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Article

Pathways for China’s Key Industries to Secure Core Positions in Global Supply Chains: A Comparative and Empirical Study

1
Shenzhen Research Institute of Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shenzhen 518057, China
2
Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200030, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Systems 2025, 13(9), 758; https://doi.org/10.3390/systems13090758
Submission received: 16 July 2025 / Revised: 16 August 2025 / Accepted: 25 August 2025 / Published: 1 September 2025
(This article belongs to the Section Supply Chain Management)

Abstract

This study develops a comprehensive analytical framework to examine how nations secure core positions in global supply chains (GSCs) for key industries. It combines a comparative analysis of advanced economies—Los Angeles (aerospace), Munich (high-end manufacturing), London (biopharmaceuticals), and Tokyo (automotive)—with a survey-based empirical assessment of Chinese industry practitioners. Using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), factor analysis and the Delphi method, an evaluation framework is constructed across five dimensions: technology, value, governance, resilience, and sustainability. The findings show that developed economies sustain their leadership through upstream innovation and standard-setting, coordination of high-value activities, integrated industrial ecosystems, and risk-buffering mechanisms. Empirical results reveal that while China demonstrates relative strengths in governance and value creation, it continues to lag in frontier technologies, resilience, and sustainability. Building on both comparative and empirical evidence, the study proposes strategic pathways for China’s key industries, including technological breakthroughs, innovation-driven clusters, governance reforms, digital resilience, and green cooperation. These insights provide actionable guidance for policymakers and highlight how latecomer economies can transform structural disadvantages into innovation momentum, evolving from participants to rule-setters in global supply chains.

1. Introduction

Key industries are vital for safeguarding national security, fostering economic growth, and advancing industrial upgrading, thereby occupying a central position in the national economy. A global supply chain refers to an economic organization model that organically integrates all stages from production to consumption on a global scale, enabling coordinated development across the entire process [1]. In recent years, intensifying Sino–U.S. trade frictions, the post-pandemic restructuring of industrial chains, and the accelerating trend toward de-globalization have profoundly reshaped the competitive landscape of global supply chains [2]. Consequently, strengthening the core positions of key industries has become an urgent strategic priority for ensuring national security and enhancing economic resilience.
Competition within global supply chains is essentially a contest for power, manifesting primarily along three dimensions: technology, manufacturing capability, and market access [3]. Technology forms the foundation for establishing a core position; manufacturing capability serves as the means to attain it; and market access is the critical resource that sustains it [4,5,6]. In complex supply-chain networks, a core position reflects the ability to exercise control over the chain: greater control yields preferential access to scarce resources and a superior position in the value chain [7]. Such a position depends not only on the capacity to regulate technology exports and market imports but also exemplifies the economies-of-scale characteristic of modern economies [8]. From a supply-chain security perspective, a nation’s overall economic development capacity determines its ability to participate in the normal operation of global supply-chain systems, while its innovation capability—and the resulting ability to supply products—constitutes the core factor by which it gains voice in the global supply-chain arena [9,10].
Traditionally, global supply chains were dominated by financial-capital conglomerates, reinforcing the hegemonic position of developed economies—particularly the United States—within these systems [11,12,13]. In recent years, intensified political conflicts, escalating trade frictions, and the trend toward de-globalization have given rise to the phenomenon of “slow globalization,” in which the global supply chain has consolidated into four major blocs [14]. At the same time, a new wave of technological revolution is driving deeper integration of global industrial chains and supply chains. International economic activity is increasingly characterized by networked, chain-embedded structures, and the global power structure is shifting from “control in the industrial era” toward “dominance in the global value chain” [15]. As this process unfolds, the international landscape is becoming increasingly multipolar, with structural power among major countries more evenly distributed—while China’s rapid ascent remains particularly notable.
The “core position in the global supply chain” should be understood as an internationally recognized and comparable concept that employs globally accepted key indicators as benchmarks, while also highlighting the distinctive advantages of individual countries [16]. Typically, for a country or region to occupy a core position in global supply chains, it must build an open, integrated ecosystem that combines physical industries, technological innovation, logistics services, modern finance, and human resources, thereby forming an interconnected hub characterized by strong radiative power, pulling force, high value added, and broad global influence [17,18]. Specific measurement criteria include:
(1)
Possession of industry-leading core technologies. The ability to command cutting-edge, proprietary technologies is a key indicator of a country’s or region’s position at the global technological frontier. Securing these core technologies strengthens the bargaining power and discourse authority of its strategic industries within the architecture of global supply chains [18].
(2)
Extensive supply-chain network and scale. Core-position countries or regions typically maintain complex, large-scale supply-chain networks. Broad collaboration with diverse intermediaries and suppliers ensures wide coverage and integration across the value chain [19].
(3)
Broad international influence. Core nations or regions exert substantial sway over global industry trends, standards, and resource flows [20].
(4)
Robust risk-control capability. A defining attribute of a core position is the capacity to identify, assess, and respond effectively to diverse risks—including natural disasters, political instability, and market volatility—while implementing timely and effective countermeasures [21].
(5)
Gaining control over green rule-making. Achieving green sustainability and low-carbon transformation in supply chains has become a global consensus, so many developed countries are gradually transforming the establishment of green standards in the supply chain sector into control over supply chains [22].
China’s 2023 macroeconomic data show a 5 percent growth in the manufacturing sector and a notable 11.9 percent expansion in information transmission, software, and IT services. These figures highlight the strategic importance of both sectors for sustaining economic momentum. Consequently, constructing a modern economic system has emerged as the foremost development priority, presenting an opportune moment for key industries to pursue high-quality, innovation-driven growth. The rapid rise of “Internet+,” Industry 4.0, and other advanced technologies has made supply-chain innovation indispensable for firms and industries alike [7]. Manufacturing—China’s principal incubator of new productive forces—has accelerated its shift from legacy production models to technology-intensive processes, achieving breakthroughs across new tracks, niches, and industries. With the world’s most comprehensive and extensive industrial ecosystem, China has cultivated hard-to-replicate economies of scale and cluster advantages in key sectors such as electronic information, advanced equipment, new materials, and biomedicine. However, the global drift toward localized, near-shore, and fragmented supply chains—coupled with intensifying sanctions from advanced Western economies—poses acute challenges to the security and stability of China’s own supply-chain systems. To mitigate these risks, expanding external openness and deepening international collaboration have become central strategies for safeguarding China’s supply-chain nerve centers. The Belt and Road Initiative seeks to liberalize factor flows, enhance resource efficiency, and deepen market integration, thereby fostering an equitable and inclusive regional economic order [9]. Meanwhile, the 2020 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), encompassing 15 Asia-Pacific economies, establishes a unified free-trade zone by removing tariff barriers. Collectively, these initiatives resonate with the ongoing regionalization and market-oriented restructuring of global supply chains, offering institutional support that reinforces cross-border industrial cooperation and promotes resilient, win-win supply-chain linkages.
Taken together, leveraging key industries to spearhead economic development and to secure a central place in global supply-chain networks carries major practical significance for China. In recent years, China has significantly enhanced the international competitiveness of its strategic sectors by harnessing emerging technologies, capitalizing on supportive national policies, and deepening external openness. At this critical stage, it is essential to distill the guiding philosophies, concrete practices, and measurable outcomes of advanced economies, to dissect the inner logic and evolutionary trajectory of global supply chains, and to identify China’s current progress, opportunities, and remaining gaps in building core positions.
To achieve these aims, this study employs a dual-method research design. First, it conducts comparative case analyses of advanced economies to distill mechanisms for sustaining core positions in global supply chains. Second, it conducts a survey-based empirical assessment among industry practitioners in China, applying the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), factor analysis and the Delphi method to construct and quantify an evaluation framework across five key dimensions: technology, value, governance, resilience, and sustainability. On this basis, China should formulate context-sensitive and stage-specific promotion strategies to accelerate the high-quality development of its supply-chain system.
Considering both the commonalities and divergences among developed countries, as well as the emerging challenges faced by China’s developed cities, the present study pursues three interrelated objectives:
  • To systematically review and assess the institutional arrangements and practical pathways that developed countries have employed to build core positions for key-industry supply chains;
  • To conduct an in-depth analysis of the internal logic and evolutionary trends of global supply-chain systems, revealing the progress and gaps in China’s developed cities;
  • To propose strategic pathways tailored to China’s developed cities, including whole-industry-chain coordination, prioritization of key industries, phased regional advancement, and multi-stakeholder collaboration.
This study contends that China should leverage its latecomer advantage as a catalyst for breakthroughs in critical “bottleneck” technologies, optimize regional industrial configurations, and develop highly efficient coordination mechanisms to propel its key industries up the global value chain. Simultaneously, the nation must reinforce international cooperation and openness, participate proactively in rule-making, and expand overseas markets under prudent risk management—thereby ensuring that its urban supply-chain systems remain secure, stable, and sustainable while advancing the overarching goal of high-quality economic development.

2. Literature Review and Theoretical Foundations

To ground our inquiry in a solid analytical foundation, Section 2 first distils the extant scholarship on core-position competition and then introduces the four theoretical lenses that structure our comparative analysis. This sequence bridges established knowledge with the methods used to explore unresolved questions, thereby ensuring conceptual coherence throughout the study.

2.1. Literature Review

Intensifying global competition has compelled nations to leverage the resources and knowledge of strategic suppliers and key customers to reduce uncertainty, lower transaction costs, and build distinctive competitive advantages—thereby elevating their pivotal industries within global supply-chain hierarchies [23,24]. Since the First Industrial Revolution, successive waves of technological change have deepened and refined the international division of labour, fostering progressively higher levels of product standardization, complexity, and modularity. As a result, production processes have become globally decomposable, replacing traditional vertically integrated arrangements with highly fragmented network structures [6]. In this context, countries aspiring to occupy a core position in global supply chains must embed themselves deeply within the world economy and exert influence over the formulation of international rules and standards.
Early global value chain (GVC) scholarship largely framed the hierarchy between developed and developing economies in terms of capital and technological advantages: developed economies retained high-value activities such as R&D and design, while developing economies specialized in mid- and low-value tasks such as assembly and processing [10]. However, the 2008–2009 financial crisis inaugurated a period of value-chain contraction and “slowbalisation,” spurring a relocation of production toward near-shore or on-shore sites and intensifying rivalry for control of critical supply chain segments [25]. Empirical studies show that lead firms consolidate core positions through technical standard-setting, brand premium extraction, and dominance in supply chain finance, achieving profitability margins 18.7 percent above industry averages. Institutional coordination also matters: Germany’s VDMA orchestrated the RAMI 4.0 reference architecture, mandating interface compatibility among suppliers and lifting German equipment makers’ global market share to 34 percent.
Recent research has expanded this narrative by employing advanced analytical tools. Using interdependence mapping, complex network analytics, GIS techniques, and panel regressions, scholars have shown that China has replaced developed economies as the central node in the global rare-earth trade network—particularly in downstream segments—thereby reshaping community structures and trade dynamics [26]. From a techno-geopolitical perspective, the Sino-U.S. strategic contest has accelerated de-globalisation in semiconductors, undermining efficiency-driven collaboration frameworks and prompting the United States—despite substantial cost increases—to engineer a geographically re-balanced supply chain focused on security [16]. Against this backdrop, enhancing industrial autonomy and sustainability has become indispensable for safeguarding China’s technological independence and long-term economic resilience. Studies further contend that embedding sustainability principles in China’s semiconductor sector would create a more resilient, self-sufficient, and environmentally responsible industry, simultaneously satisfying domestic demand, complying with environmental regulations, and strengthening global competitiveness through green innovation [20].
Despite the richness of existing scholarship, three critical research gaps persist. First, the underlying mechanisms by which countries attain and sustain core positions have yet to be systematically theorized. Second, comparative analyses of international exemplars—linking strategic choices, institutional arrangements, and measurable outcomes—are still sparse. Third, research tailored to China’s specific developmental stage and institutional context is limited; scholars have yet to articulate a coherent pathway that reconciles China’s unique opportunities with its structural shortfalls. Addressing these gaps is essential for formulating evidence-based strategies that enable China’s key industries to consolidate and expand their positions at the commanding heights of global supply chains.

2.2. Theoretical Foundations

To explore how nations establish and sustain core positions in global supply chains, this study integrates four complementary strands of theory—institutional economics, global supply/value chain (GSC/GVC) theory, national innovation system (NIS) theory, and industrial competitiveness theory (Table 1). Together they furnish the conceptual scaffolding for our multi-case, context-sensitive research design and the five-dimension evaluation template employed later in the paper.
Drawing on these foundations, we adopt a multi-case comparative design complemented by context-specific analysis [22]. We begin by distilling the archetypal practices and performance outcomes of leading economies—such as the United States, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom—in their ascent to core positions within global supply chains. Guided by the four theories, we extract the core strategic levers operative in each case. These levers are subsequently mapped onto five evaluation dimensions—technological capability, value chain control, governance sophistication, supply chain resilience, and sustainability orientation—forming a structured diagnostic framework.
Applying this framework to China enables us to identify opportunity–gap configurations unique to its developmental stage and institutional context. The final section derives targeted policy prescriptions that integrate institutional reform, innovation-system enhancement, and capability upgrading, thereby providing a coherent pathway for China’s key industries to consolidate and extend their positions at the commanding heights of global supply chains.

3. Case Studies of Core Supply Chain Leadership in Advanced Economies

To lay the groundwork for our comparative analysis, Section 3 presents the study’s methodological blueprint and its illustrations. Section 3.1 outlines an exploratory–explanatory multiple-case design grounded in a five-dimension capability framework encompassing technology, value capture, governance, resilience, and sustainability. Section 3.2 explains the case-selection rationale and introduces four exemplar metropolitan clusters—Los Angeles, Munich, London, and Tokyo—each representing a distinct pathway to supply-chain leadership. Section 3.3 details our systematic sourcing of secondary data from high-quality academic, policy, and industry repositories. Finally, in Section 3.4, we synthesize the cross-case evidence to distil common strategic practices and draw lessons directly applicable to China’s own upgrading agenda.

3.1. Research Design: Multiple-Case Comparison with Contextualised Analysis

Grounded in the resource-based view of strategic management, which distinguishes static from dynamic capabilities—we conceptualize a nation’s core position in global supply chains as the interplay between operating capability and transformative capability [25]. The former encompasses supply-chain technology, value-capture mechanisms, and governance arrangements; the latter comprises resilience and sustainability (Figure 1). Guided by this framework, we adopt an exploratory–explanatory multiple-case design. We first catalogue the strategic levers and success factors that have enabled several advanced economies to secure core positions in their focal industries. Using publicly available data, we then analyze how each lever bolsters supply-chain centrality across the five capability dimensions and assess its transferability to China’s current institutional context, thereby deriving tailored policy recommendations.

3.2. Case Description and Selection Criteria

3.2.1. Case-Selection Logic

Cases were chosen according to four criteria [27]. First, each exemplar must occupy a widely recognized critical node or leadership role within its industry—evidenced by substantive control over technical standards, key components, market access, premium services, or logistics hubs—thus ensuring the salience of its core position. Second, to capture path diversity, the sample spans different advanced economies that have followed distinct trajectories in building supply-chain dominance. Third, we prioritized relevance to China by selecting cases whose developmental stage, institutional architecture, and market scale provide realistic and actionable insights for China’s supply-chain upgrading agenda. Finally, data availability was essential: only economies for which reliable, publicly accessible statistics, policy documents, and peer-reviewed studies exist were included, thereby ensuring the rigor and replicability of our comparative analysis.

3.2.2. Case-Selection

Guided by the four criteria outlined in Section 3.2.1—salience of core position, path diversity, relevance to China, and data availability—we selected four metropolitan hubs that exemplify distinctive pathways to supply-chain leadership: Los Angeles (United States), Munich (Germany), London (United Kingdom), and Tokyo (Japan). Together they span North America, Europe, and Asia, cover the aerospace, advanced manufacturing, biopharma, and automotive sectors, and hence provide a rich basis for cross-case learning.
(1)
Case 1—Los Angeles, United States (Aerospace).
The Los Angeles metropolitan region hosts one of the world’s most intricate aerospace ecosystems and thus serves as an illustrative benchmark for the technology–value–governance–resilience–sustainability framework adopted in this study [27]. Centered on Los Angeles International Airport, which accommodates more than 80 million passengers annually, the cluster integrates tier-1 primes—Boeing Satellite Systems (El Segundo, CA, USA), Northrop Grumman (Redondo Beach, CA, USA), and Raytheon Space & Airborne Systems (El Segundo, CA, USA)—with a dense network of tier-2 and tier-3 suppliers specializing in avionics, composites, and precision tooling [28]. This spatial co-location enables real-time coordination and shortened lead times, demonstrating superior supply-chain technology and value-capture capability through rapid prototyping and high-margin defense contracts [29].
Close collaboration among these firms—supported by world-class research institutions such as Caltech and UCLA—creates a continuous feedback loop between R&D and production, reinforcing governance sophistication and nurturing interdisciplinary talent pipelines [30]. A diverse base of specialized sub-suppliers and service providers adds redundancy and flexibility, strengthening resilience against demand shocks or component shortages. Finally, California’s stringent environmental regulations spur incremental adoption of cleaner production processes and alternative aviation fuels, signalling an emergent orientation toward sustainability [30]. Taken together, Los Angeles exemplifies how concentrated industrial capabilities, integrated research infrastructure, and proactive institutional support can lock a region into the core of a global supply chain—insights directly transferable to the evaluation of China’s aspirant aerospace hubs.
(2)
Case 2—Munich, Germany (High-End Equipment Manufacturing).
Munich constitutes Germany’s premier high-tech hub and illustrates how technology depth, value-chain governance, and networked innovation reinforce a region’s core position in global supply chains [31]. The metropolitan cluster hosts more than 600 leading producers of electronic components and systems, whose outputs feed over 2400 client firms worldwide; among the anchor tenants are Siemens, BMW, and Allianz. These multinationals spearhead breakthroughs in advanced manufacturing, laser, nano-, and bio-technologies, giving Munich unrivalled technological capability across multiple precision-engineering domains [32].
The city’s strategic influence is amplified by a well-orchestrated institutional architecture. Since 2004, the municipal government has operated dedicated investment-promotion centers that streamline permitting, offer tailored consulting, and align incentives for foreign and domestic investors, thereby enhancing value-chain governance and lowering transaction costs. Sectoral associations, universities, and Fraunhofer-type research institutes collaborate under formal partnership schemes, creating a tightly knit innovation ecosystem that accelerates the translation of R&D into marketable products [33]. At the national level, ninety-six joint research associations spanning thirty-four industrial sectors channel federal funding into pre-competitive projects, ensuring a continuous inflow of frontier knowledge to the Munich cluster.
A specialized supplier network further reduces procurement lead times and enables just-in-sequence delivery, bolstering operational resilience. Simultaneously, the region’s emphasis on energy-efficient manufacturing lines and circular-economy practices—encouraged by Germany’s Industrie 4.0 and sustainability directives—signals a growing commitment to supply-chain sustainability [34]. Collectively, these features position Munich as a model for China’s burgeoning advanced-equipment zones, demonstrating how coordinated public–private governance and dense research–industry linkages can lock a metropolitan area into the high-value segments of global manufacturing chains.
(3)
Case 3—London, United Kingdom (Biopharmaceuticals)
London exemplifies how a closed-loop innovation ecosystem can secure a city’s core position in a knowledge-intensive global supply chain [35]. Four of the world’s top-ten QS-ranked medical and life-science faculties—located at Imperial College London, University College London, King’s College London, and the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine—generate a constant flow of frontier discoveries [36]. Multinational champions such as GlaxoSmithKline and AstraZeneca translate these discoveries into blockbuster therapies, anchoring London’s technological capability and value-capture power within the biopharma chain.
Cluster governance is orchestrated by organizations such as MedCity, which broker partnerships among universities, start-ups, investors, and the National Health Service (NHS). This institutional architecture streamlines regulatory guidance, facilitates venture funding, and coordinates shared laboratory and good-manufacturing-practice facilities—thereby raising governance sophistication and lowering entry barriers for early-stage firms [37].
A distinctive asset is the NHS’s consolidated patient-record platform, covering more than eight million individuals. Controlled access to this longitudinal clinical dataset speeds protocol design and patient recruitment, enhancing supply-chain resilience by shortening time-to-trial and enabling rapid pivoting in response to emergent health threats.
Finally, London’s science parks—including the pioneering Cambridge Science Park in the wider “Golden Triangle”—provide wet-lab space, incubator services, and on-site sustainability programs (e.g., energy-efficient HVAC systems and green-chemistry guidelines), embedding environmental responsibility into the physical fabric of the cluster [38]. Collectively, these elements demonstrate how dense research assets, translational anchors, and data-driven clinical infrastructure can lock a region into the high-value segments of the biopharmaceutical supply chain—insights directly applicable to China’s efforts to build globally competitive life-science hubs.
(4)
Case 4—Tokyo, Japan (Automotive Manufacturing)
Tokyo Bay’s deep, sheltered inlet—reaching almost 60 km inland—has enabled a tightly integrated port-to-factory-to-export configuration since the late nineteenth century. Raw materials and components arrive at the waterfront, flow directly into nearby assembly plants, and finished vehicles are loaded back onto ocean carriers, eliminating intermediate warehousing and establishing an enduring first-mover advantage in global automotive logistics [39].
Over time, Tokyo and the surrounding prefectures of Kanagawa, Saitama, and Chiba have evolved a finely articulated division of labour. Tier-1 assemblers concentrate on final assembly and system integration, while tier-2 and tier-3 suppliers specialize in processes such as stamping, electronics, and advanced materials, distributed according to local resource endowments and technical strengths [40]. This regionally orchestrated network exemplifies the lean production paradigm pioneered by Toyota: just-in-time deliveries, minimal buffer stocks, and continuous kaizen improvements. The model simultaneously enhances operational efficiency (technology dimension) and value capture, as inventory costs are shifted out of the chain and quality defects are detected early.
Tokyo’s knowledge base is equally dense: the metropolitan area contains about 30% of Japan’s universities, 50% of its public research institutes, and 60% of its R&D personnel [41]. Municipal policies require transparent disclosure of university research outputs and offer matching grants for joint industry projects, creating seamless pipelines from laboratory discovery to commercial deployment. These mechanisms raise governance sophistication and keep the cluster at the technological frontier—currently in vehicle electrification, solid-state batteries, and hydrogen fuel systems.
On the sustainability front, Tokyo’s “Carbon-Neutral Port” initiative and automakers’ zero-emission factory programs embed life-cycle carbon accounting into procurement criteria, signaling a decisive shift toward greener mobility solutions [42]. For China’s emerging automotive hubs, Tokyo demonstrates how port-integrated logistics, lean governance, and an R&D-rich environment can lock a region into the high-value nodes of the global automotive supply chain while simultaneously advancing resilience and sustainability goals.

3.3. Data Sources and Collection

This study primarily draws on secondary qualitative data, emphasizing breadth of coverage, authoritative provenance, and timeliness. Specifically, the dataset comprises: academic papers and research reviews published in high-quality international journals; national policies, strategies, economic development plans, and white papers issued by governments of various countries; research reports on global supply chains published by international industry organizations; and various publicly available statistical databases, such as the OECD and World Bank databases. Data reliability and consistency were ensured through systematic cross-referencing across multiple independent sources.
The contextualized analysis follows the principles of a systematic literature review. Targeted keywords—including “global supply chain core position,” “key industry competitiveness,” “industrial policy,” “supply chain resilience,” and “value chain governance”—were used to search academic databases such as Web of Science and CNKI. Priority was given to high-impact literature and authoritative reports published within the past decade. The review focused on extracting core arguments, strategic recommendations, and effectiveness evaluations relevant to the research objectives.

3.4. Case Analyses and Discussions

3.4.1. Common Practices in Developed Economies

To generate actionable insights for China’s developed cities, this section analyzes how Los Angeles, Munich, London, and Tokyo leveraged geographic advantages, industrial foundations, and innovation capacities to form highly distinctive, competitive, and influential industry clusters. In establishing core positions for their key industries, these regions shared several common emphases: securing supply-chain safety and stability, continuously reinforcing competitive advantages through technological innovation, strengthening policy support, optimizing industrial layouts, and attracting high-skilled talent. The following five common practices distill how these developed economies accelerated the growth of their key industries and effectively expanded capacity across their supply-chain ecosystems (Figure 2).
(1)
Policy Guidance and Global Industrial Layout
Developed countries have employed a series of policy instruments to adjust the global footprint of their key industries, thereby mitigating negative impacts from trade frictions and sudden disruptions [43]. For example, the UK issued Building UK Supply Chains: Good Practice from Industry and Government (2014), Government and Industry Action Plan for Strengthening UK Manufacturing Supply Chains (2015), and the Supply Chain Security Guide (2018), elevating supply-chain security and core-position development to a national strategic priority. In the United States, the government has expanded the concept of national security to control technology exports, frequently using the Entity List to maintain its international leadership in emerging technologies. In 2021, the European Union’s “Strategic Dependencies and Capacities Report” proposed reducing reliance on foreign suppliers in key areas such as batteries, active pharmaceutical ingredients, and semiconductors, aiming to repatriate critical segments of the value chain to ensure supply-chain security and strengthen autonomy for core industries.
(2)
Strengthening Basic Research and Forming Innovation Ecosystems
Leading economies have made substantial investments in basic research to create closed-loop innovation ecosystems that continuously translate scientific discoveries into industrial applications [44]. Several developed countries have established national-level fundamental research programs to secure core technological reserves. For example, the 2022 U.S. CHIPS and Science Act allocated USD 52 billion to NSF-led research on semiconductor materials and quantum computing, alongside industry–university laboratories with Stanford and IBM. In Germany, the Fraunhofer Institutes collaborated with corporations such as Volkswagen and Siemens to found “Industry 4.0 Technology Translation Centers,” which integrated flexible manufacturing system research directly into automotive production lines, thereby reducing R&D cycle times by 30%.
(3)
Cultivating Intermediary Service Platforms for Key Industries
Developed countries have built mature intermediary service systems to respond swiftly to market demands and manage internal and external supply-chain risks [45]. In 2020, the UK government launched the “Digital Supply Chain Innovation Network,” partnering with Rolls-Royce and Jaguar Land Rover to develop an AI-driven risk-warning system that continuously monitors raw-material shortages in the aerospace and automotive sectors. In 2023, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs introduced the “Industrial Chain Finance Guarantee Program,” which—in collaboration with Deutsche Bank—provides dynamic credit based on IoT data to alleviate liquidity pressures in the semiconductor manufacturing sector. Japan’s Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) established a “Global Supply Chain Support Center” to offer geopolitical-risk assessments and alternative-supplier matchmaking services to automotive and electronics firms; in 2022, this center successfully mitigated a Toyota parts shortage caused by a Southeast Asian factory shutdown [46].
(4)
Enhancing Human Capital and Promoting Collaborative Innovation
Key economies have focused on expanding and upgrading human capital to drive collaborative innovation and industrial upgrading across supply chains [47]. Germany’s “Dual Education 2.0” program added semiconductor manufacturing courses at the Technical University of Munich in partnership with Infineon to train 5000 wafer-process technicians by 2025. In 2021, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) launched the “Semiconductor Talent Repatriation Initiative,” providing fast-track green cards for engineers from TSMC and Samsung to strengthen domestic chip manufacturing capabilities. In 2022, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry enacted the “Semiconductor Industry Talent Revitalization Act,” mandating annual training budgets of 4% of revenue for firms like Tokyo Electron and Shin-Etsu Chemical, with the government subsidizing half the cost.
(5)
Driving Economic Restructuring to Support Key Industries
Developed nations have pursued economic restructuring to facilitate their key industries’ ascent from low-end to high-end value-chain segments [48]. In 2023, Germany’s Federal Ministry of Education and Research funded projects with BASF and Bayer to develop an “Industrial Metaverse Platform,” enabling virtual collaborative management across 78 global production sites. The UK’s “Advanced Manufacturing Strategy” established a “Biopharmaceutical Innovation Cluster” in Cambridge, attracting R&D centers of AstraZeneca, AI-driven drug design firms, and contract manufacturing organizations (CMOs) to extend active pharmaceutical ingredient production into gene-therapy domains.

3.4.2. Effectiveness Evaluation of Developed Countries in Establishing Core Positions in Global Supply Chains

Building on the preceding analysis, this study employs the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to construct an evaluation index system that operationalizes the concept of a core position in global supply chains. Since “core position” is inherently qualitative and strategic, we operationalize it through the measurable construct of global supply chain competitiveness. The system is designed to capture competitiveness in global supply chain participation across five key dimensions. Drawing on prior research, the supply chain technological level reflects firms’ R&D investment and innovation efficiency [49]; the supply chain value captures the scale of the industry and thereby indicates its influence within the global supply chain system [50]; the supply chain governance level is reflected in institutional and regulatory innovation, as global supply chain governance requires coordination across complex regulatory domains and legal requirements [51]; the supply chain resilience dimension emphasizes an industry’s ability to withstand supply chain disruption risks through effective resource allocation or risk management [52]; and the supply chain sustainability dimension primarily examines the level of green technological innovation as well as the impact of carbon emission trading rights on firms’ innovation [53]. In total, this study establishes fifteen specific indicators, as shown in Table 2.
Several representative developed countries have adopted diverse approaches and development paths that have effectively advanced the high-quality growth of key industries and secured core positions in global supply chains. These countries not only maintain strong upstream and downstream control capabilities but also exert significant international influence. Supported by national policies, firms along their industrial chains have rapidly expanded production capacity and penetrated overseas markets, gradually emerging as world-leading enterprises.
Specifically, these countries demonstrate high levels of technological irreplaceability. The United States controls 80% of the global aircraft engine market, with single-crystal turbine blades capable of withstanding temperatures up to 1700 °C—over a generation ahead of competitors. The United Kingdom holds 70% of global antibody–drug conjugate (ADC) patent licenses, and its breast cancer therapy Enhertu improves clinical efficacy by 40% compared with conventional chemotherapy. Japan owns 43% of global hybrid vehicle patents, with fuel injection precision reaching 0.1 microns, and dominates 65% of the high-end market. Germany’s DMG Mori achieves five-axis machining precision of 0.5 microns, while similar equipment in other countries lags by at least 2 microns. Accordingly, this study selects “degree of controllability over core technologies,” “gap with international frontier technologies,” and “level of R&D investment” as specific evaluation indicators for the technological dimension of supply chains [49].
These countries have also developed large-scale and integrated supply chain networks. The Los Angeles aerospace cluster in the U.S. hosts major firms such as Honeywell (avionics) and Pratt & Whitney (engines), accounting for 54% of the global civil aircraft market (compared with Airbus at 46%). The UK’s Cambridge–Oxford biopharmaceutical corridor houses AstraZeneca and GSK, accounting for 15% of global clinical trials, while the London Stock Exchange supports IPOs for 45% of the world’s biotech firms. Toyota’s “Just-in-Time” model coordinates 43,000 global suppliers, maintains an average inventory turnover of only 3.5 days, and produced 10.45 million vehicles in 2023—representing 11.2% of global output. Germany’s Munich industrial corridor, home to firms such as Trumpf (laser cutting) and DMG Mori (machine tools), holds 48% of the global high-end machine tool market. Based on these experiences, this study identifies “share in global market,” “value-added level in the global value chain,” and “influence on global supply chain pricing” as evaluation indicators for the value dimension [50].
These countries also exert substantial influence over global regulatory and governance frameworks. The FAA’s airworthiness certification standards are recognized in 128 countries, requiring China’s C919 aircraft to obtain FAA re-certification for international market entry. The United Kingdom’s National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) drug evaluation framework has been adopted by 30 countries, directly shaping global pharmaceutical pricing strategies. Japan’s CHAdeMO fast-charging protocol was promoted as an IEC standard, now covering 30% of Europe’s public charging stations. Germany leverages the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) to compel overseas suppliers to adopt Siemens’ carbon management software, with 85% of global industrial carbon footprint data now processed through German platforms. Therefore, this study selects “effectiveness in coordinating upstream and downstream firms,” “participation in international standard-setting,” and “extent of international influence” as evaluation indicators for the governance dimension [51].
Developed countries also demonstrate strong risk mitigation capabilities. GE in the U.S. built a dual-source supplier system for its LEAP engines, partnering with Safran in France and a U.S. domestic producer to reduce geopolitical supply risks. The UK applied blockchain technology to vaccine cold-chain monitoring, cutting COVID-19 vaccine transport losses from the industry average of 5% to only 0.8% in 2021. Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry supported the creation of a “3+1” supply system for automakers (three domestic backups plus one overseas primary supplier), enabling Toyota to reduce production by only 12% during the 2022 chip shortage—one-third of Volkswagen’s 34% reduction. Germany invested €400 million to build a hydrogen-powered smelting system, ensuring continued high-precision laser production even amid natural gas supply disruptions. Based on these practices, this study selects “diversification of suppliers for key materials or components,” “risk of supply chain disruption,” and “revenue share lost due to supply chain disruptions” as evaluation indicators for the resilience dimension [52].
Finally, developed countries dominate green standard-setting and lead key green technologies. They establish “triple barriers” through the patenting of green standards, monopolization of recycling technologies, and weaponization of carbon data—transforming sustainability into a new arena of supply chain competition. For example, Panasonic and JX Metals in Japan jointly developed “supercritical fluid extraction” technology, enabling the recovery of 240 g of gold from one ton of discarded mobile phones while reducing rare-earth recycling costs by 67%. This technology was incorporated into the OECD’s Strategic Resource Assurance Guidelines, compelling Samsung SDI to install Japanese sorting lines in its Vietnam plant. As a result, the recycled cobalt usage rate among South Korean battery producers rose from 15% to 42% in 2023. Germany’s green hydrogen certification system enabled the strategic use of carbon tariffs. Thyssenkrupp now requires overseas suppliers to adopt TÜV SÜD–certified green hydrogen in steel production, forcing downstream firms to invest in its hydrogen-based shaft furnaces. While this reduced automotive steel emissions from 1.8 tons to 0.4 tons, production costs increased by 29%. Accordingly, this study selects “investment in green supply chain development,” “mastery of recycling technologies for key parts or materials,” and “exposure to international carbon emission agreements” as indicators for the sustainability dimension [53].
In summary, the case analyses reveal that developed economies combine sustained investment in basic research with strategic patent portfolios to secure innovation leadership at its source. By converting technical standards and regulatory frameworks into de facto market entry barriers, they construct end-to-end industrial clusters in key sectors and establish robust risk-hedging mechanisms capable of absorbing geopolitical shocks and unforeseen disruptions—thereby creating durable “ecological moats” (see Table 3). Based on the evaluation index system constructed in this study, it is possible to more accurately grasp the successful experiences of developed countries and, in light of China’s national conditions and the evolving global landscape, formulate development strategies that are both distinctive to China and sustainable. These conclusions directly set the stage for Section 4, which assesses China’s current position in global supply chains through an integrated comparative analysis and a survey-based empirical evaluation.

4. Identifying China’s Gaps and Empirical Assessment in Global Supply Chain Core Positioning

Building on the comparative insights from developed economies presented in Section 3, this section turns to China’s position in global supply chains. While China’s developed cities have achieved remarkable progress and established competitive advantages in several key industries, significant structural gaps remain when benchmarked against leading global clusters. To capture these discrepancies more systematically, Section 4.1 conducts a comparative analysis to identify the specific weaknesses across core evaluation dimensions, followed by Section 4.2, which employs survey-based empirical methods to quantify China’s current competitiveness in global supply chains.

4.1. Comparative Analysis of International Benchmarks and Identified Gaps

Since the 1980s, the deepening division of labor within global value chains has driven rapid economic globalization, creating significant opportunities for developing countries. Following the initiation of reform and opening-up, China’s developed cities actively integrated into global supply-chain systems, continually extending their industrial value chains and increasing product value-addition, achieving remarkable global recognition. During this process, several key industries in China’s developed cities gradually demonstrated strong international competitiveness. According to the 2020 Hamilton Index (Table 4), among the world’s ten most critical industries—collectively worth USD 10 trillion—China’s developed cities lead in seven sectors, whereas the United States leads in three.
For example, in the electronics manufacturing sector, by covering the entire industrial chain—from raw materials procurement to manufacturing and sales—China’s developed cities leveraged their cost-control and large-scale delivery capabilities to achieve leapfrog growth in subsectors such as optics, acoustics, and liquid-crystal displays, with total industry output ranking among the highest globally. Likewise, modern service industries in China’s developed cities have evolved from traditional retail, catering, and entertainment to encompass higher-value domains such as financial services, information services, healthcare services, and logistics services (Figure 3). In 2023, China’s developed cities’ total revenue from modern services reached CNY 68.8 trillion, accounting for over 54% of GDP and emerging as a key engine of economic growth.
Yet in comparison with the benchmark clusters analysed in Section 3, three structural weaknesses persist: (i) limited autonomy in frontier technologies and critical components; (ii) incomplete international collaboration and governance mechanisms across supply chains; and (iii) lagging alignment with global resilience and sustainability norms. Table 5 juxtaposes China’s current position with that of the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan across the five evaluation dimensions employed throughout this study.

4.2. Survey-Based Empirical Assessment

While the comparative case analysis in Section 4.1 highlighted the mechanisms through which advanced economies secure core supply-chain positions, it remained essential to validate these insights in the Chinese context through first-hand data. Building on the AHP-based index system developed in Section 3.4.2, we further conducted a survey-based empirical assessment. To enhance the reliability of the findings, this study designed a questionnaire covering the five core dimensions and specific indicators of supply chain positioning discussed earlier, targeting practitioners in major Chinese industrial supply chains as respondents. The survey employed a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), where higher scores indicate stronger agreement with the given statement.
A total of 120 questionnaires were distributed, and 116 valid responses were collected. Each of the 15 items was coded as A1–A15 and the data were imported into SPSS 26.0 for analysis. To verify data suitability for factor analysis, we conducted reliability tests as well as the KMO and Bartlett’s sphericity tests. Results showed a standardized Cronbach’s alpha of 0.837, with a KMO value of 0.750 (>0.7), indicating strong sampling adequacy. Bartlett’s test yielded χ2 = 1216.627, p < 0.001, confirming the data’s suitability for factor analysis. Principal component analysis with Varimax rotation extracted five factors, cumulatively explaining 83.372% of variance—well above the 60% threshold commonly accepted in social science research. As shown in Table 6, each dimension’s three items had loadings greater than 0.70 on the corresponding factor, demonstrating sound structural validity. These five factors were identified as technology, value, governance, resilience, and sustainability, consistent with the theoretical framework of the survey. Factor score coefficients were further calculated (Table 7) and used as weights for the 15 indicator items.
Subsequently, the Delphi method was employed, inviting 10 supply chain experts to assign weights to the five system-level dimensions. The scores determined the weights for each dimension (Table 8), while the indicator-level weights were derived from standardized factor loadings. A weighted calculation was then performed to obtain the competitiveness score for China’s key industries in global supply chains:
Z i = j = 1 n w i j Y i j
where Z i represents the evaluation score of the i-th dimension, w i j denotes the weight of the j-th indicator under dimension i , and Y i j indicates the standardized value of that indicator. The final scores were normalized to a percentage scale (0–100).
As shown in Table 8, assuming an international benchmark score of 100, the competitiveness index of China’s key industries in global supply chains is 61.094, indicating a considerable gap. Among the subsystem levels, the highest scores were observed in governance, value, and technology, followed by resilience and sustainability. This suggests that, after decades of rapid development, China’s key industries have established efficient upstream–downstream collaboration models and attained some influence in global supply chains, while continuing to narrow the technological gap with developed countries. However, major weaknesses remain in the recycling technologies for critical components and raw materials, as well as in constraints imposed by international carbon emission agreements. These results highlight the inherent tension faced by developing countries between industrial development and low-carbon transition under the global climate governance framework.
From the perspective of supply chain technology levels in key industries: The weighted evaluation score assigned by industry practitioners is 60.813, placing it in the mid-range among the five dimensions. This indicates a general consensus that China’s key industries have made progress in independent innovation and are transitioning from final product assembly toward the higher-value stage of core component manufacturing. Nevertheless, China remains highly dependent on foreign core technologies. For example, among the 17 global semiconductor suppliers with annual sales exceeding RMB 10 billion, nine are based in the United States, three in Europe, and only two in China—both based in Taiwan.
More importantly, the development of emerging industries is contingent upon comprehensive intellectual property (IP) protection, which constitutes a fundamental pillar in the evolution of global supply chains. However, most Chinese firms still display weak awareness of IP protection. The supporting legal and regulatory frameworks remain underdeveloped, while the lack of standardized review criteria and skilled professionals in IP-related fields further hampers technological innovation. This, in turn, constrains the ability of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to grow into core players within key industrial supply chains.
From the perspective of supply chain value creation in key industries: The weighted evaluation score is 61.665, indicating substantial scope for improvement. While China ranks among the global leaders in total output value across sectors such as information and communication technology (ICT) and clean energy, structural challenges remain evident. Many of China’s exports remain concentrated in low-margin contract manufacturing, and export profit margins have been steadily declining. This indicates that, despite rapid growth in overall output value, the level of value-added within China’s industrial supply chains remains relatively low.
Trade statistics reinforce this pattern. Data from China’s 2023 national import and export statistics reveal a high overlap between the top ten categories of imports and exports. Electromechanical products ranked second among imports and first among exports, while high-tech products ranked third among imports and also first among exports (see Table 9 and Table 10). Such overlap signals that China has yet to secure a strong foothold in high-margin downstream stages—such as branding, distribution, and service provision—thereby limiting its ability to capture greater value within key industrial supply chains.
From the perspective of supply chain governance in key industries: The weighted evaluation score is 69.871, the highest among the five dimensions, reflecting widespread recognition that China has achieved significant improvements in supply chain governance. China has already attained global leadership in the adoption of industry standards across several key sectors. However, its ability to coordinate and collaborate across supply chain participants remains insufficient [54,55]. According to the 2024 China Chief Supply Chain Officer Survey Report, nearly half of Chinese firms report only partial connectivity with upstream and downstream partners, while 42.21% indicate major information disconnects within their supply chains. The lack of full-chain data transparency continues to impede end-to-end decision-making [56]. Among supply chain members, 46.85% report a moderate level of information sharing, 28.12% report a high level, and 25.03% report a low level—highlighting persistent deficiencies in collaborative capability (see Figure 4).
Furthermore, due to China’s historical reliance on export-oriented participation in globalization, a comprehensive and independent governance system for supply chains has yet to be fully established [57]. Opportunistic behavior persists among upstream and downstream enterprises in key industries, undermining cooperation and weakening overall supply chain cohesion and stability.
From the perspective of supply chain resilience in key industries: The weighted evaluation score is 60.809, indicating that practitioners generally believe China’s industrial supply chains still lag behind international leaders in resilience. Many of China’s key industries developed relatively late, and certain critical products remain either domestically unproducible or significantly inferior to global standards in yield rates, performance, and reliability [58]. Moreover, many firms in strategic emerging industries are SMEs with limited scale, uncertain growth prospects, and issues such as redundant investment and low-level competition.
More specifically, industries such as electronics, automotive, and industrial equipment remain overly dependent on a narrow set of import sources [59]. For example, more than 95% of vehicle chassis imports come from just four countries—Malaysia, Germany, Sweden, and Italy. Core technologies such as semiconductors are still heavily reliant on licensing from the United States and Japan, leaving China vulnerable to export restrictions. Current import channels lack sufficient diversification to mitigate these risks effectively. Additionally, China has underinvested in common foundational technologies for key industries [60]. In 2020, China accounted for 15.5% of global industrial R&D expenditure (€140.9 billion), ranking third globally [61]. However, the U.S. invested €343.5 billion and the EU €184.1 billion, 2.43 and 1.3 times higher than China, respectively. The per capita gap is even more pronounced.
From the perspective of supply chain sustainability in key industries: The weighted evaluation score is only 47.402, the lowest among all five dimensions, underscoring that supply chain sustainability remains a major shortcoming in China’s industrial development. Developed countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany have established mature carbon accounting systems and are actively competing for global “green discourse power” across domains such as carbon measurement, technical standards, trade mechanisms, and financial rules [62]. By contrast, China has yet to establish a comprehensive institutional framework in this field.
Despite being the world’s largest exporter of finished goods and importer of raw materials, China’s international logistics sector developed relatively late and still suffers from limited functional scope, small-scale operations, and weak integration [63]. Most Chinese logistics enterprises are unable to provide comprehensive end-to-end solutions encompassing logistics planning, organization, and supply chain management. China also lacks strong control over international freight transport, and its overseas logistics hubs and multimodal transport systems remain underdeveloped. According to the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (Figure 5), although China’s global connectivity has improved in recent years, it still trails behind the U.S., U.K., Germany, and Japan. Moreover, China has yet to establish globally influential procurement centers, distribution hubs, trade platforms, or pricing mechanisms, leaving its international competitiveness insufficient.

5. Evidence-Based Strategic Pathways for Strengthening China’s Position in Global Supply Chains

This study’s preceding analysis integrates two complementary strands of evidence. Section 3 examined how advanced industrial economies consolidate core positions in global supply chains by simultaneously leveraging five strategic levers: supply-chain technology, value capture, governance, resilience, and sustainability. Section 4 supplemented this comparative perspective with survey-based empirical assessment, which evaluated China’s current level of participation in global supply chain competition and identified structural gaps across the same five dimensions. Together, these findings indicate that while China benefits from an integrated manufacturing base and a vast domestic market, significant challenges remain in (i) frontier enabling technologies, (ii) value-added capture along the chain, (iii) supply-chain governance and international collaboration, (iv) resilience to external shocks, and (v) green transition performance (see Table 11). Consequently, any national strategy aimed at elevating the global standing of China’s key-industry supply chains should focus on the following strategic priorities:

5.1. Strengthening Core Technological Breakthroughs in Key Industry Supply Chains

To bridge the gaps in the industrial chain and strengthen core technological breakthroughs, it is essential to continually narrow the gap in high-tech industries such as integrated circuits, core software, and high-end CNC machine tools, which are currently “choke-point” areas, compared to international advanced levels [64]. Attention should be given to optimizing the structure of the international freight system, reorganizing the layout of international logistics, ports, and airports, rationally allocating logistics resources, and exploring a hub economic model that links international supply chains with domestic industries [65]. This will provide new strategic leverage for the upgrading of key industries. Increased funding for technological innovation should be prioritized, accelerating the construction of key laboratories, engineering technology centers, and corporate innovation centers, and focusing resources on collaborative breakthroughs in major key technologies to form technological strongholds for key industry development [66].
Additionally, talent cultivation in technological innovation should be strengthened, supporting research projects, funding, and training programs based on the talent needs of key industries [67]. This will create a positive income distribution mechanism for knowledge creation and resolve the challenges faced by innovation-focused technical talent. Furthermore, investment in infrastructure required for the development of key industries should be increased, improving industrial equipment, land resources, energy, power infrastructure, and financial support, guarantees, subsidies, and management systems to significantly enhance the operational efficiency of key industries.

5.2. Promoting the Transformation and Upgrading of Key Industries

To solidify the industrial chain foundation, it is crucial to promote the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries, ensuring self-control, security, and reliability [68]. “Choke-point” technologies in the supply chains of key industries should be included in national major science and technology projects, with funding and policy support to help build key technological systems in these supply chains and support high-tech enterprises in gaining a technological advantage within global supply chains [69]. Focus should be placed on strengthening the advantages of industries where China holds strong international competitiveness, such as high-speed rail manufacturing, power equipment, new displays, and digital platforms. Increased investment should drive the collaborative integration of upstream and downstream development, further expanding the competitive advantage of the industrial chain. A closed-loop, advantageous industrial ecosystem should be built by integrating resources and incubating modern platforms that integrate production, supply, and sales functions, ensuring effective supply and quality safety of products in key industries and enhancing China’s influence in global supply chains [70]. The depth of the industrial chain should be further explored, focusing on the characteristics of the industry chain to avoid homogeneous competition. Future industrial development should focus on high-value, high-tech areas such as artificial intelligence, the metaverse, and humanoid robotics, striving for an international competitive edge in these emerging industries, and injecting new momentum into the development of the entire industrial chain [71].

5.3. Improving Governance Levels of Key Industry Supply Chains

The Pearl River Delta region in China is home to a large number of “small giant” specializing in the electronic information industry, covering sectors such as computers, communications, electronics, software, and information services. Under the influence and industrial spillover effects of core cities like Shenzhen, a clearly divided and cluster-based industrial belt has formed, providing new opportunities for the leap-forward development of key industries in the region [72]. In the future, China should align fully with international advanced standards and break through core technological bottlenecks. The Yangtze River Delta region, with its significant growth in high-end manufacturing exports, including automobiles, ships, and CNC machine tools, should continue to strengthen outward-facing economic development, promote trade liberalization, and facilitate investment, exploring the establishment of a regulatory system and supervisory model that aligns with international standards to offer a more convenient and transparent business environment for foreign enterprises to deeply participate in the global supply chain system [73]. The central and western regions of China, with their rich natural resources, should focus on developing distinctive industries, deepening the integration of technological and industrial innovation, upgrading and enhancing the efficiency of key industries, and improving their core position in global supply chains.

5.4. Enhancing the Resilience of Key Industry Supply Chains

China should clarify the future layout and development of key industries, using digital technologies to enhance supply chain resilience in terms of value orientation, technological support, and organizational innovation [74]. Digital technologies empower modern industries to effectively break through the low-end lock-in of developed countries. By leveraging technological innovation, the industrial and supply chains can be strengthened, and through the joint construction and sharing of digital platforms, international cooperation can be deepened. This will expand open areas, enhance openness, and leverage local advantages to gather high-end elements, thereby building a modern industrial system. The management of enterprises in key industrial chains and the strategic thinking behind optimizing supply chains should shift from a short-term focus to a long-term approach [75]. A strong sense of vulnerability to external shocks and a bottom-line thinking approach should be firmly established. Enterprises should not only respond to external shocks at the tactical level but also integrate effective experiences and practical methods from continuity management into their organizational structures and business processes to build a comprehensive supply chain resilience capability at a strategic level.

5.5. Promoting the Sustainable Development of Key Industry Supply Chains

The government should increase policy support and regulatory oversight for key industries, encouraging innovative enterprises in key industries to increase investment in technological research and development, and green sustainability [76]. The development opportunities presented by the Belt and Road Initiative and RCEP should be fully utilized to build an international supply chain market strategic system, with multiple upstream players, efficient management in the midstream, and fully competitive markets downstream [77]. This will guide key industries to continuously explore globalization and sustainable development strategies. Strengthening the detailed management of associations, expanding the coverage of industries, refining service areas, and accurately assisting enterprises in overcoming difficulties should be prioritized [78]. This includes smoothing the channels for reflecting enterprise concerns and providing support in policy consultation, information services, legal knowledge, and human resources training. The establishment of a sound think tank platform for key industries should be promoted, using industry surveys to obtain relevant data and materials, providing decision-making consultations to government departments, helping to rectify deficiencies in policy formulation, and transmitting policy information to push forward the high-quality development of key industries from both legal and policy perspectives [79]. Advanced international green development technologies for supply chains should be introduced, and joint breakthroughs in key technologies for key industries should be carried out with high-level international universities [80]. This will create a multi-channel, all-encompassing, and multi-level international communication and cooperation system, promoting the sustainable development of key industry supply chains.

6. Conclusions and Limitations

This study constructs a comprehensive analytical framework—grounded in institutional economics, global supply/value chain theory, national innovation systems, and industrial competitiveness theory—to examine how nations establish core positions in global supply chains for key industries. In addition to comparative multi-case analysis, the study incorporates a survey-based empirical assessment to evaluate China’s current position in global supply chains. By combining case evidence from advanced economies with first-hand data from Chinese industry practitioners, the research identifies both successful mechanisms abroad and structural gaps at home, thereby providing a robust basis for proposing strategic pathways.

6.1. Key Research Findings

Drawing on in-depth case studies of four global industry leaders—Los Angeles (aerospace), Munich (advanced machinery), London (biopharmaceuticals), and Tokyo (automobiles)—this study distills the institutional, technological, and governance mechanisms by which developed economies secure and sustain leadership in global supply chains. Their success rests on building systematic advantages across the five dimensions of technology, value, governance, resilience, and sustainability, reinforced through policy coordination to continually expand their lead.
This research further employs the Analytic Hierarchy Process, factor analysis, and the Delphi method to construct an evaluation index system for global supply chain core positioning. The results show that China lags behind international benchmarks across all five dimensions. From highest to lowest, the weighted scores are governance, value creation, technology, resilience, and sustainability. These findings suggest that, after decades of rapid development, China’s key industries have established efficient upstream–downstream collaboration models and gained certain influence in global supply chains, while also gradually narrowing the technological gap with advanced economies.
Based on both case analysis and empirical evaluation, the study proposes five strategic pathways to enhance China’s key-industry supply chains: (i) consolidating innovation foundations through concentrated breakthroughs in “choke-point” technologies such as integrated circuits and core software; (ii) building closed-loop industrial ecosystems by leveraging advantages in high-speed rail, power equipment, and digital platforms; (iii) piloting internationally aligned governance reforms in the Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta regions; (iv) enhancing resilience through digital technologies that enable supply diversification and risk-buffering mechanisms; and (v) promoting sustainable development via green technology cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative. Collectively, these pathways form a synergistic development trajectory of “technological breakthroughs—industrial upgrading—governance optimization—resilience enhancement—green leadership.”
In sum, establishing a core position in global supply chains constitutes a systemic competition in technological control, value chain governance, institutional coordination, resilience, and green leadership. For China, the key lies in replacing simple imitation with intelligent adaptation. By pursuing a stepwise strategy of bottleneck breakthroughs, chain upgrading, and rule-making leadership, China can transform latecomer disadvantages into innovation momentum and ultimately evolve from a participant into a rule setter in global supply chains.

6.2. Limitations and Future Research Directions

Despite its contributions, this study faces several limitations. First, while the survey provides valuable first-hand data from industry practitioners, its sample coverage remains limited in scope, which may affect the representativeness and generalizability of the findings. Second, although the five-dimensional evaluation framework developed here offers strong analytical utility, it inevitably simplifies the complex interactions among policy instruments and institutional environments that shape supply chain dynamics. Third, the analysis adopts a macro-level perspective on China’s industrial system as a whole, without differentiating between sectors at varying stages of development, which constrains the formulation of more tailored strategies.
Future research could address these limitations in several ways. First, expanding the survey scope and incorporating larger and more diverse samples—possibly across multiple industries and regions—would enhance the robustness and representativeness of empirical findings. Second, longitudinal tracking and simulation modeling could be applied to test the stability and adaptability of the proposed framework under dynamic conditions. Third, more fine-grained industry-specific studies could be conducted, allowing for differentiated policy recommendations that better align with the unique characteristics and development trajectories of individual sectors. Collectively, such efforts would provide more precise policy guidance to support China’s transition from a supply-chain participant to a global rule-setter, thereby reinforcing its long-term competitiveness, resilience, and sustainable growth.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, J.L. and T.L.; Methodology, J.L. and T.L.; Investigation, T.L.; Formal analysis, T.L.; Data Curation, T.L.; Writing—Original Draft Preparation, J.L. and T.L.; Writing—Review & Editing, J.L. and T.L.; Supervision, J.L.; Project Administration, J.L.; Funding Acquisition, J.L. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research is funded by the Shenzhen Philosophy and Social Science Planning Project (SZ2024B013).

Data Availability Statement

The raw data supporting the conclusions of this article will be made available by the authors upon request.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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Figure 1. Research Design.
Figure 1. Research Design.
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Figure 2. Policy System for Developed Countries to Build Core Positions in the Global Supply Chain of Key Industries.
Figure 2. Policy System for Developed Countries to Build Core Positions in the Global Supply Chain of Key Industries.
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Figure 3. 2023 Global Share of China’s Major Industries. Data source: National Bureau of Statistics, MIIT, Ministry of Commerce.
Figure 3. 2023 Global Share of China’s Major Industries. Data source: National Bureau of Statistics, MIIT, Ministry of Commerce.
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Figure 4. Collaboration Levels Across Chinese Industrial Supply Chains. Data source: KPMG, “2024 China CEO Outlook”.
Figure 4. Collaboration Levels Across Chinese Industrial Supply Chains. Data source: KPMG, “2024 China CEO Outlook”.
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Figure 5. Comparison of Top 10 Countries and China in Logistics Performance Index (LPI), 2010–2023. Data source: World Bank.
Figure 5. Comparison of Top 10 Countries and China in Logistics Performance Index (LPI), 2010–2023. Data source: World Bank.
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Table 1. Theoretical Foundations Informing the Study’s Analytical Framework.
Table 1. Theoretical Foundations Informing the Study’s Analytical Framework.
Theoretical LensCore TenetsSpecific Contribution to This Study
Institutional EconomicsFormal rules (laws, policies) and informal norms (culture, conventions) shape actors’ incentive structures, transaction costs, and cooperative modes.Explains how heterogeneous institutional architectures condition the formation and governance of supply chain networks and influence the emergence of core-position advantages.
GSC/GVC TheoryProduction is decomposable into functionally distinct stages dispersed across borders, forming networked chains coordinated by lead firms.Provides the analytical scaffold for our cross-national case analysis of how key activities (e.g., design, fabrication, logistics, finance) are allocated and upgraded, and how lead firms leverage standards, finance, and data to capture value.
National Innovation SystemsInnovation outcomes reflect system-level interactions among firms, universities, government, and intermediary bodies within a specific institutional milieu.Informs the policy-oriented section: we assess how China’s NIS characteristics enable—or constrain—the translation of global supply-chain opportunities into sustained technological upgrading.
Industrial CompetitivenessA nation’s or region’s relative strength in a particular industry arises from factor conditions, firm strategy, demand characteristics, and supporting institutions.Allows a multi-level (macro–meso–micro) diagnosis of competitiveness sources, linking firm-level capabilities to industry-level performance and national comparative advantage.
Table 2. Operationalized Evaluation Indicators for Core Positioning in Global Supply Chains.
Table 2. Operationalized Evaluation Indicators for Core Positioning in Global Supply Chains.
Evaluation DimensionSystem LevelIndicator LevelCode
Global Supply Chain CompetitivenessSupply Chain TechnologyTechnological autonomy in strategic core domainsA1
Technological catch-up gap with global frontierA2
Level of R&D investmentA3
Supply Chain ValueMarket penetration at global scaleA4
Value-added level in the global value chainA5
Global pricing power in supply chain marketsA6
Supply Chain GovernanceEffectiveness in coordinating upstream and downstream firmsA7
Participation in setting international standardsA8
Extent of international influenceA9
Supply Chain ResilienceDiversification of suppliers for key raw materials or componentsA10
Risk of supply chain disruptionA11
Revenue vulnerability to supply disruptionsA12
Supply Chain SustainabilityInvestment in green supply chain developmentA13
Mastery of recycling technologies for key parts or materialsA14
Regulatory exposure under global carbon agreementsA15
Note: Because “core position” in global supply chains is inherently qualitative and strategic, this study operationalizes it through the measurable construct of global supply chain competitiveness. The five dimensions—technology, value, governance, resilience, and sustainability—together with their corresponding indicators provide a structured framework for approximating and evaluating core positioning.
Table 3. Cross-Case Evidence on Core-Position Advantages.
Table 3. Cross-Case Evidence on Core-Position Advantages.
Evaluation DimensionSupply Chain TechnologySupply Chain ValueSupply Chain GovernanceSupply Chain ResilienceSupply Chain Sustainability
United States
(Los Angeles)
Single-crystal turbine blades withstand 1700 °C,
outperforming competitors by one generation
80% global aircraft engine market share;
54% global civil aircraft market
FAA airworthiness standards
adopted by 128 countries
Dual-source supplier system for engines
mitigates geopolitical supply risks
Boeing 787 lightweight materials
reduce carbon emissions per unit output by 12%
Germany
(Munich)
0.5 μm precision in 5-axis machining,
2 μm ahead of global peers
48% global high-end machine tool market85% industrial carbon footprint data
integrated into German platforms
Hydrogen-powered smelting ensures
laser production during gas supply disruptions
Green hydrogen certification
significantly reduces auto sheet carbon footprint
United Kingdom
(London)
Enhertu targeted breast cancer drug,
40% more effective than chemotherapy
70% global ADC patent licensingNICE drug efficacy framework
shapes global pricing strategies
Blockchain vaccine cold-chain tracking
cuts transport losses by 23%
NHS sustainable procurement
achieves 92% packaging recycling rate
Japan
(Tokyo)
0.1 μm precision in automotive fuel injection systems43% global hybrid vehicle patents;
65% monopoly in high-end fuel injection
CHAdeMO fast-charging protocol
covers 30% European public chargers
“3+1” auto parts supplier system
counters chip shortages
Supercritical fluid extraction
lowers rare earth recycling costs by 67%
Data source: OECD MSTI, World Bank WDI, National Statistics, Industry Association.
Table 4. 2020 Hamilton Index: Industry Leaders.
Table 4. 2020 Hamilton Index: Industry Leaders.
IndustryGlobal Output (USD Billion)Leading NationLeading Nation’s Share (%)
IT and Information Services1900USA36.4
Computers & Electronics1317China26.8
Chemicals1146China29.1
Machinery & Equipment1135China32.0
Motor Vehicles1093China24.3
Basic Metals976China45.6
Metal Products846China25.6
Pharmaceuticals696USA28.4
Electrical Equipment602China36.1
Other Transport Equipment386USA34.5
Data source: Institutes of Science and Development, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Table 5. Comparative Gaps between China and Leading Economies across Five Dimensions.
Table 5. Comparative Gaps between China and Leading Economies across Five Dimensions.
Evaluation DimensionSupply Chain TechnologySupply Chain ValueSupply Chain GovernanceSupply Chain ResilienceSupply Chain Sustainability
United States
(Los Angeles)
R&D intensity 3.46% of GDP (2023)Aerospace & aviation output 16.9% of global total (2023)Aerospace & cloud-security standards—highest global adoption rateOverseas production bases cover 92% of markets; regional hubs in 57 countriesSEC climate-risk disclosures
Germany
(Munich)
R&D intensity 3.21%High-end machinery output 26.5% of global totalMachinery safety & Industrie 4.0 norms—global adoption leaderOverseas bases cover 76%; hubs in 29 countriesEU CSRD compliance
United Kingdom
(London)
R&D intensity 2.93%Biopharma output 13% of global totalBiopharma & financial-services standards—global adoption leaderOverseas bases cover 51%; hubs in 17 countriesISSB standards
Japan
(Tokyo)
R&D intensity 3.59%Automotive output 21.8% of global totalSemiconductor-materials & machinery standards—global adoption leaderOverseas bases cover 89%; hubs in 41 countriesTCFD framework
ChinaR&D intensity 2.64%ICT output 12.4%; clean-energy equipment 35% of global total (2023)5G and high-speed-rail standards—regional adoption leaderOverseas bases cover 68%; hubs in 32 countriesEnterprise GHG Accounting Guidelines
Data source: OECD MSTI, World Bank WDI, National Statistics, Industry Association.
Table 6. Rotated Component Matrix from Factor Analysis.
Table 6. Rotated Component Matrix from Factor Analysis.
ComponentCode12345
Supply Chain TechnologyA10.1050.9270.0210.0770.105
A20.2110.8550.1390.1640.163
A30.1870.9120.0530.0850.123
Supply Chain ValueA40.9040.160.0310.1550.112
A50.9250.1510.0110.0780.087
A60.9140.1710.0290.1060.138
Supply Chain GovernanceA70.2510.2140.0430.040.708
A80.0460.03−0.0650.140.891
A90.0540.139−0.0010.1970.867
Supply Chain ResilienceA100.0680.042−0.0830.870.121
A110.0970.1260.050.9120.115
A120.1660.1390.1210.8710.147
Supply Chain SustainabilityA130.0290.110.8570.005−0.044
A140.0230.0450.9260.0350.019
A150.0130.0210.9230.0280.000
Table 7. Component Score Coefficient Matrix.
Table 7. Component Score Coefficient Matrix.
ComponentCode12345
Supply Chain TechnologyA1−0.0890.419−0.046−0.036−0.053
A2−0.0420.3520.006−0.007−0.029
A3−0.0520.396−0.032−0.04−0.047
Supply Chain ValueA40.371−0.065−0.005−0.011−0.039
A50.388−0.064−0.013−0.045−0.045
A60.375−0.061−0.005−0.039−0.02
Supply Chain GovernanceA70.03−0.0070.022−0.0970.349
A8−0.058−0.087−0.006−0.0450.47
A9−0.071−0.040.012−0.0230.439
Supply Chain ResilienceA10−0.042−0.045−0.050.391−0.05
A11−0.043−0.018−0.0010.403−0.065
A12−0.014−0.0270.0280.373−0.047
Supply Chain SustainabilityA13−0.0070.0030.344−0.016−0.014
A14−0.009−0.040.378−0.0070.026
A15−0.008−0.0480.378−0.0060.02
Table 8. Delphi-Based Weighting and Evaluation Results.
Table 8. Delphi-Based Weighting and Evaluation Results.
Global Supply Chain CompetitivenessSystem LevelDelphi-Based WeightingIndicator CodeScore
61.094Supply Chain Technology60.813A160.175
A260.523
A360.691
Supply Chain Value61.665A459.664
A559.663
A659.665
Supply Chain Governance69.871A765.005
A872.241
A971.212
Supply Chain Resilience60.809A1066.553
A1159.662
A1259.664
Supply Chain Sustainability47.402A1347.763
A1446.383
A1548.105
Table 9. 2023 Top 10 Imported and Exported Goods by Value (Unit: CNY 10,000).
Table 9. 2023 Top 10 Imported and Exported Goods by Value (Unit: CNY 10,000).
RankImported GoodsImport ValueExported GoodsExport Value
1Agricultural Products164,488,317Mechanical & Electrical Products1,391,958,950
2Mechanical & Electrical653,630,947High-Tech Products592,789,130
3High-Tech Products479,161,857Apparel & Accessories112,062,133
4Crude Oil237,327,190Cultural Products101,958,352
5Metal Ores167,206,006Textile Yarns & Fabrics94,540,911
6Foodstuffs146,298,459Plastic Products70,895,770
7Natural Gas45,226,348Agricultural Products69,586,095
8Coal37,230,469Steel Products59,291,326
9Medicinal Materials36,426,196Foodstuffs53,823,893
10Unwrought Copper33,562,176Furniture45,170,967
Data source: General Administration of Customs.
Table 10. 2023 Key Import/Export Commodities by Value and Growth Rate (Unit: CNY 10,000).
Table 10. 2023 Key Import/Export Commodities by Value and Growth Rate (Unit: CNY 10,000).
RankCommodityImport ValueYoY Import Growth (%)Export ValueYoY Export Growth (%)
1High-Tech Products479,161,857−5.2592,789,130−5.8
2Electric Vehicles5,726,466+12.329,464,912+80.2
3Automobiles (Incl. Chassis)33,212,587−5.871,651,109+76.8
4Auto Parts19,351,014−6.761,658,646+14.9
5Integrated Circuits245,906,784−10.695,677,067−5.0
6Aircraft5,783,741+10.03,325,306+76.7
7Ships317,627−53.419,444,580+35.4
8Agricultural Products164,488,317+5.069,586,095+6.3
9Refined Oil19,651,721+50.034,000,866+5.4
10Medicinal Materials36,426,196+13.216,373,878−31.1
11Medical Instruments9,695,601+0.912,956,803+2.4
12Steel Products8,912,459−21.559,291,326−3.4
Data source: General Administration of Customs.
Table 11. Summary of Developed Economies’ Strategies, China’s Gaps, and Proposed Responses.
Table 11. Summary of Developed Economies’ Strategies, China’s Gaps, and Proposed Responses.
Evaluation Dimension Supply Chain Technology Supply Chain Value Supply Chain Governance Supply Chain Resilience Supply Chain Sustainability
Other Countries’ Strategies
  • Drive technological progress through intensive R&D investment;
  • Build cross-industry technology sharing platforms;
  • Apply emerging technologies to enhance supply chain automation and transparency;
  • Strengthen collaboration between research institutions and enterprises.
  • Integrate multinational supply chain resources for efficient allocation and sharing;
  • Focus on brand value enhancement;
  • Promote technology integration across various fields;
  • Improve industry chain added value through technological innovation.
  • Industry associations and governments jointly promote the formulation of supply chain cooperation;
  • Strengthen information sharing between enterprises;
  • Focus on regulatory transparency;
  • Promote cross-industry collaborative governance.
  • Implement a global supply chain layout;
  • Adopt decentralized production and regional cooperation models;
  • Enhance industry chain flexibility through technological innovation and talent cultivation;
  • Strengthen coordination within the industry.
  • Policy support for enterprises to adopt sustainable development measures;
  • Promote a low-carbon economy through technological innovation;
  • Leverage international cooperation to promote sustainable development;
  • Governments implement environmental protection regulations.
China’s Gaps
  • China has not yet reached a global leadership level in some high-tech fields;
  • The level of intelligent manufacturing, automation, and smart manufacturing is still relatively low.
  • In some high value-added industries (e.g., aerospace, precision medical devices), the overall industry chain value-added and technological content is lower;
  • Most Chinese enterprises face product homogeneity issues in competition.
  • Lack of information sharing and supply chain coordination between upstream and downstream enterprises;
  • China’s supply chain governance system still needs improvement in terms of transparency and efficiency.
  • There is a significant supply chain vulnerability in high-end manufacturing and critical raw material supply;
  • High dependency on single suppliers for critical raw materials.
  • The overall green transformation of the industry chain is still lagging behind;
  • The enforcement of environmental protection policies is insufficient;
  • Some enterprises lack awareness of environmental protection requirements.
Improvement Pathways
  • Increase R&D investment in integrated circuits, core software, and advanced manufacturing technologies;
  • Promote the widespread application of intelligent manufacturing to improve automation and intelligence levels;
  • Strengthen cooperation with globally leading enterprises and research institutions.
  • Increase policy support for high value-added industries;
  • Promote the extension of the industry chain to the high end through technological innovation and brand building;
  • Focus on key technology areas to enhance the overall value of the industry chain and form globally competitive industrial clusters.
  • Establish more open and transparent supply chain information sharing platforms;
  • Strengthen government support for supply chain governance, reduce market barriers, and promote policy transparency;
  • Encourage enterprises to share supply chain data to improve overall supply chain efficiency.
  • Promote the diversification of the industry chain to reduce dependence on single sources;
  • Build more flexible cross-industry cooperation mechanisms;
  • Enhance supply chain forecasting capabilities and emergency response abilities through digitalization and smart technologies.
  • Increase investment in green technologies, clean energy, and green manufacturing;
  • Strengthen government environmental protection supervision and implement stricter environmental policies;
  • Strengthen cooperation with international environmental protection organizations and green technology enterprises.
Data source: OECD MSTI, World Bank WDI, National Statistics, Industry Association.
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Luo, J.; Li, T. Pathways for China’s Key Industries to Secure Core Positions in Global Supply Chains: A Comparative and Empirical Study. Systems 2025, 13, 758. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems13090758

AMA Style

Luo J, Li T. Pathways for China’s Key Industries to Secure Core Positions in Global Supply Chains: A Comparative and Empirical Study. Systems. 2025; 13(9):758. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems13090758

Chicago/Turabian Style

Luo, Jianwen, and Tiantian Li. 2025. "Pathways for China’s Key Industries to Secure Core Positions in Global Supply Chains: A Comparative and Empirical Study" Systems 13, no. 9: 758. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems13090758

APA Style

Luo, J., & Li, T. (2025). Pathways for China’s Key Industries to Secure Core Positions in Global Supply Chains: A Comparative and Empirical Study. Systems, 13(9), 758. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems13090758

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