Firm Performance and Corporate Social Responsibility: The Moderating Role of Board Skills
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Firm Profitability and Corporate Social Responsibility
3. Research Design
3.1. Sample Selection and Data
3.2. Variable Definitions
3.2.1. Corporate Social Responsibility
3.2.2. Firm Performance
3.2.3. Control Variables
3.3. Model Specification and Empirical Analysis
3.4. Descriptive Statistics
3.5. Correlation Matrix
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1. The Effect of Firm Performance on Corporate Social Responsibility
4.2. Additional Analysis: The Moderating Role of Board Skills
4.3. Robustness Check
4.3.1. Alternative Metrics of Firm Performance
4.3.2. Alternative Metrics of CSR
4.3.3. Endogeneity Concerns
Entropybalancing
Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A. Variables Definitions
| Variables | Definitions |
| Dependent Variable | |
| CSR | The composite Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) scores are derived from Thomson Reuters Asset4. The environmental component (E) incorporates metrics related to resource efficiency, emissions control, and environmental innovation. The social dimension (S) encompasses labor practices, human rights compliance, community engagement, and product responsibility standards. The governance factor (G) includes board oversight, shareholder rights, and corporate responsibility strategy. |
| Independent Variables | |
| ROA | Income before tax over total assets. |
| ROE | Income before taxes over shareholders equity. |
| NET PROFIT MARGIN | The net income after taxes over net sales. |
| TOBINS’Q | Is the ratio of market value of the company over total assets. |
| Moderating Variable | |
| BOARD SKILLS | The proportion of directors possessing either industry-specific expertise or substantial financial qualifications. |
| Control Variables | |
| LEVEVERAGE | Total debt over total assets. |
| FIRM_SIZE | Natural logarithm of total assets. |
| CEO_DUALITY | CEO duality which takes 1 if CEO and board chair are the same person, 0 if not. |
| BOARD_GENDER | Proportion of female directors on board. |
| BOARD_SIZE | Number of directors on board. |
| GDP | Natural logarithm of gross domestic product per capita. |
| AUDIT_COMMITTEE | A binary indicator that denotes the presence of an Audit committee within a firm |
| GOVERNANCE_COMMITTEE | A binary indicator that denotes the presence of a corporate governance committee within a firm |
| 1 | Global Corporate Sustainability Report 2025|OECD. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/global-corporate-sustainability-report-2025_bc25ce1e-en.html (accessed on 12 December 2025). |
| 2 | 2025_Sustainable_Signals_Individual_Investors_2025_report.pdf. https://www.morganstanley.com/content/dam/msdotcom/en/assets/pdfs/2025_Sustainable_Signals_Individual_Investors_2025_report.pdf (accessed on 12 December 2025). |
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| Panel A. Sample Distribution per Country | ||
| Country | N | Percentage |
| Argentina | 86 | 0.202 |
| Australia | 1937 | 4.544 |
| Austria | 187 | 0.439 |
| Belgium | 278 | 0.652 |
| Bermuda | 143 | 0.335 |
| Brazil | 106 | 0.249 |
| Canada | 1954 | 4.584 |
| Cayman Islands | 42 | 0.099 |
| Chile | 226 | 0.530 |
| China | 3235 | 7.590 |
| Colombia | 45 | 0.106 |
| Cyprus | 32 | 0.075 |
| Denmark | 328 | 0.770 |
| Egypt | 48 | 0.113 |
| Finland | 388 | 0.910 |
| France | 1004 | 2.356 |
| Germany | 1149 | 2.696 |
| Greece | 126 | 0.296 |
| Hong Kong | 1145 | 2.686 |
| Hungary | 38 | 0.089 |
| India | 903 | 2.119 |
| Indonesia | 326 | 0.765 |
| Ireland | 383 | 0.899 |
| Isle of Man | 11 | 0.026 |
| Italy | 360 | 0.845 |
| Japan | 3429 | 8.045 |
| South Korea | 734 | 1.722 |
| Kuwait | 28 | 0.066 |
| Luxembourg | 139 | 0.326 |
| Macau | 33 | 0.077 |
| Malaysia | 510 | 1.197 |
| Mexico | 300 | 0.704 |
| Morocco | 10 | 0.023 |
| Netherlands | 465 | 1.091 |
| New Zealand | 318 | 0.746 |
| Norway | 280 | 0.657 |
| Oman | 13 | 0.030 |
| Panama | 13 | 0.030 |
| Peru | 99 | 0.232 |
| Philippines | 200 | 0.469 |
| Poland | 215 | 0.504 |
| Portugal | 81 | 0.190 |
| Qatar | 11 | 0.026 |
| Russia | 293 | 0.687 |
| Saudi Arabia | 99 | 0.232 |
| Singapore | 545 | 1.279 |
| South Africa | 859 | 2.015 |
| Spain | 301 | 0.706 |
| Sweden | 925 | 2.170 |
| Switzerland | 874 | 2.051 |
| Thailand | 405 | 0.950 |
| Turkey | 102 | 0.239 |
| Ukraine | 11 | 0.026 |
| United Arab Emirates | 22 | 0.052 |
| United Kingdom | 3403 | 7.984 |
| United States of America | 13,426 | 31.499 |
| Total | 42,623 | 100.000 |
| Panel B. Sample Distribution per Year | ||
| Year | N | Percentage |
| 2002 | 89 | 0.209 |
| 2003 | 179 | 0.420 |
| 2004 | 346 | 0.812 |
| 2005 | 490 | 1.150 |
| 2006 | 537 | 1.260 |
| 2007 | 836 | 1.961 |
| 2008 | 1145 | 2.686 |
| 2009 | 1353 | 3.174 |
| 2010 | 1608 | 3.773 |
| 2011 | 1732 | 4.064 |
| 2012 | 2071 | 4.859 |
| 2013 | 2228 | 5.227 |
| 2014 | 2265 | 5.314 |
| 2015 | 2755 | 6.464 |
| 2016 | 3215 | 7.543 |
| 2017 | 3818 | 8.958 |
| 2018 | 4353 | 10.213 |
| 2019 | 5130 | 12.036 |
| 2020 | 5743 | 13.474 |
| 2021 | 2730 | 6.405 |
| Total | 42,623 | 100.000 |
| Panel C. Sample Distribution per Industry | ||
| Industry | N | Percentage |
| Basic Materials | 5208 | 12.219 |
| Consumer Cyclicals | 8056 | 18.901 |
| Consumer Non-Cyclicals | 4104 | 9.629 |
| Energy | 3063 | 7.186 |
| Healthcare | 3668 | 8.606 |
| Industrials | 8436 | 19.792 |
| Real Estate | 2433 | 5.708 |
| Technology | 6818 | 15.996 |
| Utilities | 837 | 1.964 |
| Total | 42,623 | 100.000 |
| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CSR | 42,623 | 43.918 | 19.837 | 12.806 | 78.828 |
| ROA | 42,623 | 0.067 | 0.078 | −0.099 | 0.230 |
| LEVERAGE | 42,623 | 0.244 | 0.166 | 0.000 | 0.574 |
| FIRM_SIZE | 42,623 | 21.501 | 1.561 | 18.471 | 24.245 |
| CEO_DUALITY | 42,623 | 0.368 | 0.482 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| BOARD_GENDER | 42,623 | 15.862 | 12.525 | 0.000 | 40.000 |
| BOARD_SIZE | 42,623 | 9.711 | 3.167 | 1.000 | 33.000 |
| GDP | 42,623 | 10.481 | 0.727 | 8.733 | 11.160 |
| AUDIT_COMMITTEE | 42,623 | 0.917 | 0.276 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| GOVERNANCE_COMMITTEE | 42,623 | 0.459 | 0.498 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) CSR | 1.000 | |||||||||
| (2) ROA | 0.029 *** | 1.000 | ||||||||
| (3) LEVERAGE | 0.086 *** | −0.276 *** | 1.000 | |||||||
| (4) FIRM_SIZE | 0.441 *** | 0.105 *** | 0.134 *** | 1.000 | ||||||
| (5) CEO_DUALITY | −0.054 *** | 0.043 *** | −0.007 | 0.116 *** | 1.000 | |||||
| (6) BOARD_ GENDER | 0.312 *** | −0.015 *** | 0.062 *** | 0.016 *** | −0.015 *** | 1.000 | ||||
| (7) BOARD_SIZE | 0.271 *** | 0.024 *** | 0.108 *** | 0.460 *** | 0.057 *** | 0.007 | 1.000 | |||
| (8) GDP | 0.042 *** | −0.088 *** | −0.008 * | 0.018 *** | 0.141 *** | 0.175 *** | −0.137 *** | 1.000 | ||
| (9) AUDIT_COMMITTEE | 0.081 *** | −0.007 | 0.067 *** | −0.051 *** | 0.091 *** | 0.179 *** | −0.015 *** | 0.097 *** | 1.000 | |
| (10) GOVERNANCE_COMMITTEE | 0.023 *** | −0.048 *** | 0.062 *** | 0.079 *** | 0.290 *** | 0.107 *** | 0.025 *** | 0.309 *** | 0.253 *** | 1.000 |
| Mean VIF | 1.18 | |||||||||
| VIF | 1.12 | 1.13 | 1.34 | 1.12 | 1.07 | 1.31 | 1.18 | 1.11 | 1.26 |
| CSR | |
|---|---|
| ROA | 4.485 *** |
| (4.409) | |
| LEVERAGE | −1.448 *** |
| (−2.951) | |
| FIRM_SIZE | 6.666 *** |
| (108.865) | |
| CEO_DUALITY | −1.525 *** |
| (−9.073) | |
| BOARD_GENDER | 0.322 *** |
| (43.409) | |
| BOARD_SIZE | 0.384 *** |
| (13.161) | |
| GDP | 3.339 *** |
| (4.111) | |
| AUDIT_COMMITTEE | 6.637 *** |
| (20.060) | |
| GOVERNANCE_COMMITTEE | 5.967 *** |
| (25.001) | |
| CONSTANT | −151.841 *** |
| (−19.864) | |
| COUNTRY | Yes |
| INDUSTRY | Yes |
| YEAR | Yes |
| OBSERVATIONS | 42,623 |
| R_SQUARED | 0.445 |
| CSR | |
|---|---|
| ROA | 9.361 *** |
| (3.625) | |
| BOARDSKILLS | 0.033 *** |
| (6.582) | |
| ROA X BOARDSKILLS | −0.093 ** |
| (−2.098) | |
| LEVERAGE | −1.368 *** |
| (−2.788) | |
| FIRM_SIZE | 6.680 *** |
| (109.094) | |
| CEO_DUALITY | −1.574 *** |
| (−9.362) | |
| BOARD_GENDER | 0.324 *** |
| (43.692) | |
| BOARD_SIZE | 0.398 *** |
| (13.609) | |
| GDP | 3.130 *** |
| (3.852) | |
| AUDIT_COMMITTEE | 6.637 *** |
| (20.071) | |
| GOVERNANCE_COMMITTEE | 5.954 *** |
| (24.959) | |
| CONSTANT | −151.299 *** |
| (−19.801) | |
| COUNTRY | Yes |
| INDUSTRY | Yes |
| YEAR | Yes |
| OBSERVATIONS | 42,623 |
| R-SQUARED | 0.446 |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| CSR | CSR | CSR | |
| ROE | 3.808 *** | ||
| (4.229) | |||
| NET_PROFIT_MARGIN | 14.754 *** | ||
| (17.942) | |||
| TOBINQ | 0.151 *** | ||
| (4.730) | |||
| LEVERAGE | −1.798 *** | −0.579 | −1.790 *** |
| (−3.785) | (−1.215) | (−3.773) | |
| FIRM_SIZE | 6.668 *** | 6.746 *** | 6.737 *** |
| (108.938) | (111.316) | (109.935) | |
| CEO_DUALITY | −1.517 *** | −1.553 *** | −1.518 *** |
| (−9.029) | (−9.278) | (−9.036) | |
| BOARD_GENDER | 0.322 *** | 0.317 *** | 0.322 *** |
| (43.416) | (42.860) | (43.377) | |
| BOARD_SIZE | 0.383 *** | 0.360 *** | 0.380 *** |
| (13.126) | (12.378) | (13.008) | |
| GDP | 3.286 *** | 3.524 *** | 3.191 *** |
| (4.047) | (4.356) | (3.930) | |
| AUDIT_COMMITTEE | 6.633 *** | 6.803 *** | 6.598 *** |
| (20.048) | (20.637) | (19.957) | |
| GOVERNANCE_COMMITTEE | 5.962 *** | 6.033 *** | 5.924 *** |
| (24.983) | (25.378) | (24.836) | |
| CONSTANT | −151.198 *** | −155.938 *** | −151.549 *** |
| (−19.783) | (−20.464) | (−19.829) | |
| COUNTRY | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| INDUSTRY | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| YEAR | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| OBSERVATIONS | 42,623 | 42,623 | 42,623 |
| R_SQUARED | 0.445 | 0.449 | 0.446 |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Envir_Pillar_Score | Social_Pillar_Score | Governance_Pillar_Score | ES_Perf | |
| ROA | 8.505 *** | 4.561 *** | 8.398 *** | 2.782 ** |
| (7.496) | (3.753) | (6.615) | (2.365) | |
| LEVERAGE | 1.443 ** | −1.576 *** | −1.320 ** | −1.984 *** |
| (2.565) | (−2.638) | (−2.108) | (−3.386) | |
| FIRM_SIZE | −5.060 *** | 7.398 *** | 4.328 *** | 8.304 *** |
| (−70.055) | (96.895) | (55.638) | (109.268) | |
| CEO_DUALITY | 4.177 *** | 0.419 ** | −6.122 *** | 0.583 *** |
| (21.214) | (2.016) | (−28.310) | (2.832) | |
| BOARD_GENDER | −0.400 *** | 0.255 *** | 0.467 *** | 0.269 *** |
| (−46.442) | (27.946) | (49.432) | (30.460) | |
| BOARD_SIZE | 0.363 *** | 0.641 *** | −0.618 *** | 0.800 *** |
| (10.030) | (16.451) | (−16.229) | (20.668) | |
| GDP | −1.363 | −2.652 *** | 7.408 *** | 1.875 * |
| (−1.408) | (−2.630) | (7.156) | (1.889) | |
| AUDIT_COMMITTEE | −10.736 *** | 5.801 *** | 11.571 *** | 4.696 *** |
| (−26.488) | (13.204) | (27.423) | (10.798) | |
| GOVERNANCE_COMMITTEE | −10.758 *** | 4.974 *** | 11.751 *** | 3.967 *** |
| (−38.804) | (16.987) | (39.083) | (14.212) | |
| CONSTANT | −77.015 *** | −130.052 *** | −99.313 *** | 191.417 *** |
| (−8.374) | (−13.694) | (−10.116) | (−20.699) | |
| COUNTRY | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| INDUSTRY | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| YEAR | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| OBSERVATIONS | 42,623 | 42,623 | 42,623 | 42,623 |
| R-SQUARED | 0.298 | 0.419 | 0.238 | 0.466 |
| Entropy Balancing | 2SLS | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| CSR | ROA | CSR | |
| ROA | 4.080 *** | 8.822 *** | |
| (3.847) | (2.952) | ||
| L.ROA | 0.685 *** | ||
| (97.728) | |||
| PEER_ROA | 0.536 *** | ||
| (20.688) | |||
| LEVERAGE | 1.801 *** | −0.053 *** | −0.387 |
| (2.899) | (−21.746) | (−0.315) | |
| FIRM_SIZE | 6.298 *** | 0.003 *** | 6.576 *** |
| (84.990) | (12.166) | (39.240) | |
| CEO_DUALITY | −1.292 *** | −0.000 | −1.617 *** |
| (−6.490) | (−0.040) | (−3.933) | |
| BOARD_GENDER | 0.305 *** | 0.000 | 0.330 *** |
| (34.611) | (1.408) | (19.622) | |
| BOARD_SIZE | 0.478 *** | −0.000 *** | 0.346 *** |
| (11.869) | (−4.003) | (4.257) | |
| GDP | 2.957 *** | −0.008 ** | 4.168 *** |
| (3.072) | (−2.432) | (2.774) | |
| AUDIT_COMMITTEE | 7.085 *** | −0.003 *** | 6.855 *** |
| (16.199) | (−2.780) | (7.659) | |
| GOVERNANCE_COMMITTEE | 6.069 *** | −0.003 *** | 5.941 *** |
| (21.461) | (−2.905) | (10.088) | |
| CONSTANT | −141.612 *** | 0.003 | −144.239 *** |
| (−15.779) | (0.085) | (−9.913) | |
| COUNTRY | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| INDUSTRY | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| YEAR | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| OBSERVATIONS | 42,623 | 35,316 | 35,316 |
| R-SQUARED | 0.446 | 0.594 | 0.438 |
| UNDERID. (LM) | 1449.78 *** | ||
| WEAK ID. (CRAGG-DONALD WALD F) | 5812.31 | ||
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© 2026 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license.
Share and Cite
Fathallah, R.S.; Nizar, H.; Bouzgarrou, H.; Alomair, A. Firm Performance and Corporate Social Responsibility: The Moderating Role of Board Skills. Int. J. Financial Stud. 2026, 14, 138. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs14060138
Fathallah RS, Nizar H, Bouzgarrou H, Alomair A. Firm Performance and Corporate Social Responsibility: The Moderating Role of Board Skills. International Journal of Financial Studies. 2026; 14(6):138. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs14060138
Chicago/Turabian StyleFathallah, Rihem Soussi, Hamza Nizar, Houssam Bouzgarrou, and Abdulrahman Alomair. 2026. "Firm Performance and Corporate Social Responsibility: The Moderating Role of Board Skills" International Journal of Financial Studies 14, no. 6: 138. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs14060138
APA StyleFathallah, R. S., Nizar, H., Bouzgarrou, H., & Alomair, A. (2026). Firm Performance and Corporate Social Responsibility: The Moderating Role of Board Skills. International Journal of Financial Studies, 14(6), 138. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs14060138

