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Article

“I Am for Diversity…”: How a Victimhood Legal Formula Weaponizes Faculty Academic Freedom Against Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Social Justice

by
LaWanda Wynette Ward
* and
Daisy Rodriguez
Education Policy Studies Department, College of Education, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16801, USA
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Educ. Sci. 2025, 15(10), 1364; https://doi.org/10.3390/educsci15101364
Submission received: 3 April 2025 / Revised: 29 September 2025 / Accepted: 4 October 2025 / Published: 14 October 2025

Abstract

The phenomenon of white men faculty filing lawsuits alleging that diversity, equity, inclusion, and social justice violate their free speech and academic freedom rights is instructive for how legal strategies are employed. We engaged white legal logic to examine how three white men faculty members narrated their experiences and what legal precedent was used to support their requested legal redress. The two most salient themes are as follows: (1) plaintiffs constructed a dual legal narrative, positioning themselves as both victims and champions of DEI and social justice initiatives by simultaneously mischaracterizing DEI and social justice to align with their ideological perspectives; (2) plaintiffs weaponized academic freedom and free speech legal precedents to frame their purported ideological dissent about DEI initiatives as a constitutionally protected right. In addition to identifying two major themes, we observed a pattern in legal strategies to add to white legal logic: a victimhood legal formula. Ultimately, we illuminate calculated efforts to maintain systemic inequities under the guise of law and demonstrate the enduring struggle over education’s role in a racially diverse society.

1. Introduction

Since 2021, conservative and alt-right legislators across the United States have proposed and enacted laws aimed at suppressing critical conversations about race, racism, and gender in education. These efforts have expanded into successful waves of legislation that explicitly target diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) in higher education (Benitez et al., 2025; Adam Sachs & Young, 2025). Whether framed as bans on teaching “divisive concepts,” curriculum restrictions, or DEI program dismantling, these efforts share a common goal: to “impose ideological control over education by restricting the freedom to learn, read, and think” (Friedman et al., 2023, p. 7). Thus, even lawsuits filed before the passage of explicit anti-DEI legislation can be understood as part of a broader political project to curtail educational freedom.
Debates about what constitutes DEI and social justice range across political and ideological spectrums (Crenshaw, 2023; S. Harper et al., n.d.). However, these debates are not merely theoretical; they influence policy decisions that shape the future of education and public discourse. Definitions of DEI and social justice as tools to address and dismantle historically created and contemporarily maintained systems and structures of exclusion are met with resistance. White men who do not believe racism, white supremacy, and other forms of oppression exist have been the primary drivers of efforts to suppress DEI and social justice. Their versions of DEI and social justice involve race-evasive discourses and present ahistorical and acontextual realities of how the United States was formed and functions. Mischaracterizations of DEI and social justice do not occur in a vacuum but are sustained by white men and those who subscribe to whiteness and possess institutional power and influence. By proposing and advocating for anti-DEI legislation, they have the ability to mischaracterize these concepts and suppress their implications. Because they are the orchestrators of the anti-intellectual movement their decisions control educational discourse and policy.
Embrick and Moore (2020) argue that higher education institutions often operate as white spaces—not simply in terms of their demographic composition, but in cultural, ideological, and epistemological norms and values. These white spaces can then reproduce white supremacist logics that suppress Black, Indigenous and more racially minoritized People of Color (BIPOC) knowledge systems while reinforcing white worldviews. Through policies, practices, and norms that reflect and protect whiteness, institutions of higher education become spaces where racial inequity is not only maintained but also rationalized under the guises of objectivity, neutrality, and academic freedom (Briscoe et al., 2024; Cabrera, 2024; Moore, 2020; Patton, 2016).
White men in legislative positions wield the power to enact laws that censor curriculum, silence critical perspectives, and reinforce dominant narratives that align with their racial and political interests (Hazel, 2025; Moore, 2014a; Muñiz, 2024). According to the National Center for Education Statistics (2024), 72% of faculty self-identify as white, with white men alone making up 32%—the largest demographic group among faculty at public and private degree-granting institutions. White men’s dominance in higher education allows them to control knowledge production by setting norms, expectations, and boundaries around what constitutes “legitimate” scholarship, whose voices are amplified, and what topics are deemed acceptable (Delgado Bernal & Villalpando, 2002; Patton, 2016; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Williamson-Lott, 2018; Zuberi & Bonilla-Silva, 2008). White men’s dual authority over the production and regulation of knowledge ensures that higher education remains an extension of the broader power structures that privilege whiteness while simultaneously silencing and erasing histories, experiences and perspectives that challenge systemic inequities (Ladson-Billings, 2000). White spaces are not passive—they actively shape what is deemed acceptable, legitimate, and worthy of protection (Embrick & Moore, 2020). Thus, with the ever-evolving sociopolitical legal landscape that has determined DEI and social justice are unconstitutional, academic freedom is in a state of precarity and being weaponized. Equity work is no longer legally protected; therefore, it is important to understand the role of legal discourse, that is rooted in white supremacy, advanced by white men to roll back racial progress.
Studying at the intersection of legal authority, institutional power, and educational discourse, we ask: (1) How have white men faculty members used legal strategies to frame themselves as champions and victims of diversity, equity, inclusion, and social justice? Employing IDA methodology, we draw from and extend white legal logic (Ward, 2022a) in our analysis of how these three White men faculty members narrate their experiences through legal precedent to support their requested redress.

1.1. Weaponizing Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech to Mischaracterize DEI

The current federal government administration, conservative and alt-right state legislators have waged war against DEI, anti-racism, and more related concepts. It is important to recognize that their actions are not isolated incidents. Instead, they are deeply rooted in historical efforts to maintain racial hierarchies within education (Gillborn, 2007; Patton, 2016; Zuberi & Bonilla-Silva, 2008). Critical scholars assert that higher education institutions are deeply rooted in whiteness exemplified through ideologies, practices, and policies that reflect white supremacist logics which disproportionately harm BIPOC (Gusa, 2010; S. R. Harper, 2012; Ray, 2019). Faculty are recognized and operate as being in positions of power to determine what knowledge is and how it is conveyed. Society and established organizations have institutionalized the notion that faculty have academic freedom which offers job protection as well as precarity. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) outlines three rights faculty members are entitled to under academic freedom (AAUP, n.d.; Poch, 1993). These rights include (1) freedom from institutional censorship and discipline, (2) freedom in publication and research, and (3) freedom inside and outside the classroom for professors to comment on their field of specialization (Altbach et al., 1999).
Chemerinsky (1998, 2023) asserts that academic freedom cannot exist without freedom of speech. However, it is important to note that academic freedom and freedom of speech are not interchangeable (Braley-Rattai & Bezanson, 2020). Freedom of speech is a legally constructed right defined through a series of United State Supreme Court (SCOTUS) decisions that have defined how citizens have right to express ideas and opinions (verbal and behavior) without government interference or punishment (Abrams v. United States, 1919; Whitney v. California, 1927; Schenck v. United States, 1919). Academic freedom, “eludes precise definition” (Kaplin & Lee, 2014) yet the concept is accepted as empowering faculty to teach, research, and speak about topics without fear of retaliation from government and its actors, such as institutions of higher education. While SCOTUS has described academic freedom as a special concern (Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 1967), it has not provided clarification about when a faculty member employed at a public university (government entity) speaks in their private citizen capacity or as a government employee.
A two-prong test is typically considered by courts to determine if a public employee’s speech warrants free speech protection: (1) Is the employee speaking as a private citizen on a matter of public concern? (2) Did the government entity have adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public? If the court answers “no” to the first question, its analysis concludes. If the answer is “yes”, the second question is determined (Strasser, 2018). If a court determines that someone is speaking as a private citizen on a matter of public concern, it must find a balance to the faculty member’s right to speak against the institution’s interests in maintaining workplace efficiency, discipline and harmony. In practice, this balancing test often hinges on the potential disruption the speech may cause, such as a faculty member’s role within the institution, and the context in which the speech occurred (Connick v. Myers, 1983; Garcetti v. Ceballos, 2006; Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 1979; Pickering v. Board of Education, 1968). Legal ambiguities have caused the outcomes of these types of cases to be highly fact pattern specific, particularly in academic contexts as there continues to be a rise of complex questions about the boundaries of institutional control and individual expressive rights.
Courts have determined what qualifies as a “matter of public concern” by examining the content, form, and context of the speech. As established in Connick v. Myers (1983), public concern generally includes topics of political, social, or community-wide importance opposed to speech about internal workplace matters that do not receive the same protections. When courts determine what constitutes a matter of public concern when applied in an academic context, they must consider faculty members’ responsibilities often include addressing controversial or politically charged topics through their teaching, research, or public commentary. Therefore, clear distinctions become increasingly complex.
Courts must distinguish between speech made as a private citizen versus as an employee acting within one’s scope of their official duties. In Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006), SCOTUS held that speech made within the official responsibilities of a public employee is not protected under the First Amendment rights, even if it touches on public concerns. However, SCOTUS withheld a definitive ruling on how this standard applies within an academic context, leaving lower courts divided on interpretations and without clear guidance. Some courts have carved out an exception for academic speech in cases involving a faculty member’s teaching and scholarship reasoning that faculty must retain expressive freedom to fulfill their professional obligations (Strasser, 2018; Waters v. Churchill, 1994). Inconsistent application of the Garcetti decision has led to legal uncertainty for faculty at public institutions (Strasser, 2018).
Strasser (2018) asserts that in Pickering and Garcetti, legal ambiguity has significant implications for academic freedom. He explains how Garcetti fails to account for the unique position of academic work, where duties such as teaching and research are inherently expressive. As such, when courts apply a narrow lens to public employee’s speech as it relates to faculty, they risk undermining the core First Amendment protections by chilling speech on matters of public concern that arise within a university context. As such, Strasser suggests that courts use the Pickering v. Board of Education (1968) balancing test—which considers the interest of faculty members in commenting on public matters versus the institution’s interests in maintaining efficiency as this approach may be a better standard for evaluating academic speech, especially when it overlaps with professional responsibilities.
Overall, when faculty members criticize university policies courts must weigh whether that speech is protected under the First Amendment. This determination is not only legal but political as it shapes current ideological struggles over what constitutes legitimate academic inquiry. The unresolved legal status of academic freedom positions disgruntled white men faculty members to weaponize it. Simultaneously, BIPOC faculty demand the interpretation of academic freedom that will protect DEI and social justice. These two competing dynamics demand scholarly attention.

1.2. Theoretical Framework

Ward’s (2022a) working definition of white legal logic guided our analysis. The theory is inspired by Critical Race Theory (CRT) legal scholars who have written about free speech theory such as Kimberle’ Crenshaw, Charles Lawrence, and Mari Matsuda. One of CRT’s key functions is to reveal racism, how it operates in society, and to illuminate “the collusion of law and white supremacy” (Harris, 2019, p. 19). Recurrent themes of white legal logic include but are not limited to: (1) whiteness-informed legal reasoning that results in suppression of BIPOC civil rights and ongoing manifestations of colonization; (2) ahistorical, acontextual, willful incomplete (therefore illegitimate) accounts of the law’s role in US historical violence and its persisting effects; (3) arrogant demands of BIPOC to accept and adopt legal reasoning rooted in whiteness and anti-blackness and condoned violence against BIPOC who question or reject such reasoning; (4) resistance to revisit or reject legal precedent unless it benefits whiteness; (5) a neoliberal “market of ideas” myth based on the belief that speech outside of societal norms (determined by whiteness) will be reject and not consumed, so no government (including public colleges and universities) actions is needed for regulation; and (6) racism is a weak claim in legal arguments and reasoning because all too often the evidence submitted to prove that racism exists is rejected as unfounded, erroneous or offensive accusations. White legal logic provides an opportunity to name the hegemonic power of whiteness in law and its use to commandeer legal arguments that typically advocate racial progress. (Figure 1).

2. Methodology

2.1. Researchers’ Positionality

We enter this work as qualitative researchers, a Black women associate professor and a Latina woman Ph.D. candidate, both in the field of higher education. We are committed to unapologetically naming white supremacy at the core of legal claims that DEI and social justice efforts that violate academic freedom and free speech rights of not only white men faculty members but anyone else who makes such meritless claims. Our work joins the scholarship that refuses to normalize ahistorical and acontextual accounts of racism and other systems of oppression that continue to plague United States society.

2.2. Methods

To complement white legal logic, we employed Intersectionality Discourse Analysis (IDA) (Ward, 2022b), a non-linear and irritative process to analyze legal complaints. We engaged IDA to examine how white men faculty members constructed and deployed discourse in lawsuits challenging DEI and social justice efforts in public higher education institutions. Ward (2022b) developed IDA inspired by other legal scholars’ approaches to engaging Critical Discourse Analysis for court cases (Innis, 2010; Moore, 2014b). Drawing on Carbado’s (2013) framing of intersectionality, IDA shows how color-evasive and gender-evasive1 practices privilege white men. In this study, white men’s historical and contemporary power in academia influenced our coding process. Specifically, we focused on their access to power allows them to legitimize “a broader epistemic universe in which the racial presence, racial particularity, and racial interests of white people travel invisibly and undisrupted as race-neutral phenomena” (pp. 823–824), particularly within the law. The IDA approach moves beyond line-by-line readings of court cases and legal documents. Instead, IDA requires researchers to conduct a critically conscious reading of legal texts to identify embedded themes in what is included and excluded. Race and power have always determined the parameters of laws and who can bring forward legitimate claims. Researchers who engage IDA must attend to history, societal context, and discourse.
IDA allows researchers to critically analyze legal texts beyond explicit arguments but also for the underlying power dynamics, ideological framings, and rhetorical strategies. Specifically, we engaged IDA to investigate legal complaints brought by white men faculty members. Our approach followed the IDA criteria:
“1. Identify relevant social identities and explore how power dynamics (historical and contemporary), legal discourse(s), and hegemonic processes obfuscate or normalize subordination and discrimination. 2. Identify legal framing that sets up the boundaries of laws (i.e., what is included and excluded), “relevant facts” that align with current laws, law’s application to the relevant facts, and resulting legal decisions. 3. Analyze discursive tactics employed in a court’s explanation and justification of frames, name rhetorical practices, and clarify ideologies that go into making up the law’s articulations. 4. Critique how legal framing and discourse of court (s) relate to and connect with the racialized practices, institutional arrangements, and structures that maintain white supremacy, genderism, heteronormativity, and other systems of subordination”.

2.3. Data Collection

Guided by our researched question we focused on locating lawsuits filed by white men because that group’s perspectives disproportionately dictate the creation of laws and determine legal interpretations and policy formations. Our dataset consists of three United States District Court legal complaints filed by white men faculty members in Texas (two cases) and North Carolina (one case) who alleged discrimination and violations of their academic freedom and free speech rights. These cases were selected to interrogate how white men faculty plaintiffs in states with enacted anti-DEI legislation frame their claims regarding academic freedom and diversity-related policies. The documents were collected in two phases to ensure a systemic and comprehensive selection process. In the first phase, we employed Westlaw.com, a widely recognized legal research platform, to conduct a search of federal and state court cases between 2020 and 2024. We chose this time frame to reflect the legislative and political attacks on DEI and social justice policies, following the 2020 Black Lives Matter movement and the subsequent conservative and alt-right backlash against equity initiatives in higher education.
To identify cases relevant to faculty claims of academic freedom and free speech, Author Two conducted a search using the following actions: (1) conduct an initial search that included terms such as “[faculty + academic freedom+ higher education]” to gather a wide range of legal disputes, and (2) refine the data and focus specifically on cases invoking First Amendment protections. Additional terms like “[freedom of speech + first amendment+ higher education institution]” were applied. In recognizing that legal battles can occur at multiple judicial levels, Author two conducted separate searches for state and federal court systems. This process resulted in 17 cases that broadly aligned with our focus on faculty legal challenges to First Amendment rights and DEI-related policies.
Given the nature of our study, we sought to focus on states with enacted anti-DEI legislation. We searched the PEN America Index of Educational Gag Order Laws, a comprehensive database that tracks state-level legislative efforts to censor discussions of race, systemic inequality, and DEI-related topics in education settings (PEN America, n.d.). Once we identified states with anti-DEI laws, Author Two narrowed down the cases following these criteria: (1) cases involving a white man faculty member; (2) plaintiffs located in states that currently have anti- DEI legislation; and (3) lawsuits that included alleged violations of First Amendment, academic freedom related to DEI and social justice. This process narrowed down the cases to three: Hiers v. The Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N. Tex. Sys. (2020), Lowery v. Mills (2023), and Porter v. Board of Trustees of N. C. State University (2022).

2.4. Data Analysis

Our data consisted of three complaints as follows: Hiers v. The Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N. Tex. Sys. (2020), (31 pages), Lowery v. Mills (2023) (26 pages), and Porter v. Board of Trustees of N. C. State University (2022) (27 pages). Within each complaint, plaintiffs narrated their version of the facts that led to their lawsuits which included photo evidence, requests for jury trials, and financial compensation. Additionally, each complaint described what we called a tipping point; each faculty member was reprimanded by either non-renewal of contract (Hiers) or change of responsibilities and access to institutional resources (Lowery and Porter). After gathering the three complaints, one from North Carolina and two from Texas, our first action was to apply the first and second criteria of IDA. Following IDA’s nonlinear and iterative guiding criteria, we sought to understand their narration and identify language used to frame and justify their way of thinking. Furthermore, using IDA allowed us to interpret the usage of common legal terminology such as the “marketplace of ideas” as justification to support claims that their free speech and academic freedom rights were violated.

2.5. Findings

To contextualize the findings, we briefly summarize the three legal complaints analyzed in this study. Each case involves a white man faculty member challenging institutional DEI initiatives through legal narratives that invoke academic freedom and First Amendment protections.
Hiers v. The Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N. Tex. Sys. (2020): Nathaniel Hiers, an adjunct mathematics faculty member, filed a complaint alleging wrongful termination after critiquing departmental DEI materials, specifically fliers about microaggressions. Lowery v. Mills (2023): Richard Lowery, a finance professor at the University of Texas at Austin, alleged that institutional leaders retaliated against him for publicly criticizing DEI initiatives and their use of public funds. Porter v. Board of Trustees of N. C. State University (2022): Robert Porter, a professor of higher education, claimed that his responsibilities were systematically removed in retaliation for his critiques of DEI and social justice ideologies.
White legal logic informed our findings that illuminate how white men faculty plaintiffs in Hiers v. The Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N. Tex. Sys. (2020), Lowery v. Mills (2023), and Porter v. Board of Trustees of N. C. State University (2022) argued “facts” that demonstrate a victimhood legal formula which maintains white supremacy and normalizes the resistance of racial progress. We identified a victimhood legal formula as another recurring theme to expand Ward’s (2022a) white legal logic concept. A victimhood legal formula involves strategies that present legal narratives positioning white men plaintiffs as victims, misunderstood, ostracized, and wrongfully penalized. Specifically, plaintiffs’ versions offer ahistorical and acontextual accounts of DEI and anti-racism, while advancing the “marketplace of ideas” myth.
Our analysis, guided by white legal logic and informed by the methodological and theoretical foundations of IDA, identified two major themes: (1) plaintiffs constructed a dual legal narrative, positioning themselves as both victims and champions of DEI initiatives by simultaneously mischaracterizing DEI to align with their own ideological perspectives, and (2) plaintiffs weaponized academic freedom and free speech legal precedents to frame their purported ideological dissent about DEI initiatives as a constitutionally protected right.

2.5.1. Plaintiffs Constructed a Dual Legal Narrative, Positioning Themselves as Victims and Champions of DEI Initiatives by Simultaneously Mischaracterizing DEI to Align with Their Own Ideological Perspectives

Across all three complaints, the plaintiffs employed a consistent victimhood legal formula through three interconnected strategies: (1) framing DEI as discriminatory, (2) asserting retaliation and marginalization, and (3) mischaracterizing DEI language to critique institutional practices. This cross-case analysis reveals the systematic nature of these legal challenges and their shared ideological foundations.
Hiers v. The Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N. Tex. Sys. (2020), Hiers alleged that his termination resulted from his critique of fliers, anonymously left in the department’s break room, that warned about microaggressions. He framed his facts around his intellectual dissent about microaggressions and how they foster a culture of victimhood and discourage open dialogue. For instance, Hiers described the math department environment as a non-intellectually engaging space because of reactions to his written message on the department’s chalkboard, “‘Please don’t leave garbage lying around,’ with an arrow pointing to the [microaggression] fliers”2 (Hiers v. The Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N. Tex. Sys., 2020, p. 13, para. 112). He described his actions as a “joke” and elaborated on his critique of how the microaggressions flier undermined diversity and tolerance:
[T]his mode of thinking teaches people to see the worst in other people, promotes a culture of victimhood, and suppresses alternative viewpoints instead of encouraging growth and dialogue… [As] many of the statements that the flier condemns as “microaggressions” can (and should) be interpreted in a benign or positive manner. However, the fliers teach people to focus on the worst possible interpretation of the statement, to disregard the speaker’s intent, and to impute a discriminatory motive to others.
The above statements in Heir’s complaint map onto the three strategies of a victimhood legal formula. First, he disagreed with a DEI value, microaggression-free learning spaces, that he alleged resulted in him being discriminated against. Second, Hiers accused the math department chair, Schmidt, of a retaliatory action, cancelling a subsequent teaching contract, to silence Heirs’ dissent. Further, Heirs described two incidents between him and Schmidt to support his claim of retaliation and marginalization. He claimed that defendant Schmidt used his opinion to “ignore reasonable views opposing the “microaggressions” fliers and ultimately punished Hiers for expressing his opinion” (Hiers v. The Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N. Tex. Sys., 2020, p. 16, para. 153). Hiers claimed his contract was not renewed due to his refusal to retract his statements about microaggressions or attend additional DEI training. The complaint cited an excerpt from Schmidt’s termination letter: “[Y]our actions and responses are not compatible with the values of this department. So, with regret I see no other choice than to not renew your employment” (Hiers v. The Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N. Tex. Sys., 2020, p. 17, para. 164).
Third, Hiers mischaracterized DEI language in his complaint. He argued that his critique was not an attack on diversity but rather an effort to strengthen it. Hiers described himself as someone who “values diversity, tolerance, and growth” (Hiers v. The Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N. Tex. Sys., 2020, p. 13, para. 112) and contended that his criticism of the flier was intended to: “promote diversity, tolerance, and growth in the academic environment at the University generally and in the mathematics department” (Hiers v. The Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N. Tex. Sys., 2020, p. 13, para. 113).
Hiers further claimed that the existing DEI initiatives are harmful and should be evaluated to promote open dialogue rather than suppress dissent. In this framing, he alleged that his actions defend the University’s stated commitment to diversity and intellectual freedom. Ultimately, Hiers framed his dismissal as institutional overreach designed to “silence ideological opposition under the guise of promoting inclusion” (Hiers v. The Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N. Tex. Sys., 2020, p. 2, para. 8), rather than as legitimate accountability for inappropriate conduct.
Engaging IDA, we view the Hiers arguments as performative and a cooption approach to promote diversity as opposed to attending to its context and historical purpose. The microaggressions documents were being intolerant of hate yet, Hiers was arguing for people to tolerate hate.
Lowery v. Mills (2023), Lowery also presented facts that portrayed DEI policies as instruments of ideological oppression rather than mechanisms for equity and inclusion. He framed his critique of DEI initiatives as a defense of intellectual freedom and diversity of thought that was met with an organized retaliation. His complaint alleges a series of actions taken by institutional leaders in a retaliatory strategy against him that threatened his job, pay, institute affiliation, research opportunities, academic freedom, and labeled his behavior as inviting violence or lacking in civility” (Lowery v. Mills, 2023, p. 2).
Lowery’s narrative of victimhood because of DEI is exhibited by claims that his critiques directly resulted in professional retaliation. We identified a strategy of a victimhood legal formula, framing DEI as discriminatory, in Lowery’s allegation that because his behavior was labeled “as inviting violence or lacking in civility”, he had to self-censor his social media and alter “his speeches in academic settings” (Lowery v. Mills, 2023, p. 2, paras. 2–3). This claim is further supported by his narration of a conversation between Defendant Titman and Lowery’s friend and colleague, Carlos Carvalho: “We need to do something about [Lowery]. He added that President Hartzell and Dean Mills were upset about Lowery’s political advocacy and wanted to know if ‘we can ask him to tone it down?’” (Lowery v. Mills, 2023, pp. 12–13, para. 36). By including this exchange in the complaint, Lowery positioned himself as a target of administrative efforts to purportedly suppress his dissent against the University’s DEI initiatives.
Lowery’s complaint also reflected another victimhood legal strategy—retaliation and marginalization—in a description of an incident related to the creation of the Liberty Institute, a proposed center for classical-liberal and pro-free-market scholarship. He claimed a suppression of alternative viewpoints were at play by the university’s actions of supposedly aligning the center with its own DEI agenda (Lowery v. Mills, 2023). Lowery asserted that the University’s administration “hijacked” the Liberty Institute Through this argument, he framed himself as a victim of ideological exclusion, alleging that the institution sought to marginalize him for challenging DEI initiatives.
Another legal strategy of a victimhood legal formula- mischaracterizing DEI language—is evident in Lowery’s depiction of the Liberty Institute and his mischaracterization of DEI. He asserted that the center would have served as a counterweight to the dominant critical race theory and DEI-based ideology that was metastasizing from its origins in the humanities into more evidence-based disciplines such as business, economics, and STEM disciplines… bringing needed intellectual diversity to campus and push[ing] back against persistent attacks of free inquiry (Lowery v. Mills, 2023, pp. 6–7, paras. 16; 21).
Throughout this framing, Lowery constructed his version of diversity as one that promoted his own perception of DEI while simultaneously portraying DEI efforts as dangerous and indoctrinatory. This strategic mischaracterization enabled Lowery to claim that he is not opposed to diversity but rather to how it is currently implemented, reinforcing his broader argument that definitions of DEI that are different from his, suppress intellectual freedom rather than fostering true inclusion.
Porter v. Board of Trustees of N. C. State University (2022), Similarly to Heirs and Lowrey, Porter weaved together the three strategies of a victimhood legal formula to craft facts that showcased his purported irreparable harm due to DEI initiatives because he defended intellectual freedom and academic diversity. Porter’s facts alleged how his responsibilities were gradually stripped away in an organized strategy to remove him from the higher education program (Porter v. Board of Trustees of N. C. State University, 2022). This narration positioned Porter as a victim of ideological exclusion, where his dissent was suppressed under the guise of promoting DEI and social justice.
Porter’s complaint reflected a narrative of victimhood and retaliation—two legal strategies of a victimhood legal strategy—that he allegedly experienced after expressing opinions “on important societal issues” (Porter v. Board of Trustees of N. C. State University, 2022, p. 2, para. 1). He asserted that “defendants [were] gradually forcing [him] into what is effectively a ‘rubber room’ in retaliation for his criticism of the so-called ‘social justice’ ideology that prevailed both in his department and in academia more broadly” (Porter v. Board of Trustees of N. C. State University, 2022, p. 2, para. 2).
Porter claimed that a meeting occurred that led to him being removed from the program, Plaintiff expressed his concerns with a proposal by the CED’s Council on Multicultural and Diversity Issues to add a question on diversity to student course evaluations… To be clear, Plaintiff does not oppose, and in fact supports, the increased recruitment of qualified faculty and students of color in his academic field. But this is not what “diversity” now means in the College of Education…he was concerned that in response to social pressure, the department was rushing to include a question that had not been properly designed, and this might be harmful to faculty without yielding useful information (Porter v. Board of Trustees of N. C. State University, 2022, p. 7, para. 20; 22). Porter’s inclusion of his support for increased recruitment of racially minoritized faculty and students helped to frame him as being marginalized because his suggestion to slow down the process was met with accusations that he was against DEI.
Furthermore, like the complaints of Heirs and Lowery, Porter used the language of DEI to critique its ideological influence within academia. Porter claimed that DEI initiatives suppress diverse perspectives and abandon rigorous methodological analyses which prompted him to dissent from viewpoints generally in the field. Framing DEI as a compromise to academic research, Porter blended his critique of DEI with a mischaracterized version. Specifically, Porter positioned his actions as a legitimate defense of intellectual diversity rather than an opposition to diversity itself. By framing his critique as an effort to promote an intellectually open environment, Porter sought to align his views with a broader understanding of diversity that he claimed is being undermined by contemporary DEI practices (Porter v. Board of Trustees of N. C. State University, 2022).
All three plaintiffs constructed narratives that portrayed DEI initiatives as exclusionary rather than inclusionary. This consistent framing across cases demonstrates how white legal logic operates to invert power relations—positioning those with institutional privilege as victims of discrimination. Each plaintiff employed nearly identical language to characterize DEI as harmful to the very values it claims to promote, revealing a coordinated discursive strategy rather than independent grievances.
Building on this seemingly calculated inversion, the plaintiffs also advanced detailed narratives of professional retaliation to support their claims of victimhood. The similarity in these retaliation narratives—despite occurring at different institutions and involving different specific circumstances—suggests a formulaic approach to constructing legal victimhood. Each plaintiff positioned administrative responses to their conduct as evidence of ideological persecution rather than legitimate professional accountability. Perhaps most significantly, all three plaintiffs employed DEI language itself to critique DEI initiatives, claiming they were the true defenders of diversity and inclusion. This strategic mischaracterization enables plaintiffs to appear supportive of diversity while undermining its substantive implementation. By mischaracterizing DEI language, they position themselves as advocates for “authentic” diversity against what they characterize as corrupted institutional versions. This represents a sophisticated evolution of colorevasive rhetoric that acknowledges diversity as valuable while stripping it of any meaningful commitment to addressing historical inequities.

2.5.2. Plaintiffs Weaponized Academic Freedom and Free Speech Legal Precedents to Frame Their Purported Ideological Dissent About DEI Initiatives as a Constitutionally Protected Right

Across all three complaints the plaintiffs invoked white legal logic to narrate parallel legal stories of institutional leaders violating their First Amendment rights and that DEI initiatives infringe upon their academic freedom. Their free speech claims also followed another set of strategies within a victimhood legal formula: (1) assert a right and commitment to participating in the “marketplace of ideas” and (2) frame DEI as a “matter of public concern” to legitimize critiques, and (3) assert that First Amendment rights, freedom of speech and expression, should protect one from any professional consequences for opposing DEI policies. In the following sections, we present our analysis of repeated legal strategies throughout each plaintiff’s complaint.
Heirs asserted that when he, as a credentialed professor, critiqued the concept of microaggressions, he was exercising a well-established legally protected right. Hiers began his complaint,
The cornerstone of higher education is the ability of professors to participate freely in the “marketplace of ideas,” where all viewpoints can be debated on their merits… Seeking to participate in this marketplace, Plaintiff Nathaniel Hiers obtained his doctorate in Mathematics.
This framing within an academic identity signaled to the court that Heirs should be viewed as an advocate for intellectual diversity rather than an opponent of DEI. This narrative further positioned Hiers to align with a broader legally established precedent that faculty express dissent therefore logically his critiques of DEI should be viewed as an act of academic freedom. Heirs also argued that he was speaking as a private citizen and off duty despite being in the faculty lounge talking to his peers. His complaint stated, “when Dr. Hiers expressed his views on “microaggressions,” he was speaking on a public concern… [as] discussing matters of public concern in the context of teaching and scholarship outweighs Defendants’ interest in the efficient provision of service” (Hiers v. The Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N. Tex. Sys., 2020, p. 22, para. 210–211). The framing of DEI as a debatable topic and therefore a matter as a public concern is key to support Heirs’ request that the court interpret his free speech rights to outweigh the university’s right to allow advocacy of microaggression-free learning environments. In sum, by situating his critique of microaggression and DEI policies within the broader landscape of public discourse, Hiers attempted to persuade the court that his speech is permissible and protected as free speech and academic freedom.
Finally, Heirs asserted he had First Amendment protection to challenge DEI policies without facing professional or social repercussions. He claimed that his resistance to DEI initiatives was rooted in a commitment to academic excellence and intellectual diversity, not opposition to diversity itself. This framing positioned him as a defender of free speech within the academic environment. His alleged commitment to academic excellence and intellectual diversity erases understandings of DEI as an attendant to historical context.
Lowery also began his complaint with a right to critique and alluded to a marketplace of ideas based on “viewpoint diversity” “The First Amendment protects the right of citizens to criticize government officials including administrators at Texas’ flagship state university for their use of public funds for ideological indoctrination and their hostility to viewpoint diversity and academic freedom” (Lowery v. Mills, 2023, p. 1).
Like Hiers, Lowery positioned himself as a citizen who challenged DEI initiatives as part of a larger debate about matters including “what should be taught and the school’s ideological direction and balance” (Lowery v. Mills, 2023, p. 2). His critiques of DEI framed it as a public concern related to an alleged misuse of public funds and infringement on viewpoint diversity. This logic makes DEI a matter of public concern rather than a personal disdain for it. Lowery published his “concerns” in newspaper columns,
the teaching of critical race theory to young children… [is] a grave misuse of state fund for public purposes…UT’s use of DEI grants… [is] the diversion of state resources to political advocacy through bureaucratic means and the lack of oversight by elected officials.
Furthermore, his complaint used the third legal strategy to assert that his resistance to DEI policies is a stance against ideological conformity and therefore warrants First Amendment protection. Lowery framed himself as a scholar defending academic integrity and not someone who opposes institutional efforts toward diversity and inclusion. University of Texas, Austin’s actions of removing his rights and job responsibilities was retaliation, “an adverse employment action and a serious burden on the right to academic freedom” (Lowery v. Mills, 2023, p. 24, para. 93).
Like Heirs, and Lowery, Porter opened his complaint with legal precedent, The Supreme Court of the United States has made clear that ‘a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression’… That includes a public employee’s right to speak ‘as a citizen upon a matter of public concern (Porter v. Board of Trustees of N. C. State University, 2022, p. 1, para. 1). This opening operates as both a legal groundwork and rhetorical strategy to establish that narrative of a wronged citizen-scholar punished for engaging in legitimate, constitutionally protected debate. Allowing Porter to frame his critiques of DEI as constitutionally protected speech meant that any retaliation by the university could constitute a violation of his rights as a public employee. In the complaint Porter narrates how on 7 November 2018, he “received another letter from Defendant Pasque, this time expressing concern about his “collegiality.” In accusing [Porter] of lack of collegiality, Pasque emphasized three things, all of which related directly to [Porter’s] protected speech” (Porter v. Board of Trustees of N. C. State University, 2022, p. 15, paras. 62–63). Porter further elaborates how the letter included examples such as an article he circulated critiquing a faculty finalist, comments on academic standards, and writing an article that questioned the direction of higher education all of which he further asserts are intellectual dissents, therefore protected speech and not misconduct.
To bolster Porter’s free speech protection argument, his complaint narrates that “Plaintiff’s speech involved a matter of public concern: whether the field of higher education should sacrifice academic rigor in favor of furthering a particular view of ‘social justice’” (Porter v. Board of Trustees of N. C. State University, 2022, pp. 24–25, para. 118). Here, Porter purportedly explains how the language of public concern not only invokes legal protection, but reframes his opposition to DEI and social justice as a defense of academic standards and his critique is civic engagement rather than ideological resistance. Therefore, using this narration within his complaint allowed Porter to argue that any institutional response such as being forced out of the program, siloed, and excluded from faculty meetings, are all retaliatory employment actions (Porter v. Board of Trustees of N. C. State University, 2022).
Porter consistently presented himself as a faculty member who was unjustly targeted for his stance on “important societal issues” (Porter v. Board of Trustees of N. C. State University, 2022, p. 2, para. 1), a recognized legal argument within the broader narrative of academic freedom. Porter claimed he had been outspoken for years regarding “his concern with how the focus on so-called ‘social justice’ is affecting academia in general” (Porter v. Board of Trustees of N. C. State University, 2022, p. 6, para. 19). Through his narrative, Porter advanced a familiar version of academic victimhood drawing on long standing legal and cultural scripts about the university as a contested space of free inquiry while recasting DEI as an illegitimate institutional value and an oppressive force that threatens the foundational tenets of higher education.
All three of the complaints illuminate a victimhood legal formula in which the plaintiffs: (1) assert a right and commitment to participating in the “marketplace of ideas”; (2) argue that DEI is a “public concern”; and (3) assert that First Amendment rights, freedom of speech and expression, should protect one from any professional consequences for deniers of social context. The three white men faculty members position themselves as private citizens merely engaging in a public debate about a matter of public concern, DEI, rather than deniers of social context. Their version of the facts recasts institutional DEI efforts as ideological overreach rather than equitable treatment of BIPOC. Their advocacy for legal legitimacy of their narratives makes it difficult for BIPOC to present arguments about academic freedom protections and sociohistorical relevance of DEI. As these legal challenges potentially dominate in lawsuits and court legitimize anti-DEI, BIPOC and DEI advocates should consider other mechanisms beyond the law for protection (Stefancic & Delgado, 2018). In sum, the victimhood legal formula that undergirds legal strategies (re)shapes higher education discourses, hijacks academic freedom. Therefore, it is necessary to name the phenomenon and interrogate its use.

3. Discussion

We engaged white legal logic (Ward, 2022a) to investigate how three white men faculty members in states with anti-DEI laws used legal strategies within their lawsuit complaints to resist DEI efforts. Our analysis resulted in expanding Ward’s white legal logic to include a theme of victimhood legal formula identified across all three complaints with specific strategies to establish victim status and free speech violations. The following tactics were used to establish victimization due to purported ideological dissent: (1) frame DEI as discriminatory; (2) assert retaliation and marginalization; and (3) mischaracterize DEI language to critique institutional practices. For free speech claims, the arguments reflected these strategies: (1) demonstrate a commitment to the “marketplace of ideas”; (2) argue that DEI is a “public concern”; and (3) assert that opposition to DEI policies should be protected from professional consequences. These findings align with existing scholarship on white supremacy in higher education. Consistent with Embrick and Moore’s (2020) conceptualization of white spaces, our analysis reveals how legal discourse functions to maintain these spaces by positioning challenges to white dominance as constitutional violations. The victimhood legal formula represents a sophisticated evolution of Ray’s (2019) racialized organizational practices—institutional arrangements that maintain white advantage through seemingly neutral processes.
Our findings also echo Cabrera’s (2024) analysis of whiteness in higher education, demonstrating how white individuals leverage institutional power to reframe racial equity efforts as discriminatory against them. Each plaintiff employed nearly identical rhetorical strategies to invert power relations and position themselves as the aggrieved party. This pattern supports Gusa’s (2010) argument that white institutional presence actively shapes what is deemed legitimate, extending this concept into the legal realm where constitutional protections become tools for maintaining racial hierarchies.
Our application of white legal logic (Ward, 2022a) proved illuminating in revealing the calculated nature of these legal challenges. The victimhood legal formula represents a significant extension of Ward’s original six themes, demonstrating how white legal logic adapts to contemporary challenges to white supremacy. The recurrent patterns across all three cases validate Ward’s assertion that white legal logic operates through consistent mechanisms that suppress BIPOC civil rights while appearing to advance neutral legal principles.
The IDA methodology enabled us to uncover embedded power dynamics and ideological framings. Consistent with Carbado’s (2013) intersectionality framework, our analysis revealed how color-evasive and gender-evasive practices allowed these white men faculty to position their privilege as universal concerns about academic freedom.
Our findings challenge existing scholarship on academic freedom. While traditional scholarship treats free speech protections as neutral constitutional principles (AAUP, n.d.; Chemerinsky, 2023), our analysis demonstrates how these protections are weaponized to maintain white supremacy. The victimhood legal formula challenges assumptions underlying the “marketplace of ideas” concept in academic freedom jurisprudence. Our analysis reveals how it functions as a white supremacist construct that privileges certain forms of knowledge while marginalizing others, aligning with critical race theory scholarship critiquing the marketplace of ideas as fundamentally flawed (Delgado Bernal & Villalpando, 2002; Lawrence, 1990).
Our study provides crucial insight into how faculty-level legal challenges operate within broader anti-DEI legislation contexts. The cases analyzed preceded explicit anti-DEI legislation in Texas and North Carolina, yet employed remarkably similar discursive strategies, suggesting coordinated approaches to undermining DEI across multiple institutional levels. The consistency validates S. Harper et al.’s (n.d.) documentation of how DEI misinformation circulates through interconnected resistance networks, with each plaintiff employing nearly identical mischaracterizations of DEI as ideological indoctrination.

4. Implications

The findings from this study offer several implications for practice and future research, particularly when examined through the lens of white legal logic and its role in undermining DEI and social justice efforts in higher education. First, the findings revealed how academic freedom, often regarded as a foundational value of higher education, is increasingly weaponized in both practice and interpretation. Rather than functioning as a universal protection for all faculty, academic freedom is shaped by institutional power, sociopolitical context, and the embedded racialized hierarchies within academia. For instance, in all three cases the white men faculty invoked academic freedom not as a defense of open inquiry, but as a strategic tool to resist institutional commitments of DEI and social justice. These faculty members positioned themselves as defenders of academic rigor while characterizing DEI as politically motivated or ideologically coercive. Their efforts focused on portraying critical pedagogy and anti-racist scholarship as threats to purported objectivity. Their advocacy protects dominant ideologies and reframes academic freedom in ways that maintain white supremacy. Hence, the need for institutional leaders to adopt equity-centered frameworks that recognize how race, power, and positionality shape whose speech and scholarship is protected and whose is silenced or penalized.
Second, we reiterate that academic freedom is weaponized as our findings highlight how white men faculty members continue to assert authority over the definitions of DEI and social justice. Through legal strategies and institutional influence, these faculty members position their views, often grounded in race-evasive, meritocratic, and anti-DEI rhetoric, as neutral, objective and academically valid. In Heirs, he framed microaggressions as promoting a “culture of victimhood,” arguing that such frameworks “actually hurt diversity and tolerance” (Hiers v. The Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N. Tex. Sys., 2020, pp. 11–12, para. 106). His case was settled out of court with a financial award of $165,000. In Lowery, he called for increased viewpoint diversity while simultaneously describing DEI initiatives as politically driven. As of the writing of this article, Lowery is appealing a Texas federal court decision issued in October 2024 in favor of the university. Lowery’s claim that his free speech rights were violated was deemed meritless by the court and viewed as an attempt to rebrand his retaliation claim. Meanwhile in Porter, he argued that DEI in higher education meant “abandoning rigorous methodological” standards (Porter v. Board of Trustees of N. C. State University, 2022, p. 6, para. 19). These assertions are not merely legal defenses, but they are ideological claims that maintain whiteness as the normative framework through which legitimacy in teaching and research is determined. Federal courts did not rule in favor of Porter. Yet, the legal landscape has increasingly become hostile towards DEI and social justice advocacy. Specifically, court decisions and executive orders (i.e., Executive Order 14151, 2025; Executive Order 14173, 2025) that have ruled DEI as unconstitutional define the limits of acceptable scholarship and assert control over what counts as legitimate academic inquiry. Therefore, faculty whose work is guided by feminist, decolonial, and anti-racist knowledge traditions can be and are negatively impacted. The work of organizations such as AAUP, PEN America, and legal advocacy groups who are engaging in the ongoing battle to redefine and contextualize academic freedom in the current moment is necessary. Yet, the legal forum should not be the only arena for change. As such we call on institutional leaders to actively resist these anti-academic freedom agendas by ensuring that DEI and social justice work is not only protected but recognized as intellectually valid and essential to the mission of higher education (Pedota et al., 2025).
Finally, from a research perspective this study underscores the need for more critical inquiry into how legal strategies are being used to defend DEI and social justice, particularly through the lens of white legal logic. These strategies are often employed by white men faculty members who position themselves as neutral actors while challenging equity frameworks they deem ideologically extreme. Enabled by court rulings, policy shifts, and institutional complicity, these legal maneuvers work to mischaracterize DEI and social justice through a white supremacist lens, and undermine the transformative potential of dignity affirming scholarship (Briscoe et al., 2025; Ward, 2022a). Dignity affirmation is evidenced through research that critically examines how tactics function within broader campaigns to suppress critical pedagogy and uphold whiteness as the standard of academic legitimacy. Additionally, we urge the exploration of how institutions respond to legal and political threats whether by retreating, reframing, or reaffirming their DEI and social justice commitments and the material consequences of those responses for BIPOC, critical researchers and students.

5. Conclusions

This study reveals how white legal logic operates through a systematic “victimhood legal formula” that weaponizes constitutional protections against racial equity in higher education. Our analysis of three legal complaints filed by white men faculty members identified consistent discursive strategies that position institutional privilege as persecution while undermining DEI and social justice initiatives.
The victimhood legal formula represents a sophisticated evolution in white supremacist resistance tactics. Rather than overtly opposing diversity efforts, plaintiffs mischaracterize the language of equity and academic freedom to legitimize maintaining racial hierarchies. The consistent strategies across Hiers, Lowery, and Porter cases—framing DEI as discriminatory, constructing retaliation narratives, and mischaracterizing equity initiatives—suggest coordinated resistance that extends beyond individual grievances.
Our IDA analysis revealed how legal discourse functions to normalize white supremacy within ostensibly neutral constitutional frameworks. Plaintiffs weaponized academic freedom protections by positioning their resistance as constitutionally protected speech, effectively shielding white resistance from institutional accountability.
As federal courts increasingly legitimize anti-DEI positions, the legal landscape becomes hostile toward justice-oriented scholarship. Faculty whose work is grounded in critical, anti-racist traditions face growing vulnerabilities as their research is reframed as ideological rather than scholarly. This study underscores the urgent need for institutional leaders and critical scholars to recognize and resist these calculated efforts to weaponize constitutional protections against racial progress. If higher education is to remain a space for transformative inquiry, it must actively resist legal mechanisms that constrain justice-oriented scholarship within narrow constitutional frameworks.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, L.W.W. and D.R.; methodology, L.W.W. and D.R.; formal analysis, L.W.W. and D.R.; writing—original draft preparation, L.W.W. and D.R.; writing—review and editing, L.W.W. and D.R.; project administration, L.W.W. and D.R. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

This study was submitted to the Pennsylvania State University Institutional Review Board (IRB) and was determined to be non-human subject research. As such, the study did not require IRB review or approval.

Informed Consent Statement

Informed consent for participation is not required, as the Pennsylvania State University Institutional Review Board determined the study to be non-human subject research.

Data Availability Statement

Case documents can be located on https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/westlaw (accessed on 7 February 2025).

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
DEIDiversity, equity, inclusion
BIPOCBlack, Indigenous, and more racially minoritized People of Color
AAUPAmerican Association of University Professors
SCOTUSSupreme Court of the United States
IDAIntersectionality Discourse Analysis
CRTCritical Race Theory
UTThe University of Texas at Austin

Notes

1
We choose to use the color-evasive and gender-evasive in lieu of Carbado’s (2013) two concepts: “color-blind intersectionality” and “gender-blind intersectionality” in our commitment to rethinking and removing ableist language in all aspects of our work, particularly in research and scholarship (Annamma et al., 2013). Carbado (2013) defines color-evasive intersectionality as “instances in which whiteness helps to produce and is part of a cognizable social category but is invisible or unarticulated as an intersectional subjected position” (p. 817) and gender-evasive intersectionality in a “similar intersectional elision with respect to gender” (p. 817).
2
There appears to be a discrepancy within the Hiers complaint. On page 2 paragraph 5, the plaintiff states they wrote, “Don’t leave the garbage lying around.” However, on page 13 paragraph 112, the complaint references the statement as, “Please don’t leave garbage lying around.”

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Figure 1. Recurrent themes of white legal logic (Ward, 2022a).
Figure 1. Recurrent themes of white legal logic (Ward, 2022a).
Education 15 01364 g001
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MDPI and ACS Style

Ward, L.W.; Rodriguez, D. “I Am for Diversity…”: How a Victimhood Legal Formula Weaponizes Faculty Academic Freedom Against Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Social Justice. Educ. Sci. 2025, 15, 1364. https://doi.org/10.3390/educsci15101364

AMA Style

Ward LW, Rodriguez D. “I Am for Diversity…”: How a Victimhood Legal Formula Weaponizes Faculty Academic Freedom Against Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Social Justice. Education Sciences. 2025; 15(10):1364. https://doi.org/10.3390/educsci15101364

Chicago/Turabian Style

Ward, LaWanda Wynette, and Daisy Rodriguez. 2025. "“I Am for Diversity…”: How a Victimhood Legal Formula Weaponizes Faculty Academic Freedom Against Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Social Justice" Education Sciences 15, no. 10: 1364. https://doi.org/10.3390/educsci15101364

APA Style

Ward, L. W., & Rodriguez, D. (2025). “I Am for Diversity…”: How a Victimhood Legal Formula Weaponizes Faculty Academic Freedom Against Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Social Justice. Education Sciences, 15(10), 1364. https://doi.org/10.3390/educsci15101364

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