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Article

The United Nations as a New World Government: Conspiracy Theories, American Isolationism, and Exceptionalism

Mershon Center for International Security Studies, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210, USA
Genealogy 2025, 9(3), 76; https://doi.org/10.3390/genealogy9030076
Submission received: 25 June 2025 / Revised: 23 July 2025 / Accepted: 24 July 2025 / Published: 29 July 2025
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Conspiracy Theories: Genealogies and Political Uses)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the historical genealogy of conspiracy theories about a global supergovernment by focusing on one period of American history in which it attained particular visibility. The formation of the United Nations in 1945 and the onset of the Cold War galvanized speculation on the political margins that a shadowy, malevolent international government was seeking world domination by targeting the United States and its political culture. At the same time, mainstream United States foreign policy was marked by a desire to both reshape international institutions to resist Soviet influence while also avoiding any domestic changes that might result from international engagement. This paper suggests that conspiracy theory functioned as a mechanism resolving the vicious circle occasioned by these competing foreign policy priorities. Through a narrative analysis of conspiratorial sentiments in North Dakota Representative Usher L. Burdick’s warnings about the United Nations as a threat to American liberty and sovereignty, this article highlights the continuities between mainstream American exceptionalism and conspiratorial ideas.

1. Introduction: The United Nations: A New World Order?

The formation of the United Nations in 1945 was welcomed by many as a first step towards creating a more peaceful world in the wake of the unimaginable devastation of World War Two. Its mission soon elicited politicking and negotiations as states jockeyed for influence and wrestled to balance the creation of universal norms and respect for independence and sovereignty. Nevertheless, the UN’s widespread support among most of the world’s nations—and, crucially, the backing of global superpowers, including the United States—offered the possibility of a future marked by international cooperation and collaboration rather than conflict and division.
The United States has waxed and waned in its attitude towards international institutions over the intervening years, often emphasizing its exceptionalism regarding the norms it otherwise promotes (Ignatieff 2005). United States exceptionalism is premised on the concept that the United States occupies a unique historical role and serves as an exemplar to other nations (Kupchan 2018). Exceptionalist ideology holds that the United States must guide other nations whilst avoiding the corrupting influence of foreign powers. This has led to a practiced equivocation in its relationship with the United Nations (Wiseman 2025). Rarely, however, has this ambivalence veered into complete disengagement; as Lyndon Johnson phrased it, ‘[we] support the United Nations as the best instrument yet devised to promote the peace of the world and to promote the well-being of mankind’ (Haviland 1965, p. 643). The tradition of the United States as the leader of a liberal democratic international order and defender of its norms on the world stage has animated American foreign policy decisions as diverse as the foundation of the Peace Corps to the War on Terror. This consensus was largely unquestioned in the post-World War Two era; by this time, true isolationists had become ‘wacko birds’, in the words of former Republican Senator John McCain (Kupchan 2018, p. 142). In other words, the mainstream debate was not over whether the United States should shape the international order, but over how best to do so.
While the necessity of the United States’ active engagement with the international stage was solidifying into a dogma in mainstream Washington circles, it was also providing renewed vigor to a flurry of conspiracy theorizing about a global supergovernment, often popularly termed a ‘New World Order’. Conspiracy theories refer to the belief that multiple parties are engaging in a secretive plot, with malign results on a large scale. As conspiracy theories inherently touch on the dichotomies of good and evil and power and powerlessness, conspiracy theories about cabals scheming to covertly attain power have always been present, albeit with historical particularities (Barkun 2013, pp. 3–4). While concerns about secret societies existed in the eighteenth century, the concept of a creeping totalitarian world government gained ground more readily in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Europe. Its early iterations had heavily antisemitic overtones. In post-World War Two America, however, it became heavily entangled with anticommunist sentiments (Flores 2022). Organizations like the John Birch Society formed to protest what they perceived as a global communist plot to disempower the United States, which they linked directly to the formation of organizations like the United Nations (Dallek 2023). In parallel, Christian nationalists viewed the ‘New World Order’ as a globalist assault on Christian values in the name of ideologies like feminism and environmentalism (Herman 2001, p. 60).
These examples show that the concept of a ‘New World Order’ is malleable and capable of lending itself to diverse contexts. Moreover, it has the propensity to be recast by a variety of actors for numerous political agendas. As such, the aim of this paper is not to draw a throughline between past conspiracy theories about the United Nations and conspiracy theories about the New World Order that have resurfaced in the twenty-first century. Instead, it aims to unpack this adaptability and fluidity by examining the political context of anti-United Nations conspiracy theorization, viewed alongside broader patterns of US exceptionalism and isolationism. How, in the context of the Cold War, did anti-United Nations conspiracy theories correspond with more mainstream political anxieties?
In posing this question, this paper aims to connect International Relations theories about US exceptionalism and international engagement with the current state of the art on the political function of conspiracy theories. This paper affirms Barkun’s (2013) assertion that supergovernment or New World Order conspiracy theories exhibit complex and intersecting genealogies. The argument advanced in this article submits that this was not divorced from broader reckonings of the United States’ place in the world occurring in varied political circles, and that this conspiracy theory can be understood through mapping the ideational links between isolationism and exceptionalism in American national identity. Through a close reading and narrative analysis of Cold War-era conspiracy theorization about the United Nations, this paper highlights the continuity between conspiratorial attitudes towards international institutions and the tensions inherent to United States exceptionalism.

2. Sources and Methods

This paper undertakes a narrative analysis of North Dakota Republican congressman Usher L. Burdick’s speech The Great Conspiracy to Destroy the United States, exploring its key themes in relation to broader patterns of US exceptionalism and isolationism. While Burdick did not view himself as an isolationist, stressing that he was committed to global trade, he was deeply opposed to the United States’ involvement in the United Nations due to the inclusion of communist nation-states, and his suspicion that it threatened the United States’ sovereignty (Lemelin 2002, pp. 167–70). This aligns with the tenor of American isolationism, which has historically been geared towards foreign policy rather than trade (Schlesinger 1995). In other aspects, however, Burdick’s ideological views were eclectic and significantly diverged from other foreign policy isolationists of the era. While anti-United Nations sentiment was growing in far-right anticommunist milieus, Burdick could not be classified under this ideational umbrella. For example, he had been a supporter of Roosevelt’s New Deal and supported the expansion of the safety net in certain areas. Nor was he utterly convinced of McCarthyist conspiracy theories about communist infiltration (Lemelin 2002, p. 165).
This eclecticism can be explained by the distinctive ideological tradition to which Burdick belonged: Upper Midwest isolationism. Even prior to World War One, the Upper Midwest—and North Dakota in particular—were pronounced in their embrace of isolationism towards international politics and a distaste for foreign intervention (Wilkins 1965). While these sentiments during World War One were often historically attributed to the state’s large German population, the persistence of isolationist ideas over a long period of time points to a deeper ideological genealogy (Wilkins 1963, pp. 210–11). In fact, isolationism among North Dakotans transcended traditional ideological lines to advance a form of regional populism. Isolationist arguments among this milieu symbolically drew on the state’s perception of being a ‘frontier’ with different interests than the financial capitals on the East Coast (Wilkins 1963, p. 206). They also had a strong anti-capitalist strand. Some important North Dakota newspapers, for example, urged non-involvement in World War Two to safeguard North Dakotans from the fate of being ‘farmed by a capitalist class’ (Wilkins 1963, p. 208). Burdick himself, who was heavily influenced by the views of his constituents, was a strong advocate of farmers’ interests, and indeed, some of his rhetoric aligns more with classic early twentieth-century populist themes (Lemelin 2002, p. 172).
Consequently, examining Burdick’s views, rather than the more frequently studied conspiratorial isolationist actors like McCarthyists or the John Birch Society of the same period (e.g., Mulloy 2014; Dallek 2023), has the advantage of illuminating how anti-United Nations conspiratorial sentiments were articulated in more mainstream political spaces. This included Congress, where Burdick attempted to introduce legislation limiting UN influence (Lemelin 2002, pp. 168–70). While focusing on a single case necessarily imposes limitations in terms of generalizability, it also offers the opportunity to examine the role of conspiratorial ideas within Burdick’s isolationist worldview in richer, more precise detail. This approach also allows for anti-United Nations conspiracy theories to be contextualized within the larger ideological milieu of Burdick’s Upper Midwest isolationism, an understudied body of thought (Lemelin 2002, p. 163) that was highly distinct from the emerging radical right milieu voicing similar ideas (Hart 2013, p. 558).
While Burdick’s regional tradition of anti-United Nations sentiment and the emerging radical right milieu should not be conflated, it is nevertheless important to acknowledge that Burdick’s ideas were not hermetically sealed from the latter. In fact, the publication and circulation of his speech, The Great Conspiracy to Destroy the United States, hints at the instrumentalization of his ideas by these milieus. His speech was published by an organization called the Christian Nationalist Crusade (Burdick 1954). The name of this publisher hints at how skepticism towards international institutions had been adopted and promoted by a growing religious right-wing movement. The Cold War context helped bring disparate isolationist elements together, furthered by new forms of technology like independent radio (Hendershot 2011). There were some genuine ideological convergences as well: anti-communist organizations like the Christian Nationalist Crusade feared that the United States might introduce atheistic and communist propaganda to vulnerable schoolchildren through programs like UNESCO. Indeed, Butter observes that anti-communism formed one of the ideational logics for conspiracy theories during this era (Butter 2014, pp. 224–25).
This paper places anti-United Nations conspiracy theories during the Cold War in conversation with two broader ideational tendencies within United States foreign policy: exceptionalism and isolationism. As the literature demonstrates, United States exceptionalism invites a deeply conflicted, ambivalent relationship with international institutions. This paper argues that for isolationists, conspiracy theories provide a function that epistemologically resolves this tension.
A narrative analysis of this conspiracy theory—and particularly, a close mapping of the evidence Burdick draws upon to support his assertions—is useful in highlighting continuities between its underlying assumptions and other, more mainstream, worldviews. As Robertson and Dyrendal observe, conspiracy theories present a narrative in which some elements are emphasized and imbued with greater significance, while others are pushed to the side (Robertson and Dyrendal 2018). Narrative analysis is a methodology that parses how a story is represented to locate, inter alia, the constructed positionality of the storyteller and the arrangement of constitutive narrative elements, thus allowing the researcher to derive conclusions about the beliefs and values of the narrator (Riley and Hawe 2005). Though emphasizing thematic continuities in the arguments offered to support conspiratorial conclusions, it aims to derive and analyze the conceptual categories proffered (Riessman 2005, p. 2).
Consequently, this paper will first present a theoretical framework on how American exceptionalism leads to an inherently unstable relationship with the concept of global governance represented by international institutions like the United Nations. It will show that while fears of engagement with the international system might prompt isolationism and disengagement with international institutions, this approach still elicits anxiety, given the United States’ interests as a world power and, perhaps even more crucially, its perception of its own identity. By putting this framework in conversation with Burdick’s conspiracy theory about the United Nations, it will show how vilifying the United Nations by discrediting its foundational mission offers an explanation that resolves this tension.

3. American Exceptionalism, Isolationism, and Fear of a New World Order

3.1. United States Exceptionalism and Its Ambiguities

Michael Ignatieff identifies a curious pattern characterizing the United States’ engagement with international institutions, which he ties to the concept of American exceptionalism (Ignatieff 2005). American exceptionalism refers to the United States’ self-perception of its own important and unique mission that will alter the course of history. Yet, as McEvoy-Levy demonstrates, this is far from a stable ideology, leading to numerous internal contradictions and diverging policy agendas (McEvoy-Levy 2001). With regard to engagement with institutions of global governance, Ignatieff likewise argues that this has led to contradictory approaches. While the United States has taken a leading role in influencing international institutions, strengthening their legitimacy, and globally promoting universal norms, such as human rights, it also has sought to exempt itself in various ways from their reach (Ignatieff 2005). This is not simply a question of double standards or hypocrisy, which he acknowledges is common within many countries’ engagement with the international order. Rather, the United States is unique due to its vacillation between promotion and exception, resulting in the ‘paradox of being simultaneously a leader and an outlier’ (Ignatieff 2005, p. 2).
This sense of being at cross purposes is frequently noted in characterizations of American exceptionalism, though it has been theorized in different ways. Restad considers that American exceptionalism involves a negotiation between outward-facing ‘missionary’ and internally-focused ‘exemplary’ elements (Restad 2014). Similarly, Crothers argues that American foreign policy is driven by a negotiation between ‘isolationism’ and ‘internationalism’ (Crothers 2011). Indeed, as Ceaser observes, the notion of exceptionalism itself requires that the United States remain stable, as a model or exemplar, and undertake a mission vis-à-vis the outside world (Ceaser 2012). Onuf suggests that this can be conceptualized as a clash between liberal and conservative exceptionalisms, where the former seeks to ‘remake the world in their own image’ while the latter fears ‘threats to their liberties in the despotic machinations of a distant metropolis’ (Onuf 2012, p. 81).
Exceptionalism thus has protectionist and activist elements. The former believes that US prosperity, if kept discrete from corrupting forces, will inspire the rest of the world to follow its example; the latter argues that direct intervention to shape the world is required. These elements are inherently unstable, and the contradictions that emerge out of this instability risk compromising the perception of the United States as a global leader (Ignatieff 2005, p. 24). For example, as Restad argues, even ‘isolationist’ exceptionalists have endorsed the logic of imperial expansion (in the form of manifest destiny) through the belief that the United States is different than other empires (Restad 2012, p. 70). In more recent history, the United States has undertaken actions that it would reject from other countries, and its official rhetoric heavily implies that it alone has unique prerogatives, including the ability to remain exempt from treaties that it otherwise supports (Hughes 2015, p. 528). The United States is thus forced to continually rebalance the imperative to reshape the world—requiring stronger international norms—with its reluctance to be reshaped itself so that it can remain an uncorrupted exemplar.
What happens when the balance tilts towards isolationism? A skepticism of multilateralism veering towards isolationism has formed a recurrent thread within American history (Restad 2014). Kupchan shows how isolationism can logically proceed from exceptionalism: to safeguard American identity and prevent foreign infiltration, the country must distance itself from potentially corrupting influences (Kupchan 2020). On the other hand, this tilt threatens the missionary tendency of American identity, which, since the foundation of the country, has been premised on a core tenet of exceptionalism: that the United States must play a leading, historical role in the global world (Restad 2014). Badri refers to this as a ‘messianic’ self-perception, where the United States sees itself as a ‘beacon of light for other societies’ (Badri 2024, p. 158). Complete disengagement may lead to a loss of influence, which is unacceptable according to the core assumptions of American exceptionalism. Worse, it may risk empowering the United States’ geopolitical rivals, thus compromising both its material interests and its identity as an exemplar for other nations. This paper suggests that isolationism introduces tensions of its own that can be distilled to three interrelated elements, all unpalatable from an exceptionalist point of view.

3.1.1. The Desire for Global Leadership

The first area of tension concerns America’s perception of itself as a global leader, which is essential to an exceptionalist worldview. In theory, an isolationist vision of US exceptionalism supposes that the United States must lead by example rather than active engagement. Yet as Ceaser argues, for exceptionalism—or the perception of uniqueness so inherent to American self-perception—to be differentiated from other forms of nationalism, it also entails the assumption of a ‘great historical task’ (Ceaser 2012, p. 10). While this sense of leadership has often been historically imbued with religious significance, it need not be explicitly or solely theological. A belief in civilizational progress, for example, can underlie the goal of spreading democracy worldwide (Ceaser 2012, p. 17).
After World War 2, however, there was a growing awareness that this mission could not be accomplished solely through withdrawal and leading by example. To be a leader, the United States had to act in the world by actively disseminating its values (Kupchan 2018, p. 139). Consequently, a complete withdrawal from international institutions might hinder the United States’ ability to fulfill its perceived historical mission, leading to a potential irrelevance that would challenge the very tenets of United States exceptionalism.

3.1.2. Geopolitical Rivalry and Competition for Influence

American exceptionalism inherently presents a series of assumptions about American national identity vis-à-vis the wider world. American exceptionalism is a simultaneously unifying and differentiating ideology (O’Donnell 2019). As O’Donnell argues, while it smooths over internal differences between varied populations within the United States by creating a common national purpose and identity, it also symbolically ‘divides the nation from its geopolitical others’ who are irrelevant to—or even antithetical to—the national mission (O’Donnell 2019, p. 66). The nature of this antagonist is highly mutable. Early variants of US exceptionalism differentiated the new nation from perceived British or European despotism (Onuf 2012, pp. 90–92). In the context of Cold War bipolarity, the United States was in part defined by its difference from the Soviet Union; it was a healthy, free nation in comparison with a sickened, corrupt ‘other’ (O’Donnell 2019, p. 71).
Yet there is also a sense of threat involved in this worldview. The Soviet Union was imagined as an expanding corruption, and its involvement in international institutions might risk corrupting potential United States allies. From a realist lens, allowing for the empowerment of a geopolitical rival is blatantly unpalatable to any great power. Yet symbolically, too, ceding ground to an alternative messianic vision presents a deep dissonance with what Americans believed to be true about their place in the world. After the Second World War, many Americans believed that liberalism was inherently appealing to most countries (Garson 1990), and there was broad support for anti-Soviet interventionism (Pell 1995). As Restad puts it, ‘the idea that in every foreigner there is an American waiting to get out’ has historically connected otherwise highly ideologically discordant American leaders (Restad 2012, p. 70). To withdraw from international institutions and engagement more generally, thereby leaving vulnerable countries and peoples to their fate at the hands of the expansionist, malevolent Soviet Union, could not be squared with the messianic aspects of American exceptionalism.

3.1.3. The Ambiguities of US Interests in a Globalized World

In foreign policy, exceptionalist isolationism is frequently linked with tendencies such as unilateralism. According to exceptionalist doctrine, the need for the United States to maintain its absolute sovereignty is paramount. Skepticism of alignments that might require the United States to go against its national interests dates back to the eighteenth century, epitomized by Washington and Jefferson’s warnings about foreign involvement. Washington’s Farewell Address explicitly advised the country to ‘have with [foreign nations] as little political connection as possible’ (Kupchan 2018). This tendency to avoid entanglement in foreign machinations that are unrelated to the United States’ interests has persisted throughout history, though it has adapted to different contexts as the world has become more politically and economically interconnected. In later iterations of this suspicion, the United Nations has been a source of especial concern, linking with a greater skepticism towards globalization more generally (Dumbrell 1999, p. 29). In short, isolationists believe that international engagement requires the United States to assume a disproportionate and unfair political and economic burden that is not in its interests (Kupchan 2018).
Yet globalization cannot be turned back, and complete avoidance of entangled interests is both undesirable for the United States’ interests and, moreover, impossible. The political and economic interests of the United States are practically linked to the fortunes of the wider world (Kupchan 2018, p. 145). Concerns about sovereignty, alongside the inevitability of globalization, thus form the third category of tension attached to isolationism from an exceptionalist perspective.
The takeaway, then, is that engagement with international institutions poses an existential identity dilemma for the United States that is not wholly resolved by isolationism. This paper argues that conspiracy theories—through vilifying the concept of an international order as inherently threatening to American uniqueness—consequently fill a core function within a politically isolationist worldview.

3.2. The Political Function of Conspiracy Theories

With this ideological context in mind, how can conspiracy theories about a supergovernment or ‘New World Order’ be understood? This study proceeds from the understanding that conspiracy theories represent a form of counter-hegemonic, ‘stigmatized knowledge’ (Barkun 2013, p. 23). In particular, they purport to be a form of suppressed knowledge, or, in Barkun’s words, position themselves as ‘claims that are allegedly known to be valid by authoritative institutions but are suppressed because the institutions fear the consequences of public knowledge or have some evil or selfish motive for hiding the truth’ (Barkun 2013, p. 27). By definition, then, conspiracy theories posit a theory of power and place the conspiracy theorist on its margins (Nera et al. 2022).
Despite this self-positioning, the distance between conspiratorial and mainstream beliefs can be blurry. In some cases, conspiracy theories may be believed by an extremely large portion of a given population (van Prooijen and van Vugt 2018). Moreover, conspiracy theorists—despite positioning themselves as a persecuted minority—may affirm, rather than contest, normative systems of power and conceptions of identity. This is particularly the case on the international level: by suggesting that pernicious foreign actors are conspiring against one’s country, the conspiracy theorist may be upholding existing conceptions of national identity and more banal nationalist ideological tenets (Nera et al. 2022).
Conspiracy theories are also efficacious in themselves, as their circulation alters social dynamics among those discussing them. Within some subaltern milieus, circulating conspiracy theories may boost individuals’ status and cement social bonds (Bertuzzi 2021, pp. 5–6). They can also bridge both domestic and transnational milieus, providing ideological glues between otherwise unrelated publics (Hu 2025). Being a conspiracy theorist can even become a form of identity in itself, as studies often show that belief in one conspiracy theory renders the endorsement of other—even apparently incompatible—conspiracy theories more likely (van Prooijen and van Vugt 2018). Nevertheless, research has shown that specific conspiracy theories must be understood through reference to the emic categories of identity that they posit. For example, some conspiracy theories point to threats against the people of a particular nation, while others point to threats against a subgroup within a nation; each of these formulations holds different implications for how identity is conceptualized (Mao et al. 2024).
From an ideational perspective, conspiracy theories may provide a framework through which to conceptualize the existence of evil, operating as a kind of theodicy (Robertson and Dyrendal 2018, p. 416). For a movement, this may help to legitimize actions that might otherwise not have been taken (van Prooijen 2022). This bears relevance to the Cold War context. As Lemelin argues, Burdick’s views—alongside those of other anti-United Nations advocates—were conditioned by the experience of the Korean War, and the perception that, despite its lofty goals, the global movement towards multilateralism was not making the world more peaceful or secure (Lemelin 2002, p. 167). Yet, as Robertson and Dyrendal observe, conspiracy theories are not simply about description or explanation. The very act of revelation, they argue, creates the possibility of a future without this evil (Robertson and Dyrendal 2018, p. 417). Similarly, in his speech, Burdick ends with a note of hope: now that this plot has been revealed, if the United States were to withdraw from the United Nations, the dire future he predicts may be forestalled (Burdick 1954, p. 6).
In the case of the internal tensions within US exceptionalism and isolationism, we can see how conspiracy theories indeed are linked to the function of theodicy that resolves the inner contradictions of isolationism: if international institutions are inherently malevolent, then engagement is necessarily futile. This can be evidenced through a closer reading of Burdick’s speech.

4. The United Nations as a Coming World Government in ‘The Great Conspiracy to Destroy the United States’

In his speech, Burdick suggests that the United Nations project would have one clear effect: the devastation of the United States of America. ‘It ought to be obvious to any fair-minded person’, he determines, ‘that it is the deliberate scheme of the United Nations to destroy the Constitution of the United States’ (Burdick 1954, p. 3). It was the seemingly admirable goal of the United Nations—namely, promoting the cause of world peace—that allowed it to be so persuasive to war-weary Americans, and, by extension, so dangerous. The call to action at the end of Burdick’s speech prompts Americans to consider withdrawing from the United Nations. If ‘armed with the facts’, he suggests, ordinary American citizens may do what their elected officials cannot (Burdick 1954, p. 6). Consequently, his speech positioned itself in a persuasive context: his goal was to ‘lay this proof before the American people’ (Burdick 1954, p. 1).
Unlike later iterations of the New World Order conspiracy theory, which more clearly incorporated apocalyptic and millenarian motifs (Barkun 2013, p. 40), the main thrust of Burdick’s argument was political. Traditionally religious elements were present, but in a minor and largely perfunctory way. He closes the speech with a statement of faith that God would not ‘desert [Americans] in [their] efforts to maintain a government of freedom and liberty’ (Burdick 1954, p. 6), but does not, on the whole, portray the United Nations as a theological threat so much as a danger to American identity and freedom. On the other hand, it is this conception of national identity that becomes sacralized through the broader narrative of American exceptionalism.
Indeed, anti-United Nations conspiratorial sentiments in Burdick’s speech are imbricated in the larger conceptual framework of American exceptionalism. Burdick points to the fact that the United States is ‘the only government on earth where the people themselves rule’, emphasizing that ‘[for] over 160 years we have gone on our way with our own concept of government, and we know what freedom means’ (Burdick 1954, p. 6). Yet he commits himself to an isolationist interpretation of this exceptionalism: ‘[if] other nations want to follow our example, let them do it’, but makes clear that the country should avoid contamination from foreign sources (Burdick 1954, p. 6). He had consistently argued that the fight against communism should begin and end within the actual territory of the United States (Wilkins 1963, p. 217). In other statements, he had reiterated that he was not an isolationist: ‘I believe in friendship and in helping those who cannot help themselves’; nevertheless, he stressed that ‘protecting our own rights and freedoms, and our resources in men and goods’ should be privileged (Lemelin 2002, p. 167).
In arguing for withdrawal from international institutions like the United Nations, Burdick advances three key arguments. Firstly, he presents the mission of the United Nations as a façade, suggesting the existence of a conspiracy. Second, he suggests that continued engagement will result in the loss of American exceptionalism, as the United Nations is dedicated to negatively influencing the minds of the younger generation. Thirdly, he argues that this will result in the destruction of the United States as an exemplar by eliminating its distinctive constitutional and political culture.

4.1. A Sinister Plot Behind an Admirable Exterior

Burdick’s argument acknowledges that the stated mission of the United Nations—the prevention of war before its outbreak—is commendable and naturally appealing to Americans, particularly after the ruinous experience of the Second World War. ‘It seemed like a plausible idea, and not knowing the sinister purpose behind the move, millions of people supported the suggestion,’ he notes (Burdick 1954, p. 1). The apparent legitimacy of the organization’s intentions renders it all the more dangerous, however. Burdick’s juxtaposition between the United Nations’ lofty aims and its malicious reality throws this disconnect into sharp relief: ‘This is to be done in the name of peace, but will result in the total destruction of our liberty’ (Burdick 1954, p. 1).
Such an initiative had the opportunity to succeed where previous attempts to subjugate the United States’ national project had failed. Essential to the notion of American exceptionalism is the idea that the United States is, either materially or symbolically, surrounded by threats to its unique way of life, against which it must remain vigilant through defensive or offensive means (O’Donnell 2019). In this vein, Burdick argues that submitting to foreign control ‘could not be done by force’, which is why a ‘false, insidious and conspiratorial scheme to subdue us’ had been concocted (Burdick 1954, p. 6). His speech then becomes a valiant unmasking of this conspiracy.
This sense of deception inherent to the United Nations’ project is substantiated by Burdick’s own ideological journey. Prior to 1949, Burdick had spoken favorably of ‘a world program to keep the peace of the world’ (Lemelin 2002, pp. 166–67). Yet the experience of the Korean War—and the provision of aid to Europe through programs like the Marshall Plan—set politicians like Burdick against the normalization of interventionist foreign policy that he believed was against American, and particularly North Dakotan, interests. Burdick believed that such intervention represented an unfair burden on taxpayers and was not making the world safer (Wilkins 1963, p. 217). Worse, expending resources in this direction would leave the country less able to defend itself, if and when needed (Lemelin 2002, p. 167).

4.2. Influencing and Corrupting American Minds

Burdick suggested that if Americans were aware of the true nature of the United Nations, they would reject it, given their love for ‘freedom and liberty’ (Burdick 1954, p. 6). Consequently, he elaborated that the United Nations aimed to brainwash and distort young Americans’ beliefs and values. As the plotters were aware of the United States’ ‘strong national spirit’, they had ‘determined that this spirit must be destroyed, or at least minimized’ (Burdick 1954, p. 5). Consequently, cultural programs like UNESCO elicited particular suspicion. Similarly to the United Nations itself, he argued that, on first glance, there was no reason to be skeptical of UNESCO’s aim to promote global education. Yet under the surface, he claimed, it constituted ‘the most dangerous, the most dastardly undertaking of all that the United Nations had theretofore contrived’: ‘a deliberate plan to create public opinion for the coming world government’ (Burdick 1954, p. 5). This was allegedly accomplished through instructing children that national loyalty and commitment were a barrier to world citizenship (Burdick 1954, p. 5).
On this issue, Burdick’s focus on UNESCO as a mechanism for brainwashing converged in various ways with the emerging evangelical far-right. UNESCO formed a particular target in anti-United Nations rhetoric and pamphleteering among this milieu, though they tended to focus more on its endorsement of multiculturalism (Hart 2013, p. 559). Yet this milieu also used similar lines of argumentation to Burdick. Billy James Hargis, an anti-communist right-wing radio evangelist who founded the Christian Crusade organization, published a pamphlet suggesting that ‘[continued] blind adherence to UNESCO and other communist polluted international organizations can only move the American people closer and closer to the brink of communist enslavement’, and reiterated that its ‘ultimate end [would] be the complete loss of freedom by Americans’ (Hargis 1963, p. 8).
Yet Burdick’s ideas also aligned with more banal sentiments inherent to United States exceptionalism. UNESCO has been a particularly controversial organ of the United Nations, epitomized by periodic United States withdrawals (Wiseman 2025). The accusations that the organization has engaged in mission creep, is prone to bureaucratic inefficiency and waste of resources—to which the United States contributes a disproportionate share—and is subject to politicization, have been frequently levied against it (Weiler 1986). Yet as Burdick’s argument indicates, the explicitly cultural focus of UNESCO presents a more fundamental, symbolic affront to United States exceptionalism. The concept of promoting global citizenship that he identifies within UNESCO is inherently threatening to the notion of American exceptionalism, prompting a tendency to withdraw to safeguard national uniqueness.

4.3. A Usurpation of United States Law

The crux of Burdick’s argument is that membership and involvement in the United Nations will lead to the dismantling of the United States Constitution and American political culture. The UN Charter itself, he suggested, was not a treaty in the traditional sense, entailing a bilateral agreement between two nation-states. Rather, he considered it a pretext for the formation of a ‘world government’ that would subordinate the United States’ Constitution (Burdick 1954, p. 1). He spoke with concern about several cases in which the UN Charter had been used within the United States legal system, which had been overturned only by subsequent court decisions (Burdick 1954, p. 2). Nevertheless, he warned, even the existence of this possibility should represent a warning to the American people. He raised further concerns over the potential ability of the United Nations to try American citizens ‘subject to the provisions of a world court’, thus eroding their constitutional rights (Burdick 1954, p. 4).
As with the argument against UNESCO, Burdick’s argument was not entirely divorced from mainstream foreign policy sentiment, though it did attach a conspiratorial veneer to more banal critiques. The idea that the United Nations constituted a danger to Americans’ civil and political liberties has been a consistent theme in the United States’ engagement with international institutions, particularly in the Cold War context. For the most part, though, this led to contestation over whose ideas would predominate within these institutions. For example, for decades, the United States emphasized civil and political liberties within international human rights bodies, while the USSR promoted economic, social, and cultural rights (Quintavalla and Heine 2019, p. 680). More generally, resistance to being influenced by international law is a key feature identified by Ignatieff within his definition of US exceptionalism (Ignatieff 2005, p. 8).
Similarly, Burdick presents civil and political liberties—the cornerstone of the United States’ approach to human rights—as being fundamentally threatened by this global project. Burdick was deeply critical of draft human rights covenants that he feared intruded on civil and political rights, such as freedom of religion and expression, by stipulating the circumstances under which they might be restricted. He feared that these provisions were ‘trying to rewrite our Constitution’ and wondered why this was necessary to achieve world peace: ‘Is not our Constitution and the desire of all the people of this country in favor of peace?’ (Burdick 1954, p. 3). There was only one possible explanation for this dissonance: ‘Do we need further proof’, he asked, ‘that the real and only purpose of the builders of the United Nations was to fashion a world government and to make our citizens subject to that world government, and to strip from them the protection guaranteed them under the Constitution of the United States?’ (Burdick 1954, p. 4).

5. Discussion: Anti-United Nations Conspiracy Theories in the Context of US Exceptionalism

Returning to the three elements of tension between isolationism and exceptionalism, we can now see how Burdick’s arguments ameliorate these anxieties through positing the existence of a conspiracy. By suggesting that the United Nations is not what it seems, it resolves tensions over relinquishing a potential leadership role; by alleging that international organizations are infiltrated by Communists aiming to brainwash American youth, it presents withdrawal as a necessary riposte to an offensive maneuver, and by suggesting that engagement will lead to the destruction of American political culture, it sidesteps thorny questions about how to determine American interests in a complex, globalized world.

5.1. An Infiltrated Organization

Understanding the United Nations as an infiltrated, corrupt organization whose humanitarian mission is merely a smokescreen offers the United States an exit strategy from active engagement with the institution altogether. On the surface, the United Nations’ goal of advancing world peace and preventing conflict aligns with the sense of historic purpose inherent to United States exceptionalism. In this sense, as Ignatieff argues, the United States has an interest in taking a leading role in engaging in multilateral institutions as a ‘forum in which U.S. leadership can be exercised and American intuitions about freedom and government can be spread across the world’, even while it may be uneasy about the effect this engagement might have on its own political traditions and culture (Ignatieff 2005, p. 13).
In Burdick’s formulation, however, positing the existence of a conspiracy helps to resolve this tension. By suggesting that the United Nations is not what it seems, and that its instruments, however apparently well-intentioned, are masking the desire to develop a ‘supergovernment’ (Burdick 1954, p. 4), it absolves the United States of any need to assume a leading role within its project. Moreover, by suggesting that the United Nations is not just a façade, but a threat to the United States’ supremacy in the Cold War, it reframes the debate about ceding influence to its geopolitical rivals.

5.2. A Corrupting Influence

Burdick’s argument suggests that the United Nations is eroding the distinctiveness of United States identity through brainwashing young people, achieving through deception that which could not be accomplished through brute force: ‘can anyone doubt that the United Nations was purposely set up to do to this country what could not be done by force of arms, but through the blandishments of Communists, fellow travelers, and dupes, get us to surrender our liberty without firing a shot?’ (Burdick 1954, p. 6). He feared that the method of representation within the UN would favor communist nations, such as Russia and China, and that the impending world government would thus be under their thumb (Burdick 1954, p. 6).
This offers an implicit counterargument to the notion that isolationism might lead to the empowerment of the United States’ geopolitical rivals. Among most mainstream politicians, it was accepted that the United Nations was a potent enough geopolitical power to necessitate some degree of engagement (Haviland 1965). Yet by suggesting that Communists already had the upper hand in the United Nations, Burdick presents withdrawal from these institutions as a necessary action to maintain the United States’ competitiveness.
This is heightened by the sense of threat he constructs. As Melley describes, brainwashing is a particularly evocative accusation common in conspiratorial rhetoric from this time, conjuring images of ‘communist influence and American weakness’ (Melley 2008, p. 147). Geopolitical conflict was now occurring in an environment in which ‘clandestine agents and powers could never be fully known to the public’ (Melley 2008, p. 150). The notion of brainwashing also operates as a theodicy to explain why the perceived truth of liberal democratic ideals did not inherently triumph over their ideological rivals, leading to the world independently refashioning itself in the United States’ image, as many American exceptionalists thought it implicitly must (Restad 2012, p. 70). Burdick’s use of this trope constructs involvement in international institutions as a threat from within and without. As such, to preserve the distinctiveness of American identity, withdrawal from these organizations becomes the only possible course of action.

5.3. An End to United States Exceptionalism

The United Nations offered the promise to liberal exceptionalists that broadening the United States’ historic mission would also support its interests. Aid programs and mechanisms of cooperation could forestall conflicts, furthering the progress of global civilization—with strong American influence—while also bolstering United States security (Haviland 1965, p. 644). Isolationists and libertarians who were more inclined to view the wider world as corrupting questioned this logic (Onuf 2012, p. 81). Yet calculating national interest for a nation with an exceptional mission proves challenging. Isolationism relies on a perception of self-sufficiency, but in a globalizing world, problems are rarely confined within nation-states’ own borders (Oğuzlu 2020; Hadley 2012).
Burdick’s formulation of a conspiracy behind organizations like the United Nations suggests an existential threat to United States exceptionalism. The root of United States exceptionalism rests on its perceived uniqueness that allows it to assume an unprecedented historical role. Burdick argues that participation in the United Nations system will, over time, dismantle this distinctiveness by attacking American institutions and political culture through the formation of a ‘new world government with a heterogeneous collection of nations whose ideas of the purpose of government conflict with our own’ (Burdick 1954, p. 6). The extent of this danger, if realized, threatens both the protectionist and activist forms of exceptionalism. This renders withdrawal the only possible resolution to safeguard the country’s interests and ontological security, resisting the ‘siren songs of those whose design it is to destroy this great Government’ (Burdick 1954, p. 6).

6. Conclusions: Whither US Exceptionalism and Isolationism?

This paper advances that Cold War conspiracy theories about a shadowy international government seeking to disrupt the United States’ historical mission and subdue its sovereignty should be viewed within a larger ideological genealogy of United States exceptionalism. Drawing on Ignatieff (2005), it affirms that United States exceptionalism creates a paradox when dealing with international institutions. While isolationism may address fears about abdicating sovereignty, however, it also leads to new tensions about the United States’ continued leadership and relevance. Through analyzing Burdick’s call to withdraw from the United Nations through this lens, this paper suggests that conspiracy theories—through vilifying the entire project of international institutions—offer a symbolic resolution for this inherent foreign policy tension that preserves the core elements of American exceptionalism.
Nevertheless, for decades, this approach has been a fringe belief. The United States may have chafed at perceived overreaches from international authorities, but it has generally avoided complete disengagement, preferring to tread a geopolitical tightrope between promoting international norms in the abstract whilst implicitly suggesting its own exemption from these standards (Ignatieff 2005). Isolationism and suspicion of a globalist agenda have been largely restricted to actors on the political margins. Even supposed peaks of American isolationism, such as the 1920s, are considered by many historians to be overstated (Braumoeller 2010). While conspiratorial isolationist ideas circulated through politically marginal organizations like the Christian Nationalist Crusade, the reach of such publications was limited.
There are reasons to believe that this status quo may be shifting. Changes in communication technologies and the rise of the internet have led to distinctive milieus forming around conspiratorial beliefs, with fewer gatekeepers or barriers to disseminating or accessing this information. As a result, previously marginal beliefs have become more conspicuous and have increasingly found a path into mainstream political culture as they have been promoted by conspiracy entrepreneurs fueling fears about a New World Order (Zeng et al. 2022, pp. 931–32; Buehling et al. 2025, p. 4). This has come at a time when political power has become increasingly—and often arcanely—linked to transnational corporate interests instead of public welfare, and foreign policy decisions are often made without public knowledge or approval (Monbiot 2024). Politically, decades of foreign policy overextensions have soured many Americans on the necessity of shaping the international order (Kupchan 2018, p. 146).
In this context of heightened mistrust and disillusionment, the conspiratorial elements of isolationism have become increasingly salient. Indeed, isolationism has gained an unprecedented political foothold, offering a unique opportunity to shape governance rather than remain in the opposition (Harper 2025, p. 36). Even in his first term, Trump officials condemned the ideology of ‘globalism’, a term loaded with conspiracist associations, as promoting international interests over those of the United States (O’Donnell 2019, p. 80). The second Trump administration has signaled its commitment to an even more exemptionalist, isolationist approach to US exceptionalism (Patrick 2025). In the inaugural address for his second term on 20 January 2025, Trump referred to a ‘more exceptional’ era of American history and repeatedly emphasized the need for ‘sovereignty’ to ‘be reclaimed’ (Trump 2025).
This has not been mere rhetoric. In keeping with the ‘America First’ ethos, international engagement not expressly linked to the United States’ material interests has been rejected. Since Trump’s return to the Oval Office in January 2025, the United States has disengaged from several major United Nations instruments and cut funding for key international programs. Analysts have noted with concern the security implications that an isolationist variant of US exceptionalism might have at the current political moment, impacting fields as diverse as artificial intelligence regulation to effectively combating climate change (Patrick 2025).
This is unlikely to be simply a passing trend; this pattern of isolationism will likely outlast Trump’s presidency in certain milieus. As trust in the United Nations is on the decline among Republicans, and fewer Americans see the benefit of membership (Fetterolf 2024), there is good evidence that this current exceptionalist-isolationist moment constitutes a significant historical shift rather than a fleeting aberration. This makes developing an understanding of the historical philosophy behind United States isolationism—and its connections to conspiratorial rhetoric—more urgent than ever.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful for the support provided by the University of Michigan Special Collections Research Center, which provided the primary sources used in this research.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

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Murphey, H. The United Nations as a New World Government: Conspiracy Theories, American Isolationism, and Exceptionalism. Genealogy 2025, 9, 76. https://doi.org/10.3390/genealogy9030076

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Murphey H. The United Nations as a New World Government: Conspiracy Theories, American Isolationism, and Exceptionalism. Genealogy. 2025; 9(3):76. https://doi.org/10.3390/genealogy9030076

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Murphey, Helen. 2025. "The United Nations as a New World Government: Conspiracy Theories, American Isolationism, and Exceptionalism" Genealogy 9, no. 3: 76. https://doi.org/10.3390/genealogy9030076

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Murphey, H. (2025). The United Nations as a New World Government: Conspiracy Theories, American Isolationism, and Exceptionalism. Genealogy, 9(3), 76. https://doi.org/10.3390/genealogy9030076

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