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Article

Evolutionary Game of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises’ Accounts-Receivable Pledge Financing in the Supply Chain

School of Economics and Management, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao 066000, China
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Academic Editor: Evangelos Katsamakas
Systems 2022, 10(1), 21; https://doi.org/10.3390/systems10010021
Received: 17 January 2022 / Revised: 13 February 2022 / Accepted: 15 February 2022 / Published: 17 February 2022
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Computational Modeling Approaches to Finance and Fintech Innovation)
Due to limited guarantees, it is difficult for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to obtain loans from banks. Supply chain accounts-receivable pledge financing (SCARPF) can help in overcoming those financing difficulties. This study developed an evolutionary game model of banks, core enterprises and SMEs in SCARPF, analyzed the evolution path and evolution rules of the model, and performed a numerical simulation. The results indicated that the result of the evolutionary game depends on the initial values of the variables. When certain conditions are met, the system will evolve to (lending, keep the contract). The higher the return rate during either normal production of SMEs, the loan interest rate or supply chain punishment, the more likely it is that banks will lend money and SMEs will keep the contract. However, the bank will only be likely to lend money, enabling SMEs to keep the contract, when the probability of core enterprises and SMEs engaging in joint loan fraud—or the proportion of the benefits that SMEs share when engaging in joint loan fraud—is reduced. The results of this study provide insights for banks, core enterprises, and SMEs in supply chain financing decisions, which is conducive to solving the financing difficulties of SMEs. View Full-Text
Keywords: supply chain accounts-receivable pledge financing; small and medium-sized enterprises; supply chain financing; evolutionary game supply chain accounts-receivable pledge financing; small and medium-sized enterprises; supply chain financing; evolutionary game
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MDPI and ACS Style

Hu, H.; Li, Y.; Tian, M.; Cai, X. Evolutionary Game of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises’ Accounts-Receivable Pledge Financing in the Supply Chain. Systems 2022, 10, 21. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems10010021

AMA Style

Hu H, Li Y, Tian M, Cai X. Evolutionary Game of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises’ Accounts-Receivable Pledge Financing in the Supply Chain. Systems. 2022; 10(1):21. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems10010021

Chicago/Turabian Style

Hu, Haiju, Yakun Li, Mao Tian, and Xinjiang Cai. 2022. "Evolutionary Game of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises’ Accounts-Receivable Pledge Financing in the Supply Chain" Systems 10, no. 1: 21. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems10010021

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