4.2. Estimation Results
Following the empirical settings, the Probit and IV-Probit methods are used to test models, and all results are reported in this section. This study classifies the data into four country groups regarding the national income, including low-income countries (LI), low-medium income countries (LMI), upper-medium income countries (UMI), and high-income countries (HI). Then, to clarify the role of firm size, the sample data is classified according to two different size groups, namely SMEs and large enterprises, in the further sensitive analysis.
The results are presented in
Table 3. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 are the results of regressions without the set of control variables (model 1), and columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 are the results of model 2.
Alongside this, the negative correlation coefficients of the control variables support the previous hypothesis. Larger firms tend to pay fewer bribery shares than smaller firms. Similarly, characteristics such as high-capacity utilization, international certifications, and research and development (R&D) activities imply that a firm can operate efficiently, with high quality. A good firm can this avoid informal payments to lobby for its operations. Nevertheless, the estimates do not find a clear relationship between firm age and bribe payment. Except for firms in the UMI country group (column 6), firm age has a positive and statistically significant effect on the bribery share, as the coefficient is 8.6% and . In other groups the coefficient is insignificant ().
Second, this study predicts the effect of firms’ perceptions in paying bribes and compares non-exporting firms (named as non-exporter) and exporting firms (named as an exporter) to further assess the impact of each perceived level of barriers on bribery payment. A visual representation of images makes it possible to compare the differences between the analysis groups more quickly. Therefore, a visualization of the predicted marginal effects of three constraints in four country groups on bribery share at the 95% confidence interval is shown in
Figure 1. As a result, the set of obstacles has a significant marginal effect on the firm’s bribery share on all levels of obstacle severity (
p < 0.01) in both export status groups.
In general, most of the coefficients of all three hindrances show a positive and statistically significant relationship with the bribery payment at a 1% level. These findings imply that firms are likely to increase their bribery rates as pressures from barriers increase, such as stricter tax and business license administration in government agencies, and political instability becomes more severe. Among the three types of obstacles, tax management barriers have the strongest impact on increasing the probability of bribery of enterprises, except three cases in columns 1, 4, and 8. For example, the influence of the tax administration in the UMI countries (columns 5 and 6), accounts for the highest proportion of the three obstacles, regardless of with or without control variables in the model. Even so, the influence of the taxad variable is only half that of the effect of political instability on bribe payments by firms in the HI group (0.055 compared with 0.113 in column 8). In addition, political instability in LMI countries has a negligible effect on bribe payments. Regression results in column 3 and 4 record the correlation coefficient of these two variables (pol and briS) only are 0.015 and 0.047, respectively.
At first glance, the graph’s shape of the correlation between obstacles and the predictive margin of bribery is quite similar between exporters and non-exporters in each country group. However, the gap between lines in non-exporter compared with those in exporter might be more recognizable in the LMI group (
Figure 1(5,6)). Additionally, there is no significant difference in the rest of the country groups. This result is obtained through observing and comparing the slopes in the prediction equations. Comparing different country groups, an interesting feature is that in two groups of LI and HI countries, the impact of non-exporters awareness levels in all three types of barriers on bribery is higher than that of exporters. Meanwhile, the situation is opposite in medium-income nations, including LMI and UMI countries.
Then, going into detail, the relationship between tax administration and the probability of bribery is predicted as a positive linear function, except in HI group (
Figure 1(5,6)). The impact of tax administration on the marginal effect of bribery is waning with the income nation level. The results show that this effect is strongest in low-developed countries (group LI), and lowest in developed countries (group HI). Specifically, the graph steadily increased with a smaller amplitude in the UMI and HI groups, compared with the other two groups. Besides, the marginal effect of bribe payments is mainly highest at the major level of tax administration, except in the UMI countries (
Figure 1(5,6)).
In addition, the correlation between the
permit and the margin probability bribery is predicted in terms of a linear function in HI group, instead of saturation function like the rest of the groups. All functions are positive. From (
Figure 1(1–4)), the probability of bribery of firms in LI and LMI countries tends to increase gradually as regulatory barriers become increasingly difficult. This effect then becomes saturated when the licensing constraints reach the “Major” threshold. Legal systems in underdeveloped and developing economies are often quite cumbersome, with overlapping functions between state agencies. As a result, firms need to have enough experience and take a lot of time to process procedures, such as business licenses. In such a weak legal system, bribery tends to be promoted in businesses, to “smooth” this process. However, when legal barriers become too severe, this can result in businesses not being able to afford to continue to push the payment of bribes, or that bribery cannot help firms to overcome these barriers. Thus, at the “Major” hindrance level, the probability of bribery becomes saturated. Although this trend is similar in UMI firms, the effect of licensing barriers in these countries is only a quarter of the impact in the LMI group, and half the impact in the LI group. The correlation coefficient of the permit and the bribe margin effect in the UMI group is about 0.01 compared with around 0.045 in the LMI group and 0.02 in the LI group. Unlike other groups, the correlation between the permit and predictive margin effect of bribery in the HI group is consistent with the linear function (
Figure 1(7,8)). Then, the obtained
value is over 90% in both exporting and non-exporting groups. Whereas if the function is described as quadratic or saturated, the value of
is almost insignificant (below 40%).
Similarly, the functions representing each relationship between the political instability and the bribery marginal probabilities are mostly saturation predicted, with
values in the range from approximately 80% to more than 97%, excepting the group HI (
Figure 1(7,8)). The effect of political instability on the bribery margin probability is more notable than others. Specifically, the impact of pol was 2-fold higher than the effect of tax administration in the LI group (
Figure 1(1,2)) and the UMI group (
Figure 1(5,6)), respectively. An interesting finding is that in contrast to other groups, the effect of political instability in LMI countries is represented as a negative function.
In brief, the results support the argument that the three types of constraints directly affect the firm’s bribery payments. The positive relationship between them supports the idea that when firms perceive an increase in a firm’s obstacles, they spend more informal amounts on bribes. Graphically and intuitively, the degree of influence of all three constraints on the probability of bribery in the HI countries is the least volatile. There is almost no big difference between the base level (“No obstacles”) and the rest of the levels. The explanation for this problem may be due to the characteristics of developed countries such as the development of the state management system, the perfection of the legal and institutional system, the political stability, and the low level of national corruption. As an effect, firms find it difficult to find loopholes to engage in bribery. This argument might be appropriate because it is also likely to be relevant for the opposing group. This argument may be relevant because it also can account for the opposing group. Bribery probabilities of firms in low-developed countries (LI) are strongly influenced by the degree of impediment.
Table 4 presents the results of models 3 and 4 by
IV-Probit regression, comparing different country groups. Model 3’s coefficient for bribery is both positive and significant at a 1% level in two groups of medium-income nations (columns 3 and 5). In particular, a firm’s export as the share of export sales in LMI and UMI groups is likely to increase to 2.1% and 3.6% point once a firm increase bribe, respectively. By contrast, there is a negative relation between bribery payment and the firm’s export share in nations with a high-income level HI (column 7). Approximately 11.4% drop in the probability of exports was recorded at a 5% significant level (
) when a firm pays more for informal payments. These findings are similar to
Gamage (
2019) covering 25 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. She found that the bribe payment rate increased from 0% to 8%, the firms export intensity decreasing by 9.25%. Nevertheless, there is no evidence for the effect of bribery on exports in the LI country group. The coefficient of bribery is not statistically significant in both models that exclude and include control variables (columns 1 and 2). In addition, comparing the results of model 3 and model 4, the influence of obstacles makes the correlation coefficient of bribery decrease, though the gap is negligible. This result shows that bribery is less effective when enterprises face obstacles such as an external competitive environment, lack of skilled labor, and higher financial constraints.
A part from this, in the set of control variables shown in the result table, firm size, international certificate, RnD, and foreign ownership are factors that have a notable effect on export activity. All characteristics positively affect exports and are statistically significant at the 1% level in all regressions in which the large-sized firm is more likely to export than smaller firms (30% on average). Similarly, the higher the foreign ownership and/or holding the international certification, the more likely the firm increases exports (40% and 60% on average, respectively). Research and development activity tends to powerfully impact the export probabilities of firms in a developed economy (HI group). RnD can increase the likelihood of export growth of this group by nearly 47% (column 8), nearly double that of the other groups. In addition, there is no evidence for the impact of state contracts and capacity utilization on export activity in these estimates.
I predict the margin effect of bribery payments on a firm’s export share to comprehensively analyse results. Through the intriguing results of marginal effect ranges, it is possible to analyze the responses of exports to changes in each level of bribery.
Table 5 presents the detailed results. In the LI group, starting from over 50% of bribery payments, the margin effects are no longer significant, as (
). When a firm pays more bribery from 0% to 40%, the probability of export increases by 27.9% (column 1). Similarly, the results in LMI are significant up to the 30% rage of bribery payment (Column 3). In addition, the results in the UMI group are statistically significant in most of the bribery ranges, except the 20% range (Column 5). Compared with the same degree of bribery payments, once a firm raises a bribery payment from 0% to 30%, export probability also goes up in both LMI and UMI groups. Export’s likelihood in UMI countries increases by approximately 106%, over 1.5 times higher than in the LMI group. Finally, the more extensive the bribery range, the lower the likelihood of exporting firms in the HI group. The results in the HI group are significant across all ranges of bribery. These results infer that when the bribe value increases by 30%, the probability of exporting decreases from probability (−0.107) to probability (−2.658).
In a nutshell, this study finds the positive effect of bribery payment on firms’ export in nations belonging to the medium-income countries group, but negative influence in high-income countries. Moreover, no evidence is found for the rest group (LI). Moreover, the effect of bribery on exports becomes more pronounced when considering firms’ obstacles. The visualization of the margin results provides a clearer view of the impact of perceived barriers on the relationship between bribery and exports.
In contrast to the main model, instead of controlling for the effects of all three constraints simultaneously, this section examines the interaction of each in turn on the relationship between bribe payment and exports. The similarity with the main part of the model is that the set of control variables remains the same, and the regressions are performed on 4 sub-data classified by country income group.
Table 6 reports the results of the regressions. From the comparison between firms without difficulty (No) and with difficulty (Yes), it is possible to highlight the interaction between obstacles and bribery in relationship with exports.
Overall, bribe payments have absolutely no relationship with exports in the LI group. Moreover, the presence of hindrance changed the relationship between bribery and export, from insignificant to significant in HI group. In the other two groups, the correlation coefficients are significant, regardless of whether the enterprise faces obstacles or not.
Specifically, panel A reports that the rate of bribe payment of enterprises in the LI group is not able to explain the change in export probability, because the correlation coefficients are all significantly greater than 10%. This result is consistent with the results in the main model (
Table 4). Comparing the number of observations between the groups facing and not facing obstacles, the number of enterprises with difficulties is more than that of enterprises without obstacles. Even the number of firms in LI that are financially constrained is three times more likely than unrestricted firms (columns 5 and 6). However, compared with the number of observations in the rest of the country groups, the figure in the LI group was the lowest, ranging from 376 to 1131 observations. The limitation of the sample may be the reason why we question the consistency of the population.
Panel B and panel C reflect the positive outcomes of bribery in the LMI and UMI groups. Although the correlation coefficient is significant even when firms do not face impediments, the presence of impediments reduces the magnitude of the impact of bribery on exports, comparing columns 1, 3, 5 and columns 2, 4, 6, respectively, in pairs. These results are similar to the main part (results in
Table 4), but the effect of bribery on export probability is stronger when observing each type of hindrance separately. To illustrate this point, for firms in LMI facing financial difficulty, the effect of bribery is strongest. The probability of exporting is then likely to increase by 0.021 (column 6), compared with 0.015 (column 2) and 0.018 (column 4) once these businesses face competition, or lack of skilled workers, respectively. In contrast, the effect of bribery was strongest for firms in UMI that face competitive difficulties (correlation coefficient 0.037), compared with firms facing the other problems. Interestingly, however, when comparing the disparity caused by the impediment, the results reflect an opposite trend. The most significant reduction in the impact of bribe payments in the LMI group (panel B) was due to competition, from 0.038 (column 1) to 0.015 (column 2). Whereas, in the UMI (panel C), the change caused by financial constraints is the most pronounced, from 0.064 (column 5) when a firm is not facing financial difficulties to 0.033 (column 6) when it is facing financial constraint.
Finally, no different from the main result (
Table 4), panel D reflects the negative outcome of bribe payments to exports by firms in the HI group. Under the interaction of competition and lack of skilled workers, the association between bribery and export becomes statistically significant. The magnitude of the effect of bribery when considering the interaction of bribery and these two constraints is −0.186 (Column 3) and −0.173 (Column 4), respectively. This result is much higher than the effect of bribery when controlling for all three constraints in the main model simultaneously (Column 8–
Table 4). The cause of this finding is that financial constraints do not change the nature of the relationship between bribery and exports in the HI group. The ability to export is not affected by bribery regardless of the firm’s financial position, as the correlation coefficients are not statistically significant (columns 5 and 6—panel D–
Table 6).
To sum up, the results obtained when separating each constraint are in favor of the main results. In more detail, the interaction between competition and bribery makes the effect of bribery on exports strongest in the UMI and HI groups. While the interaction between financial constraints and bribery makes the effect of bribery on exports strongest in the LMI group.
- (ii)
SMEs and Large-Sized firms
In this further analysis, the study approaches the main models on SMEs and large-sized firms. First, the results of model 1 and model 2 for SMEs and large-sized firms are shown in
Table 7. Regardless of firms’ size, the scale of a firm’s bribery tends to increase once firms face more severe difficulties in tax administration, business licensing procedures, and political instability (columns 1 and 3). This result may reduce when controlling for firm characteristics as control variables (columns 2 and 4). The results also show that political instability has the least influence on bribery payment compared to the other two barriers, regardless of SMEs or large companies. These findings aline with the results of the main part.
In addition,
Figure 2 visually depicts the predicted marginal effects of these constraints in both firm-size groups at the 95% confidence intervals relative to the export situation. All three obstacles have a significant marginal impact on the payment of bribes at all obstacle levels, as
. Overall, it is immediately apparent that the shapes of the graphs are similar between exporting and non-exporting firms in both SMEs and large firms. The correlation between tax impediment and the marginal prediction of bribery increases gradually with a positive linear function. However, the growth rate in the group of SMEs is slightly higher. Likewise, the graph of the political instability variable can also be predicted as an increasing linear function. While political instability has almost no discernible effect on the bribery behavior of SMEs, large firms find a notable variation in the probability of bribery when it faces with uncertainty politics. Illustrating this point, the graph is steep as the firm moves from the starting point (no obstacle) to the beginning of perceived difficulty due to corruption (minor obstacle). However, the degree of variation in the likelihood of bribery increases slowly at the next difficulty levels. Unlike the above two hindrances, the relationship between permit and the marginal effect of bribery is most appropriate with a saturation function, as the coefficients
are greater than 64% in SMEs, and over 98% in large firms. When a firm begins to perceive business licensing and permit impediments, the probability of bribery gradually increases in both groups of firms, before becoming saturated when impediment reaches Major level. In short, tax administration barriers have a stronger impact on bribery behavior of SMEs than large firms. In contrast, the latter is more dominated by political instability and bureaucratic difficulties.
Second, the effect of bribery on exports is tested by
IV-probit estimation using the location–country–sector average of bribery as the instrumental variable (models 3 and 4). The results are presented in
Table 8. Columns 1 and 2 reflect the results for SMEs. The results emphasize that an increase in bribe payments can account for an increase in exports (the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level,
). SMEs paying more bribes can increase their ability to export. Specifically, in the baseline model (Model 3) and the model that controls for the specific characteristics of the enterprise (Model 4), the ability to export can increase to 1.6% and 1.8%, respectively. On the other hand, no relationship was found between bribe payments and exports in large firms (Column 4). The correlation coefficient between bribery and exports is not statistically significant even when I add control variables to the model (column 5). In addition, although competitive pressure from competitors reduces the export ability of both SMEs and large enterprises, its impact on SMEs is almost twice as high, −0.074 (Column 2) compared with −0.037 (Column 4). This finding is the same expected result as
Ito and Pucik (
1993). Furthermore, though the shortage of high-skilled labor is significant for export activities of enterprises, the regressions do not find a significant difference of this factor for the probability of paying bribes of SMEs and large corporations. Unlike the above two types of impediments, the study only found evidence of a negative interaction of financial constraints on the relationship between bribery and exports in the large group of firms (column 4). In contrast, no relationship of financial problems was found in the SMEs group (column 2).
All in all, regardless of firm size, obstacles related to tax administration, business licensing and permit, and corruption all explain the variation in corporate bribery probabilities. The relationship was found to be positive. However, the study only found a link between bribery and exports in the case of SMEs, but did not find any indication of this association in large firms.