Rethinking Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa: Promises, Limits and Practice in Aḥmad al-Raysūnī’s Thought

Abstract

Increased debates over the higher objectives of Islamic law (maqāṣid al-sharīʿa) have emerged in recent decades, with considerable attention devoted to their potential for intellectual and legal reform. Nonetheless, a very prolific contemporary contributor to the maqāṣid debate, the Moroccan scholar Aḥmad al-Raysūnī (b. 1953), has received very limited attention in Western scholarship to date. Therefore, this article offers a comprehensive critical analysis of al-Raysūnī’s interpretation of the maqāṣid and its implications for contemporary Islamic normativity. Aiming to assess the relationship between al-Raysūnī’s theoretical elaborations of the maqāṣid and their practical implications, both his publications and his legal opinions (fatwas) are considered and analysed. Thus, methodologically, the article combines textual analysis of al-Raysūnī’s works with an analytical evaluation of his legal reasoning in practice. The study demonstrates that while al-Raysūnī stresses the importance of a structured maqāṣid-reasoning and suggests models for their organisation, his fatwas rarely implement these concepts directly; instead, they rely predominantly on a broader notion of public welfare (maṣlaḥa). By choosing al-Raysūnī as an example, the article argues that this tension highlights both the reformist potential and the practical limitations of contemporary maqāṣid discourse, thereby contributing to broader discussions on Islamic legal reform.

1. Introduction

In the context of debates over the reform of Islamic law, a marked turn toward the originally premodern concept of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa has been evident since the 1950s, particularly following the publication of Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya by Muḥammad al-Ṭāhir Ibn ʿĀshūr (d. 1973). Among other reasons, the maqāṣid have gained considerable support because they are regarded as a traditional yet flexible framework that can facilitate reform of Islamic law (Ahmed 2018, p. 241). Although modern interpretations of the maqāṣid have been subject to various criticisms,1 scholarly engagement with the concept and the number of related publications continue to grow steadily. These engagements are diverse in nature and extend beyond the question of how the maqāṣid can contribute to the reform of Muslim thought. Particularly in the field of law, these include discussions on how the maqāṣid themselves might be reformed to produce a more contemporary, ethics-based Islamic thought and legal framework.2

This article aims to examine the contributions of a contemporary author who—despite his extensive contributions to the maqāṣid—has remained relatively unnoticed, particularly in the Western scholarly community. The author in question is the Moroccan scholar Aḥmad al-Raysūnī. The few publications available to date on al-Raysūnī primarily discuss his political and legal positions, as well as his approach to the concept of public interest (maṣāliḥ, sing. maṣlaḥa).3 One article also examines his views on normalisation and peace agreements with Israel (see Shemer 2021, pp. 1200–22). In view of these few publications on the scholar, it can be agreed that despite his prolific academic activities and publications, “there has been almost no academic research on al-Raysūnī” (Shemer 2021, p. 1201).4

This article pursues several objectives. It first introduces Aḥmad al-Raysūnī’s general understanding of Islam and his approach to Islamic legal reasoning before focusing on his interpretation of the maqāṣid al-sharīʿa. His writings on the maqāṣid are particularly noteworthy because he presents them as a methodologically structured and systematic framework for legal reform and for the renewal of Islamic thought.5 To reconstruct al-Raysūnī’s approach, the study analyses his published works in print and online. The specific approach taken in analysing the sources was to include all those in which al-Raysūnī engages with the topics of ijtihād and maqāṣid. From approximately fifteen primary sources, al-Raysūnī’s understanding of the maqāṣid was extracted and critically discussed. As for the selection of fatwas for analysis, after reviewing his legal opinions, representative samples were chosen—namely those that reflect al-Raysūnī’s general tendency in issuing fatwas: that is, to base his primary argumentation on the Islamic concept of the common good (maṣlaḥa), without explicitly arguing on the basis of the maqāṣid, or more specifically, without relying on his own classification of the maqāṣid.

This article extends beyond a descriptive account of al-Raysūnīs theoretical maqāṣid approach and critically examines how al-Raysūnī translates his theoretical reflections into legal practice. A preliminary observation already emerges from his theoretical writings: despite emphasising the importance of a maqāṣid-led ijtihād,” al-Raysūnī rarely illustrates how such an approach should be implemented in concrete legal cases. The analysis reveals that his fatwas confirm this pattern. While he strongly advocates the centrality of the maqāṣid in theory, his legal opinions generally do not explicitly rely on a maqāṣid reasoning. Instead, they tend to be grounded in a more general notion of maṣlaḥa.

This discrepancy between theoretical emphasis and practical argumentation raises broader questions about the actual role that the maqāṣid currently play in contemporary Islamic legal reasoning. In addition to an analysis of al-Raysūnī’s thought, the article therefore reflects on what this gap reveals about modern reformist engagements with the maqāṣid and their function within current discourses on Islamic legal renewal.

Following this introduction, the second section outlines al-Raysūnī’s biography, his legal thought and controversies surrounding his person and positions. The third section examines his interpretation of the maqāṣid, the role he assigns to them in legal reasoning (ijtihād) and potential challenges related to their practical application. It also considers his proposals for reforming traditional maqāṣid concepts. The fourth part analyses a selection of his fatwas to assess the practical application of his maqāṣid framework. Section five critically discusses al-Raysūnīs maqāṣid approach in theory and its limits in practice, and finally the study’s findings are summarised in the conclusion.

2. Biographical Notes on Aḥmad al-Raysūnī

Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Salām b. Muḥammad al-Raysūnī was born in 1953 in the Moroccan city of al-Qaṣr al-Kabīr. He studied at the Faculty of Sharia at al-Qarawiyyīn University in Fez and at Mohammed V University in Rabat, where he completed his PhD in Islamic jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh) in 1992. From 1978 to 1984, he taught at a high school in Meknes. He subsequently served as a professor of uṣūl al-fiqh and maqāṣid al-sharīʿa at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities at Mohammed V University from 1986 to 2006. Al-Raysūnī is a founding member of the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS, al-Ittiḥād al-ʿĀlamī li-ʿUlamāʾ al-Muslimīn), and he served as its elected president from 2018 until his resignation in August 2022. In addition, he has been involved in the establishment and leadership of numerous scholarly and cultural associations, delivered hundreds of academic and public lectures and participated in various television programmes and dialogue platforms (al-Raysūnī n.d.).

In terms of his scholarly output, al-Raysūnī’s work focuses primarily on legal theory, particularly uṣūl al-fiqh and ijtihād. Among his numerous works on the maqāṣid, all originally written in Arabic, only his Natharīya al-maqāṣid ʿaind al-Imām al-Shāṭibī6 has been translated into Western languages. Beyond strictly legal topics, he addresses a broad range of issues and has issued fatwas on subjects such as society, women and the arts, while also commenting on contemporary developments, such as the coronavirus pandemic (al-Raysūnī 2020b).

Alongside his scholarly activities, al-Raysūnī has also been politically active. From 1994 to 1996, he served as the president of the Association of the Islamic Future in Morocco. He subsequently led the Movement of Unity and Reform (Ḥarakat al-Tawḥīd wa al-Iṣlāḥ) from 1996 to 2003 and acted as editor-in-chief of the newspaper al-Tajdīd from 2000 to 2004 (al-Raysūnī n.d.).

2.1. Al-Raysūnī’s Legal Thought

In terms of his legal thought, al-Raysūnī can be described as broadly rooted in a classical-traditional framework, as he considers the Quran and the Prophetic tradition to be the central foundations of sound legal reasoning. At the same time, he maintains that these sources must be continuously reread and reinterpreted to address ever-changing circumstances and emerging questions, and to ensure the ongoing vitality of Islam and its ability to produce adequate rulings (al-Raysūnī 1981, p. 675).

In his view, efforts in this direction hold central importance today. In light of what he describes as a prolonged neglect of ijtihād and renewal (tajdīd) in Islamic history, al-Raysūnī regards reform efforts across different fields and at multiple levels as urgently necessary (al-Raysūnī 2014c, pp. 39–40).

2.2. Controversies

As a public figure, al-Raysūnī has repeatedly commented on political and controversial issues. These include criticism of domestic Moroccan politics7 as well as international matters, such as when he publicly addressed the 2018 murder of the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi and sharply criticised the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (Middle East Monitor 2018).

His repeated engagement with political topics has also attracted criticism, particularly during his tenure as president of IUMS. One such instance occurred during an interview on the television programme Bi-Lā Quyūd, where he was criticised for frequently expressing political views despite his primary role as a religious scholar. In response, al-Raysūnī emphasised that his focus is clearly scholarly. At the same time, he argued that responding to political questions in public settings is both natural and legitimate.

In August 2022, al-Raysūnī triggered an international scandal that led to his resignation as president of the IUMS. In the context of the Algeria–Morocco conflict over Western Sahara, the scholar argued that the colonial powers drew the borders between Morocco and Western Sahara and that Western Sahara historically belongs to Morocco. The IUMS addressed the issue, stating that this was al-Raysūnī’s personal point of view and does not represent the IUMS, but that the Union respects it (BBC News 2022). Despite the IUMS’s statement, al-Raysūnī declared in an interview that he was withdrawing from all official functions and that, henceforth, he would pursue his activities as an independent scholar (Alyaoum24 2022), enabling him to express his freedom of opinion and stand by his positions without pressure (Le Bihan 2022).

3. The Maqāṣid in al-Raysūnī’s Legal Understanding

At the outset of this section, it should be noted that al-Raysūnī understands the maqāṣid as inherent to Islam and as already embedded in the legal practice of the earliest Muslim community. As for the conceptualisation of this concept, he considers the writings of the Andalusian jurist Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī (d. 790/1388) central to the conceptualisation of the maqāṣid (al-Raysūnī 2009, p. 277). According to al-Raysūnī, attention to the maqāṣid enables several key dimensions of legal reasoning. As the primary objectives of the Sharia derived from the sources, they allow for a contemporary reading of the texts in every era and facilitate a flexible and context-sensitive interpretation (al-Raysūnī 2014a, p. 102). At the same time, they promote a coherent and far-sighted mode of reasoning, which he describes as maqāṣid thinking (fikr maqāṣidī; al-Raysūnī 2014a, pp. 37, 99). Within the legal process, al-Raysūnī regards attention to the maqāṣid as a prerequisite for any sound ijtihād (al-Raysūnī 2016a, p. 82), whereas their negligence risks superficial readings of the sources and flawed interpretations (al-Raysūnī 2014a, p. 99). Thus, emphasising their centrality, he invokes the famous dictum of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111): “The maqāṣid are the prayer direction (qibla) of the jurists.”8

3.1. Definition of the Maqāṣid and Their Categories

Al-Raysūnī notes that he was unable to identify a precise definition of the maqāṣid in premodern scholarship. Instead, he mentions that in classical works on uṣūl al-fiqh, the term was used undefined and interchangeably with related concepts such as “aim” (hadaf), “purpose” (gharad), “wisdom” (ḥikma) and “cause” (ʿilla) (al-Raysūnī 2009, p. 8; 1995, p. 21).

The modern definition that he finds appropriate reads that the maqāṣid are “the aims which the Sharia has established in order to be realised for the benefit maṣlaḥa of human beings” (al-Raysūnī 1995, pp. 18–19).

Regarding their categories, broadly speaking, al-Raysūnī distinguishes between two types of maqāṣid: general maqāṣid of Islam and more specific legal maqāṣid. The former refer to overarching ethical and religious principles of the Islamic worldview. These include questions such as the purpose behind God’s creation of the world, life and death, the mission of the prophets and the responsibility of human beings on earth, among others (al-Raysūnī 2014a, p. 20).

However, Al-Raysūnī’s primary focus lies on the specific maqāṣid as they are commonly discussed within the established maqāṣid discourse and its ethical-legal framework. Following the classification of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī,9 he adopts the well-known threefold division of the maqāṣid into “necessities” (ḍarūriyyāt), “needs” (ḥājiyyāt), and “embellishments” (taḥsīniyyāt; al-Raysūnī 2014a, p. 69). Like al-Ghazālī, within the category of the ḍarūriyyāt, al-Raysūnī (2014a, p. 32) also includes the five core values of religion, life, intellect, lineage and property. He also maintains that each of these categories comprises additional subcategories that function as complementary elements (mukammalāt) to their respective higher-level objectives (al-Raysūnī 2014a, p. 69).

In addition to these goals and their categories, the scholar further classifies different groups and priorities of the maqāṣid:

• The general maqāṣid (al-maqāṣid al-ʿāmma): These are the ones that the Sharia considers in all or most of its rulings and themes. Al-Raysūnī states that this is the category scholars have in mind when they speak of the maqāṣid al-sharīʿa, or al-ḍarūriyyāt al-khams. Until now, al-Raysūnī seems to equate these terms, although he then continues to state that there is a difference between the maqāṣid ʿāmma and the popular ḍarūriyyāt. However, he does not resolve this ambiguity, and thus this point remains unclear.
• The specific maqāṣid (al-maqāṣid al-khāṣṣa):10 These are the maqāṣid that the Sharia aims to realise in particular fields, such as family law, finance and criminal law.
• The partial maqāṣid (al-maqāṣid al-juzʾiyya): These are the ones that God intends with every single Sharia ruling (aḥkām, sing. ḥukm), such as the purpose of contracting a marriage being to establish a strong and stable relationship (al-Raysūnī 1995, pp. 19–21).

It is noteworthy that although al-Raysūnī stresses the importance of clarity of the maqāṣid categories to enable a sound ijtihād, he does not explain how these categories concretely guide legal reasoning in practice. As a result, and in the absence of illustrative applications, the practical implications of his maqāṣid framework remain unclear.

3.2. The Question of Authority: Who Is Entitled to Identify the Maqāṣid and What Constitutes a Maqāṣid -Led Ijtihād?

al-Raysūnī (2014a, p. 43) holds that all divine commands, recommendations and prohibitions conveyed in the Quran and the Prophetic tradition contain specific higher purposes, i.e., maqāṣid. He argues that these purposes can be identified only by qualified scholars who fulfil a set of requirements (al-Raysūnī 2014a, p. 46), including an excellent command of the Arabic language (al-Raysūnī 2014a, p. 62) and the mastery of uṣūl al-fiqh (al-Raysūnī 2014a, pp. 65–66).

Al-Raysūnī’s thoughts on the identification of the maqāṣid raise the question of what happens when different scholars identify differing, perhaps even competing maqāṣid in the texts? Moreover, who ultimately has the authority to determine the maqāṣid, in case that the existence of such an authority is desired at all?

Al-Raysūnī does not pursue these questions further; instead, he turns to reflecting on the correct conduct of a maqāṣid-oriented ijtihād. According to him, such an approach naturally requires in-depth knowledge of the maqāṣid themselves (al-Raysūnī 2010, p. 89). However, the ability to identify the maqāṣid alone is not sufficient. As he emphasises, the process also requires the ability to distinguish between the objectives of the Sharia and the means (wasāʾil, sing. wasīla) through which these objectives are realised, since conflating the two would undermine the validity of legal reasoning (al-Raysūnī 2014a, p. 82).11 Nonetheless, while this distinction is presented as essential, al-Raysūnī does not elaborate on the methodological steps by which it is to be operationalised in concrete legal reasoning, thereby leaving a crucial aspect of a maqāṣid-based ijtihād insufficiently specified.

It can thus be argued that, despite his explicit commitment to clarity and methodological rigour, al-Raysūnī’s framework exhibits a recurring structural tension: while it aspires to conceptual precision, key ambiguities persist and remain unresolved upon closer scrutiny, and its practical implications are left largely underdetermined, reflecting an issue that becomes particularly evident in the analysis of his fatwas.12

3.3. al-Raysūnī’s Awareness of Practical Challenges

In light of the critical remarks and questions raised so far, it must be acknowledged that al-Raysūnī is indeed aware of certain unresolved questions and challenges and explicitly addresses them. Among these is his observation that it is relatively easy to theorise about the maqāṣid and to construct their categories; an exercise that few jurists would fundamentally contest. As he explains, disagreements tend to arise when these concepts are applied to concrete legal cases. One source of such disagreement lies in differing understandings of what constitutes a genuine benefit (maṣlaḥa ḥaqīqiyya muʿtabara) that should be considered in legal reasoning, as opposed to what is deemed harmful and should be avoided (al-Raysūnī 2014b, p. 25). Another problem is the lack of consensus on objective criteria for identifying such benefits, as well as the question of who has the authority to determine them.

At this point, it is worth noting that, while al-Raysūnī addresses these issues at a theoretical level, he does not attempt to resolve them, possibly because he considers them inherently difficult or even irresolvable. Instead, he explains that practical solutions often emerge through majority decisions shaped by particular interests and contextual considerations (al-Raysūnī 2014b, p. 70).13

3.4. What Distinguishes a Correct from an Incorrect Maqāṣid-Oriented Ijtihād?

As already noted in Section 3.2, al-Raysūnī maintains that scholars must fulfil certain criteria to engage seriously with the maqāṣid. In addition to these prerequisites, he emphasises that such individuals should regard the primary sources of Islam as authoritative and pursue an ijtihād oriented towards the texts and their maqāṣid. However, al-Raysūnī observes that the current maqāṣid discussion is not limited to classically trained scholars but also includes actors who, in his view, neither possess the necessary scholarly qualifications nor the required religious orientation. He characterises these actors primarily as Western-oriented secularists and modernists14 who, according to his assessment, engage with the maqāṣid mainly to justify particular political or social agendas (al-Raysūnī 2014b, p. 21). According to al-Raysūnī (2014b, p. 70), these individuals exhibit a clash between their own (secular) understanding of the maqāṣid and the divinely intended maqāṣid. Because they do not prioritise the religious texts and religious considerations, they subordinate them to their own understanding of what constitutes a benefit or advantage.15 Thus, whenever new questions arise, they are weighed against the text, resulting in the marginalisation or even the nullification of religious injunctions and, consequently, significant parts of the religion as a whole (al-Raysūnī 2009, pp. 115–16).16

For the concrete process of determining what actually constitutes a benefit that can guide legal reasoning, al-Raysūnī emphasises that distinctions must be made between different levels of benefit and harm, and that the religious texts should serve as the primary criterion for such an assessment. In this way, potential ambiguities or apparent contradictions between the text and a maṣlaḥa can be resolved (al-Raysūnī 2014b, pp. 38–40).17 As a guiding principle, he refers to the well-known legal dictum, “the Sharia is a maṣlaḥa and the maṣlaḥa is Sharia” (“al-sharīʿa maṣlaḥa wa al-maṣlaḥa sharīʿa”). According to his interpretation, the first part of the dictum emphasises that the Sharia ultimately aims at the realisation of human benefits, while the second part suggests that when a predominant benefit (maṣlaḥarājiḥa) is clearly identified, it may be understood as reflecting the intention of the Sharia itself (al-Raysūnī 2014b, pp. 67–68).

However, despite these theoretical clarifications, the practical implications of this principle remain unclear. As already stated, al-Raysūnī also does not provide concrete examples after his theoretical elaborations that would demonstrate how scholars are to determine when a perceived benefit qualifies as a predominant maṣlaḥa or how such determinations should be methodologically justified. This leaves open the question of how the distinction between legitimate maqāṣid-oriented reasoning and the “incorrect” uses of maṣlaḥa that he criticises is to be operationalised in concrete cases of legal reasoning.

3.5. Does a Contemporary Ijtihād Require a Reform of the Traditional Maqāṣid Concept?

If al-Raysūnī considers the maqāṣid to be a central element of a correct and required ijtihād, this raises the question of what implications this has for the traditional concept of the maqāṣid itself. Is it sufficient that these objectives were once formulated in Islamic history—most prominently by al-Ghazālī—or must they be subjected to reinterpretation or expansion to provide adequate answers for today’s requirements? Put differently, does the classical maqāṣid framework itself require a form of ijtihād to remain relevant and can generate suitable responses to contemporary challenges? Al-Raysūnī has different answers to these questions over time, a development he himself acknowledges. At one point, he maintained that scholars must continually search for the maqāṣid. According to this view, identifying the maqāṣid is an ongoing scholarly task, as changing social conditions prompt scholars to approach the texts with new questions and to seek new interpretive angles. Consequently, the search for and discovery of the maqāṣid can never be complete. Al-Raysūnī further argues that individuals have different intellectual capacities and insights into the religion, which might lead some people to discover a maqṣad that is not revealed to others (al-Raysūnī 2014a, p. 46). This position implies that the maqāṣid framework is potentially open-ended and that additional values can be added to the traditional five ḍarūriyyāt. Al-Raysūnī himself illustrates this possibility by stating that he once considered ethics (akhlāq)18 to be added to the five fundamental necessities.19

However, as he later recounts, he rejected this earlier proposal. In his more recent position, he argues that if there is a clear need to expand on classical values, such a step would only be justified under certain circumstances. One option he proposes is to retain the classical five maqāṣid—the “old ḍarūriyyāt khams”—while introducing an additional set of five new objectives, which he terms the “new ḍarūriyyāt khams”. Al-Raysūnī sees this option as a compromise, which recognises the accomplishments of earlier scholars while acknowledging the efforts of contemporary jurists. Whatever scholars decide in this regard, al-Raysūnī is keen to emphasise that the new maqāṣid must be in accordance with the Sharia and there must be a clear necessity for accepting them as the five new maqāṣid (al-Raysūnī 2009, p. 174).

Nonetheless, this proposal raises several questions. Al-Raysūnī insists that any newly identified maqāṣid must be grounded in the Sharia and justified by a clear necessity. However, he does not specify the criteria by which such necessity should be determined or who would possess the authority to recognise and validate new maqāṣid. Moreover, the suggestion of introducing a second set of five necessities appears somewhat arbitrary, since the rationale for maintaining the numerical structure of the classical model remains unexplained, and the process of determining the new five maqāṣid (and why only five) remains unclear. This pattern repeats itself when al-Raysūnī discusses the reinterpretation of the already existing classical maqāṣid. For instance, when he speaks about the classical maqṣad “protection of reason” (hifth al-ʿaql), he, similar to Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAṭīya (d. 2017; ʿAṭīya 2007, pp. 73–75), calls for a broader reading and, besides the prohibition of alcohol, he argues for the inclusion of anything harmful to reason, such as laziness, indolence and ignorance (Badawia 2019, p. 301). While this broader interpretation appears plausible, al-Raysūnī does not elaborate on how such an expanded understanding could be translated into concrete legal, ethical or institutional measures in the modern context. Consequently, the proposal remains largely at the level of general moral reflection rather than providing a systematic framework for contemporary legal reasoning.

To contextualise al-Raysūnī’s reflections, it seems instructive to consider the broader landscape of contemporary maqāṣid discussions. For instance, when looking at recent efforts to expand and reform the classical maqāṣid framework, a familiar pattern emerges: while these proposals offer innovative perspectives on revising traditional maqāṣid concepts, they often lack concrete examples of how such reforms might be applied in practice (Bassiouni 2024, pp. 163–82). In this regard, al-Raysūnī’s own limitations are by no means unique, but rather reflective of a wider challenge within current debates on the practical implementation of maqāṣid-oriented legal reasoning.

4. Practical Applications: An Analysis of al-Raysūnī’s Fatwas

Following the theoretical discussion of al-Raysūnī’s understanding of the maqāṣid and their role in ijtihād, the question arises concerning whether and how he applies these ideas in practice. To address this question, the following legal opinions will be analysed.

In one fatwa, al-Raysūnī is asked whether a necessity (ḍarūra) can differ from one place to another. The question is posed in reference to a fatwa from the European Council for Fatwa and Research that allows taking an interest-based loan to buy a house. Al-Raysūnī responds by first explaining that a ḍarūra refers to a situation that people usually cannot bear, or can only do so with difficulty. The assessment of a ḍarūra depends on various factors, and it is up to experts to make it. Regarding the specific fatwa issued by the European Fatwa Council and the Fiqh Council of North America, al-Raysūnī explains that it was issued by experts well aware of the circumstances of Muslims living in the West and the hardships they face. Furthermore, if Muslims accept this fatwa and abide by its conditions for its legitimacy, they thus fulfil what God has commanded the believers to do. At the same time, al-Raysūnī stresses that accepting this ruling is not obligatory. Thus, those who remain unconvinced are free to follow the legal opinions of other scholars, since the ruling merely represents a facilitation issued by experts (al-Raysūnī 2020a).

A similar topic arose in Morocco in 2020, when al-Raysūnī advocated a form of loan with a slightly higher interest rate of less than 2%. Al-Raysūnī supported this initial move by the Moroccan government, defending it by saying that such a minimal rate does not constitute profit-oriented interest in the conventional banking sense, since it does not generate significant profit. Instead, he suggested that the loan resembles a “good loan” (al-qarḍ al-ḥasan) in its purpose and effect, as it aims primarily to improve people’s living conditions. Because the loan is designed to benefit borrowers and does not involve substantial profit-making, he considers it permissible and distinct from the form of interest condemned in the Quran (al-Araby Al-Jadeed n.d.).

Across the available corpus of fatwas, only a single instance could be identified in which al-Raysūnī explicitly invokes the maqāṣid. This is the case when he discusses whether the establishment of the caliphate or an Islamic state represents a maqṣad of the Sharia or merely a means (wasīla). Al-Raysūnī emphasises that the differentiation between a maqṣad or a maṣlaḥa and other types of legal considerations hold strong significance for the soundness of the legal process. After discussing various points, he states that although the state plays an important role in organising Muslim societies, neither the Qur’an nor the Prophetic tradition (sunna) provides specific political structures for establishing a state or anything resembling one. At most, general principles such as “that which is necessary to accomplish an obligation becomes itself an obligation” (mā lā yatimmu al-wājib illā bihi fa-huwa wājib) could be used to support such an argument. Therefore, al-Raysūnī stresses that he rejects contemporary ideas that seek to add the establishment of the caliphate to the number of traditional maqāṣid. Instead, according to him, the state should be understood as a means to realise the interests of its citizens. Thus, political institutions belong to the domain of means (wasāʾil), while the protection of public welfare and their interests itself constitutes the actual maqṣad (al-Raysūnī 2019e).

After examining many of al-Raysūnī’s fatwas and statements—of which the three examples have been selected for the purpose of demonstration—several characteristics became evident. First, it can be said that the scholar usually answers questions very briefly and succinctly, without citing the sources he uses to support his argument. Another observation is that al-Raysūnī’s opinions are mostly based on a general maṣlaḥa idea and social benefit. When it comes to the maqāṣid, the analysis revealed that although the maqāṣid play a distinguished role in al-Raysūnī’s theoretical writings, their explicit mention and application in his fatwas are very limited and occur only when he addresses a question that concerns the maqāṣid. This observation is noteworthy because numerous questions in his fatwas—such as issues concerning women’s rights (al-Raysūnī 2019b), a contemporary approach to apostasy (al-Raysūnī 2019c), or the social roles of spouses (al-Raysūnī 2019d)—would seem to invite a maqāṣid-based argumentation. Nonetheless, in most cases, his reasoning remains framed in broader terms of public benefit rather than through a systematic application of the maqāṣid framework.

5. The Limits of al-Raysūnī’s Maqāṣid Oriented Legal Reasoning

Al-Raysūnī’s reluctance to explicitly ground his fatwas in maqāṣid reasoning, despite his extensive theoretical engagement, reflects a broader pattern within the contemporary maqāṣid discourse. As numerous examples—including Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān20 and Adis Duderija, among others—demonstrate, many scholars strongly emphasise reforming Islamic law through the maqāṣid, yet their proposals for practical implementation often remain vague. What might explain this widespread discrepancy? An analysis of contemporary reform debates suggests that a range of factors may be at play. On the one hand, a general explanation may be that greater reliance on maqāṣid reasoning raises concerns about the boundaries of interpretation and the potential reconfiguration of established legal constraints. This appears to be the case with Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935), about whom Kerr (1966, p. 187) observes that the jurist feared that an extensive reliance on his maṣlaḥa-approach could either produce unorthodox conclusions or results closely resembling Western or secular solutions. However, in al-Raysūnī’s case, such concerns do not seem to constitute the determining factor behind the limited application of his maqāṣid elaborations. This is evident in his fatwas, where he relies heavily on the notion of maṣlaḥa and—as the example of permitting interest-based loans for home purchases illustrates—does not appear, in principle, to object to solutions that resemble Western models. Could apprehension about internal criticism be a factor, particularly if the application of his maqāṣid framework were to challenge established boundaries? However, as shown in Section 2.2, al-Raysūnī generally does not shy away from expressing his views, even at personal cost, which makes this explanation rather unlikely. If al-Raysūnī generally grounds his legal reasoning in broad notions of maṣlaḥa rather than explicitly drawing on his maqāṣid framework, one possible explanation is that his theoretical model operates implicitly without being formally articulated. Given that fatwas are typically addressed to a broader audience, they may serve as simplified expressions of more complex reasoning processes, while more technical and systematic applications of maqāṣid -based reasoning are likely to emerge in internal scholarly discussions.

Thus, it can be concluded that in the contemporary maqāṣid discourse, the framework offers significant guidance for theoretically articulating the ethical and social objectives of Islamic law. However, al-Raysūnī’s work illustrates the persistent gap between theoretical elaboration and practical application: while he develops a comprehensive conceptual model, the maqāṣid seldom appear explicitly in his fatwas, functioning more as a normative horizon than as an operationalized tool in legal reasoning.

6. Conclusions

This article has examined Aḥmad al-Raysūnī’s maqāṣid-oriented thought and located it within broader contemporary efforts to reconcile Islamic legal tradition with modern challenges. While his work is characterised by a strong emphasis on conceptual clarity and systematic exposition, it also reveals certain limitations. His theoretical discussions remain largely abstract and offer only limited guidance on how the maqāṣid might be operationalised in concrete legal reasoning.

This tension becomes particularly evident in his fatwas, where the maqāṣid—despite their central role in his theoretical framework—are rarely invoked explicitly. Instead, his reasoning often relies on general notions of maṣlaḥa, without clearly linking these to his conceptual model. As a result, the practical relevance of his maqāṣid theory often remains unclear. At the same time, this should not be understood merely as a shortcoming of al-Raysūnī’s work, but rather as reflecting a broader methodological challenge within the contemporary maqāṣid discourse: the ongoing effort to translate comprehensive theoretical frameworks into consistent legal practice. In this sense, al-Raysūnī’s contributions provide important conceptual resources and points of orientation, even if their systematic application remains a task for further scholarly development.