Gender, Perception of Audits, Access to Finance, and Self-Assessed Corporate Tax Compliance
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
3. Methodology
3.1. Data and Sample
3.2. Measurement
3.3. Model Specification
3.4. Data Analysis
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
4.2. Verification of Hypothesis
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Variable | Measurement |
---|---|
Tax compliance | Measured with three answer categories: 1 = no compliance if, in the observation year, the firm was inspected by the tax officials for more than thirty days; 2 = partial compliance if the firm was inspected by the tax officials in less than thirty days; and 3 = full compliance if the tax officer never checks the company. |
Financial statement audit | A dummy variable is equal to one if the firm has its financial statements audited by an external auditor and zero otherwise. |
Access to finance | “To what degree is access to finance an obstacle to the current operations of this establishment?” and quantified on a scale from 0 (very severe obstacle) to 5 (no obstacle). |
Top manager’s gender | A dummy variable is equal to one if the top manager is female and zero otherwise. |
Firm size | Classified into four categories: 1 = the firm is a micro-firm with the number of employees less than 5; 2 = the firm is a small firm with 6–19 employees; 3 = the firm is a medium firm with 20–99 employees; and 4 = the firm is a large firm with more than 100 employees. |
Firm age | Firm age in 2018. |
Family ownership | A dummy variable is equal to one if the firm is a family firm and zero otherwise. |
Variables | Total | Female Managers | Male Managers | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
N | % | N (14.988) | % | N (30.516) | % | |
Audit | ||||||
With financial statement audits | 28.209 | 61.99 | 9.472 | 63.2 | 18.737 | 61.401 |
Without financial statement audits | 17.295 | 38.01 | 5.516 | 36.8 | 11.779 | 38.599 |
Access to Finance | ||||||
No obstacle | 14.268 | 31.36 | 4.901 | 32.7 | 9.367 | 30.695 |
Minor disagreement | 10.192 | 22.40 | 3.477 | 23.2 | 6.715 | 22.005 |
Moderate obstacle | 10.420 | 22.90 | 3.402 | 22.7 | 7.018 | 22.998 |
Major obstacle | 7.223 | 15.87 | 2.278 | 15.2 | 4.945 | 16.205 |
Very severe obstacle | 3.400 | 7.47 | 929 | 6.2 | 2.471 | 8.097 |
Tax Compliance | ||||||
Full compliance | 17.043 | 37.45 | 5.966 | 39.8 | 11.077 | 36.299 |
Partial compliance | 25.470 | 55.97 | 8.168 | 54.5 | 17.302 | 56.698 |
No compliance | 2.990 | 6.57 | 854 | 5.7 | 2.136 | 7.000 |
Variables | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Coef. | p-Value | Coef. | p-Value | Coef. | p-Value | |
Audit | −0.060 | 0.023 ** | 0.070 | 0.000 *** | −0.066 | 0.012 |
Access to finance | 0.085 | 0.000 *** | ||||
Firm size | −0.085 | 0.000 *** | 0.131 | 0.000 *** | −0.096 | 0.000 *** |
Firm age | −0.004 | 0.000 *** | −0.002 | 0.000 *** | −0.004 | 0.000 *** |
Family ownership | 0.021 | 0.454 | 0.052 | 0.000 *** | 0.017 | 0.551 |
Adjusted R2 | 0.002 | 0.008 | 0.004 |
Panel A. Mediation Test Berdasar t Value | |||
Z | p-Value | ||
Sobel | 4.5960 ** | 0.0000043 | |
Goodman 1 (Aroian) | 4.5749 ** | 0.0000047 | |
Goodman 2 | 4.6175 ** | 0.0000038 | |
Panel B. Mediation Test Based on Coefficient and Standard Error | |||
Z | Std. Error | p-Value | |
Sobel | 4.5487 ** | 0.00130806 | 0.0000054 |
Goodman 1 (Aroian) | 4.5264 ** | 0.00131451 | 0.0000060 |
Goodman 2 | 4.5713 ** | 0.00130159 | 0.0000485 |
Variables | Female Managers | Male Managers | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
Coefficient | p-Value | Coefficient | p-Value | |
Panel A. Effect of financial statement audit on tax compliance | ||||
Audit | 0.008 | 0.064 * | −0.091 | 0.005 ** |
Firm size | −0.119 | 0.000 *** | −0.070 | 0.001 ** |
Firm age | −0.004 | 0.001 ** | −0.004 | 0.000 *** |
Family ownership | 0.000 | 0.996 | 0.066 | 0.078 * |
Adjusted R2 | 0.003 | 0.002 | ||
Observation | 14.988 | 30.516 | ||
Panel B. Effect of access to finance on tax compliance | ||||
Audit | 0.016 | 0.097 * | −0.094 | 0.004 ** |
Access to finance | 0.103 | 0.000 *** | 0.075 | 0.000 *** |
Firm size | −0.128 | 0.000 *** | −0.081 | 0.000 *** |
Firm age | −0.004 | 0.002 ** | −0.004 | 0.000 *** |
Family ownership | −0.008 | 0.867 | 0.063 | 0.000 *** |
Adjusted R2 | 0.,005 | 0.003 | ||
Observation | 14.988 | 30.516 |
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Sunardi, S.; Damayanti, T.W.; Supramono, S.; Hermanto, Y.B. Gender, Perception of Audits, Access to Finance, and Self-Assessed Corporate Tax Compliance. Economies 2022, 10, 65. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies10030065
Sunardi S, Damayanti TW, Supramono S, Hermanto YB. Gender, Perception of Audits, Access to Finance, and Self-Assessed Corporate Tax Compliance. Economies. 2022; 10(3):65. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies10030065
Chicago/Turabian StyleSunardi, Sunardi, Theresia Woro Damayanti, Supramono Supramono, and Yustinus Budi Hermanto. 2022. "Gender, Perception of Audits, Access to Finance, and Self-Assessed Corporate Tax Compliance" Economies 10, no. 3: 65. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies10030065
APA StyleSunardi, S., Damayanti, T. W., Supramono, S., & Hermanto, Y. B. (2022). Gender, Perception of Audits, Access to Finance, and Self-Assessed Corporate Tax Compliance. Economies, 10(3), 65. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies10030065