is sometimes unclear due to occasioned mistakes in missing words etc. It needs more careful proofreading. Also, the name Thomas C. Mann appears at line 42 as if he is an actor in the story but he is not identified  at any point in the article text.  He should be identified as should everybody. I had to go to the internet to remind me that he was the US Ambassador to Mexico under JFK, and later an Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs under LBJ.  Note also that Line 541 refers to   “Undersecretary of State Charles Bowles,” whereas the real figure was “Chester Bowles” --  well known to students of the Kennedy years, but causing confusion here.
   1. Unfortunately, the scaffold removed the indents when it was converted to pdf. I have re-checked and fixed that issue.
   2. I have spent extra time proof reading to address those grammatical concerns.
   3. I have included a short section on TC Mann from l.113-117. It’s a good point, I talk more about him towards the end, but it should be clearer up top.
   4. And, yes, that’s a bad typo – I re-checked the document and it was indeed Chester Bowles.
2. The argument, in so far as I can make it out, is that The Alliance for Progress (AFP) was a move to inoculate Latin America against repeats of the Cuban Revolution or, to put it another way, to contain the outcome of the Cuban revolution.  Further, it is argued that there is rather more style than substance to the AFP policy and that the effects of this Kennedy administration manoeuvre were to convince Latin Americans that the US was helpful and sincere in bringing about moderate progress without actually doing very much to address the key economic problems of  inequality, in land distribution, the problems of commodity prices and international trade,  and the like.  In other words, the AFP was rhetoric without much reality  of change to it. And yet it was successful in reaching the Kennedy administration’s actual goals to isolate Cuba within the Association of Latin American States by having it expelled. Six states abstained but the writer does not say which ones, and whether they supported Cuba’s inclusion but were afraid to dissent.  (In other words, were these states also influenced by an American hegemony).
   1. To address the issue of clarity, I have added in additional structure to the introduction and conclusion. I have also taken the time to include more information on the geo-political landscape (see l.398-422) that Kennedy inherited and was therefore operating in. Yes, I’m suggesting that the US was misleading democratically elected politicians based on their concrete desire for US assistance. Some assistance was provided, but much of it actually peaks in late 1961- right before the vote to exclude Cuba.
   2. The six-states are more clearly explained in the revised draft. And this feedback is really valuable to improve my communication of my argument here. I unpacked the actual vote a bit more too on l.647-660. Thank-you, this is really helpful feedback.
3. Evidence and Interpretation. I found this plausible but without knowing more about the reception of the policy in Latin America it is hard to say if the objective of the research has been  I think we need to know a bit more about the social and ideological bases  of the political class in those Latin American countries that supported the plan, and about the voters in those countries. How come they were so easily hoodwinked and gullible as to expect serious progress?  Unless, of course, they were part of the same set of political and ideological interests that the U.S. administration  represented, e.g., supporters of American foreign investment in the region. I don’t think this is a particularly surprising or earth-shattering argument but I didn’t get a clear sense of exactly how innovative this interpretation actually is. Surely it should have been well known  already. If not, why not?  Am I just too cynical?  Not enough is done by the author to demonstrate the value  of the new interpretation as an advance in understanding of US policy toward Latin America in the Kennedy years. If  “the diplomatic motivations of 1961” [line 84] have in fact not been dealt with by other historians, I’d be surprised, but I’m not an expert on this. You really need a Latin American historian expert for this point.  In any case, the gist of the historiography should be  spelt out a bit better, at least by making clear near the beginning the overall point of its direction in relation to the interpretation of the author of this article. Viz:  “The existing scholarship argues …; in contrast, I shall show that >>> “
   1. Based on this feedback I have done two things. I have slightly altered the audience of the Kennedy Plan to being the most influential democratic presidents in the region, and indirectly their populations. I’ve also included some more evidence to prove their reception to the idea of the AFP and general attitude towards Kennedy.
   2. I didn’t intend to paint these leaders as “gullible”. Many of them were in tenuous political positions. And some of them, like Betancourt, had already experienced the other side of US policy. I’ve tried to tighten up that argument. I’ve switched out a Castro quote for a Betancourt (l151-154) – because that’s the audience of the Kennedy Plan. They were hopeful that the US would stand by their word for their own political careers and the welfare of their nations. They also didn’t have a lot of other options, Castro was an outlier in his willingness to deal with the Soviets. I’ve tried to make that point clearer in my revisions, as I certainly don’t want “gullible” to be the takeaway point.
   3. While possibly not “earth shattering”, I do think it’s a unique interpretation that highlights public policy in a different way than other scholars. I’ve tried to clarify (l.129-133 is my central argument).
   4. I have increased the size of the literature review in order to make this point clearer and set my article apart from the other interpretations.
4. This work is almost entirely based on secondary sources. There appear to be almost no government archives or private papers used to shed light on the episode, except a few available online. So, it seems that this might be a significant interpretation of events but it’s unfortunate that more Latin American voices were not used. Without them, this article remains quite US-centric.
   1. This is a fair point. I do see a value in going back over records that have been used by other scholars alongside reading their interpretations. And to be fair, it is a US-Centric article focussed on US motivations and strategies.
   2. Based on this feedback, I have incorporated more quotes and comments from significant Latin American leaders.(See Romulo Betancourt on l51-154; and Figueres on l.247-252).
5. The writers documents various assessments of the project but to do so more convincingly it would be necessary to at least do a better job of explaining why his or her interpretation is better than the existing knowledge. So, there are thus both technical difficulties of style and presentation, but also worries about how new this interpretation is. I did not get a strong sense of the historiography, which needs to be more clearly critiqued.
   1. I have increased the historiography section on both Kennedy’s diplomacy and the leading scholarship on the AFP. I’ve tried to differentiate myself accordingly. In the updated version, I’ve sought to set myself apart from the standing assumption of the literature that the original goal of the AFP was derailed during 1963, in the months before Kennedy’s death. I would argue that it was always political in nature and designed to isolate the Cuban threat. It’s a different interpretation based on my revision of the freely available FRUS documents, that have obviously been well studied by the likes of Stephen Rabe.

Thank-you sincerely for all your feedback. Your critique has made me rethink and revise certain parts of the article that were potential weaknesses. The points on emphasising the Latin American context and response is particularly helpful. So, thank-you very much. Please let me know if there’s anything else I can address.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

I uploaded them below.  Here they are, but they may not be formatted properly, as the they are in the uploaded document:

I have selected “average” on two criteria about the originality and the contribution of the manuscript to the field, but this understates my overall positive recommendation. If this were a five point instead of a three point scale, with five being “very high”, I would give the manuscript a 4 on both counts.

The author persuasively argues for distinguishing between the diplomatic and the economic objectives of Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, rating it a “success” on the first criterion, a failure on the latter. While largely relying on mainstream historiography, thus, on secondary sources, there is enough reference to primary sources related to diplomacy to justify his description of policy goals and why they should be distinguished from one another in assessing the policy’s success.

I think that two significant but not difficult revisions should be asked:

• There are several places where quotations are not formatted so as to distinguish them from the text. I will not try to list them all, but by way of example: lines 119-123, 231-234, 242-246, 543-545 (an especially ambiguous one). There are others.
• Number 1 is easy. This second revision should involve a clarification of what the author means by the “success” of the diplomatic policy. I agree that the policy “isolated” Cuba, but it needs to be clearly stated that the author is rating its success in terms of what the US sought to achieve. I would go so far as to say that his analysis would justify saying that it successfully maintained “imperialist” objectives. Perhaps, “success in reinforcing the regional hegemony against the challenge of the Cuban Revolution.” From the context in the article, I think this latter position is consistent with the author’s own views.

I have less urgent suggestions as well.  I think a paragraph or two might be added to comment on how the “failure” and “success” of the policy. I was struck by parallels to Obama’s popularity and the objective of US policy to blunt the impact of Chavismo’s petrodiplomacy, which was impeding US objectives to Free Trade Area of the Americas. Also, I think references to how the AFP was to be a counterweight to demands from Latin America’s for a New International Economic Order echo today.

Author Response

Dear Reviewer 2,

Thank-you for the time and consideration. I appreciate the opportunity to resubmit based on the quality feedback that I received from the editor and both peer reviewers. I appreciate the overall comment,

• I have selected “average” on two criteria about the originality and the contribution of the manuscript to the field, but this understates my overall positive recommendation. If this were a five point instead of a three point scale, with five being “very high”, I would give the manuscript a 4 on both counts.
• The author persuasively argues for distinguishing between the diplomatic and the economic objectives of Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, rating it a “success” on the first criterion, a failure on the latter. While largely relying on mainstream historiography, thus, on secondary sources, there is enough reference to primary sources related to diplomacy to justify his description of policy goals and why they should be distinguished from one another in assessing the policy’s success.

And I have attempted to address all of your feedback below:

1. There are several places where quotations are not formatted so as to distinguish them from the text. I will not try to list them all, but by way of example: lines 119-123, 231-234, 242-246, 543-545 (an especially ambiguous one). There are others.

1. 1. Unfortunately, there was a formatting issue that all three reviewers have picked up on. I have checked my original copy and those examples have come fromthe transfer in the scaffold. I apologise and appreciate the feedback.
2. Number 1 is easy. This second revision should involve a clarification of what the author means by the “success” of the diplomatic policy. I agree that the policy “isolated” Cuba, but it needs to be clearly stated that the author is rating its success in terms of what the US sought to achieve. I would go so far as to say that his analysis would justify saying that it successfully maintained “imperialist” objectives. Perhaps, “success in reinforcing the regional hegemony against the challenge of the Cuban Revolution.” From the context in the article, I think this latter position is consistent with the author’s own views.
3. 1. I have taken time to clarify this point. Essentially, success was excluding Cuba from the OAS and turning potentially hostile regimes into committed allies. Based on this feedback and a comment from reviewer 1, I have included some extra examples of Latin American leader’s responses and have painted a much clearer pictures of the geo-political landscape as it existed in 1961. I also unpacked the actual vote further on l646-666. That wording is consistent with how I’m viewing the outcome. I’ve changed it slightly and highlighted the argument at the end of the introduction – l.129-131.

3. I have less urgent suggestions as well.  I think a paragraph or two might be added to comment on how the “failure” and “success” of the policy. I was struck by parallels to Obama’s popularity and the objective of US policy to blunt the impact of Chavismo’s petrodiplomacy, which was impeding US objectives to Free Trade Area of the Americas. Also, I think references to how the AFP was to be a counterweight to demands from Latin America’s for a New International Economic Order echo today.
   1. On your suggestion, I have included a final paragraph – l.715-735. You’ll see that I am avoiding making too big of a claim about Obama’s policies and am instead making the parallel – which is a good one and something I am considering for a bigger project. It was quite reaffirming for you to make that comment as it’s something I’ve been considering in recent years.

Thank-you for your overall support for the article’s contribution. Hopefully, the reviewed draft’s renewed emphasis on the uniqueness of this argument in response to reviewer 1 will strengthen the overall narrative.

Again, thank-you for all your time and effort. And please let me know if there is anything else I can do.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Round 2

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

I recommend acceptance. The writer has done a fairly good job of replying to my comments and trying to elaborate to  make the argument clear.   

 

I have no further opposition other than to suggest that the small matters below are attended to.

 

I would however say to the writer: isn’t there a slightly different and more valuable  suggestion contained in this research?  If we turn the issue around to see it not from the US position but from the internal and regional politics of Latin America, the push for an Alliance for Progress, even only as a fig leaf, served the interests of the more liberal and democratic elements in the ruling sectors of Latin American societies because they were themselves frightened of Communism infiltrating the labour movement.  The Alliance for Progress gave the incumbent democratic regimes  a way of seeming to support progressive change without engaging in significant redistributive policies that a Communist left might push for, while at the same time solidifying the domestic anti-Communist and anti-Cuban character of the liberal tendencies in Latin America. These people could argue for some change, without aligning with Castro, which would otherwise undermine their support base in their home countries. That lay in the non-Communist “liberal” left or moderate politics. 

 

Something to think about!

 

Line 32 “Union” not “United” in USSR! m

 

Line 46. the region (p. 199). Concluding that Kennedy.  --  this is not a sentence – perhaps full stop, then “He”

 

Line147 “revolution” or “some form of revolution” ?  -- the latter is more flexible for the flow of the argument.

 

Line162 I think Cuba was actually a US protectorate for a couple of years  prior to the Platt amendment

 

Line173 – should be “which was”

 

Line 212 – we know what it is but still name the canal in full -- name Panama Canal

 

Line 212 ‘Bogotazo’ needs a fn to explain the term – according to AI “the violent riot in Bogotá, Colombia, on April 9, 1948”

 

Line 458 Goulart   -- Give full name? João Goulart.   (I cannot do a search but I think this is the first time he is mentioned.

 

 

Line 588-89 this sentence seems abrupt.  Start with “Yet”