2.1. The Extended View: Some Aspects
The “Extended View” is a model to deal with material and immaterial aspects of a person as a social being and its interactions with and its expectations towards its environments on a causal level [
5]. Therefore the model must allow the bridging of unlinked gaps, e.g., between “body and mind”. This is possible with the help of a set of additional epistemological tools, e.g., thanks to the natural philosophy of Einstein [
5]. A “basic assumption of the “Extended View” is: incompatibilities between different natural and non-natural scientific based disciplines are to expect because of the consequences of incompatibilities between the nature of their research objects. They can be caused by techniques to generalize research problems on special aspects with the inherent consequence to skip out other aspects which are not relevant for “classic” problems of a discipline—but maybe for “extended ones”. Einstein could confirm this with his Relativity Theories!
His problem was the incompatibility between the identical wording of the term “movement” in electromagnetism and mechanics. The term (and the related processes) is indispensable in both scientific fields but does not cover identical contents: both contents simplify on what is relevant for the changing of an object in its position in time and space for mechanics OR for electromagnetism. Einstein´s solution demonstrates a natural principle: what is relevant on one level can be irrelevant on another level and vice versa. The irrelevant is (nearly) neglected in nature and can be neglected in science. The classic example:
The differences between the diffraction of a beam of light passing the sun calculated with “Newton” and “Einstein” are significant. However, they are not relevant for human daily life. They are irrelevant for problems adequately to handle with mechanics (e.g., to calculate the need of fuel for a missile) but they are indispensable when dealing with atomic energy, GPS, WWW Therefore the content of the term “movement” can be and should be different depending on its scientific use for mechanics, electromagnetism and gravitation.
As the reason for that can be assumed: natural entities are evaluating actors! They (can) simplify what is constitutive for their precursors on older evolutionary levels and are unable to attribute meaning to what is emergent on “younger levels”.
2.2. Semantic Correctness—as Simple as Possible but not too Simple
Einstein developed a technique for his problem: to invent a general definition of movement that covers both terms [
7]: the invention should be as simple as possible but not too simple: it should cover all the logic and empiric relevant. The Relativity Theories were created. I modified this technique for the “Extended View”. Now we will apply this technique on “information”.
I focus on a related aspect: we need terms to be able to communicate “differences, which make differences”. Therefore, we have to create a term and—if needed—related qualities if we can observe or conclude differences but are not able to communicate about them.
However, the creation of the term and the related quality is not enough within science about our world. We have to postulate characteristics which can be proved: are they “in agreement” to our given world, is there an increase of scientific power to expect to deal more appropriate with daily life problems? Only such inventions of terms can be accepted.
2.4. What Do You Prefer: A Machine Model or “Symbol Intentions” of Actors?
Is it enough to accept that information is all the time the result of a process thanks to the ability of the observer to attribute information/meaning to an observed matter?
You can answer: yes—if you deal just with machine models. Then, you accept an automatism between the perception, the attribution of information to the matter and the consequence that anything happens. This is a stimulus response model—sufficient to understand machines.
But any machine needs a planning person with the intention that the machines do something in regard to the intention of the creator. No machine can exist without a creator who knows that the reaction of the stimulus will be the intended response. However, remember Bertalanffy: please no machine models for life and persons [
11]!
We have to introduce intentionality and—for persons—free will. Can we handle this appropriate?
Again a critical look at Darwin and his evolutionary theory: nobody—even not Darwin—can know about the intentions of another entity. However, he can conclude on them from the observable results of their doing. He generalized the intentions of any living being on what is the fundamental prerequisite for any individual intention: to survive. So “survival” can be understood as a “symbol-intention”.
To be alive is indispensable to realize individual intentions. Individual intentions are in principle “individual” and cannot be fully grasped by an outside observer. Predictable are the agreements about the prerequisites which are common and constitutive to be a “member within a subset of entities”. All “members” will intend these “symbol-intentions” as prerequisite to be able to realize their individual intentions. This can be predicted by the outside observer.
Darwin was interested in a predictable general model for evolution. Therefore I cannot see any incompatibility between the assumptions of Darwin (who included the progress of immaterial aspects in his evolutionary understanding—e.g., the emotions of an earthworm [
12]) if I attribute to any single entity intentionality—on the level which was reached by the entity: they are different between the earthworm and Mozart, but both have/had the fundamental intention to survive.
We have to see these differences with respect to the historic dimension and to (the progress in) the application of the autopoiesis of “natural principles”:
Inanimates up to photons have no genes, but are to understand as expressions of and precursors for an evolutionary process: consequently, we have to attribute to them intentionality too.
Therefore we have to extend our understanding of “information”. We have to attribute to the actors not only the ability to link information with matter, but to attribute “meaning” to information.
And if our actors are not omnipotent and ideal, then we have to assume that they attribute positive and negative valuations to meaning. This links our discussions with the natural principle of enforcement and inhibition. Sechenov and Pavlov have discovered them in physiological systems.
I have reported shortly that this principle can be understood as a natural principle which can be observed on any level of our world [
13].