Incentive Mechanism for Improving Task Completion Quality in Mobile Crowdsensing
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Related Work
2.1. Research on Incentive Mechanism for Data Quality in Crowdsensing
2.2. Sunk Cost Effect
3. Design of IMBSC
3.1. System Model
3.2. The Influence of Sunk Cost Effect on Participants’ Decision-Making
3.2.1. Effort Sensing Reference Factor
3.2.2. Data Quality Update Based on Sunk Cost Effect
3.3. Incentive Mechanism Design Based on Sunk Cost Effect
3.3.1. Task Publishing
Algorithm 1: Task publishing |
1: FOR DO |
2: |
3: Releasing on the platform |
4: End FOR |
5: FOR DO |
6: Registering on the platform |
7: Selecting the tasks which are willing to execute |
8: Evaluating value |
9: |
10: Submitting to platform |
11: End FOR |
3.3.2. Participant Selection
3.3.3. Reward Payment Stage Based on Sunk Cost Effect
Algorithm 2: Reward selection payment |
1:Input: , , , , , |
2:Output: |
3: Sort all in descending order of |
4: FOR DO |
5: Sort all in ascending order of |
6: Find the smallest such that |
7: IF such exists THEN |
8: FOR all s.t DO |
9: |
10: |
11: End FOR |
12: End IF |
13: End FOR |
14: FOR DO |
15: performs his tasks |
16: submits his data to platform |
17: End FOR |
18: the platform test quality of data |
19: FOR DO |
20: IF THEN |
21: Pay according to Definition 3 |
22: |
23: Give the and |
24: ELSE |
25: Pay the |
26: End IF |
27: End FOR |
Algorithm 3: Final reward settlement |
1:Input: |
2: FOR DO |
3: continue to performs his tasks and improve quality |
4: resubmits his data to platform |
5: End FOR |
6: the platform test quality of data |
7: FOR DO |
8: IF THEN |
9: Pay the |
10: End IF |
11: End FOR |
3.4. Utility Analysis
3.4.1. Participant Utility
3.4.2. Platform Utility
4. Simulation Experiment and Result Analysis
4.1. Experimental Setup
4.2. Experimental Results
4.2.1. Server Platform Utility
4.2.2. Average Utility of Participants
4.2.3. Number of Tasks Completed
5. Summary
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Parameter | Meaning |
---|---|
, , | set of tasks, number of tasks, the jth task |
, , | set of participants, number of participants, the ith participant |
, | set of values of all tasks, value of the jth task |
, | task budget set of all tasks, task budget of the jth task |
cost of completing task in run r of | |
set of completed tasks by | |
, | set of bidding for all tasks in , bidding for of in rth run |
, | set of participants‘ bidding information, ’s bidding information |
upper limit number of tasks performed by | |
quality threshold of the th task in the th run | |
data quality of submitted by for the first time in the rth run | |
, | set of all winners, set of winners whose first data quality is less than |
, | set of winners meetting the quality standard and failling to meet |
, | set of quality re-attainment, set of final quality non-attainment |
percentage of winners exceeded by in the rth run | |
effort sensing reference factor | |
withhold factor | |
Boolean value, True means is the winner of , False means was not selected as the winner of | |
, , | The utility of complete task in the rth run, the utility of in the rth run, the utility of the platform in the rth run |
Parameter | Value | Meaning |
---|---|---|
50~500 | Number of users in the participant set | |
50~500 | Number of tasks in the task set | |
1~80 | Single task value | |
~ (0~60) | Single task budget | |
0.5~4 | Cost of completing the task | |
~8 | Bidding for tasks | |
1~5 | Maximum number of completed tasks | |
0~1 | Data quality | |
0.1~0.9 | Impact on quality |
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Wang, K.; Chen, Z.; Zhang, L.; Liu, J.; Li, B. Incentive Mechanism for Improving Task Completion Quality in Mobile Crowdsensing. Electronics 2023, 12, 1037. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12041037
Wang K, Chen Z, Zhang L, Liu J, Li B. Incentive Mechanism for Improving Task Completion Quality in Mobile Crowdsensing. Electronics. 2023; 12(4):1037. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12041037
Chicago/Turabian StyleWang, Kun, Zhigang Chen, Lizhong Zhang, Jiaqi Liu, and Bin Li. 2023. "Incentive Mechanism for Improving Task Completion Quality in Mobile Crowdsensing" Electronics 12, no. 4: 1037. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12041037
APA StyleWang, K., Chen, Z., Zhang, L., Liu, J., & Li, B. (2023). Incentive Mechanism for Improving Task Completion Quality in Mobile Crowdsensing. Electronics, 12(4), 1037. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12041037