Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Effects of Problem Size and the Problem Proposing Mechanism on the Problem Processing Mechanism in a New Main Manufacturer–Supplier Collaborative System
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Methods
2.1. Theoretical Backgrounds and Assumptions
2.1.1. Main Manufacturer–Supplier Collaborative Mode
2.1.2. Problem Processing Mechanism in M-S Collaborative Supply Chain
2.1.3. Problem Size and Problem Processing Mechanism
2.1.4. Problem Proposing Mechanism and Problem Processing Mechanism
2.2. Payoff Matrix for Manufacturer and Supplier.
3. Results
3.1. Equilibrium Points and Their Stability Analysis
3.2. Impact of the Problem Size
3.3. Impact of The Problem Proposing Mechanism
4. Discussion
4.1. Theoretical Implication
4.2. Managerial Implication
4.3. Limitations and Future Research Directions
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Supplier | Main Manufacturer | |
---|---|---|
Deal with the problem (D) | Not deal with the problem (N) | |
Deal with the problem (D) | , | , |
Not deal with the problem (N) | , | , |
Scenario | The Existing Condition | ESSs |
---|---|---|
① | and | and |
② | and | and |
③ | and | No ESS exists |
④ | and | No ESS exists |
⑤ | , , and or | |
⑥ | , , and or | |
⑦ | , , and or | |
⑧ | , , and or |
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Zhang, M.; Zhu, J.; Kumaraswamy, P.; Wang, H. Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Effects of Problem Size and the Problem Proposing Mechanism on the Problem Processing Mechanism in a New Main Manufacturer–Supplier Collaborative System. Mathematics 2019, 7, 588. https://doi.org/10.3390/math7070588
Zhang M, Zhu J, Kumaraswamy P, Wang H. Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Effects of Problem Size and the Problem Proposing Mechanism on the Problem Processing Mechanism in a New Main Manufacturer–Supplier Collaborative System. Mathematics. 2019; 7(7):588. https://doi.org/10.3390/math7070588
Chicago/Turabian StyleZhang, Ming, Jianjun Zhu, Ponnambalam Kumaraswamy, and Hehua Wang. 2019. "Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Effects of Problem Size and the Problem Proposing Mechanism on the Problem Processing Mechanism in a New Main Manufacturer–Supplier Collaborative System" Mathematics 7, no. 7: 588. https://doi.org/10.3390/math7070588