Trust Hardware Based Secured Privacy Preserving Computation System for Three-Dimensional Data
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- Hierarchical separation computation: The SPPC system adopts a hierarchical architecture: computation off-chain, storage off-chain and consensus on-chain. TEE performs critical data computation and attests to correct and complicated execution off-chain. Distributed data storage, independent from consensus and computation, provides secure and large-capacity storage. On-chain nodes are responsible for maintaining a consistent global state and performing consensus updates efficiently.
- Data leverage scheme: Data expectation matching is realized by similarity computation of registered data text attributes with a graph structure. According to reputation value, the graph structure could be altered. Moreover, the registered costs should affect data provider ranking in a similarity computation list. In this way, the SPPCS voids network resource consumption caused by invalid transactions effectively.
- Dual hybrid isolation model: To obscure the connection between the sender and receiver of a transaction, we design a transaction isolation model based on the TEE leader scheme. The TEE leader completes the transactions with the sender and the receiver asynchronously to cover up the direct relationship, which can avoid privacy exposure issues caused by individual identity disclosure. To prevent access the all the original data, we also construct another hybrid model based on non-accessible attributes of TEE. Data requesters obtain computation results instead of accessing original data to preserve data confidentiality.
2. Related Work
2.1. Privacy with Principles
2.2. Network Implementation in Privacy Protection
2.3. Peer-to-Peer Technology
3. Preliminaries
3.1. Blockchain
3.2. IPFS
3.3. Trust Hardware with SGX
3.4. Graph Sturcture
4. The Proposed SPPCS Overview
4.1. System Framework
- DP: The unity owns sensitive data. In our system, DP can register data attributes, individual reputation value and expected unit price with the smart contracts.
- DR: The users who require data from DP for their purposes perform three tasks in TCP to preserve data privacy. (1) After DRs broadcast demands on-chain, data matching analysis requirement should be delegated to TCP off-chain. (2) DRs obtain requirement matching list results from TCP and the results verification will be published on-chain. (3) DRs conduct hybrid transaction with DPs through TCP on-chain.
- EB: Consensus nodes of EB are responsible for maintaining the consistency of data transaction records on-chain and validating state updates with the TEE attestation. EB in SPPCS also acts as an interaction medium among DP, DR and TCP.
- DS: IPFS, as a typical representative of DS, provides a safe and large-capacity storage. SPPCS utilizes IPFS to separate storage from consensus and computation. The IPFS receives encrypted data and returns location indexes.
- TCP: Trusted computation nodes, with SGX-enabled CPU and bios, should be considered as the core of TCP. These trusted nodes conduct delegated requirement matching computations, hybrid transactions and data analysis computations with REE and TEE. REE supports interaction interfaces between on-chain and off-chain. TEE guarantees confidentiality in the data process with SGX remote attestation, SGX seal and unseal and cryptographic methods. The delegation request is sent to TCP and the trusted computation node queries related information and executes the corresponding analysis. The trusted computation node securely stores the results outside the enclave with SGX seal, otherwise the reads seal data into the enclave with SGX unseal. Simultaneously, the trusted computation node sends execution results to EB for verification by SGX remote attestation and cryptographic methods. A quorum of trusted computation nodes run a hybrid transaction protocol to complete transactions and obscure the relationship between DR and DP.
4.2. Data Leverage Scheme
4.3. Workflow of SPPCS
- 1.
- Register Phase
- (a)
- Initialize attestation: The Ellipse Curve Cryptography (ECC) key pair of the DP, DR, TN, TN enclave and consensus node (CN) are denoted as , where is the public key, is the private key and is one of DP, DR, TN, TN enclave and CN. The TN initializes reputation , node type , enclave public key and expected price . Similarly, the DP initializes reputation and estimates the quality of own data .
- (b)
- Leader selection: can be set that is normal or complex, with a normal default value. Different TNs have different ranges and only complex TNs can perform hybrid transactions and run a leader election protocol. Complex TNs, with much higher upper limit values, consist of a complex trusted node pool (CTNP), where the winner in each round of elections updates the leader management smart contract. The term of the leader node is determined by reputation and the successful transactions number. The leader reputation is influenced by DR comments and the successful transaction rate. The number of successful transactions increased by one with a smart contract triggered by the DR validation. The smart contract records the reason for leader re-election, which takes place in these scenarios: ① the number of successful transactions reaches a set value; ② the leader node reputation value is lower than the set value. When DPs notice the leader node is inconsistent with the DR transaction period, DPs can continue transaction for reason ① and reject it for reason ②.
- (c)
- Attribute and requirement description: DPs extract data characteristics into text-item sets , such as data type, data amount, unit price, etc. Moreover, DP creates a unique signature notion (USN), defined as DP signature of the keyword hash value , where the keyword is designated by the DP. DR converts the demand into keyword sets including required data description, expected size, bid price, required number of TN and unit delegation fee.
- (d)
- Data storage and pre-estimation: DP generates a one-time symmetric key to encrypt original data in each round of transactions. should be uploaded to IPFS and DP obtains the corresponding location index . DR publishes the quality evaluation code of required data, based on which all DPs pre-estimate the data matching value .
- (e)
- Registration: DR releases the delegation register contract designed in next Section 4.4 to broadcast , and . DP and TN complete registration by using the corresponding smart contracts. DP registers the contract records hash value , USN and . DP information management contract mainly contains on-chain. TN register contract includes , , and TN leader. and the transaction number are registered in TN information management contract .
- 2.
- Requirement Matching Phase
- (a)
- Delegation protocol: Corresponding to step 1 to step 4 in Figure 4, the DR broadcast requirement via blockchain starts the process of requirement matching analysis. The TNs first notice the DR demand contract and establish secure channels to reply to DR with a TN signature pre-emptively. When DR receives a response node, it conducts an SGX remote attestation to validate TEE platform. Then, the DR verifies the signature of TN with and decrypts with . Only if equals can the node be a candidate. According to a combination strategy of higher and lower with the shortest response time, the DR publishes candidate nodes on-chain and deposits double either of the TNs expected.
- (b)
- Requirement analysis off-chain: According to the TNs selected by DR, these TNs first run an information synchronization protocol, such as Gossip, to maintain consistency of computation results. Step 5 in Figure 4 presents the potential DP and establishes a secure channel with any one of the selected TNs recorded on-chain to send encrypted with , denoted as . The selected TNs verify the identity of DP with and then to compare the consistency between and in . In particular, ensure is validated and executed in the TEE environment. If the previous two hashes have same value, TNs share validated in ciphertext and then execute further computations in enclaves with the graph structure . It is assumed that the requirement matching analysis result list and corresponding hash value are denoted as and . The contains , , and . published on-chain can not only protect the privacy of the requirement matching analysis result, but also makes it tamper-proof and provide verification. The serial number notation (SNN) is utilized to anonymize and is regarded as the representative item of the serialized result list corresponding line. The contains SNN, , and and the hash value, which can be represented as . , , and are encrypted with and stored outside with the seal method. As described in step 6 in Figure 4, TNs send and on-chain. Then, TNs sign encrypted final results with and send to DR through the OCALL method in step 7 of Figure 4. DRs are unable to obtain the information of DP from .
- (c)
- Execution result validation: Corresponding to step 6 in Figure 4, the smart contract recognizes the final computation result with of , where is the maximum occurrence number and is more than . When DR receives a response node, it conducts SGX remote attestation to validate the TEE platform, as shown in step 8 of Figure 4. Then, the DR utilizes to check whether is from published TNs and validates the consistency between received and on-chain to ensure no tampering. In step 9 of Figure 4, the DR also considers the maximum occurrence number of as the validation result. When the final computation result is recognized by the smart contract as the same with the DR validation result, the smart contract is triggered to provide TNs with the correct computation and return extra change for DR with the reputation feedback received.
- 3.
- Hybrid Transaction Phase
4.4. Smart Contract and Algorithm Design
Algorithm 1 Data Matching Analysis Algorithm | |
1 | input: encrypted data attribute item, encrypted keyword, DP register contract id |
and DR delegation register contract id | |
2 | output: encrypted data matching list with a correctness proof by TEE |
3 | begin |
4 | get selected TN list from blockchain and load into TEE |
5 | get data requirement demands from blockchain and load into TEE |
6 | if timestamp < set-time then |
7 | get data attribute hash from blockchain and load into TEE |
8 | parse as |
9 | validate with data attribute hash |
10 | if data attribute hash is invalidated then |
11 | abort |
12 | else |
13 | if validated is not new then |
14 | wait another |
15 | else |
16 | synchronization encrypted DP data with selected TNs |
17 | parse as |
18 | perform calculation and obtain |
19 | |
20 | else |
21 | cluster different attribute sets with k-means |
22 | send encrypted to DR |
23 | send on-chain |
24 | if contract verify result success then |
25 | receive payment and reputation comments from blockchain |
26 | else |
27 | abort |
28 | end |
5. Implementation and Performance Evaluation
5.1. SGX Execution Performance Evaluation
5.2. Transaction Execution Privacy Evaluation
6. Security and Privacy Analysis
6.1. DoS Resistance
6.2. Malicious Fraud Resistance
6.3. Confidentiality and Consistency
7. Conclusions and Future Work
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Notation | Description |
---|---|
3D | the three-dimension |
TEE | the trusted execution environment |
SPPCS | the secured privacy-preserving computation system |
SGX | the Software Guard Extensions |
P2P | the peer to peer |
IPFS | Inter Planetary File System, a decentralized storage structure |
IAS | the Intel Attestation Server |
PRM | the preserved random memory |
EPC | the enclave page cache |
EPID | the enhanced private ID |
DP | the identity provides some attributes data |
DR | the entity requires some attributes data |
EB | Ethereum blockchain |
DS | distributed storage |
TCP | trusted computation pool consists of trusted nodes |
TN | trusted node with TEE |
CN | consensus node |
ECC | the Ellipse Curve Cryptography |
CTNP | complex trusted node pool |
USN | unique signature notion |
SNN | the serial number notation |
the keyword designated by DP | |
the required number of TN | |
the DP original data | |
the DP original data storage location index | |
the quality evaluation code of required data | |
the DR computation code | |
the data matching value pre-estimated from DP | |
the DP register contract | |
the DR delegation register contract | |
the TN register contract | |
the DP information management contract | |
the TN information management contract | |
the DP data attribute, such as data type, data amount, unit price… | |
the DR requested data, such as data description, expected size, bid price… | |
the TN leader successful transaction number | |
the TN type and TN leader must be complex value | |
List_TN | the list produced by most selected TNs |
Serialized_List_TN | the serialized List_TN |
the number of items in selected transaction list |
Notation | Description |
---|---|
the public key for , which can be one of DP, DR, TN, TN enclave and CN | |
the private key for , which can be one of DP, DR, TN, TN enclave and CN | |
the reputation, can be one of DP, DR and TN | |
the expected price for , which can be DP, DR and TN | |
the symmetric key used for , which can be original DP data and DR computation code | |
the requirement matching analysis result for , which can be normal result list and serialized result list | |
the storage methods of , which can be seal and unseal |
Node Account | Data Demand Description | Delegation Contract Address | |
---|---|---|---|
DR1:0xDF353A4B5B0FB8F29B33185FF63CE4986F1B6C0F | input: | two-foot cloud data | 0x7CE6AF1006F0474FBA430E4B6E9ACE82ACA584AB |
output: | foot length | ||
expected unit size: | less than 6 MB | ||
expected resolution: | 1 mm depth accuracy | ||
expected data acquisition: | Intel RealSense | ||
bid price: | 1.87 Milliether | ||
required TN number: | 3 | ||
Delegation fee: | 0.37 Milliether | ||
DR2:0x24FFA197D6D002032343C4CE4FA3980DB167C398 | input: | face cloud data | 0x7CE6AF1006F0474FBA430E4B6E9ACE82ACA584AB |
output: | the distance between eyes | ||
expected unit size: | less than 10 MB | ||
expected resolution: | 1 mm depth accuracy | ||
expected data acquisition: | Intel RealSense | ||
bid price: | 0.75 Milliehter | ||
required TN number: | 5 | ||
Delegation fee: | 0.1 Milliether |
Node Account | Data Attribute Description | Attribute Hash | |
---|---|---|---|
DP1:0X7ECF438AED8B220900F9381FC3D317F26B176684 | data: | two-foot cloud data | 0XFEA958EF07F41B615C1B36760C4DF9D89CDEA34F27F43CECB8A0F60B4FE3E8DB |
data amount: | 10 groups | ||
unit size: | 2 to 5 MB | ||
unit price: | more than 1.5 Milliether | ||
data resolution: | 1 mm depth accuracy | ||
data acquisition: | Intel RealSense | ||
responding: | 0X7CE6AF1006F0474FBA430E4B6E9ACE82ACA584AB | ||
hash of USN: | 0X5B779E7EF4C7792E484B146CE224415F46727C9EEC21D2132DBFC5F753C44C4B | ||
DP2:0x994CDD94D999F28293412FF9AE1F7BCEE8270BF6 | data: | two-foot cloud data | 0X32D26333AD8D7A725391DA6B8CCB131B21C856671AE809363D638C89DB73DED4 |
data amount: | 500 groups | ||
unit size: | 2 to 6 MB | ||
unit price: | more than 0.2 Milliether | ||
data resolution: | 1 mm depth accuracy | ||
data acquisition: | Intel RealSense | ||
responding: | 0X7CE6AF1006F0474FBA430E4B6E9ACE82ACA584AB | ||
hash of USN: | 0X33FACA8AA322AFD9B47A49AE0BA8C0040AF5C989FA1CB0E4D089A42A376946FF | ||
DP3:0x1B83F6F1EEC42A23CABD86BDC161D980BB425A55 | data: | two-foot cloud data | 0X0479180CA0C14869E132C0636BA6C874A5EABC7F533F822037FFD19D64F49F1D |
data amount: | 1 group | ||
unit size: | 10 MB | ||
unit price: | 1 Milliether | ||
data resolution: | 1 mm depth accuracy | ||
data acquisition: | Intel RealSense | ||
responding: | 0X7CE6AF1006F0474FBA430E4B6E9ACE82ACA584AB | ||
hash of USN: | 0XC54786BCFEAF46FCD9D877DC04D726BC6D16B74BF741D487F9CB41D894DE6949 | ||
DP4:0x9E977724A12FAFD04F6190FCD8F9E50F97597128 | data: | right foot cloud data | 0X936C40C1802E74CE98A9E2CDA2A95F7A0B2358D26389B58B3BCC08CCC5F1070A |
data amount: | 10 groups | ||
unit size: | 3 to 5 MB | ||
unit price: | more than 1.2 Milliether | ||
data resolution: | 1 mm depth accuracy | ||
data acquisition: | Intel RealSense | ||
responding: | 0X7CE6AF1006F0474FBA430E4B6E9ACE82ACA584AB | ||
hash of USN: | 0XC4A47A582969241CBEA4124C3F1B41B987E84F69330F325961B19F1B3930C5B2 | ||
DP5:0xADB9A686AC0ED116F4139A71F163F1B67624ALE4 | data: | right foot cloud data | 0XDC62CB2395A000DE8F299DBF3C498FB792182F5D2B84DD08A8DB1B407EA0A1B6 |
data amount: | 5 groups | ||
unit size: | 2 to 4 MB | ||
unit price: | more than 1 Milliether | ||
data resolution: | 1 mm depth accuracy | ||
data acquisition: | Intel RealSense | ||
responding: | 0X7CE6AF1006F0474FBA430E4B6E9ACE82ACA584AB | ||
hash of USN: | 0X66D0FD0872FAD652360A2CC950B3B68D20ED55BA563CF9871882C165F82E7DE8 | ||
DP6:0x238E262CE05A87E03CAB1E8CD2A5BFF472ED07CC | data: | face cloud data | 0X2CF73EC50C44FEC18230D174CC6FD34BD05FA49A6523F96CE8E98AD7F21170F7 |
data amount: | 3 groups | ||
unit size: | 2 to 7 MB | ||
unit price: | more than 0.5 Milliether | ||
data resolution: | 1 mm depth accuracy | ||
data acquisition: | Intel RealSense | ||
responding: | 0xBB04015B84FEDE3F98270054BC21689DCDEF765B | ||
hash of USN: | 0XFAFBE27F3718FA3B86D2390929E2D43973A3074AE9CF460B7BD5615B4A4F9C45 | ||
DP7:0x60E7E355A3883971836231436AF9230309FDC3AE | data: | two-foot cloud data | 0X348BEFC97E10E337253922446C7CC729965B146E76F54FDE2398AC6E7D95D031 |
data amount: | 1 group | ||
unit size: | 3 MB | ||
unit price: | 1 Milliether | ||
data resolution: | 1 mm depth accuracy | ||
data acquisition: | Intel RealSense | ||
responding: | 0X7CE6AF1006F0474FBA430E4B6E9ACE82ACA584AB | ||
hash of USN: | 0X5A5C1BB6E46E8F4955DAA41CA4107F49D24111FD3B587C6CF89976E1E0906F96 | ||
DP7:0x60E7E355A3883971836231436AF9230309FDC3AE | data: | face cloud data | 0X5F814EB245DC90C89C87CF7FA316B9E05879396BF417E3224F4A0E4B92F24BBC |
data amount: | 2 groups | ||
unit size: | 5 to 6 MB | ||
unit price: | more than 0.5 Milliether | ||
data resolution: | 1 mm depth accuracy | ||
data acquisition: | Intel RealSense | ||
responding: | 0xBB04015B84FEDE3F98270054BC21689DCDEF765B | ||
hash of USN: | 0XC43ED4200761EFA120176862DCD9DF4DBD623120C2273DFD758176349215AD2C | ||
DP8:0xDE6372D2572404DB317F43AD49C5997EF46C3AAF | data: | face cloud data | 0X7AD3F0B3C9AF4F836571D798CA6EF6A9F403C9B5508C7311369F101E91C4FDBA |
data amount: | 10 groups | ||
unit size: | 2 to 5 MB | ||
unit price: | more than 1 Milliether | ||
data resolution: | 1 mm depth accuracy | ||
data acquisition: | Intel RealSense | ||
responding: | 0xBB04015B84FEDE3F98270054BC21689DCDEF765B | ||
hash of USN: | 0XCCB75618F5EF3CBE5E1B8C3E7504FE4F98F70DBB9CF2050D5034DC8539A2A8EB | ||
DP9:0xEC6E3D1BEB36FFDF6C0180D42EB17BE66EFA0885 | data: | two-foot cloud data | 0X35EBDD4367911A1DE45B31EF6011D1F3191F1F93B345B299E22EB4DD644FC67C |
data amount: | 50 groups | ||
unit size: | 1 to 4 MB | ||
unit price: | 1.5 Milliether | ||
data resolution: | 1 mm depth accuracy | ||
data acquisition: | Intel RealSense | ||
responding: | 0X7CE6AF1006F0474FBA430E4B6E9ACE82ACA584AB | ||
hash of USN: | 0XA6C995A0FB7EF493337042F007255A22C14FC710C63143C81B02C30452406CC9 | ||
DP9:0xEC6E3D1BEB36FFDF6C0180D42EB17BE66EFA0885 | data: | face cloud data | 0X971F95007041CE9D7AF161BD5F917B4BF6EB161A27620C71153D7CA4DA325720 |
data amount: | 5 groups | ||
unit size: | 3 to 6 MB | ||
unit price: | 0.75 Milliether | ||
data resolution: | 1 mm depth accuracy | ||
data acquisition: | Intel RealSense | ||
responding: | 0xBB04015B84FEDE3F98270054BC21689DCDEF765B | ||
hash of USN: | 0X6A2808BEA0D390E0A755ED9644FD9E998E8CFACE696A02D47B0334FAB94DF84B | ||
DP10:0xF67C41CD59F097C822A1CCFCDFBB61CF6FE28169 | data: | face cloud data | 0X03E88CF0BFD85868BE4D372CA7930C78DEE5EBAB3C8015FD0E44DE0DB1143D1B |
data amount: | 8 groups | ||
unit size: | 2 to 6 MB | ||
unit price: | more than 0.8 Milliether | ||
data resolution: | 1 mm depth accuracy | ||
data acquisition: | Intel RealSense | ||
responding: | 0xBB04015B84FEDE3F98270054BC21689DCDEF765B | ||
hash of USN: | 0XA5F7F7DB06D75B3DE2FB61B3247AE748BAB88636A11DCED38A2D4877A3F019BA |
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Share and Cite
Yuan, M.; Li, X.; Li, X.; Tan, H.; Xu, J. Trust Hardware Based Secured Privacy Preserving Computation System for Three-Dimensional Data. Electronics 2021, 10, 1546. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics10131546
Yuan M, Li X, Li X, Tan H, Xu J. Trust Hardware Based Secured Privacy Preserving Computation System for Three-Dimensional Data. Electronics. 2021; 10(13):1546. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics10131546
Chicago/Turabian StyleYuan, Munan, Xiaofeng Li, Xiru Li, Haibo Tan, and Jinlin Xu. 2021. "Trust Hardware Based Secured Privacy Preserving Computation System for Three-Dimensional Data" Electronics 10, no. 13: 1546. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics10131546
APA StyleYuan, M., Li, X., Li, X., Tan, H., & Xu, J. (2021). Trust Hardware Based Secured Privacy Preserving Computation System for Three-Dimensional Data. Electronics, 10(13), 1546. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics10131546