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Article

Debt Service as an Intertemporal Constraint: ARDL Evidence on Debt Overhang in Egypt

by
Sarah El-Khishin
* and
Arwa Mohamed
Economics Department, The British University in Egypt, P.O. Box 43, El Sherouk City 11837, Cairo, Egypt
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Economies 2026, 14(4), 105; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies14040105
Submission received: 19 February 2026 / Revised: 19 March 2026 / Accepted: 20 March 2026 / Published: 24 March 2026
Versions Notes

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of public debt servicing on private investment in Egypt within the debt overhang hypothesis. While existing research largely focuses on the debt–growth relationship, limited attention has been given to how debt servicing burdens affect private capital formation. Using annual data from 1990 to 2023, the study employs an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model to estimate short-run and long-run dynamics between private sector gross fixed capital formation and key mac-roeconomic variables. Results provide statistically significant evidence of a long-run debt overhang effect, whereby debt servicing exerts a persistent negative impact on private investment. Short-run effects appear temporarily expansionary but dissipate as servicing pressures accumulate. The analysis focuses on Egypt-where debt servicing pressures have repeatedly intensified in response to external shocks and exchange rate adjustments-but offers broader implications for emerging market and developing economies. The paper contributes to the literature by identifying repayment capacity as the key transmission channel through which public debt affects private investment. In contexts characterized by liquidity constraints, external vulnerabilities, and refinancing risks, debt servicing burdens-rather than debt levels alone-constitute the binding con-straint on private capital formation. Accordingly, the findings emphasize the im-portance of assessing debt sustainability through servicing obligations and repayment pressures.

1. Introduction

Private investment plays a central role in sustaining long-term economic growth and productivity. However, in highly indebted economies, rising public debt burdens may constrain private sector activity through the debt overhang mechanism. Debt overhang arises when high debt burdens reduce expected returns to investment, as investors anticipate future fiscal adjustments and increased uncertainty. This forward-looking constraint weakens investment incentives and may crowd out private capital formation over time.
In the case of Egypt, rising debt servicing pressures and increased reliance on external financing have heightened fiscal constraints, making private investment particularly sensitive to debt dynamics. While public borrowing may support economic activity in the short run, sustained increases in repayment obligations can create pressures that undermine private sector development. This raises important questions about the channels through which debt affects investment and the role of debt sustainability in shaping long-term growth outcomes.
Since 1990, Egypt has experienced persistent fiscal pressures, repeated stabilization programs, exchange rate adjustments, and structural reforms. Despite major initiatives—including the 1991 Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme, the 2016 IMF-supported reform, and subsequent policy interventions—public debt and debt servicing burdens have remained central macroeconomic challenges. In recent years, rising external debt exposure, exchange rate depreciation, and increasing global interest rates have amplified repayment pressures. By 2023, total debt service reached 5.65 percent of GNI, reflecting growing fiscal commitments relative to national income. These developments raise a critical question: Do rising debt servicing burdens constrain private capital formation in Egypt?
Although the extensive literature examines the public debt–growth nexus, relatively limited attention has been given to the investment channel of debt overhang. Most empirical studies rely on stock-based indicators such as the debt-to-GDP ratio, which may not fully capture the forward-looking repayment constraints that shape investor expectations. Within the Egyptian context, existing research predominantly evaluates the impact of public or external debt on aggregate growth outcomes. Unlike most existing studies that focus on debt stock, this paper emphasizes debt servicing as the operative constraint affecting investment decisions. While debt stock measures capture the level of indebtedness, debt servicing reflects the flow of obligations that must be met over time, making it a more direct indicator of repayment pressures. This distinction is particularly relevant in emerging economies, where liquidity constraints and refinancing risks play a central role.
The empirical analysis employs an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) framework to capture both short-run and long-run dynamics. This approach allows for the identification of temporal asymmetries in the relationship between debt servicing and private investment.
Three central contributions of this paper are as follows. Primarily, it conceptualizes debt service as an intertemporal indicator of debt sustainability. Unlike static debt stock measures, debt service captures the flow of obligations that must be honored over time and therefore directly reflects repayment capacity constraints. From an intertemporal budget perspective, rising servicing burdens signal that future fiscal resources are increasingly pre-committed, reducing policy flexibility and heightening uncertainty for investors. The empirical findings suggest that it is this forward-looking constraint, rather than the nominal size of debt alone, that drives investment responses in highly indebted economies.
Secondly, empirical findings identify a temporal asymmetry, where debt servicing exerts short-run expansionary effects but long-run contractionary impacts on private investment. Finally, it provides country-specific evidence from Egypt, where debt servicing pressures and macroeconomic vulnerabilities shape private investment dynamics.

2. Conceptual Framework and the Related Literature

2.1. The Debt Overhang Mechanism and Private Investment

The relationship between public debt and private investment is theoretically grounded in the debt overhang framework. Originally developed in corporate finance (Myers, 1977), the concept was extended to sovereign debt by Krugman (1988) and Sachs (1988). The central argument is that when a government’s repayment capacity becomes constrained, additional borrowing implies higher future taxation or fiscal adjustment. Anticipation of these future obligations reduces expected returns to investment, weakens investor confidence, and discourages capital formation.
From an intertemporal perspective, debt overhang operates through expectations about future resource allocation. When a significant portion of future fiscal revenues is perceived as pre-committed to debt repayment, private investors internalize lower net returns and delay or reduce investment decisions. Bulow and Rogoff (1990) further argue that excessive debt distorts incentives and generates macroeconomic uncertainty, reinforcing this contractionary effect.
The crowding-out hypothesis complements this mechanism. Rising public debt may increase interest rates and tighten liquidity conditions (Taylor, 1993), reducing the pool of funds available for private investment. Moreover, high debt levels are often associated with budget deficits and declining national savings, creating upward pressure on interest rates (Elmendorf & Mankiw, 1999). When debt reaches elevated levels, these effects intensify and may reduce the efficiency of monetary policy (Abbas & Christensen, 2007).
Monetary conditions further shape debt dynamics. Prolonged low interest rates can encourage excessive borrowing and delay fiscal adjustment (Hannoun, 2026). Conversely, monetary tightening increases servicing costs, especially in highly indebted economies, raising default risk and constraining profitable investment opportunities (Lang & Samadi, 2023). Over time, these mechanisms reinforce the negative investment effects associated with debt overhang.
While Keynesian theory emphasizes the short-run stimulative effects of deficit-financed expenditure (Keynes, 1936; Jahan et al., 2014), it also acknowledges that persistent deficits may eventually crowd out private investment through higher interest rates and taxation. Thus, even within demand-driven frameworks, the long-run consequences of excessive debt may become contractionary.
In addition to the expected taxation (cash flow) channel, debt overhang may also operate through a second mechanism related to the discount rate applied to future returns. From an investment perspective, firms evaluate projects based on the present value of expected cash flows, discounted by a risk-adjusted rate that reflects macroeconomic uncertainty and investor risk aversion. Elevated public debt and rising debt servicing burdens increase uncertainty regarding future fiscal policy, inflation, and macroeconomic stability, thereby raising the risk premium required by investors.
As a result, even if expected future cash flows remain unchanged, higher discount rates-driven by increased risk premia-lower asset prices and discourage investment. This channel is well established in the macro-finance literature. Cochrane (1991) shows that investment is negatively related to fluctuations in discount rates, while Pastor and Veronesi (2012) demonstrate that policy uncertainty increases equity risk premia and depresses investment. Similarly, Baker et al. (2016) find that economic policy uncertainty significantly reduces corporate investment, and more recent contributions (Dou et al., 2022) highlight how higher discount rates reduce expected returns and intensify competitive pressures.
Both channels jointly imply that when debt servicing burdens increase, private investment declines due to both lower expected returns and higher discount rates.
Overall, the literature suggests that debt can initially support economic activity but may undermine private investment once repayment capacity becomes binding. The critical question is therefore not merely the size of debt, but whether its servicing obligations impose an intertemporal constraint on private capital formation.

2.2. Debt Service as an Intertemporal Indicator of Sustainability

Traditional assessments of debt sustainability rely heavily on stock-based measures such as the debt-to-GDP ratio. However, recent scholarship questions whether such indicators adequately capture repayment risks and investment constraints.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) show that crises often arise not solely from high debt levels but from the interaction between debt and adverse shocks, short maturities, and currency mismatches. Furman and Summers (2019) emphasize the importance of distinguishing between debt stocks and debt flows, arguing that interest burdens and servicing dynamics provide a more accurate assessment of fiscal sustainability. Similarly, Debrun et al. (2019) highlight the role of liquidity pressures and refinancing risks, particularly in emerging markets.
In developing economies, vulnerability frequently stems from servicing constraints and external liquidity exposure rather than from headline debt ratios alone (El-Khishin & Mohieldin, 2021). Berk and van Binsbergen (2026) further argue that excessive reliance on debt-to-GDP measures may obscure intertemporal fiscal risks and distort policy responses. Extending this reasoning, El-Khishin and Rashied (2026) contend that debt service functions as a binding intertemporal constraint, shaping investor expectations through anticipated fiscal adjustment and repayment commitments.
Debt service captures the flow of resources required to honor outstanding obligations. Unlike debt stock, which reflects accumulated liabilities at a point in time, debt service measures the immediate fiscal burden placed on national income and public finances. From an intertemporal budget constraint perspective, rising servicing obligations signal that future revenues are increasingly pre-committed, reducing fiscal flexibility and increasing uncertainty for private investors.
For this reason, debt service may provide a more direct channel through which debt overhang affects private investment. High servicing burdens can divert national income away from productive activities (Clements et al., 2005), reduce capital formation (Dijkstra & Hermes, 2001), and intensify reliance on external borrowing (Metwally & Tamaschke, 1994). Rising servicing costs may also necessitate higher taxation (Dackehag & Hansson, 2012), further discouraging private sector activity.
Building on this literature, the present study adopts debt service as the primary sustainability indicator. By focusing on repayment flows rather than nominal debt stocks, the analysis captures the forward-looking constraint that lies at the core of the debt overhang mechanism.

2.3. Empirical Evidence on Debt Overhang and Investment

Empirical evidence on the relationship between public debt and economic performance is extensive, yet findings remain heterogeneous. A substantial body of research shows that excessive debt accumulation negatively affects long-term growth, particularly in developing economies. ARDL-based studies report adverse effects of both external and domestic debt on GDP growth, debt service burdens, inflation, and broader macroeconomic stability (Bal & Rath, 2014; Ngugi, 2016; Saungweme & Odhiambo, 2019; Yusuf & Mohd, 2021). These results are consistent with the debt overhang hypothesis, suggesting that once debt surpasses repayment capacity, uncertainty and resource misallocation constrain economic performance.
Debt composition and institutional conditions further shape these effects. Ojonye et al. (2022) show that in Nigeria, domestic debt may support growth, while external debt exerts persistent contractionary effects. Similarly, Cordella et al. (2009) demonstrate that the threshold at which debt becomes harmful depends on institutional quality and macroeconomic management, with weaker institutions experiencing adverse effects at lower levels of indebtedness.
Beyond aggregate growth, a growing strand of the literature directly examines the investment channel of debt overhang. Sen et al. (2007) provide panel evidence that high external debt reduces private investment in developing countries. More recent contributions highlight the role of debt servicing burdens as the operative constraint. Joy and Panda (2019), analyzing BRICS economies, find that elevated debt service as a percentage of GNI significantly diminishes productive investment in both the short and long run. Their results suggest that repayment pressures redirect resources away from capital formation and constrain private sector expansion.
Similar patterns are observed across different contexts. Vanlaer et al. (2021) report that higher public debt is associated with lower private investment in European Union countries. At the firm level, Bai et al. (2024) show that while moderate public debt may temporarily ease financing conditions, exceeding a threshold generates crowding-out effects. In emerging markets, Prah (2022) finds that excessive external debt reduces foreign direct investment inflows in Ghana, while Adeniwura et al. (2024) document negative growth effects in the West African Monetary Zone linked to overhang and crowding-out mechanisms.
Although some studies identify short-run expansionary effects consistent with Keynesian demand dynamics (Owusu-Nantwi & Erickson, 2016; Al-Refai, 2015), the broader empirical record indicates that persistent and poorly managed debt ultimately undermines private investment, particularly in economies characterized by fiscal constraints, macroeconomic volatility, and limited institutional capacity.
The debt overhang mechanism appears particularly relevant in emerging markets, where fiscal space is limited and external vulnerabilities are pronounced. Prah (2022), using ARDL for Ghana, finds that high external debt significantly reduces foreign direct investment inflows, suggesting that perceived repayment risk discourages foreign participation. Similarly, Adeniwura et al. (2024), studying the West African Monetary Zone, show that excessive external debt constrains growth primarily through overhang and crowding-out effects. Emerging economies are often exposed to currency mismatches, refinancing risks, and liquidity pressures, which amplify the effects of debt service burdens. As debt servicing obligations rise relative to national income, fiscal flexibility declines and private investors face heightened uncertainty. This vulnerability is reinforced when debt is externally denominated, exposing economies to exchange rate fluctuations and global interest rate cycles. Findings therefore suggest that repayment capacity and servicing burdens play a central role in shaping investment outcomes in developing countries.

3. Debt Accumulation, Servicing Pressures, and Investment Constraints in Egypt

3.1. Previous Empirical Work

An expanding body of empirical research identifies public debt as a persistent constraint on Egypt’s long-term economic performance. Most studies document a negative association between rising debt levels and growth outcomes, particularly in relation to external borrowing.
ElGhouty (2018) finds that increasing government debt adversely affects macroeconomic performance, especially in the aftermath of political instability and fiscal pressures following the 2011 revolution. Sahel and Bentafat (2021), examining the period 2000–2019, report a long-run negative relationship between public debt and GDP growth, attributing this outcome to structural inefficiencies in Egypt’s debt-financed economic model. Mousa (2022) further confirms that external debt weakens growth indicators, including GDP per capita, trade openness, and gross fixed capital formation. Introducing a nonlinear perspective, Hassanien (2023) demonstrates that while foreign debt may generate short-run stimulus, its effects become unfavorable beyond a threshold, a finding consistent with debt overhang theory. Similarly, Sharaf (2021), using a nonlinear ARDL approach, identifies a threshold level of 96.7 percent of GDP beyond which external debt significantly hampers growth.
Evidence also suggests that the adverse effects of debt extend beyond aggregate growth to investment dynamics. El-Mahdy and Torayeh (2009) show that domestic debt negatively affects per capita growth, while Stylianou (2019) finds that external debt, debt repayment, and exchange rate volatility significantly reduce public investment. Abdel-Haleim (2023), using a Structural VAR framework, highlights the role of public debt in shaping investment behavior, although the growth effects vary across debt types. Stylianou (2019) confirms that external debt exerts a long-run negative impact on growth in Egypt, even when short-run effects appear limited. Together, these studies indicate that debt accumulation imposes structural constraints on economic performance. However, the debt service channel in relation to private capital formation remains insufficiently explored.
Beyond outcome-based analyses, several studies investigate the structural drivers of Egypt’s debt accumulation. Al-Nashar (2019) decomposes debt dynamics and finds that fiscal deficits, exchange rate depreciation, and institutional inefficiencies are primary contributors to rising debt levels. High real interest rates have partly masked domestic debt burdens, while currency misalignments have amplified external debt pressures. Abdu (2020) confirms that exchange rate shocks and previous debt levels significantly influence debt-to-GDP ratios, whereas stronger growth and primary balances help reduce debt. Boshra and Serag (2024), applying the DIGNAR model, demonstrate that export fluctuations play a central role in shaping Egypt’s debt sustainability path.
These structural factors are reflected in the evolution of Egypt’s debt profile. Public debt increased significantly in the early 1990s, prompting the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme in 1991 (Nasser, 1997). While fiscal consolidation in the early 2000s temporarily stabilized debt indicators, expansionary policies and exchange rate adjustments led to renewed accumulation by the mid-2000s. The global financial crisis of 2008 and the 2011 revolution intensified borrowing needs, with fiscal deficits widening and reforms delayed (Momani, 2018).
The 2016 IMF program marked another turning point, as exchange rate liberalization led to currency depreciation and a rise in external debt obligations (Hashem & Fahmy, 2019). Although debt-to-GDP ratios declined temporarily between 2018 and 2019, debt service burdens continued to increase, reflecting rising interest costs. The COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent global inflationary pressures further elevated servicing requirements. By 2023, debt-to-GDP reached 95.9 percent, while total debt service rose to 5.65 percent of GNI, indicating mounting repayment pressures amid tightening global financial conditions.
The composition of debt also evolved. Domestic debt historically represented a substantial share of total public debt, reflecting reliance on internal financing. However, following exchange rate liberalization and external shocks, external debt increased significantly, reaching 50.1 percent of GDP by 2023. While domestic borrowing may reduce exposure to currency risk, it often entails higher interest rates and may intensify crowding-out pressures. External debt, in contrast, exposes the economy to exchange rate volatility and global interest rate fluctuations, increasing servicing vulnerability.
Recent policy discussions emphasize strengthening debt management and promoting private sector development. The IMF (2021) highlights reallocating resources toward private investment and limiting inefficient public expenditure. El-Khishin and Mohieldin (2021) stress the importance of medium-term debt management strategies that address servicing risks and liquidity constraints.

3.2. Research Gap and Motivation

Despite the expanding empirical literature on public debt, two important gaps remain. First, most studies rely on debt stock indicators such as the debt-to-GDP ratio when assessing sustainability and macroeconomic effects. While informative, stock measures do not fully capture the intertemporal repayment constraint that shapes investor expectations, liquidity conditions, and fiscal flexibility. Servicing obligations, rather than nominal debt levels, determine the immediate allocation of public resources and the extent to which future revenues are pre-committed to repayment. Consequently, analyses that overlook debt service flows may underestimate the channel through which debt overhang operates.
Second, within the Egyptian context, empirical research has largely concentrated on the debt–growth nexus rather than the debt–investment channel. Existing studies consistently document negative long-run effects of public and external debt on growth indicators (ElGhouty, 2018; Stylianou, 2019; Sahel & Bentafat, 2021; Mousa, 2022), and identify threshold effects and structural vulnerabilities. However, no study directly tests whether rising debt service burdens constrain private capital formation through the debt overhang mechanism.
Given Egypt’s evolving debt composition, rising external obligations, and increasing servicing costs, understanding this channel is particularly relevant. As debt services absorb a growing share of national income, repayment pressures may function as a binding intertemporal constraint on private investment.
This gap motivates the empirical approach adopted in this study. By treating debt service as a forward-looking sustainability indicator and estimating its short-run and long-run effects on private investment using a dynamic ARDL framework, the analysis tests whether repayment pressures crowd out private capital formation in Egypt over the period 1990–2023. The following section outlines the data construction and econometric methodology employed to examine this relationship.

4. Data, Methodology and Empirical Specification

The empirical analysis employs the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model to examine both short-run and long-run relationships between debt servicing and private investment. The ARDL approach is particularly suitable in this context as it can be applied irrespective of whether the underlying variables are integrated of order I(0) or I(1), provided none are I(2). Moreover, the ARDL framework allows for the simultaneous estimation of short-run dynamics and long-run equilibrium relationships through the error correction representation. This is especially relevant for analyzing debt overhang effects, which are inherently dynamic and may differ across time horizons.

4.1. Data and Variable Specification

To empirically examine whether public debt servicing crowds out private investment in Egypt through the debt overhang channel, this study uses annual data covering the period 1990 to 2023. The sample period ensures sufficient time-series variation while maintaining macroeconomic comparability. The endpoint is deliberately chosen to avoid structural changes in debt composition and servicing dynamics that emerged after 2023. Data are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the International Monetary Fund databases, and Egypt’s Ministry of Finance. The dataset consists of six macroeconomic variables selected in line with the theoretical framework outlined in Section 2. The dependent variable is gross fixed capital formation in the private sector as a percentage of GDP, which serves as a proxy for private investment and captures private capital formation relative to economic size. The selection of control variables is guided by the theoretical channels emphasized in the debt overhang literature. In particular, the model incorporates variables that capture (i) resource availability (Gross Domestic Savings), (ii) expected returns and market conditions (GDP per capita), (iii) fiscal adjustment pressures (tax revenue), and (iv) financing costs and risk premia (real interest rate). Together, these variables reflect the key mechanisms through which debt servicing burdens can influence private investment, ensuring that the empirical specification remains closely aligned with the theoretical framework.
The key explanatory variable is total debt service as a percentage of GNI. Consistent with the intertemporal sustainability framework, debt service is treated as the operative constraint reflecting repayment capacity rather than nominal debt stock. This variable includes principal repayments and interest payments on long-term debt, short-term debt interest, and repayments to the IMF. By measuring the flow burden of obligations, debt service captures the fiscal resources committed to past borrowing and the forward-looking constraint central to the debt overhang mechanism.
Gross Domestic Savings (as a percentage of GDP) is included to capture the availability of domestic resources for investment, consistent with the Two-Gap model, where higher savings support private capital formation. In addition, GDP per capita (GDPC) and tax revenue (TREV) are included to capture key macroeconomic and fiscal channels through which debt overhang may affect private investment. GDP per capita serves as a proxy for the level of economic development and market size, which influence investment opportunities and expected returns. In the context of debt overhang, higher income levels may also reflect stronger economic fundamentals and improved fiscal capacity, which can mitigate uncertainty regarding debt sustainability and thereby support private investment. Conversely, lower income levels may amplify concerns about repayment capacity and future fiscal adjustment, reinforcing the disincentive to invest.
Tax revenue (as a percentage of GDP) captures the fiscal adjustment channel central to the debt overhang hypothesis. High debt servicing obligations may necessitate increased taxation to meet repayment commitments, which reduces after-tax returns on investment and discourages private capital formation. Thus, tax revenue reflects the extent to which fiscal pressures translate into distortionary effects on private sector incentives. Finally, the real interest rate is included to account for borrowing costs and monetary conditions affecting investment decisions. Elevated debt servicing burdens may increase risk premia or lead to tighter monetary conditions, raising real interest rates. This increases the cost of capital and reduces the profitability of investment projects, further reinforcing the crowding-out effect of public debt on private investment.

4.2. Econometric Framework

As mentioned above, to estimate both short-run and long-run dynamics between debt servicing and private investment, this study employs the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bound to the testing approach developed by M. H. Pesaran et al. (2001). The ARDL methodology is appropriate for three main reasons. First, it allows estimation when variables are integrated of mixed orders I(0) and I(1), provided none are I(2). Second, it enables simultaneous estimation of short-run adjustments and long-run equilibrium relationships within a single equation framework. Third, it performs well in small samples, which is relevant given the 34 annual observations available.
Within the ARDL framework, the error correction representation allows identification of both the long-run equilibrium relationship and the speed at which deviations from equilibrium are corrected. This feature is particularly relevant for testing the temporal asymmetry implied by the debt overhang hypothesis, where short-run effects may differ from long-run outcomes. The analysis and results of the ARDL model is presented in the Appendix A.

5. Empirical Findings and Discussion

The ARDL estimates provide strong empirical support for the presence of a debt overhang effect in Egypt. The long-run results indicate a statistically significant and economically meaningful negative relationship between total debt service and private investment, measured by gross fixed capital formation in the private sector. This finding is consistent with the debt overhang hypothesis advanced by Krugman (1988), which posits that when repayment obligations absorb a growing share of national income, expected returns to investment decline. In this framework, debt service functions as an intertemporal constraint: as fiscal resources become increasingly pre-committed to repayment, both domestic and foreign investors anticipate reduced profitability and heightened macroeconomic uncertainty. The result aligns with Brady and Magazzino (2018), who argue that rising debt commitments crowd out productive private sector activity. Moreover, the negative long-run impact of debt service on private investment can be further interpreted through the discount-rate channel discussed in Section 2.1. In addition to reducing expected returns through anticipated fiscal adjustments, high debt-servicing burdens may increase macroeconomic uncertainty and investor risk premia, thereby raising the discount rate applied to future investment projects. A higher discount rate lowers the present value of expected cash flows, reducing firms’ incentives to invest. This interpretation is consistent with the macro-finance literature, which shows that investment is negatively related to discount rates and policy uncertainty (Cochrane, 1991; Pastor & Veronesi, 2012). Additionally, Dou et al. (2022) demonstrate that higher discount rates intensify competition among firms, reducing the returns generated by their assets and further dampening investment incentives. These findings are consistent with both the expected cash flow channel and the discount rate channel, offering a more comprehensive interpretation of how debt overhang affects private investment in Egypt.
A notable feature of the results is the temporal asymmetry between short-run and long-run effects. While the long-run coefficient of debt service is negative, the short-run estimates reveal positive coefficients for total debt service (LTDS), with the first three lags (LD, L2D, and L3D) being statistically significant. This suggests that increases in debt servicing may initially coincide with expansionary effects on private investment, possibly reflecting short-term liquidity conditions or demand-side stimulus associated with government borrowing, consistent with Keynesian arguments and empirical findings such as Joy and Panda (2019).
In terms of magnitude, the short-run coefficients are relatively large and positive; however, their impact is transitory and declines across lags, indicating that the expansionary effect dissipates within approximately three periods. In contrast, the long-run effect remains negative and persistent, implying that the initial stimulus is not sustained and is ultimately reversed as debt servicing pressures accumulate. The speed of adjustment toward the long-run equilibrium is captured by the error correction term (ECT), which is negative and statistically significant. The estimated coefficient (−2.921) suggests a rapid adjustment process, indicating that deviations from the long-run equilibrium are corrected within a short period, albeit with potential overshooting dynamics1 This adjustment pattern implies that while short-run expansionary dynamics may arise, the system converges quickly toward a long-run equilibrium in which debt servicing exerts a contractionary effect on private investment. Overall, these findings highlight the dynamic nature of debt overhang, where short-term expansionary effects coexist with longer-term contractionary pressures, reflecting the gradual materialization of fiscal sustainability constraints.
Gross Domestic Savings exhibit a positive and significant long-run relationship with private investment, consistent with the Two-Gap model’s emphasis on domestic resource mobilization. Higher savings appear to support capital formation over time. However, the short-run negative coefficient suggests that domestic savings may not immediately translate into productive investment, possibly reflecting structural rigidities or reliance on external financing in the near term. This pattern is consistent with evidence from low-saving economies where domestic savings play a limited short-run financing role.
Among the control variables, GDP per capita shows a negative long-run effect on private investment. Although counterintuitive, this result may reflect the interaction between income growth and rising debt commitments. If higher income levels coincide with increased fiscal obligations and repayment burdens, the net effect on private investment may remain constrained. This interpretation aligns with the debt overhang perspective, where repayment pressures dominate growth benefits when sustainability risks intensify.
The real interest rate exerts a significant negative effect on private investment in the short run, confirming the standard investment channel through borrowing costs. Higher interest rates discourage capital formation by increasing the cost of finance. In the long run, however, the effect becomes statistically insignificant, possibly reflecting monetary policy interventions aimed at stabilizing financial conditions. Active liquidity management may dampen persistent interest rate effects, particularly in a context where fiscal dynamics play a more dominant role in shaping investment expectations.
Tax revenue presents a differentiated effect. In the short run, higher tax revenue negatively affects private investment, which may reflect anticipatory behavior by investors who expect future fiscal tightening to service debt obligations. This is consistent with Ricardian considerations (Barro, 1989) and with findings that rising debt levels often lead to higher taxation (Boskin, 2020; Dackehag & Hansson, 2012). In the long run, however, tax revenue shows a positive association with private investment, suggesting that improved fiscal capacity, when efficiently managed, may support capital formation and enhance macroeconomic stability.
Findings are generally consistent with a broad body of empirical literature documenting the adverse effects of public debt burdens on private investment in emerging and developing economies. Early cross-country evidence by Pattillo et al. (2011) shows that high external debt reduces investment and growth, particularly beyond certain threshold levels. Similarly, Presbitero (2012) finds that excessive public debt weakens private investment in developing economies through expectations of future taxation and macroeconomic instability. These findings align with the negative long-run relationship identified in this study, where rising debt servicing burdens crowd out private capital formation.
More recent contributions focusing on emerging markets emphasize the role of uncertainty and financial conditions in transmitting debt overhang effects. For instance, Kose et al. (2021) show that rising global and domestic debt levels increase macro-financial vulnerabilities and dampen investment, particularly in emerging economies facing tighter financing conditions. Recent works on Egypt—such as El-Khishin and Rashied (2026)—similarly highlight that elevated debt servicing pressures constrain fiscal space and reduce the ability of governments to support private sector development, thereby indirectly suppressing investment.
This paper contributes to this literature in three important ways. First, unlike most existing studies that focus on debt stock, the analysis emphasizes debt servicing flows as the operative constraint affecting investment decisions. This distinction is particularly relevant in emerging economies such as Egypt, where liquidity pressures and rollover risks play a more immediate role than the overall level of debt. Second, the results reveal a clear temporal asymmetry: while debt servicing may be associated with short-run expansionary effects-possibly reflecting temporary liquidity injections or fiscal stimulus-these effects dissipate over time and give way to a persistent long-run contractionary impact. This dynamic adjustment process is less explored in the literature and highlights the importance of distinguishing between short-run and long-run channels of debt overhang. Third, the rapid adjustment toward equilibrium identified through the error correction mechanism suggests that private investment in Egypt responds quickly to fiscal imbalances, reflecting heightened sensitivity to debt-related risks and macroeconomic uncertainty.
Taken together, these findings extend the existing empirical literature by demonstrating that debt overhang in emerging economies operates not only through the level of indebtedness but also through the timing, structure, and servicing burden of public debt. This provides a more nuanced understanding of how fiscal pressures translate into private sector responses, particularly in contexts characterized by constrained fiscal space and evolving macroeconomic conditions.

6. Conclusions

The paper examines whether public debt servicing crowds out private investment in Egypt through the debt overhang channel. Using annual data from 1990 to 2023 and an Autoregressive Distributed Lag framework, findings confirm the presence of a debt overhang mechanism in Egypt, whereby sustained repayment obligations reduce the expected returns to investment and divert resources away from productive private sector activity. Importantly, the results are consistent with the debt overhang framework, in which higher debt servicing burdens reduce expected returns on investment and increase macroeconomic uncertainty, reinforcing the role of forward-looking constraints in shaping investment behavior.
The reversal from short-run expansionary to long-run contractionary effects, and the significant error correction mechanism, confirm that debt service burdens are proven to constitute a binding intertemporal constraint on private investment in Egypt, pointing to forward-looking adjustments in investment behavior rather than purely contemporaneous liquidity effects. While short-run expansionary effects may arise during periods of borrowing, sustained increases in servicing obligations ultimately crowd out private capital formation. The results hence confirm that debt sustainability cannot be assessed solely through stock measures; rather, the flow burden of repayment plays a central role in shaping investment dynamics. This distinction is particularly relevant for Egypt, where elevated refinancing needs and external vulnerabilities amplify the macroeconomic consequences of debt servicing pressures.
Policy implications are substantial. First, fiscal consolidation strategies must prioritize reducing debt service pressures rather than merely stabilizing debt ratios. This requires a shift toward active liability management strategies, including lengthening debt maturities, reducing reliance on short-term and foreign-currency-denominated debt, and improving the predictability of debt servicing profiles. Second, improving domestic savings mobilization can mitigate reliance on external borrowing and strengthen investment resilience. This includes deepening domestic financial markets and enhancing financial intermediation to channel savings into productive investment. Third, debt management strategies should address maturity structure, currency composition, and rollover risks to limit uncertainty faced by private investors. In the Egyptian context, reducing exposure to external shocks and exchange rate volatility is particularly critical for stabilizing investment expectations. Without credible and sustained adjustments in debt servicing dynamics, efforts to stimulate private sector-led growth are likely to remain constrained.
Finally, the results highlight the importance of maintaining macroeconomic regime stability. Structural shifts in debt composition and financing conditions can alter long-run relationships and investment responses, reinforcing the need for coherent fiscal and monetary coordination. In particular, anchoring inflation expectations, maintaining exchange rate stability, and enhancing policy credibility are essential for reducing risk premia and supporting private investment.
Overall, the evidence suggests that in the Egyptian case, persistent debt servicing burdens represent a structural impediment to private capital formation. Sustainable growth requires not only managing debt levels but also reducing exposure to repayment pressures that constrain private investment. Looking ahead, Egypt’s growth trajectory will critically depend on its ability to transition from a debt-driven to an investment-driven model of development, where fiscal policy supports—rather than constrains—private sector expansion.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, A.M. and S.E.-K.; methodology, A.M. and S.E.-K.; software, A.M.; validation, S.E.-K.; formal analysis, A.M. and S.E.-K.; investigation A.M. and S.E.-K.; resources, A.M.; data curation, A.M.; writing—original draft preparation, A.M.; writing—review and editing, S.E.-K.; visualization, A.M. and S.E.-K.; supervision, S.E.-K.; project administration, S.E.-K. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

The data used in this study are publicly available from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) databases, and Egypt’s Ministry of Finance. The datasets analyzed during the current study are available from these sources.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Appendix A. Estimation Procedures and Preliminary Analysis

The baseline empirical specification can be expressed as follows:
P I t = f ( L T D S t , G D S t , G D P C t , T R E V t , R I R t )
where private investment (PI) is modeled as a function of debt servicing (LTDS) and a set of macroeconomic control variables capturing domestic savings, economic development, fiscal conditions, and borrowing costs. This specification is grounded in the debt overhang framework, where both fiscal pressures and macroeconomic conditions influence private investment decisions.

Appendix A.1. Data and Variable Specification

The primary objective of this analysis is to ascertain if and to what degree rising debt servicing costs crowd out private investment. The World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Egypt’s Ministry of Finance are just a few of the reputable national and international sources of the annual secondary data used in this research from 1990 to 2023. Six macroeconomic variables make up the dataset, which were chosen in accordance with economic theory and earlier empirical research on the dynamics of debt, growth, and investment. Gross fixed capital formation for the private sector (GFCFP) is the dependent variable, while Gross Domestic Savings (GDS) and total debt service (TDS) are the main independent variables. Building literature, this study adopts debt service as the primary sustainability indicator, capturing the forward-looking repayment constraint central to the debt overhang mechanism. In line with other research, such as Joy and Panda (2019), which used a similar structure while examining the BRICS economies, the model’s control variables include GDP per capita (GDPC), real interest rate (RIR), and tax revenue (TREV). This alignment guarantees comparability with existing research while also strengthening the model’s empirical robustness, while tailoring the model to the Egyptian context and the availability of data since the topic has not yet been explored in Egypt. These variables reflect the macroeconomic factors that impact private investment behavior, and their description and sources are presented in Table A1.
Table A1. Data Description.
Table A1. Data Description.
Variables Abb.Description Source
Total Debt service (% of GNI)TDSThe sum of principal repayments and interest paid in cash, products, or services for long-term debt, short-term debt interest, and repayments to the IMF(World Bank, 2024a)
Gross fixed capital formation, private sector (% of GDP)GFCFPThe total private fixed investment(World Bank, 2024b; OECD, 2024)
Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP)GDSGDP minus final consumption expenditure (total consumption) (World Bank, 2024b; OECD, 2024)
Tax Revenue (% of GDP)TREVcompulsory transfers to the central government for public purposes1990 to 2015, (World Bank, 2024b)
2015 to 2023 (Egypt Ministry of Finance, 2024)
Real Interest rate (%)RIRThe lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator(International Monetary Fund, 2024)
GDP per capita (current U.S. dollars)GDPCGross domestic product divided by midyear population(World Bank, 2024b; OECD, 2024)
In order to determine whether debt discourages or encourages investment, the dependent variable, gross fixed capital formation, Private Sector (GFCFP), is a direct indicator of private sector investment, which is used as a proxy for measuring the degree of crowding out.
Moving on to the independent variables, the rationale behind using total debt service (% of GNI) is that the Debt-to-GDP ratio fails to account for the increasing difficulties in repayments of debt caused by exogenous factors, because increasing debt service will be accompanied by an outright decrease in private investments (Clements et al., 2005). According to Dijkstra and Hermes (2001), it will drastically decrease capital formation. Debt repayment shifts resources away from local and international markets, leading to multiplier effects that hinder economic development and increase reliance on foreign debts (Metwally & Tamaschke, 1994). As a result, debt service is an essential indicator for emerging nations like Egypt. Additionally, Gross Domestic Savings (GDS) estimates the available resources for investment, which is an essential indicator according to the two-gap model, because the internal resources available for investment are reflected in Gross Domestic Savings (GDS), since capital formation is anticipated to be supported by higher domestic savings.
Moving on to the control variables, grants that were used in the study of interest as a source of government revenue (Joy & Panda, 2019) were not available in Egypt; however, tax revenue has been used instead as a source of government revenue and to measure fiscal decisions. Tax Revenue (TREV), according to Barro (1990) and King and Rebelo (1990) in their economic models, shows the role of tax policy in driving growth, where stable tax rates offer a predictable fiscal framework for developing nations specifically. Moreover, tax revenues minimize dependence on foreign aid and debt, which promotes good governance through increased transparency (Romer & Romer, 2010). Moreover, gross domestic product per capita (GDPC) is a proxy for output. Finally, real interest rate (RIR) is a proxy for the cost of borrowing and the monetary-policy stance affecting private investment decisions.
All variables are transformed into natural logarithms to facilitate elasticity interpretation and reduce heteroskedasticity.

Appendix A.2. Empirical Model Specification

The empirical model proceeds in three steps.
First, unit root tests are conducted using the Augmented Dickey–Fuller procedure to ensure that no variable is integrated of order two. The ARDL approach requires that variables be either I(0) or I(1).
Second, the optimal lag length is selected using the Akaike Information Criterion. The bounds testing procedure is then applied to determine whether a long-run cointegration relationship exists among the variables.
Third, once cointegration is confirmed, both long-run coefficients and short-run dynamics are estimated. The error correction term is examined to assess the speed of adjustment toward equilibrium.
Standard diagnostic tests, including tests for serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, and multicollinearity, are conducted to ensure robustness and model stability.

Appendix A.3. Pre-Tests

Prior to estimating the ARDL model, a set of preliminary tests was carried out to validate the model’s robustness, validity, and reliability. These include unit root tests to check stationarity, multicollinearity diagnostics, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity tests, and the ARDL limits test to validate the presence of long-run cointegration.

Appendix A.3.1. Unit Root Test

To get started, the variables’ stationarity was tested using the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test, which was introduced by (Dickey & Fuller, 1981). The ARDL model demands that all variables be stationary at the level [I(0)] or first difference [I(1)] as mentioned earlier, but not at the second difference [I(2)]. The ADF test results revealed that all variables are stationary at either level or first difference, meeting the required criterion for ARDL application. Table A2 presents these observations.
Table A2. Unit root test.
Table A2. Unit root test.
The Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) Test
Variables At Level1st Difference Remark
LGFCFP0.92080.0001 ***I(1)
LTDS0.39020.0064 ***I(1)
LGDPC0.36730.0031 **I(1)
LGDS0.37700.0000 ***I(1)
LRIR0.0051 *0.0000 ***I(0)
LTREV0.14770.0000 ***I(1)
Notes: ***, ** and * correspond to 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. Source: Computed by the author.

Appendix A.3.2. Multicollinearity Test

To ensure the robustness of the ARDL model specification, the linear dependence among the variables is examined by using Pairwise correlations and the Variance Inflation Factor. First, the Pairwise correlation did not reveal any hint of a strong multicollinearity issue since the greatest coefficient among the variables fell below the requirement of being less than 80% (Berry & Feldman, 1985), as shown in Table A3. This was further proven by conducting the VIF test, which had a mean of 1.71 as shown in Table A4, which is far below the typical threshold rate (10) (Coccia, 2017). Such results imply that the problem of multicollinearity is not present within the variables.
Table A3. Correlation matrix.
Table A3. Correlation matrix.
LGFCFPLTDSLGDSLRIRLGDPCLTREV
LGFCFP1
LTDS−0.34491
LGDS0.46630.30891
LRIR0.07310.00530.11451
LGDPC−0.356−0.4131−0.6985−0.32651
LTREV−0.22280.47810.29470.16−0.39861
Source: Computed by the authors.
Table A4. Variance inflation factor (VIF).
Table A4. Variance inflation factor (VIF).
VariableVIF1/VIF
LGDPC2.520.397
LGDS2.010.497
LTDS1.450.690
LTREV1.40.715
LRIR1.190.840
Mean VIF1.71
Source: Computed by the authors.

Appendix A.3.3. Autocorrelation and Heteroscedasticity Tests

To avoid undermining the reliability of the analysis or getting incorrect, biased results, it was essential to test for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (Kumar, 2023). The findings, as shown in Table A5, prove that the model does not suffer from serial correlation, and the error terms are homoscedastic, thereby validating the assumptions underlying the ARDL approach.
Table A5. Diagnostic tests.
Table A5. Diagnostic tests.
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:
Null hypothesis: No serial correlation at up to 1 lag
F-statistic0.569521Prob Value0.5884
Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey
Null hypothesis: Homoskedasticity
F-statistic0.334361Prob Value0.9052
Source: Computed by the authors.

Appendix A.4. Econometric Framework: ARDL Model Approach

To address the fundamental research question of this paper, which is to what degree does debt servicing in Egypt crowd out private investment due to the debt overhang effect? This study uses the ARDL bound testing approach developed by M. H. Pesaran et al. (2001). The ARDL framework is especially useful when the underlying variables have mixed order of integration (I(0) and I(1)), but none have an integration of order two [I(2)]. Prior to estimating, unit root tests were performed to confirm that this criterion was met.
Moreover, the ARDL model allows for the estimate of both short-run dynamics and long-run equilibrium connections using a single equation framework, addressing autocorrelation and omitted variable bias. H. Pesaran and Shin (1995) suggest its applicability for small sample sizes, including the 34 observations in this case. This approach has also been widely used in research on the debt-growth-investment nexus (Bal & Rath, 2014; Ngugi, 2016; Saungweme & Odhiambo, 2019; Yusuf & Mohd, 2021; Prah, 2022; Ojonye et al., 2022; Sahel & Bentafat, 2021; ElGhouty, 2018).
The general functional relationship can be expressed as:
Private Investment = f(Debt Service, Domestic Savings, GDP per capita, Real Interest Rate, Tax Revenue)
All variables were transformed into their natural logarithmic forms to simplify elasticity-based interpretations and standardize units of measurement (Yusuf & Mohd, 2021), and thus, the equation of the model will be as follows:
LGFCFPt = β0 + β1LGFCFPt−1 + β2LGFCFPt−2 + β3LGFCFPt−3 + β4LGFCFPt−4 + β5LTDSt−1 + β6LTDSt−2 + β7LTDSt−3 + β8LTDSt−4 + β9LGDSt−1 + β10LGDSt−2 + β11LGDSt−3 + β12LGDSt−4 + β13LGDPCt−1 + β14LGDPCt−2 + β15LGDPCt−3 + β16LGDPCt−4 + β17LRIRt−1 + β18LRIRt−2 + β19LRIRt−3 + β20LTREVt−1 + β21LTREVt−2 + β22LTREVt−3 + β23ECMt−1 + εt
where
  • LGFCFP = Gross fixed capital formation, private sector (% of GDP);
  • LTDS = Total debt service (% of GNI);
  • LGDS = Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP);
  • LRIR = Real interest rate (%);
  • LGDPC = GDP per capita (Current U.S. dollars);
  • LTREV = Tax revenue (% of GDP);
  • ECM: Error correction model to measure the speed of equilibrium adjustment;
  • t = time trend.

Appendix A.4.1. ARDL Bounds Test for Co-Integration

After confirming that the model has met the preconditions, the ARDL bounds test was performed to determine if a long-run co-integration relationship exists among the variables (Montenegro, 2019). Testing the long-run relationship among the variables is done by conducting two tests. To begin with, the maximum optimal number of lags for the F-test was 4, which was selected accordingly to M. H. Pesaran et al. (2001) recommendations regarding small sample sizes. Moreover, the F-statistic result is higher than the upper bound across all conventional significance levels, which is 7.82. It was significantly higher than the upper bound at a significance level 5%, where the critical values for I(0) and I(1) are 2.14 and 3.34. In order to make sure of this result, the t-statistic was conducted as well, showing a t statistic of −12.81, which seems to be much lower at all significance levels, which fails to accept the null hypothesis. Therefore, the two test concludes that the variables co-integrate in the long run, as shown in Table A6, indicating that any short-term fluctuations will lead to the equilibrium in the long run regardless (Smith, 2001).
Table A6. ARDL bounds test of co-integration results.
Table A6. ARDL bounds test of co-integration results.
F-Bound Test
Test StatisticValueSignif.I(0)I(1)
F-Statisitc7.8195710%1.812.93
k55%2.143.34
2.5%2.443.71
1%2.824.21
T-Bound Test
Test StatisticValueSignif.I(0)I(1)
t-statisitc −12.8144810%−1.62−3.49
5%−1.95−3.83
2.5%−2.24−4.12
1%−2.58−4.44
Source: Computed by the authors.
These findings collectively confirm the use of the ARDL model to predict both the short-run and long-run dynamics of debt service costs and private investment in Egypt, providing a statistically robust framework for the following analysis.

Appendix A.4.2. ARDL Results

The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) was used to calculate the best lag duration, which indicated that four delays were sufficient. As a result, the long-run and short-run calculations were performed using a lag structure of (4,4,4,4,4,3). Table A7 and Table A8 demonstrate the estimated outcomes.
Table A7. ARDL long-run estimated results.
Table A7. ARDL long-run estimated results.
Coef.Std. Err.tP > t[95% Conf. Interval]
ADJ
LGFCFP
L1.−2.9210.0588−49.720.013 **−3.668−2.175
LR
LTDS
L1.−0.9540.012−78.130.008 ***−1.1097−0.799
LGDS
L1.0.4230.00672.890.009 ***0.3500.497
LGDPC
L1.−0.2450.009−26.430.024 **−0.362−0.127
LRIR
L1.0.0030.004170.790.573−0.0500.056
LTREV
L1.1.9170.03850.150.013 **1.4312.403
Notes: *** and ** correspond to 1% and 5% significance level. Source: Computed by the authors.
Table A8. ARDL short-run estimated results.
Table A8. ARDL short-run estimated results.
SR Coef.Std. Err. T P > t[95% Conf. Interval]
LGFCFP
LD.1.1270.04823.6100.027 **0.5201.734
L2D.1.2930.04529.0200.022 **0.7271.859
L3D.0.7380.03322.2500.029 **0.3171.160
LTDS
D1.0.0640.0163.9400.158−0.1430.271
LD.2.5420.03571.8800.009 ***2.0922.991
L2D.1.8090.03256.9600.011 **1.4062.213
L3D.0.7460.03819.4800.033 **0.2601.233
LGDS
D1.0.1780.0315.7200.110−0.2180.575
LD.−0.8580.027−31.3100.020 **−1.206−0.510
L2D.−0.6360.020−32.1100.020 **−0.888−0.384
L3D.−1.2590.024−52.4600.012 **−1.564−0.954
LGDPC
D1.0.9290.02635.5000.018 **0.5961.261
LD.1.3190.05026.4700.024 **0.6861.952
L2D.0.5420.0668.2200.077 *−0.2961.379
L3D.−0.8160.038−21.3600.030 **−1.302−0.331
LRIR
D1.0.0050.0031.5600.363−0.0360.046
LD.0.0180.0062.9300.210−0.0600.097
L2D.−0.0080.004−2.0900.284−0.0550.040
L3D.−0.0510.002−20.9800.030 **−0.082−0.020
LTREV
D1.2.1510.03857.1500.011 **1.6732.629
LD.−1.7160.054−31.5900.020 **−2.406−1.026
L2D.−0.7800.049−15.9100.040 **−1.402−0.157
_cons−1.8070.145−12.5000.051 *−3.6440.030
Notes: ***, ** and * correspond to 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. Source: Computed by the author.

Note

1
In the ARDL error correction specification, the adjustment coefficient (reported as ADJ in Table A7) corresponds to the error correction term (ECT). The magnitude of the coefficient exceeding unity in absolute value indicates a rapid adjustment process with potential overshooting dynamics, reflecting strong short-run corrections toward the long-run equilibrium.

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El-Khishin, S.; Mohamed, A. Debt Service as an Intertemporal Constraint: ARDL Evidence on Debt Overhang in Egypt. Economies 2026, 14, 105. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies14040105

AMA Style

El-Khishin S, Mohamed A. Debt Service as an Intertemporal Constraint: ARDL Evidence on Debt Overhang in Egypt. Economies. 2026; 14(4):105. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies14040105

Chicago/Turabian Style

El-Khishin, Sarah, and Arwa Mohamed. 2026. "Debt Service as an Intertemporal Constraint: ARDL Evidence on Debt Overhang in Egypt" Economies 14, no. 4: 105. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies14040105

APA Style

El-Khishin, S., & Mohamed, A. (2026). Debt Service as an Intertemporal Constraint: ARDL Evidence on Debt Overhang in Egypt. Economies, 14(4), 105. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies14040105

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