EU Digital Communication in Times of Hybrid Warfare: The Case of Russia and Ukraine on X

Abstract

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022 triggered a series of dramatic events with both humanitarian and informational repercussions. In this context, social media became saturated with rhetorical strategies and narrative framing from civil society, European media, and EU institutions alike. This paper examines how the European Union communicated institutionally during the first year of the war, focusing on the online activity of the three main EU bodies—the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Council—and their respective presidents: Ursula von der Leyen, Roberta Metsola, and Charles Michel. The study centres on their use of the social media platform X (formerly Twitter), analysing the content of their posts related to the conflict. In addition, several in-depth interviews were conducted with experts in EU institutional communication and disinformation on social media to complement the analysis and offer a broader perspective on the communicative strategies employed.

1. Introduction

Institutional communication has become a cornerstone of the global political landscape, particularly during periods of crisis and geopolitical tension. In this regard, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia on 24 February 2022 has introduced a range of communicative challenges for European Union institutions.

The proliferation of disinformation and the growing influence of Eurosceptic narratives—frequently reflected in so-called “Euromyths”—have prompted the European Union (hereinafter, the EU) to adopt alternative strategies to engage citizens through its communication policies.

This study explores the character of institutional communication throughout the first year following the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war, with a specific focus on how this issue was addressed on X by various EU institutions and their leading political figures. In fact, the article does not claim to directly analyse hybrid warfare content, but rather to position the EU’s communication efforts within a broader international security and disinformation framework.

2. State of the Art

2.1. Digital Institutional Communication: A Shift from Traditional Models to the 3.0 Ecosystem

Ever since the beginning of the century, the European Union has taken a leading role in incorporating the internet and social media into its institutional communication strategies. This commitment is evident in its efforts to foster a European public sphere by encouraging unmediated, two-way dialogue, which promotes transparency and helps to simplify communication practices often encumbered by bureaucratic procedures. While a certain level of synergy can be observed between the media and EU institutions in their coverage of European affairs, the development of a fully integrated and collaborative pan-European communication framework remains a key objective.

Digital tools and platforms are undeniably central to engaging citizens and disseminating trustworthy information in ways that are both accessible and appealing. Institutional communication is currently undergoing a paradigm shift characterised by the emergence of new formats, audiences, channels, and message construction techniques that move fluidly between textual and audiovisual registers.

In this context, the coordinated work of communication departments within EU institutions—via influential platforms such as X, YouTube, Instagram, LinkedIn, Facebook, and institutional websites—is now regarded as vital for engaging broader audiences [1]. These digital channels offer a means of involving citizens in complex policy matters that directly impact their lives, on a day-to-day basis.

2.1.1. The Evolving Role of EU Communication Offices in the Digital Landscape

In the current era, information no longer functions solely as a medium of communication; it has acquired intrinsic value as a symbolic and strategic asset. Public institutions, including those within the European Union, are thus compelled to adapt to this transformed communicative environment. For years, the EU has sought to narrow the gap between its institutions and the public, with communication offices emerging as a key component in this process. The advent of the internet has significantly reshaped the day-to-day interactions between these offices and the media, enabling direct engagement with both journalists and citizens via digital platforms [2]. Rodríguez-Guillén [3] points out that social media empowers individuals to “select, decode, and reinterpret information, sharing it from their own digital spaces as though they were media outlets themselves.”

Considering this, EU authorities have committed to ensuring citizens are well-informed about the decisions made at the European level. This strategy responds to a long-standing recognition of the communication deficit between the EU and its constituents—a disconnect that continues to hinder the full realisation of a coherent and comprehensible supranational project for many Europeans.

Institutional communication is currently experiencing an unprecedented phase of visibility and influence, particularly through platforms such as X (formerly Twitter), where users simultaneously monitor events and stimulate discussion through real-time interactions, tagging and referencing political figures and institutions [4]. As Freelon and Karpf [5] suggest, “Twitter offers a lens through which pivotal political moments and actions may be evaluated.” Its unique attributes have solidified its status as the primary platform for political engagement and discourse, while also serving as a valuable resource in academic and social research on communication [6,7].

2.1.2. Social Media Strategies and Practices Among EU Institutions and Leaders

The European Parliament led the way in addressing the EU’s communication deficit, with the European Commission soon following. Both institutions took deliberate steps to reduce the perceived distance between the Union and its citizens, aiming to cultivate a pro-European sentiment. This approach contributed to the development of what has been termed the “Europe of Information”—a model in which communication serves as a means of fostering a shared European identity and encouraging a sense of belonging to the supranational project, thereby shaping the figure of the homo europeus. When crafting public messages, EU institutions must account for the significant challenge posed by the continent’s cultural and linguistic diversity, which makes it difficult to achieve uniform communicative impact across Member States.

Despite differences in intensity of social media usage among EU bodies, it is crucial that all institutions continue to expand their presence in digital spaces. This evolution should include the development of communication units that move towards models of engagement defined by online interaction—commonly referred to as Communication Office 2.0 or 3.0 frameworks—which emphasise proximity, responsiveness, and sustained dialogue with citizens [1,8,9].

Drawing upon institutional communication policy documents, scholars such as Rodríguez-Guillén [3] argue that a paradigmatic shift has occurred in the EU’s approach to public engagement. The earlier, hierarchical model—centred on unidirectional information flow—has given way to more interactive, citizen-focused strategies, aiming to enable genuine dialogue between institutions and the public [10]. This shift is accompanied by efforts to foster stronger connections not only between different levels of governance—local, regional, national, and supranational—but also between administrations and civil society actors.

The European Parliament’s communications team underscores the importance of aligning institutional priorities with public interest. Their aim is not to dictate the media agenda but to support it by amplifying issues under parliamentary discussion that already resonate with the public, thereby reinforcing the visibility of Parliament’s role [2].

Within the European Commission, Commissioners and Directorate-Generals maintain official social media accounts and post content regularly. The Commission’s spokesperson, supported by DG COMM, oversees the dissemination of audiovisual materials and coordinates information-sharing efforts across Member States through the network of Representations [11]. These Representations, usually staffed with one or more communication officers, act as national relays for institutional messaging.

While the Commission has made significant strides in its use of social media, there remains untapped potential—particularly in encouraging more active participation by Directors-General, Commission staff, and DG units—to present a more approachable and engaged institutional image. Conversely, the European Parliament is often regarded as the most successful EU body in adapting to the dynamics of social media communication. As for the Council, maintaining and strengthening its communication efforts remains essential, especially by improving digital coordination and securing a more prominent and consistent presence across online platforms.

2.2. The State of Hybrid Warfare in the Disinformation Era

Hybrid threats have emerged as a central security challenge, reflected in the strategic frameworks of numerous states. Both the European Union (EU) and NATO have introduced measures to address them. The term remains deliberately broad to reflect its fluidity [12], but within the EU it denotes “the mix of coercive and subversive activities, conventional and unconventional methods—diplomatic, military, economic, technological—that can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives just below the threshold of formally declared war” [13] (p. 2).

Lesaca [14] highlights the consolidation of digital disruption as a weapon, distinct from cyber-attacks or traditional offensives. Disinformation campaigns exemplify this, using rhetorical devices and false or misleading content to influence opinion via social media [15]. They cut across multiple domains—thirteen in total, including the cyber, social, political, administrative and cultural—identified by the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and the Joint Research Centre [16].

While deception has long served military aims, its significance has intensified with digital communication. Though illegal in peacetime and lawful in wartime, such a distinction is largely theoretical, as hybrid warfare unfolds in a grey zone where the boundaries of war are blurred [17].

The world wars first established the media and public opinion as decisive actors in conflict, a role institutionalised during the Cold War under the label “information warfare.” Asymmetric warfare today is sustained by “a powerful propaganda machinery and massive information operations through alternative channels” [12] (p. 13). For Castells [18], the defining communicative shift of the early twenty-first century was the emergence of “mass self-communication,” which reconfigured elite power by enabling individuals to shape public debate. Digital platforms and marketing tools have, in turn, altered the balance between institutions, media and citizens.

Because decision-making is structured through interpretive frames, symbolic exchanges and mediated communication, information can be weaponised to generate cognitive, emotional and behavioural effects. Yet since the UN Charter proscribed war as an instrument of international relations, states have preferred terms such as “conflict” or “armed conflict” to avoid the explicit language of war [19].

Authoritarian actors now exploit the very communication tools used daily for legitimate purposes. Election interference illustrates how disinformation erodes trust, polarises societies and strains international alliances [16,20,21]. Among the principal hybrid strategies is the deployment of disinformation through orchestrated campaigns [22,23]. Fabricated news is embedded in coordinated plans that employ artificial intelligence and data-driven targeting to manipulate discourse.

Computational propaganda, in the other hand, refers to “a set of practices executed by computer programs to persuade people of the merits of ideas, individuals, or initiatives on social networks and other digital platforms” [24] (p. 36). As Rodríguez-Fernández [25] observes, its growing prevalence has led governments to establish dedicated units to counter professionalised “cyber troops”.

3. Materials and Methods

3.1. Objectives

This study aims to examine the posting practices and communication strategies employed by the European Union on social media during periods of international conflict and hybrid warfare. It specifically focuses on the EU’s ability to foster meaningful public discourse among the various stakeholders involved in shaping political opinion. Therefore, this paper is positioned as a descriptive case study with modest theoretical ambition rather than as a fully explanatory framework.

In line with this objective, the research assesses whether EU institutions maintain a coordinated communicative approach during crises, employing a shared tone and lexicon, or whether their responses reflect disparate narratives on critical issues.

3.2. Hypotheses

Based on the above, the following hypotheses were proposed:

• EU institutions tend to adopt a politically symbolic rhetoric when addressing international conflict, whereas their representatives on social media often favour a more procedural and administrative style of communication.
• Combating disinformation and enhancing citizens’ understanding of European matters are central pillars in the communication strategies pursued by EU institutions and their leaders during periods marked by hybrid threats.
• Institutional posts related to the Russia–Ukraine conflict generally exhibit a polished and professional audiovisual presentation.
• EU institutions and leaders regularly engage in digital exchanges with international organisations and prominent political figures, while their interactions with media professionals, scholars, and civil society actors are more selective and occasional.
• Posts published by European representatives on X attract higher levels of audience engagement compared to those shared through the official accounts of EU institutions.

3.3. Content Analysis

3.3.1. Sampling Selection Criteria

This research takes the X post (formerly known as a tweet) as its principal unit of analysis, following established methodologies in the study of political and organisational communication [6,26,27,28,29]. Publications issued by the official accounts of European institutions or their representatives are directed either at an established niche audience (followers) or at potential audiences (prospective followers). At the same time, each tweet can be examined through specific parameters that enable a systematic analysis of both its form and content.

The dataset consists of six verified accounts: three belonging to official EU institutions, and three representing key political figures within the European Union. A total of 1466 posts were compiled for examination during the first year of war between Russia and Ukraine (24 February 2022–24 February 2023).

The selection of X accounts prioritised three core community institutions: the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council. These bodies constitute the backbone of the EU’s institutional framework and the central axis of Brussels’ communication strategy. The Council of the EU was excluded owing to its rotating presidency, which prevents the maintenance of a single permanent account, as communication channels change with each six-month presidency. Similarly, the Court of Justice of the EU, the European Central Bank and the European Court of Auditors were not included, since their communication activity is largely confined to legal or economic domains.

3.3.2. Procedure for the Content Analysis

Content analysis was conducted on tweets published by the selected accounts within the study period using a coding scheme based on analytical variables drawn from previous research on political and organisational communication on X [30,31,32,33].

Tweets corresponding to the one-year study period were automatically retrieved with the T-Hoarder tool, which integrates the REST, Search and Streaming APIs of Twitter [34]. T-Hoarder, an open-source tool in use since 2012, meets the requirements of objectivity, transparency and reproducibility, and the data retrieved included publication date and time, tweet content, tweet link, number of followers, language, retweets and likes [35].

After retrieval, the dataset was cleaned and prepared for coding. Only tweets published in English were retained to preserve the international relevance of the analysis, as English remains the main working language of the EU institutions despite Brexit [36]. Furthermore, inclusion was contingent upon the presence of at least one reference to themes linked to the Russia–Ukraine war within the post’s main text or caption, as follows:

• Ukraine
• Russia
• Ukraine’s
• Russia’s
• Ukrainian
• Russian
• Ukrainians
• Russians
• Kyiv
• Kremlin
• Kiev
• Putin
• Zelensky
• Zelenski
• Poland
• Hungary
• Mariupol
• Donetsk
• Luhansk

A reliability pilot test was conducted among the two coders. A random 10% of the sample was independently coded by each, achieving 0.91 intercoder agreement according to Cohen’s Kappa, which was deemed an optimal level to ensure consistency in the subsequent full-sample coding. This preliminary study confirmed the frequent use of these words when the tweet content addressed topics related to the conflict.

The entire sample was downloaded, imported into a spreadsheet and manually coded by both researchers, using software tools such as Microsoft Excel and the basic version of IBM SPSS Statistics to manage the dataset and generate visual representations through charts and tables. A structured codebook was devised to ensure analytical consistency and reliability (see Appendix A). This manual was organised around three primary analytical dimensions—narrative content, interaction type, and audience engagement—drawing on variable categories commonly employed in prior descriptive studies of political and institutional communication on platforms such as X [37].

3.3.3. Research Variables

To operationalise the hypotheses, a set of variables was defined. All variables are nominal, distinguishing categories without implying any hierarchy.

At the narrative level, the dependent variable captures the persuasive and narrative elements inferred from tweet content, reflected in the selected indicators. At the interaction level, the analysis focuses on hypertextual features—constituting the tweet’s format and content—as well as mentions and quotations of other accounts within the international community.

These dimensions, together with audience engagement, form the core of institutional communication via an X account. Engagement was measured by retweets, likes, and quoted tweets at the time of data collection. Quoted tweets were used to replace the subvariable ‘Comments’ common in other studies, as recent changes to X make automated comment counts unreliable, and manual counts were inconsistent. This approach has been successfully applied in prior research [4,7]

The coding scheme, detailed in Appendix A, comprises dependent variables and clearly defined categories, designed according to methodological criteria of exclusion, exhaustiveness, homogeneity, relevance, clarity, and productivity, to ensure systematic content analysis.

3.4. In-Depth Interviews

To complement the content analysis, this research also employed a qualitative methodology through the conduction of in-depth interviews with experts in the field of communication of European affairs. This secondary technique was intended to provide interpretative depth, enabling a richer understanding of the data by situating the findings within broader professional and analytical contexts.

The interview method is considered effective for gathering expert opinions and perspectives on emerging phenomena [38]. Therefore, the interviews provide contextual insights, serving to illustrate and enrich the results rather than constituting systematically analysed data. This procedure has enhanced the understanding of the subject matter through a holistic perspective.

Some researchers assert that the interview is the qualitative research technique that grants participants the greatest freedom during interaction. This allows the interviewer to obtain responses through an informal conversational climate, avoiding the rigidity of a predefined form. Thus, it creates a comprehensive human encounter between the interviewer and the informants [39], resembling spontaneous verbal interaction [40].

The seven interviewees (whose profiles are described in Appendix B and identified with ID codes along the article) are experts in various fields that intersect with the subject of this research. Interviewees were carefully chosen to represent four distinct professional categories: academics and specialists in EU communication policy, institutional representatives from EU bodies, international journalists, and communication practitioners with a focus on European issues.

Consistent with previous studies on communication and disinformation within the EU context, these interviews were conducted using a semi-structured questionnaire. The questions were framed according to organisational and practical criteria recommended by other scholars [41,42]. To improve interaction and conversational experience, efforts were made to conduct these interviews in person, where possible, or otherwise via telematic means. The average length of the conversations was around 45 min.

After the interviews were completed, they were transcribed using the advanced version of Trint online software (for interviews conducted in English) and a programming code based on voice recognition technologies (for interviews conducted in Spanish). This code enabled the processing of audio files and employed advanced algorithms to automatically convert spoken content into written text, thereby saving the researcher time and effort by facilitating the analysis and search for specific information within the transcriptions.

4. Results

This section offers a comprehensive examination of the findings derived from the content analysis of tweets issued by the selected EU institutions and political figures.

4.1. European Commission (@EU_Commission)

During the period under review, the European Commission emerged as the most active account, generating 344 tweets—equivalent to 23% of the total dataset.

4.1.1. Narrative Level

Among the predominant thematic areas addressed, the Commission’s public communications most frequently centered on support for Ukraine, with related content constituting 25.5% of its output. In contrast, topics such as disinformation or the displacement of Ukrainian citizens featured far less prominently, appearing in under 5% of the posts (see Figure 1). Overall, there is a limited presence of disinformation-related content in the dataset.

Expressions of solidarity through hashtags were a notable feature, with nearly 44% of the tweets incorporating tags such as #StandwithUkraine, #EUSolidarity, #WithUkraine, or #SlavaUkraini. On the other hand, 33.6% of the posts omitted hashtags entirely.

Regarding the communicative function of the messages, 44.1% of the tweets were aimed at conveying conclusions or updates on measures implemented by the European Commission in response to the war. Posts focused on symbolic solidarity initiatives—such as public art or illuminations of Commission buildings in Ukrainian colours—and those calling for societal or institutional action both accounted for 11.9% of the total, sharing second position. In third place (10.4%) were tweets that explicitly denounced the Kremlin’s conduct, often naming President Putin or referencing the Russian armed forces.

4.1.2. Interaction Level

A textual format enriched with multimedia elements and links to official EU channels characterised the majority (53.6%) of the Commission’s posts. Additionally, audiovisual resources were frequently employed: 23.2% featured still images, infographics or animated graphics, while 18.6% incorporated video or audio segments.

With regard to fostering dialogue, most tweets (66.7%) did not mention other accounts. Mentions of fellow EU institutions or leaders—such as President von der Leyen—accounted for 17.1%, typically aiming to encourage interaction or response. Mentions of political figures outside the EU comprised 7.5%.

The practice of quoting existing tweets, whether from within the institution or other users, was also examined. Only 26% of posts adopted this format, suggesting a limited tendency to comment on or reframe external content. The remainder (74%) consisted of original posts not citing prior tweets.

4.1.3. Engagement Level

To assess engagement, the number of retweets, likes, and quote tweets each post attracted was recorded. In terms of retweets, the majority of posts (49.3%) fell within the 26 to 100 range, while 21.4% surpassed this bracket, reaching up to 200. Less than half received under 100 retweets.

User interaction was generally higher in terms of likes: nearly 30% of the tweets exceeded 500 likes, although a notable proportion (22.3%) garnered fewer than 200. As for quote tweets—indicative of users adding commentary to the Commission’s posts—over half of the tweets received between 6 and 25 quotes, with 20% attracting between 26 and 100.

4.2. European Parliament (@Europarl_EN)

The 111 posts shared by the European Parliament’s official X account during the analysed period represent 8% of the overall dataset—a proportion similar to that recorded for its president, Roberta Metsola.

4.2.1. Narrative Level

Support for Ukraine emerged as the leading theme in the Parliament’s communications, comprising 28.8% of its total posts. A further 20.7% focused on high-level meetings with international actors or intergovernmental forums where the conflict featured prominently on the agenda.

Hashtag usage was relatively limited: more than half of the posts (52.3%) omitted them altogether. Approximately 30% employed hashtags as a means of expressing solidarity with the Ukrainian population, while 11.7% included more general references to the Russia–Ukraine war, such as country names or the names of occupied territories.

In terms of communicative intent, nearly one-third (30.6%) of the Parliament’s posts aimed to communicate the outcomes of EU-level initiatives intended to address the repercussions of the war. Informational updates on the unfolding of the conflict constituted 22.5% of the posts, while 19.8% were dedicated to messages of solidarity with victims.

4.2.2. Interaction Level

From a format perspective, close to 40% of the Parliament’s posts combined textual content with external links—primarily directing users to institutional websites or social media channels—and additional multimedia components such as images or videos. Notably, video content stood out as the primary resource in 27% of the posts (see Figure 2).

When considering interaction with other users or institutions, the majority of tweets (62.2%) contained no mentions. However, 22.5% referred to other EU bodies or representatives, while 12.6% included references to political leaders either from within the European Union or beyond.

Nearly half of the posts (45%) were either retweets or quote tweets referencing content from EU institutions or high-ranking officials, including President Metsola and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. In contrast, only a small fraction (1.8%) cited posts by international political figures.

4.2.3. Engagement Level

In terms of audience engagement, the majority of the Parliament’s tweets—almost 60%—accumulated fewer than 100 retweets. However, 13.5% achieved over 500 retweets, a notable figure within the context of institutional messaging.

The distribution of likes followed a similar pattern to that of the European Commission: 37% of the posts received more than 500 likes, while 44.1% attracted between 26 and 200.

Quote tweets, indicating users’ inclination to comment on and reshare the Parliament’s content, were somewhat less prevalent. Approximately 38% of posts generated fewer than five quote tweets, 28% fell within the range of six to 25, and 24.3% received between 26 and 100.

4.3. European Council (@EUCouncil)

The Council of the European Union contributed 186 posts to the analysed sample, representing 13% of the total. This places it third in terms of volume among the institutional accounts examined.

4.3.1. Narrative Level

The Council’s posts on the Russia–Ukraine war primarily focus on three themes: sanctions imposed on Russia (23.7%), high-level meetings or conferences with international powers (23.1%), and the delivery of support packages to Ukraine (20.4%).

Solidarity-related hashtags—such as #StandWithUkraine, #EUSolidarity, or #SlavaUkraini—appear most frequently, accounting for 43.5% of those used. An additional 28% consist of broader terms referencing the invasion or the affected territories.

The main objective behind over half of the Council’s posts (53.2%) is to report on policy decisions or institutional responses to the conflict, a communicative function that closely mirrors that of the European Commission. Informative updates on the evolution of the war represent 14% of the content, while 7.5% serve alternative purposes not captured by the predefined coding categories.

4.3.2. Interaction Level

In terms of format, a significant 80% of posts combine basic textual content with links—either to the Council’s official website or previous X publications—accompanied by additional multimedia elements. In contrast, purely audiovisual content is less common, with videos accounting for 7% of posts and static visuals, such as images or infographics, comprising 6.5%.

Mentions of other accounts are rare. A striking 81.7% of tweets do not reference any external users. Among those that do, 7.5% mention international organisations such as the UN or UNHCR, while 4.8% refer to political figures from either within or outside the EU.

A similar trend is observed with quote tweets: almost three-quarters of the Council’s posts (approximately 75%) are standalone in nature, lacking embedded references to earlier content. The remaining 25% build upon previous messages, either from the Council’s own account, its President Charles Michel, or other key institutional actors.

4.3.3. Engagement Level

Engagement levels show moderate interaction from users. In terms of retweets, 42.5% of the Council’s posts fall within the 6–25 range, whereas only 7.5% exceed 100 reposts (see Figure 3).

Likes are slightly more widely distributed: over half of the tweets receive between 26 and 100, while a notable 15.6% surpass the 500-like threshold. At the lower end, 12.4% gather fewer than 25. When it comes to quote tweets, interaction is generally limited. More than 77% of the Council’s posts receive no more than 25 quote tweets, indicating relatively modest levels of public commentary or sharing with added remarks.

4.4. Ursula von der Leyen (@vonderleyen)

Among the EU leadership, the German president of the Commission issued 115 tweets concerning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine between 24 February 2022 and 24 February 2023, accounting for 8% of the total sample.

4.4.1. Narrative Level

The thematic focus largely defines the nature and tone of von der Leyen’s posts and distinguishes them from the content issued by the institution she represents. Twenty per cent of her tweets address the assistance provided to Ukraine, while 17.4% focus on the country’s EU membership candidacy and accession process. The third most frequent theme is participation in international conferences or meetings (16.5%).

Von der Leyen’s use of hashtags is minimal: 88% of her posts do not include any. When hashtags are used (5.2%), they express solidarity with Ukraine through short slogans or supportive phrases.

The purpose of 40% of the tweets is to convey conclusions regarding measures adopted by the European executive, as illustrated in Figure 4. At a considerable distance, tweets that aim to raise awareness among international leaders on specific issues account for 14.8%, followed by those providing updates on the conflict’s evolution (13%).

4.4.2. Interaction Level

The most common format found in von der Leyen’s posts is text accompanied by images or infographics (37.4%), followed by short video or audio clips, either live or pre-recorded (31.3%). A smaller proportion (12.2%) includes links to the Commission’s official website or social media posts, often alongside audiovisual content.

Regarding account mentions, nearly 70% of her posts do not engage with other users via this format. However, 20.9% refer to political leaders from both EU and non-EU states, and 7% mention other EU leaders or institutions.

The pattern is similar with quoted tweets: two-thirds of von der Leyen’s posts are not quotes from her own or other official accounts. The remaining third includes posts from EU institutions or leaders, accompanied by additional commentary.

4.4.3. Engagement Level

More than half of von der Leyen’s tweets receive over 500 reposts. A further 18.3% fall between 100 and 200 retweets, and 19.2% between 200 and 400.

The “like” metric follows a similar pattern: 96.5% of the tweets garner more than 500 likes, while the remaining 3.5% receive more than 400.

Quoted tweets deviate from this trend: 41% of her posts are quoted between 26 and 100 times; 20% receive between 101 and 200 quote tweets; and 13.1% are quoted fewer than 25 times.

4.5. Roberta Metsola (@EP_President)

Unlike Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Parliament uses this official account primarily to disseminate institutional messages, while maintaining a secondary and more personal account (@RobertaMetsola). Her posts constitute 9% of the sample, with a total of 124 tweets analysed.

4.5.1. Narrative Level

The most prominent theme in Metsola’s posts is her participation in international conferences or bilateral meetings with representatives from other countries (36.3%). This is followed by tweets related to the assistance provided to Ukraine (15.3%) and the successive packages of sanctions imposed on Russia for its ongoing aggression (12.1%).

Almost 40% of these posts on X include hashtags expressing solidarity with the Ukrainian people, either in English or Ukrainian. A further 31.5% use terms related to the conflict, such as the names of invaded territories or countries involved in the war.

With regard to the purpose of these tweets, 25.8% seek to highlight the achievements of EU action, while roughly 20% are aimed at calling for action on specific issues or expressing support for victims of the Russian invasion.

4.5.2. Interaction Level

As Figure 5 illustrates, Metsola’s preferred format for conveying her messages about the war is the combination of text with an image, infographic, or gif (46.8%). This is followed by plain text posts (26.6%) and tweets that incorporate video or audio content (16.1%).

Nearly half of her tweets do not mention other accounts, whereas 30.6% include references to political leaders from countries such as Portugal, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Canada, or the United States. A further 11.3% tag other European leaders or related EU institutions.

Regarding quoted tweets, a significant majority (87.1%) do not fall under this category. Of the remainder, 11.3% cite previous posts by herself or by other EU institutions and leaders, while 1.6% refer to posts by heads of government or ministers from major international powers and other miscellaneous citations.

4.5.3. Engagement Level

A notable proportion of Metsola’s tweets (17.7%) receive over 500 reposts. However, 42.7% fall within the range of 26 to 100 shares; another 17.7% between 101 and 200; and 7.3% between 201 and 300 reposts.

In terms of likes, this reaction type emerges as the most effective in engaging the audience. More than half of the tweets (52.4%) surpass 500 likes, 13.7% receive between 201 and 300, and 12.9% reach around 400 likes.

The trend reverses when considering quoted tweets: 59% of Metsola’s posts receive fewer than 25 citations, and only 1.6% of them exceed 500 quoted posts.

4.6. Charles Michel (@eucopresident)

This is the EU leader’s account with the highest number of tweets during the period under review: a total of 180 out of the 580 posts published by European representatives, accounting for 12% of the overall sample.

4.6.1. Narrative Level

Over one-third of the tweets focus on the issues addressed during international meetings attended by Michel in his capacity as President of the European Council. A further 20.6% refer to aid packages sent to Ukraine, and nearly 13% centre on the escalation of the invasion and Russian attacks on various border regions.

The most frequently used hashtags refer directly to the Russia–Ukraine conflict (47.2%). These are followed by hashtags conveying solidarity with Ukraine (31.1%), while a significantly smaller proportion of posts include no hashtags at all (8.3%).

The primary function of 33% of the tweets is to communicate conclusions on decisions adopted. Meanwhile, 16.7% seek to highlight specific, urgent issues to be addressed in the short term, and 13.9% aim to explicitly condemn the actions of the Kremlin and identify Vladimir Putin as the main instigator of the war.

4.6.2. Interaction Level

With regard to format, the figures for the most-used types are relatively even, reflecting a strong preference for audiovisual content: 30.6% of tweets contain video or audio clips, and 29% include photographs or animated visuals. These are followed closely by text-only tweets, which account for 28.3% of the total.

Approximately 40% of the posts mention the X profiles of political leaders, while 31.7% contain no mentions. A further 15% refer to international organisations, most commonly those linked to the United Nations.

In terms of quoted content, 57.2% of Michel’s posts are original tweets, whereas 41.1% quote previous tweets published by his personal account or by the institution he represents.

4.6.3. Engagement Level

Roughly 40% of Michel’s tweets receive between 26 and 100 reposts. Nevertheless, 11.7% surpass the threshold of 500 shares. The Like variable indicates a higher level of engagement: 55.6% of his posts receive more than 500 likes, while approximately 30% gather between 300 and 500 positive reactions (see Figure 6).

Finally, 58.3% of tweets receive between 6 and 25 quoted replies, and 16.7% fewer than 5. By contrast, 18.3% of the tweets are quoted between 26 and 100 times.

5. Discussion

Based on the results obtained through content analysis and their comparison with the interviews, a discussion is undertaken to confirm or refute the hypotheses proposed.

Hypothesis 1.

EU institutions tend to adopt a political-symbolic rhetoric when addressing an international conflict, whereas their representatives on social media often favour a more procedural and administrative style of communication.

It was initially hypothesised that the dominant themes in posts by EU institutions would centre on sanctions against Russia, with a key communicative function being the expression of solidarity with the Ukrainian people. In contrast, it was anticipated that EU leaders would focus more heavily on international meetings addressing the conflict, using their posts primarily to convey conclusions on adopted measures.

In the case of the European Commission, sanctions against Russia do indeed represent a major thematic focus, featuring in 14% of its tweets. Similarly, 12% of its content is explicitly dedicated to expressing solidarity with Ukraine. This thematic pattern, however, is not mirrored in the European Parliament’s output, although the communicative function of expressing support—evident through the use of solidarity hashtags—is comparably present.

As noted by CON-5 (3 May 2023), during the first year of the war, EU institutions, and the Commission in particular, “followed a markedly different set of communication priorities” than those currently observed.

In contrast to the institutional approach, leaders such as Ursula von der Leyen and Roberta Metsola place significant emphasis on content related to high-level diplomatic meetings and summits concerning the war. The principal objective of these posts is to inform the public about the scope and outcomes of decisions adopted by the European executive. This trend is also reflected in the activity of Charles Michel, whose posts show a similar orientation in roughly one-third of the sample.

Taken together, these findings partially support the initial hypothesis regarding the thematic content and communicative intent of posts. The political-symbolic and administrative-procedural narratives appear to intersect at certain points, both in institutional communications and in the messaging strategies of key EU figures.

Hypothesis 2.

Combating disinformation and enhancing citizens’ understanding of European matters are central pillars in the communication strategies pursued by EU institutions and their leaders during periods marked by hybrid threats.

In response to the pressing threat posed by disinformation, European authorities have opted for a dual-track strategy—both regulatory and educational—within their public communication efforts [43,44]. As CON-2 (1 June 2023) recalls, the EU faced “very dark moments during the migration crisis and the pandemic; fake news and disinformation at that time were very, very strong. In response to all that, Europe legislated very effectively.” While current concerns in the European Parliament centre around “Russian interference and the use of bots and AI by China,” institutions now possess a more robust set of tools to counter such threats [45].

At a strategic level, both the Parliament and the Commission appear to align closely in their communication approaches, showing no significant divergences. The Council’s orientation broadly reflects this consensus, albeit with “certain blocking elements,” as highlighted by CON-7 (9 June 2023), who also notes that “much greater emphasis is being placed on the dimension of disinformation and its influence on citizens.”

Nonetheless, when examining the findings of the content analysis, the prominence of disinformation as a communication theme appears limited. Posts from both the Commission and the Parliament that explicitly address disinformation or its influence on narratives surrounding the Russian invasion of Ukraine account for no more than 5% of their respective outputs. In the Council’s case, the issue does not appear among the top ten thematic priorities communicated during the period under review.

Among EU leaders, this issue receives even less attention. References to disinformation constitute approximately 1% of Ursula von der Leyen’s posts, 2% of Roberta Metsola’s, and 3% of Charles Michel’s—figures that reveal only a marginal engagement with the topic.

Therefore, it may be concluded that this second hypothesis is not fully substantiated. Despite institutional discourse expressing concern about disinformation, this does not appear to translate consistently into communicative practice on X, at least not in relation to the Russian invasion of Ukraine during this period. According to previous scholarship, European communication must operate on a dual track—both institutional and media [21,46]—to effectively reach audiences and counter disinformation, which, as one interviewee noted, “has long been present and tends to be overlooked in times of social, political and economic prosperity” (CON-4, 25 March 2023).

Hypothesis 3.

Institutional posts related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict generally exhibit a polished and professional audiovisual presentation.

The use of audiovisual formats has become a hallmark of contemporary narrative strategies and is now integral to the communication dynamics of both public and private organisations on social platforms such as X [4]. CON-3 (31/05/2023) stresses the importance of engaging the target audience by responding to their expectations and promoting interaction—an objective often achieved through the use of multimedia links and visually appealing, dynamic videos. In terms of impact and visual storytelling, such formats are more effective in capturing users’ attention and contribute to fostering an online community connected to the institution [46].

In this vein, CON-6 (4 May 2023) remarks that, in an institutional setting, “the mere fact that a political leader gives a speech via streaming on Twitch already significantly changes public perception.

The findings of the present analysis corroborate this assessment. More than 90% of the European Commission’s tweets on the topic combine an external link with additional multimedia elements—such as images, infographics, or video clips—underscoring a clear preference for enriched content. This approach is mirrored in the practices of both the European Parliament and the Council.

Similarly, close to 70% of Ursula von der Leyen’s posts on the Russia–Ukraine conflict incorporate some form of multimedia content. Fewer than 10% of her tweets are composed exclusively of traditional text, with or without accompanying hashtags. Roberta Metsola’s profile reflects a pattern consistent with that of the institution she leads: a quarter of her posts rely solely on textual content, although she favours image-based formats over video by a ratio of three to one. Charles Michel, representing the European Council, also displays a strong multimedia orientation, using audiovisual elements in around 60% of his tweets.

Therefore, rather than reflecting a clear divide between institutional and individual communication, the degree of professionalisation and/or content sophistication depends more on each profile than on the initial division between institutions and EU leaders.

Hypothesis 4.

EU institutions and leaders regularly engage in digital exchanges with international organisations and prominent political figures, while interactions with media professionals, scholars, and civil society actors are more selective and occasional.

The relationship between European institutions and other international actors has proved inconsistent in the digital sphere. This applies particularly to stakeholders operating beyond official channels yet frequently wielding greater influence over public opinion—such as media organisations, academia, NGOs, and civil society associations [37].

As CON-1 (3 May 2023) argues, a fundamental issue lies in the prevailing perception among many European states that civil society operates in service of institutional agendas: “civil society should be there to respond to institutions, not to act as their propaganda through a network of ambassadors.”

According to the analysis of X posts, international organisations and political leaders—both within and outside the EU—constitute the most frequently mentioned and cited accounts. Despite a general tendency to avoid tagging other profiles, there is notable reciprocal engagement among European leaders, who regularly reference one another in cross-tweets, particularly when attending joint meetings or multilateral forums in their institutional capacities.

By contrast, references to civil society actors—such as academic figures, researchers, media outlets, and NGOs—are minimal, accounting for no more than 6% of mentions across all analysed profiles. This is deemed problematic since, as CON-7 (9 June 2023) observed, “sometimes you need to step back and speak with other actors to gain perspective. From inside the Eurobubble, the EU is viewed differently than it is perceived from outside”.

CON-1 (3 May 2023) and CON-6 (4 May 2023) offered a similar critique: “European nations often treat civil society as though it should serve their interests and only promote the merits of the EU. Yet civil society should challenge institutions rather than act as their propaganda; the same applies to the media”. On this basis, the fourth hypothesis may be considered confirmed.

Hypothesis 5.

Posts published by European representatives on X attract higher levels of audience engagement compared to those shared through the official accounts of EU institutions.

Personalising an institution through a profile bearing a full name fosters a stronger connection between the audience and the European political representative, and, by extension, with the supranational organisation they embody [47,48,49].

An examination of the comparative data largely supports this assertion in the case of Von der Leyen, Metsola, and Michel, whose X accounts register higher engagement rates than those of the institutions they represent over the period under review. However, it is worth noting that the repost and like figures of the first two are broadly comparable to those of the European Commission and the European Parliament, respectively.

The fifth hypothesis is therefore confirmed, demonstrating that a significant proportion of posts published by European leaders on X attract greater audience than those disseminated by institutional EU accounts.

6. Conclusions

Over the past two decades, the communication of European affairs has acquired considerable significance, becoming a strategic component of EU politics in its bid to reinforce citizens’ sense of identification with the European project in the 21st century.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine represents a further milestone in the ongoing evolution of institutional communication—another moment of crisis within the European framework, akin to earlier episodes such as the migration crisis or the Brexit referendum. The narratives promoted by the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council have developed in a largely consistent and aligned manner, revealing no significant divergences and pointing to a well-coordinated approach to communicating about the war (CON-2; CON-3; CON-5).

Our analysis of the EU’s communication on X shows a focus on highlighting and condemning the conflict, while demonstrating material and symbolic support from Brussels to Zelensky and affected populations. At the same time, it emphasised initiatives designed to mitigate the conflict’s impact on European citizens, including rising energy costs, food shortages, market saturation, and mass migration. In doing so, the institutions adhered to conventional organisational communication norms, adapted to a Web 3.0 context mediated through social media.

Nonetheless, the study’s findings underscore the pressing need to strengthen collaboration between the media and EU institutions. Rather than seeking to shape opinion through persuasive messaging, the focus should lie on the fundamental task of informing. Enhancing dialogue with European journalists in the digital communication arena appears vital, as the current lack of interaction risks undermining the impact and reach of institutional communication strategies aimed at engaging citizens.

CON-5 (3 May 2023), for example, argued that it is necessary to “rethink European information and give it more weight and importance”. He nevertheless noted a growing ambition to address existing shortcomings, particularly since the pandemic, “because we have realised at the media level that decisions made in Brussels matter greatly and have a direct impact on people’s daily lives”.

In terms of hypertextual strategies, multimedia formats remain central to the ‘new narratives’ promoted on social media. In September 2022, the European Commission launched its first fully transmedia initiative, a ‘European metaverse’, allowing citizens to engage with EU services virtually, though it attracted varied criticism. While audiovisual and transmedia formats are increasingly important in institutional communication, their integration without anticipating impact or establishing a robust design framework highlights the need for further development in this area.

6.1. Study Limitations

The primary limitations of this study relate to the suggested length of the article, which constrained the development of certain points that could be explored more fully. Consequently, some sections have been synthesised to present the essential information necessary to contextualise the research without exceeding the scope or losing focus.

For instance, Section 2 provides a concise overview of key concepts underpinning the study, such as European communication, digital narratives on social media, institutional communication, and hybrid warfare.

Regarding the content analysis, the sample comprised publications appearing on the timelines of the selected accounts within the specified period. This included retweets and quoted tweets, as outlined in the corresponding variable description, which may partially affect the extrapolation of the results from a social network analysis (SNA) perspective. A similar limitation arises from measuring the ‘Comments’ variable using quoted tweets rather than the total number of comments, due to technical constraints. These limitations will also be addressed in future research through the design of ad hoc methodologies and the application of advanced computational tools for analysis.

Likewise, the authors acknowledge that the English-only dataset could be perceived as a limitation for some researchers, as the exclusion of non-English material may affect the generalisability of findings, given the multicultural and multilingual background of European citizenry and the heterogeneous profile of X users within the European Union. However, it should be stressed that this decision was methodological rather than conceptual. Future research would integrate multilingual corpora to better capture the EU’s communication environment.

As previously stated, this paper should be positioned as a descriptive case study with modest theoretical ambition rather than as a fully explanatory framework. By documenting the EU’s communication practices in this context, our work provides an empirical foundation that future research can build upon, especially with multilingual corpora and larger comparative datasets.

6.2. Future Reseach Directions

Future research in this area aims to examine additional control variables related to audience interaction and engagement with EU communication, in order to assess its reach and effectiveness. In this regard, a more detailed analysis of the digital communication strategies of institutions and leaders concerning the Russia–Ukraine conflict could be conducted over an extended period, yielding more robust insights.

Investigating the progressive integration of artificial intelligence (AI) tools in the design and management of EU institutional communication policies—particularly in addressing disinformation flows on social media during critical periods, such as European elections in 2024—also presents a promising avenue, as demonstrated by initiatives like EUvsDisinfo.

Another related line of inquiry concerns the potential development of a pan-European public sphere through the media–institutional communication nexus. As noted earlier, the involvement of media in disseminating accurate and accessible information about the EU could strengthen citizens’ sense of belonging to a supranational community and enhance the resonance of institutional messages at local and less specialised levels. However, the effectiveness of this dual discourse is debatable; interviewees suggested that media–institutional synergy alone may be insufficient to consolidate a genuine European demos.

Pragmatically, several critical issues must also be considered, including multilingualism and the digital divide, which could each warrant dedicated study. Analysing the limits of the European public sphere raises the question of whether, if a single narrative for Europe is unattainable, a set of diverse narratives could generate constructive debate and inform strategies to foster public identification with European issues. Future research could therefore begin by formulating hypotheses on these matters for empirical testing or refutation.