Citizenship Education in a World of Identity in Flux, Intercultural Conflict, and the Need for Belonging

Abstract

The human need for belonging and identity (stemming from the need for belonging) is strong. This article begins by discussing these needs, drawing on the theories of Abraham Maslow and Erik Erikson. Forceful societal trends in the early twenty-first-century world have been creating a new societal context that tends to disrupt historical, relatively simple trajectories of identity formation. These trends are then subsumed under two megatrends that operate in the contemporary world. The first is globalisation, evident in the world since c.1990 as “Globalisation 3.0”. One outcome of Globalisation 3.0 is identity flux. Around 2015, a trend of deglobalisation became evident around the world. Populism is one of the manifestations of this counter-trend, a manifestation that is also visible in identity formation patterns. Education, citizenship educationin particular, has long been looked up to as instrument of political socialisation and identity formation, and these counter-trends tend to impact it, as well. The thesis of this article is that citizenship education, as it is presented in the education systems of the contemporary world, could be deemed to be anachronistically simple and hence requires adaptations in response to the exigencies of this new, changed global context. Finally, we suggest some guidelines for a reconceptualised citizenship education attuned to the exigencies of the new unfolding global context.

1. Introduction

Forceful societal trends are currently re-shaping the world. These trends have disrupted historical ways of enculturation and of constructing identity and have profound implications for citizenship education1, which has historically been looked up as having the power to socialise young people. The aim of this article is to critically examine citizenship education in the face of the new societal context and to identify guidelines for the construction of a reconceptualised citizenship education attuned to the exigencies of the current societal context. The article begins by discussing the human needs for belonging and for identity, drawing on the theories of Abraham Maslow and Erik Erikson. This is followed by a survey of the unfolding twenty-first century societal context of education. Historically developed patterns in citizenship education are then reconstructed and evaluated against the new societal context. As a conclusion, guidelines for a reconceptualised citizenship education attuned to the exigencies of the new, unfolding global context are suggested.

This research has been performed with the methodological apparatus of the field of scholarship of comparative and international education. Comparative and international education studies education systems as they are embedded in their societal contexts (see Wolhuter 2022). A fundamental theorem of comparative and international education is that education systems are interwoven with their societal contexts. That means, firstly, that education systems are called into existence, find their raison d’être in, and are continuously being shaped by, societal contextual forces. It means, secondly, that education systems have societal outcomes and should be assessed on the basis of these societal outcomes. Societal contexts shaping education system have been customarily conceptualised in comparative and international education for analytical purposes, consisting of the following aspects: geography, demography, level of technological advancement, social systems and dynamics, economy, politics, and religion and life and world philosophy.

2. Methodological Note

This study is a comparative literature study (see Wolhuter 2008). The authors have worked on the latest corpus of published knowledge in the scholarly field of Comparative and International Education and social sciences in general. Socio-political trends were studied, and these were then, using the method of comparative and international education, as explained above, compared to what is taking place in schools around the world.

3. The Human Need for Belonging and for Identity

American Psychologist Abraham Maslow (1908–1970) formulated his highly cited theory of human needs during the mid-twentieth century. According to Maslow (1953, 1954), every human has a hierarchy of five categories of needs. These are physiological needs, safety needs, love and belonging needs, esteem needs, and self-actualisation needs. These needs are reflected in

Table 1. Maslow’s theory of human needs.

Need	Elaboration
Self-actualisation needs	Becoming the person one can be, creativity, spontaneity, sovereignty, problem-solving, self-fulfilment, meaning
Esteem needs	Self-esteem, respect of and from others, status, recognition
Love and belonging needs	Friendship, sense of connection, family, sexual intimacy
Safety needs	Personal (physical) security, employment, income, resources, morality, family, health, property
Physiological needs	Air, food, water, sleep, shelter, clothing

.

According to Maslow, these needs drive human actions and shape human personality. While Maslow is best known for this, the original version of his theory of needs, in later publications, he added three additional categories of needs (Maslow 1968). These are cognitive, aesthetic, and transcendental or transpersonal needs. Cognitive needs entail needs of knowing and understanding and of foresight. Aesthetic needs refer to needs for order, for harmony, and for beauty. Transcendental or transpersonal needs refer to the needs of human beings to connect to something larger than themselves, i.e., a need for the sacred.

While “identity” does not explicitly figure in Maslow’s scheme, several of his enumerated needs point to a search for identity and to identity formation. These include safety needs (finding security in an identity), belonging needs, esteem needs, self-actualising needs, and transcendental needs. Transcendental needs, that is, needs for a purpose and meaning beyond the self, imply taking on a particular identity.

At this stage, the term “identity” as used in this article should be clarified. To begin with, a distinction between personal identity and object identity should be made. The American Psychological Association (2025) defines personal identity as

“…an individual’s sense of self defined by (a) a set of physical, psychological, and interpersonal characteristics and (b) a range of affiliations (e.g., ethnicity) and social roles”.

Turning to the issue of identity formation in the life cycle of humans, Erik Erikson’s (1902–1994) model of psychosocial development distinguishes between eight stages in the life cycle, each one presenting a challenge of two extremes to the individual (Erikson 1950). The successful resolution of the challenge of each phase provides a basis to build on, i.e., a foundation on which to proceed to the next phase. The fifth phase in Erikson’s model is the phase of identity versus role confusion as the two extremes. This challenge presents itself to the individual in the adolescent phase, i.e., 12 to 15 years of age. At this stage of life, the adolescent starts to ask questions such as, “Who am I?”, “How do I fit in?”, and “Where am I going in life?”. The adolescent is exploring and searching for their own unique identity. Identity formation is closely tied to personal beliefs, goals, and values and to the morality of the individual, which are now being explored and developed. The stage can culminate either in identity formation or in role confusion. The latter is a danger, especially in the contemporary complex, diverse world. Erikson coined the term “identity crisis” for this phenomenon (Erikson 1968). The adolescent is faced with a complexity and variety in the (modern) world; they are unsure or cannot decide what to identify with. This theme was later further developed by two scholars, Polish-British philosopher Zygmunt Bauman (2004) and Richard Hughes Gibson (2021). According to them, identity formation in times before modernity was no issue, as people generally grew up in a small village, never left the precincts of the village, and without any thought identified with the village. But modernity (which they take to have started around the seventeenth century) changed that. Not only have adolescents become more physically mobile, they are confronted by an ever-growing variety of possible identities, and this has created an identity uncertainty. The influence of mass culture/culture industries (since the 1960s) and of social media and the internet (since the 2000s), a way of being “mobile” but without physically travelling, has compounded this trend. Identity is no longer seamlessly, effortlessly, and unconsciously assumed but now must be acquired. To complicate matters, the current age, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, is characterised by an array of global societal trends, which makes the varieties of identity adolescents must choose from even larger. These trends can be subsumed under the collective names of globalisation and deglobalisation—in many respects, the opposite of each other. It is these trends that the next section of the article will discuss.

4. Societal Trends of the Twenty-First Century: Globalisation 3.0

4.1. Conceptual Clarification

There is no single universally accepted definition of “globalisation”. A much-cited definition is that of Held (1991, p. 9), namely, that “…globalisation refers to the intensification of worldwide social relations, which connect distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa”. These connections can be taken to be both physical and (increasingly, in the contemporary world) virtual or electronic. Edwards (2021) describes globalisation as referring to the worldwide intensification of social interaction. Globalisation can therefore be taken to denote the worldwide integration of people, societies, and economies. Di Nicola (2020) explains that, from the vantage point of sociology scholars, globalisation has been described as the whole world being “incorporated into a single society”.

4.2. Globalisation 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0

Thomas L. Friedman (2005) distinguished between the following three instances of globalisation during the course of history: Globalisation 1.0 (1492–1800), Globalisation 2.0 (1800–2000), and Globalisation 3.0 (2000–present).

Globalisation 1.0 took off with the early voyages of exploration and colonisation, i.e., the Portuguese voyages of discoveries around Africa and to the Orient at the behest of Prince Henry the Navigator in the fifteenth century, later followed up with similar voyages by the Portuguese and Spanish to Africa, Asia, and especially the Western Hemisphere. A milestone event was when Fernando Magellan in 1519 became the first person to circumnavigate the Earth. England (particularly under the rule of Queen Elizabeth I) and the Netherlands (especially after its creation as an independent nation state in 1648) joined Portugal and Spain during the ensuing two centuries (sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). National Chartered Companies (such as the Dutch East Indian Company) figured prominently in these colonisation projects, although it was still national governments that pursued colonisation ventures.

A number of events towards the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century brought Globalisation 1.0 to an abrupt end. These include the American Independence (1776), the French Revolution (1789), the devastation of the Napoleonic Wars (till 1821), and a weakened Europe, which led to the independence of the colonies of Latin America. Globalisation 2.0 began soon after and gained traction during the second half of the nineteenth century. Globalisation 2.0 was a form of globalisation more intense than Globalisation 1.0, made possible by new technology that brought about the first and second industrial revolutions. This included railroads, the steamboat, the telegraph, the telephone, the development of the tarmac road, and finally the radio. This phase also entailed the exploration of the interior of Africa and a new bout of colonisation—that of Sub-Saharan Africa during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Global economic integration became visible as investment capital flowed all over the world—much of it originating in London and connected to the economic development of colonies and former colonies, including the United States of America, Canada, and Australia.

The outbreak of the First World War cut short the acceleration of Globalisation 2.0. The interwar growth of nationalism in many parts of the world, the worldwide depression in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and finally the Second World War represented forces working against globalisation.

The post-Second World War decades saw a resumption of the forces of globalisation. The Bretton Woods Institutions (the International Monetary Fund and World Bank) and later the World Trade Organisation (WTO), as well as the United Nations, founded in 1945, forged a globalised political order, while the internationalisation of the Creed of Human Rights set in place a moral code for a globalised world. Technological developments such as the aeroplane and the television provided momentum in the growth of globalisation.

From 1990, and especially from around 2000, Globalisation 3.0 picked up momentum. A driving force behind Globalisation 3.0 was the newfound power of the individuals to collaborate and to compete globally, made possible by new technology such as the personal computer, the smart phone, software, and the Internet. This—the power of individuals as a driving force in globalisation—stands in contrast to previous waves of globalisation, where governments and the corporate sector were in the driving seat. The societal contextual drivers of Globalisation 3.0, and, at the same time, the defining features of Globalisation 3.0, are of a technological, demographic, political, and economic nature, as will now be explained.

4.3. Technology

The time after 1990, and more so after 2000, saw the appearance of the internet, Google, the worldwide web, email, online meetings, the mobile phone, and social media such as Facebook (see Wu 2017; Harari 2024), and more recently Instagram, TikTok, etc. These developments have increased connectivity between people, so much so that physical distance no longer constitutes an impediment to connectivity. Currently, there are more mobile phones than people on Earth. As an indication of communication density, it is estimated that (as of 2025) every day, 347.3 billion emails are sent around the globe, marking a 4.3% increase from the previous year (Ramuthi 2025).

4.4. Demographics

Increased population mobility has been a second driving force, as well as a feature of Globalisation 3.0. This increased mobility includes two kinds, namely, short-term and long-term mobility. The following statistic is an indication of increased short-term mobility. Whereas, in the United States of America, people travelled on average 50 metres per day in 1800, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, that figure came to 50 kilometres per day (Urry 2007).

As regards long-term mobility, international migration numbers have been rising steadily during recent years and decades. By mid-2024, the estimated number of international migrants in the world was 304 million, or 4 percent of the global population (Migration Data Portal 2025). A major global migration pattern is the flow from the Global South to the Global North. This comprises a south–north flow, from Latin America and Africa to North America and Europe, and an east–west flow from Asia and Eastern Europe to North America and Western Europe.

4.5. Democratisation

The economic implosion of the former Eastern Bloc followed by a political collapse ended the Cold War and Iron Curtain and heralded a wave of democratisation in the countries of the former Eastern Bloc and of the Global South in the 1990s, so much so that Fukuyama (1992) predicted this to be a permanent change bringing (political and military) history to an end. The liberal democratic political dispensation and the attendant Creed of Human Rights made for more porous national borders, and, together with the information and communications technology revolution, contributed to the diminishing of the power of the nation state.

4.6. Neo-Liberal Economics

The economic flipside of the wave of political democratisation that swept the world during the years after 1990 was neo-liberal economics (Buckham et al. 2022, pp. 134–35, 164–65, 204–5, 260–61). The economic implosion of the Eastern Bloc left one alternative, namely, the neo-liberal economics that had been building up in Western countries since the late 1970s and early 1980s. Neo-liberal economics entailed the contraction of the role and of the regulatory framework of the State and giving the forces of the market free rein. These forces included the activities of multinational companies and of an international money market operating 24/7/365, with scant regard for national borders.

4.7. Multiculturalism, Interculturalism, and Global Citizenship

The global migration patterns described above and the empowerment of individuals brought about by information and communication technology resulted in diverse societies replacing the historically comparatively homogenous societies. An infinite tapestry of identities, including hybrid identities, and a flow of identities became visible among people (see Van der Walt and Wolhuter 2021). In Western countries, at least, responses to this new diversity included multiculturalism, later buttressed or superseded by interculturalism, and advocacy for global citizenship (De Cicco 2016).

Regarding multiculturalism, Canada became the first nation to adopt this approach as an official government policy (in 1972). While many meanings have been attached to the term “multiculturalism”, we adopt Magsino’s definition thereof (Magsino 1995) (developed in the context of Canada). It enumerates the constituting elements of multiculturalism as follows:

• Retaining culture and cultural development: the government supports and encourages all cultural groups, as they give structure and vitality to (Canadian) society;
• Respect for, and participation in, cultural heritage to promote a richer life and national unity for all;
• Full participation in society by members of all cultural groups;
• Individual freedom and choice with respect to identification with, and participation in, cultural activities.

By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the concept of multiculturalism had become eclipsed or superseded by the notion of interculturalism. The events of 9/11 may be singled out as a significant cause, but they were by no means the only one. Unchecked late-twentieth century postmodernism laissez-faire attitudes seemingly had to be balanced by a centripetal force aimed at ensuring peaceful co-existence and offering an effective response to (potential) threats to society and to humanity.

Interculturalism presupposes multiculturalism but goes further. According to Markou (1997), the four basic principles of interculturalism are as follows:

• Empathy, that is, a deep understanding of the other and “living-into” their situation;
• Solidarity, that is, the cultivation of a collective conscience and the promotion of social justice;
• Intercultural respect;
• Ethical thought and dialogue.

In the context of Globalisation 3.0, the notion of global citizenship gained traction. The concept of citizenship now needs clarification. Because the word “citizenship” has assumed an assortment of meanings throughout history, a reference point in the scholarly discourse on citizenship is the definition given by British sociologist T.H. Marshall in his book Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays (Marshall 1950), namely, that citizenship refers to a status accorded to those who are full members of a community. That status includes both rights and obligations. Marshall argues that, although these rights and obligations may vary from place to place and from time to time, they are usually of a civil, political, and social nature. Civil rights and duties refer to individual freedoms (e.g., freedom of expression and of speech), political rights refer to the right to take part in the exercise of political power, and social aspect refers to being able to live in a society as a civilised being in accordance with the prevailing standards in society, from the right to economic welfare and security to the right to share fully in social heritage.

The reality of globalisation, as well as the fact that humanity is facing an array of crises, which are global in scope and which can only be addressed from a global perspective (five that can be singled out are the ecological crisis, global terrorism, the nuclear threat, artificial intelligence (see Ord 2020), and global pandemics (see Ferguson 2021)), gives credence to the notion that citizenship should no longer be conceptualised within the parameters of the nation state (as it has historically been understood) but rather in the context of a global consciousness or global citizenship.

However, just when it seemed that globalisation was an unstoppable, irreversible force, deglobalisation emerged as a powerful counter-force.

5. Deglobalisation

From around 2015, a trend towards deglobalisation could be observed around the world. This trend can be conceptualised as constituting the following tenets: rising geopolitical tension, protectionism, a regression in democracy and in human rights, nativism, and populism.

Rising geopolitical tension is visible in flashpoints such as the Middle East, Ukraine–Russia, China and East and Southeast Asia, and Northern and Central Africa, as well as between the United States of America and China, and—to a lesser extent—between the European Union and the United States of America, within North America, among centrifugal forces within the European Union, and in the setting up of the BRICS and expanded BRICS grouping as the antipode of Western or American hegemony. The economic flipside of geopolitical tension is protectionism or rising tariffs that impact on international trade.

The regression of democracy (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019) and of human rights (Human Rights Watch 2025) since c. 2015 has been well documented and will not be discussed at length here. Nativism, or a sentiment against immigration, is also visible in many countries (see Betz 2017).

Populism has made a forceful return in many parts of the world in the last decade (see Biti et al. 2022). “Populism” is a concept that defies a simple definition (it is often stated that while easy to recognise, it is difficult to define), but Harari (2024, pp. 129–34) identifies the key traits of populism as follows:

• Populists claim that they alone truly represent the people. From this, it follows that the populist party should have all the power.
• A fundamental part of the populist credo is the belief that “the people” is a unified body with a single will, the “will of the people”.
• Anyone not agreeing with the “will of the people” either suffers from false consciousness, is not part of the people, or is even the enemy of the people.
• Populists are suspicious of institutions that, in the name of objective truths, override the supposed will of the people.

To this, we can also add the predilection of populists towards personality and emotional politics and identity politics rather than the politics of principle, or rational or considered politics; internal inconsistencies in policy positions (and frequent change or a “flip flop” between policy positions); a propensity to divide people into “us” (“the people”) and the “other”; and a disregard for the rule of law.

This article has been written by three scholars whose locus standi in academe is a Research Unit for Education in Human Rights in Diversity and, subscribing to the Creed of Human Rights, hold an adverse view regarding the developments associated with the trend of deglobalisation. These developments are deemed to be a cause for concern. For example, a populist stance on political issues can very easily spill over into a nuclear war with devastating consequences for humanity and even for the planet. The question is, then, how educators and educationists should respond to these dangerous developments. Over the last several centuries, citizenship education has been looked towards to help shape a more peaceful and desirable world. Our focus will now be on this issue.

6. Citizenship Education

Education for citizenship has been a strong (even dominant) motive for the provision of institutionalised schooling. Schools as institutions date back to around 2500 BC, shortly after the invention of writing. Few scholars have thus far attempted to explain the origins of schools as institutions, but anthropologist Yehudi Cohen (1970) tabled an interesting theory. According to Cohen (1970), schools originated in what he called “civilization states” such as ancient Mesopotamia, ancient Egypt, and ancient China. These “civilization states” invariably comprised the amalgamation of smaller units or polities into a macro-state. To maintain the integrity of the state, local loyalties had to be suppressed and a loyalty and identification with the state cultivated, at least among the elite tasked with the administration of the state, namely, the scribes. For this reason, schools were established. Cohen explains the formation of national systems of education since the beginning of the nineteenth century (first in Europe and North-America, from where it spread to the rest of the world) with the same hypothesis: the creation of nation states (which can be traced back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 but which gained greater traction in the beginning of the nineteenth century), as a political ordering principle of the world, also needed an institution to cultivate loyalty and identification with the nation state, and schools (national systems of education) were created for this purpose.

The role of institutionalised schooling in legitimising the nation state, if not the raison-d’être for creating mass systems of public education from circa the beginning of the nineteenth century, has been highlighted by leading scholars in sociology, such as Émile Durkheim (1956), as well as in education, such as John Dewey (1916). It has further been substantiated by extensive case studies in both the scholarly fields of sociology (for example, see Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1983) and education (for example, see Abernethy 1969; Cowan et al. 1965; Green 2013; Heater 2004). Indeed, citizenship education forms an important component of public school systems worldwide (Sungur 2025, p. 2), either as a stand-alone subject and/or, more often, permeating other subjects (see Schulz et al. 2022), with one notable (but by no means the only) example being history curricula (see Zajda et al. 2017).

In the wake of stronger globalisation by the end of the twentieth century, voices started to advocate for global citizenship education, that is, citizenship education no longer being circumscribed according to the parameters of the nation or nation state but by the parameters of the global village. Citizenship was thus conceived along the dimensions outlined by Marshall (1950), explained earlier, but geographically extended to include the global community (See Schugurensky and Wolhuter 2020). UNESCO (2015, p. 9) defines Global Citizenship Education as “…a framing paradigm which encapsulates how education can develop the knowledge, skills, values and attitudes learners need for securing a world which is more just, peaceful, tolerant, inclusive and sustainable”. Global Citizenship Education has been advocated for by UNESCO (UNESCO 2015) and by the scholarly community (see Routledge Book Series on Global Citizenship Education) and has made its way into teacher education programmes worldwide (see Schugurensky and Wolhuter 2020).

Yet, for all the necessity and advocacy for global citizenship education, case study after case study has found that citizenship education in the public school systems of the world remains entrapped in national contexts and nationally prescribed objectives (for example, see Çayır 2015; Myers and Rappoport 2021; Sungur 2025, pp. 9, 13, 14; Tröhler et al. 2021).

7. Citizenship Education to Meet Current Requirements

Since around 1990, a combination of global societal drivers, such as the information and communication technology revolution, demographic mobility, and neo-liberal economics, have eroded the power of the once omnipotent nation state and have resulted in a forceful globalisation trend, as explained earlier, named Globalisation 3.0. The concept of global citizenship has been developed as a form of citizenship consonant with this new context of globalisation.

However, since 2015, a backlash or resistance against globalisation as such can be detected, inter alia, in the form of new geopolitical tensions, anti-immigration sentiment, the results of elections in several parts of the world, rising populism, and identity politics. Unsatisfied needs for belonging and crises around identity definition are two of the major factors at the root of these developments. The allochthonous component of populations experience both a lack of a sense of belonging and a questionable identity. The latter is compounded in the case of people of hybrid descent. Autochthonous components of populations experience feelings of alienation and a sense of threat towards their sense of belonging and identity. The point here is that the notion of global citizenship has thus far failed to satisfy many individuals’ and peoples’ need for belonging and for identity.

In addition, the concept of an exclusive national identity or an even narrower citizenship (where “national” is restricted to qualifications in terms of, for example, a hegemonic language or ethnicity) is becoming, in the face of the forces of globalisation and the erosion of the sovereignty and power of the nation state, increasingly anachronistic. Presently, populism, tariff wars, blanket anti-immigration, and so forth are proving incapable of stopping the forces of globalisation and of offering, as explained earlier, inadequate responses to people’s legitimate concerns. With the notions of exclusive national citizenship and of global citizenship both found to be inadequate, the key question now is how to approach the future and how it will affect humanity based on the present world.

We propose that the answer to this question can be found in six interrelated principles that should be acknowledged in the public discourse on citizenship, each with direct implications for citizenship education’s content and pedagogical shape. These six principles suggest that citizenship education for the twenty-first century must move far beyond its historical nation state focus. Instead, it must equip learners to navigate a complex world of hybrid, layered, relational, and fluid identities while fostering secure belonging, civic responsibility, and ethical engagement on multiple scales. Such an approach not only addresses the existential needs of individuals but also responds to the broader societal and global exigencies of our time.

7.1. Heimat: The Foundational Human Need for Belonging

In 2018, New York Times columnist Joachim Bittner observed that the English language had adopted certain German words—such as Schadenfreude and Kindergarten—for which no exact English equivalents exist and argued that English, in waging public discourse, could greatly benefit from embracing a third term: Heimat (Bittner 2018). At its core, Heimat encapsulates a fundamental human need for spatial orientation—a reference point that offers identity, stimulation, and safety in one’s existence. This need lies at the heart of identity formation, reflecting the deeply rooted human desire for belonging, security, and existential anchoring. In an era characterised by global mobility, technological acceleration, and cultural fluidity (Bauman 2004; Gibson 2021), individuals increasingly seek stable frameworks that can provide personal coherence and continuity. The centrality of these needs is well documented in Maslow’s hierarchy, which situates belonging, esteem, and self-actualisation as essential components of human development (Maslow 1954, 1968), and in Erikson’s psychosocial theory, which emphasises the resolution of identity crises as a key determinant of psychological well-being (Erikson 1950, 1968).

Therefore, citizenship education should intentionally cultivate a sense of belonging, both by anchoring learners in their immediate cultural, historical, and community contexts and by equipping them to negotiate these within broader national and global frameworks. Curricula should allow students to explore their personal and communal narratives, fostering rooted identities that simultaneously allow for openness to diversity (Maslow 1954; Erikson 1968). Such an approach can mitigate the identity insecurities that often manifest in exclusionary populist politics (Biti et al. 2022).

7.2. Identity as a Multi-Layered and Complex Construct

Modern identity is inherently multi-dimensional, consisting of overlapping and sometimes intersecting affiliations across multiple spheres. Leopold Scholtz’s (2016) reflection on his identity as an Afrikaner, South African, African, world citizen, Christian, journalist, historian, and rugby enthusiast exemplifies this multi-layered complexity. Erikson’s (1950, 1968) developmental model underscores that such multi-faceted identities are not fixed but continuously constructed and negotiated throughout life.

Consequently, citizenship education must reflect and accommodate this identity complexity. Curricula should avoid rigid, monocultural, monolithic, static representations of citizenship and instead present identity as a dynamic interplay among various affiliations—local, national, regional, professional, cultural, and global. This approach equips learners with the cognitive and ethical capacity to balance multiple, and at times conflicting, identity dimensions (Bauman 2004; Gibson 2021). It fosters a civic disposition that is self-reflective and sensitive to the diverse identities of others.

7.3. Hybrid Identities in the Age of Globalisation 3.0

The intensification of global flows of people, capital, culture, and ideas under Globalisation 3.0 has given rise to increasingly hybrid identity configurations (Friedman 2005; Harari 2024). Individuals no longer inhabit singular or stable identity categories but instead navigate fluid, intersectional affiliations shaped by transnational influences, intercultural encounters, and virtual networks (Van der Walt and Wolhuter 2021; Bauman 2004; Gibson 2021). This hybridity challenges conventional notions of citizenship rooted in homogeneity and territoriality.

Citizenship education must embrace hybridisation as a normative feature of contemporary identity. Pedagogies should cultivate intercultural competence, empathy, and dialogical engagement, equipping learners to interact effectively across diverse and evolving cultural landscapes (UNESCO 2015; Markou 1997). Furthermore, educational programmes should prepare students to critically navigate global interdependencies, fostering adaptability and resilience within shifting identity configurations (Van der Walt and Wolhuter 2021).

7.4. Rejection of Essentialist and Stereotypical Identity Conceptions

Essentialist conceptions of identity—those which posit fixed, inherent characteristics—are increasingly inadequate in describing twenty-first-century identity realities. Wolhuter (2008) showed that individuals often adopt highly personalised configurations of religious, cultural, and moral beliefs, defying traditional, singular labels. Identity descriptors such as “Protestant” or “Sikh” function more appropriately as Weberian ideal types or Wittgensteinian family resemblances, serving heuristic rather than definitive purposes (Wolhuter et al. 2008).

Citizenship education should actively develop students’ capacity for reflexivity, enabling them to examine and deconstruct identity categories critically. Reflexive pedagogies should foster an awareness of the socially constructed nature of identity, the limitations of rigid classifications, and the dangers of stereotyping (Wolhuter et al. 2025). This epistemological sensitivity enhances learners’ ability to engage with pluralistic societies in ways that resist ethnocentrism and essentialism, thus promoting democratic coexistence.

7.5. The Complementarity of National and Global Citizenship

While national citizenship remains a vital topic in political participation, social cohesion, and identity anchoring (Marshall 1950; Dewey 1916), global challenges increasingly demand the cultivation of global citizenship consciousness. Climate change, terrorism, nuclear threats, pandemics, and artificial intelligence require transnational cooperation and shared ethical responsibility (Harari 2024; UNESCO 2015). National and global dimensions of citizenship are thus not mutually exclusive but are interdependent in addressing contemporary civic realities (Schugurensky and Wolhuter 2020).

Accordingly, citizenship education should cultivate national and global civic engagement competencies. Curricula should balance historical, cultural, and constitutional literacy with transnational awareness, intercultural dialogue, and global problem-solving skills (Çayır 2015; Myers and Rappoport 2021). Students should be equipped to act as informed citizens within their national democracies and as ethical participants in the global community (UNESCO 2015; Schugurensky and Wolhuter 2020).

7.6. Reconceptualising Space: From Territorial to Relational Frameworks

Finally, contemporary conceptualisations of space must shift away from strictly territorial and geographically fixed notions to embrace relational and networked understandings. Space is increasingly constituted by social relations, digital connections, and genealogical or supra-genealogical affiliations rather than by contiguous physical borders alone (Lewis et al. 2016; Brock 2016; Brown and Schweisfurth 2024). The elasticity of concepts such as the “Global South” reflects this fluid spatial logic (Di Nicola 2020; Wolhuter et al. 2025).

Citizenship education must reflect these shifting spatial dynamics by expanding learners’ spatial literacy to include relational, virtual, and historical dimensions of identity and belonging. Pedagogies should explore how digital technologies, global networks, and genealogical ties shape civic identities and communities in complex, multi-scalar ways (Wolhuter et al. 2025; Lewis et al. 2016). This spatial reconceptualisation prepares students for participation in civic life that transcends traditional geographical constraints.

8. Concluding Remarks

The discussion throughout this article has highlighted the profound tensions between the increasingly complex, hybrid nature of identity in the era of Globalisation 3.0 and the enduring human need for belonging, which have far-reaching implications for citizenship education. Because historically significant, traditional nation state-based models of citizenship education are no longer sufficient in addressing the multi-faceted identity negotiations that individuals undertake in today’s globalised and often polarised world. At the same time, although it addresses specific transnational challenges, global citizenship has not fully fulfilled individuals’ existential need for rootedness and coherence. The six guiding principles proposed offer a way forward by grounding citizenship education in an approach that is sensitive to the human quest for Heimat, recognises the multi-layered and hybrid nature of modern identity, fosters reflexivity against essentialist categorisations, and balances national and global civic commitments within a relational and fluid spatial framework. This way, citizenship education can better equip learners to navigate identity formation amidst intercultural conflict and identity flux while at the same time cultivating ethical responsibility and belonging at multiple levels of social life. Ultimately, this reconceptualised citizenship education is not merely an academic reformulation but a necessary response to the urgent societal transformations that are defining our current existence.