Managing Religious Diversity in Italy: Law, Policy, and Practice in a Pluralist Era

Abstract

The phenomenon of immigration, together with an increasingly interconnected form of globalization and the rapid development of scientific and digital technologies, has placed considerable pressure on contemporary Western constitutional orders. These dynamics have compelled States to confront complex challenges, particularly with respect to facts, rights, and freedoms relating to religion. While such trends are observable in numerous countries, this article focuses on Italy, which is particularly instructive in terms of its approach to contemporary cultural–religious pluralism. From this perspective, the Italian legal framework exhibits several distinctive features, most notably in the regulatory arrangements based on accordi (agreements) and intese (understandings) concluded between the State and religious denominations pursuant to Articles 7 and 8(3) of the 1948 Constitution.

1. Introduction

The phenomenon of immigration, in conjunction with an increasingly interconnected form of globalization and the rapid development of scientific and digital technologies, has exerted considerable pressure on contemporary Western constitutional orders. These dynamics have compelled states to grapple with complex challenges, particularly in relation to the protection of fundamental rights, the reconciliation of competing interests, and the maintenance of social cohesion. Such challenges become especially acute when they concern facts, rights, and freedoms pertaining to religion. It is therefore unsurprising that these pressures have, at various times, influenced both the scope of religious freedom and the normative configuration of State–Church relations, including the principle of secularity (Greene 2018; Mitchell 2022). At the same time, processes of secularization (Taylor 2007) have not diminished the political and social relevance of religion or of religious communities, which continue to occupy a prominent position within domestic legal systems. Moreover, in certain national contexts, religion remains particularly influential, notably by virtue of forms of preferential treatment accorded to specific denominations whose long-standing, deeply institutionalized presence has secured them a distinct and often privileged legal status (Joppke 2020; S. Ferrari 2020)1.

This situation creates an additional dilemma. From the perspective of economic theory, it can be understood as a form of negative externality. When State law grants a specific legal status to the majority religion and to a limited number of minority religious communities, it risks generating discriminatory effects toward other religious and non-religious groups. Such effects may undermine the principle of equality. In liberal democracies, this principle is meant to safeguard the full plurality of religious freedoms. It therefore includes the right to difference. This tension manifests itself with particular intensity in “glocal” (Roudometof and Dessì 2022) contexts characterized by complex cultural and religious cleavages and by pervasive perceptions of insecurity.

While analogous trends can be identified in numerous jurisdictions, this study focuses specifically on Italy, which is of particular relevance in light of the foregoing considerations. The Italian legal framework governing religion, together with the related rights and freedoms, exhibits a number of distinctive features that are closely linked to the historical presence and enduring influence of the Catholic Church. This is particularly evident in the regulatory arrangements based on the “agreements” (accordi) and “understandings” (intese) concluded between the State and religious denominations pursuant to Articles 7 and 8(3) of the 1948 Constitution—a system commonly referred to as the principle of bilateralism (Pasquali Cerioli 2025; Colaianni 2024; Casuscelli 2012; D’Angelo 2012).

These situations give rise to complex and difficult questions, which may be articulated through a number of guiding inquiries. How can the Italian legal system reconcile its historical and cultural heritage with the need to develop a more inclusive framework for “other” social formations—so defined because they depart from traditional or long-established groups? What path should Italy pursue in order to govern an increasingly diverse and multifaceted form of cultural–religious pluralism? Which areas of the legal order require systematic reform to ensure a coherent and effective implementation of the principle of equality? And, finally, how is this principle—rooted in the history of liberal constitutionalism—affected when it is confronted with new forms of religious diversity that fall outside the situations it was originally designed to regulate?

This analysis is structured around four main dimensions: the legal and jurisprudential conceptions of State secularism; the structure and configuration of religious and cultural pluralism in Italy; the socio-cultural position of the Catholic Church within the national legal order; and the modalities through which the State engages with historically established or dominant religious groups. An understanding of these elements, and of their interaction with broader political dynamics, is indispensable for assessing how the Italian democratic and constitutional order confronts and regulates the challenges arising from contemporary cultural and religious pluralism.

2. Hierarchical Pluralism

Under the Italian legal system, religious and non-religious groups are accommodated through differentiated normative regimes. Although this system formally protects individual freedom of conscience and regulates collective religious activities, it also gives rise to structurally asymmetric effects.

In Italy, the legal conception of state secularity, which is central to this institutional architecture (Rescigno 1987; Lariccia 2006; Grossi 2017), is grounded neither in a model of strict separation nor in one of assimilation, such as the French laïcité de combat (Bruley 2025; El Haggar 2008). Nor does it correspond to a fully communitarian paradigm, such as the British model of multiculturalism (Mancini and Rosenfeld 2010). Rather, Italian secularism operates through a scheme of selective recognition that safeguards the autonomy of religious denominations (Mangiameli 1997; Olivetti 2000) while simultaneously producing differentiated legal positions within the system (Colaianni 2024). Consequently, although Catholics, adherents of other religions, and non-believers are, in principle, entitled to equal rights and freedoms, access to specific legal prerogatives remains uneven and is contingent upon institutional mechanisms of recognition. This structural imbalance raises persistent concerns regarding the effective realization of sustainable pluralism, which must be grounded in the right of all individuals and all denominations to be equal and equally free before the law, without unreasonable distinctions; that is, constitutionally unjustified forms of discrimination. In this light, it becomes necessary to examine the normative and jurisprudential mechanisms through which the Italian constitutional order structures and governs the current religious and cultural landscape.

From this perspective, the governance of pluralism is primarily anchored in Articles 2, 3, 7, 8, 19, and 20 of the 1948 Constitution, from which the Constitutional Court has derived what it has termed the “supreme principle of secularity” (principio supremo di laicità). This principle was first articulated in judgment no. 203 of 1989 (Cardone and Croce 2021) and continues to rest on what may be called favor libertatis and favor religionis. On the basis of a combined reading of Articles 2, 3, and 19 of the Constitution, favor libertatis emphasizes the rights and freedoms of individuals to profess and practice both religious and non-religious beliefs; according to Articles 7, 8, and 20, favor religionis safeguards the rights and autonomy of religious communities, beginning with the Catholic Church (Cavana 2025).

It should be noted that judgment no. 203/1989 arose in connection with the implementation of the 1984 Villa Madama Agreement between the Italian Republic and the Holy See, which revised the 1929 Lateran Pacts2. The 1989 decision specifically concerned Article 9 of the 1984 Agreement, which obliges the State to recognize “the value of religious culture”. Article 9 further provides that, since the Catholic Church forms “part of the historical heritage of the Italian people” (patrimonio storico del popolo italiano), the State shall continue to provide for the teaching of Catholicism in public schools. In this way, the Constitutional Court’s ruling highlights a defining feature of Italian secularism: its deep foundation in bilateral cooperation between public authorities and religious denominations.

This feature becomes even more evident when one considers the logic and mechanisms that have emerged from the implementation of Articles 7 and 8(3) of the Constitution. Article 7 governs relations between the Catholic Church and the State through the 1929 Lateran Pacts and their subsequent modifications, including the Villa Madama Agreement. Article 8, by contrast, regulates relations between the State and “other” denominations (that is, denominations other than Catholicism) by means of the intese. To date, thirteen minority religions have concluded such intese, while many other groups remain without any formal understanding. The result is marked inequality, amplified by the absence of a comprehensive law on religious freedom and the continued reliance on law no. 1159 of 1929 on “recognized cults” (culti ammessi); enacted under the fascist regime and predating the 1948 Constitution, this law remains largely disconnected from the legal foundations of the Italian Republic (Jemolo 1949); in any case, this law cannot be declared fully constitutional, as doing so would create a complete legislative void regarding religious freedom for those groups that do not have access to the system of agreements under Article 8(3) of the Constitution (Zaccaria et al. 2019).

Thus, it can be argued that Italy’s legal framework for regulating religious pluralism is stratified. Catholicism occupies the primary layer under Article 7 of the Constitution, while other denominations are placed on secondary layers under Article 8(3). Yet the story does not end there. In practice, the implementation of Article 8(3) further subdivides minority denominations into two groups: those that have concluded an intesa and those that have not. The latter group is then split into two additional subcategories: “cults” recognized under law 1159/1929, and unrecognized groups, which are governed by the general provisions of the civil code (Tozzi 2011; Camassa 2015).

This stratified structure creates a hierarchical arrangement that, rather than supporting sustainable pluralism, highlights the persistent tension between favor religionis and favor libertatis. In practice, it reflects the conflict between the advantages granted to certain religious denominations through bilateral agreements under Articles 7 and 8(3) of the Constitution and the constitutional guarantees—specifically those in Articles 2, 3, 8(1), and 19—that ensure all individuals and groups enjoy equality and equal freedom before the law, regardless of their religious or non-religious status.

3. The Janus-Faced Nature of Italian Secularism

In order to contextualize and more fully understand this situation, it is necessary to examine the historical and political background that has produced these outcomes. From this standpoint, it can immediately be observed that four principal categories currently coexist in Italy, each directly or indirectly linked to the religious dimension: practising and non-practising Catholics; adherents of religious denominations other than Catholicism; emergent or alternative forms of religiosity; and non-believers, encompassing a heterogeneous spectrum of so-called “nones” (atheists, agnostics, humanists, and rationalists) (Balazka 2025; Thiessen and Wilkins-Laflamme 2017). This classification reveals two overarching configurations. The first lies within the Catholic sphere, which is historically and institutionally embedded in Italian society. The second extends beyond Catholicism and encompasses religious and non-religious orientations that interact with a context in which—despite a decline in spiritual and religious practices in everyday life, and the growing presence of “other” religious–cultural groups—Catholicism continues to exert significant influence, particularly from a political standpoint3. A proper appreciation of these dynamics is essential for analysing how the Italian legal system addresses issues of religious freedom, secularity, and pluralism, both at the level of normative doctrine and in its practical implementation.

From a sociological perspective, Italy is often described as a predominantly Catholic country. Yet considerable variation exists within this categorization. Many Italians, for instance, identify as Catholic by default, while engaging only minimally with the Church’s official doctrines, ecclesiastical rules, and religious practices. In other words, their Catholic identity is primarily rooted in cultural inheritance rather than theological or spiritual conviction. Moreover, religious affiliation frequently coexists with significant scepticism, particularly regarding transcendent entities and the “truths” of Sacred Scriptures. This helps explain why a substantial portion of the Italian population continues to participate in life-cycle ceremonies (like baptisms, church weddings, and funerals) that remain central to both individual and community life. In these contexts, confessional references are intertwined with secularized, mediated practices: Catholicism and its values provide a sense of belonging, even as regular religious practices (such as Sunday worship, communal prayer, and Bible study) become increasingly limited. A similar pattern is observed in the sustained attendance at specific religious events, including papal elections, World Youth Days, canonizations, papal visits to local dioceses, and commemorations of charismatic figures (Ventura 2014; Garelli 2014a, 2014b).

These manifestations reveal a striking paradox in Italian religious life, particularly within the Catholic Church: widely attended public ceremonies coexist with ritual obligations that are increasingly neglected in daily practice. This paradox is mirrored at the legal level, where the regulation of religion distinguishes between historically entrenched Catholicism and other religious or non-confessional orientations.

Rooted in Italy’s cultural heritage, this dynamic is particularly evident when considering two main types of “social formations”, as referred to in Article 2 of the Italian Constitution. First, the Catholic Church and its adherents. Second, non-Catholic believers, who may be further categorized as: minority religious denominations with a historical presence in Italy (e.g., Jews, Lutherans, Waldensians); new religious communities, especially those shaped by migration, including the diverse and fluid constellation of Muslim organizations; and a growing number of individuals identified as religious nones (atheists, agnostics, rationalists, humanists, etc.).

In light of this scenario, it may be observed that the Italian legal system continues to regulate contemporary realities through a normative framework largely derived from the country’s historical experience (Lariccia 2022). This framework not only fails to adequately capture and reflect present-day cultural and religious pluralism, but also falls short of fully complying with the requirements laid down by the Republican Constitution—starting with those concerning individual religious freedom, the equal freedom of religious denominations, and the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religious or non-religious orientation. In other words, the principles and rules governing religion and religious freedom in Italy display a dual-faced, Janus-like character, simultaneously oriented toward the past and the future, albeit with different—if not opposing—effects depending on the perspective adopted. While firmly shaped by a historically and culturally homogeneous past, this system does not always demonstrate sufficient adaptability to a present increasingly shaped by religious diversity.

From this perspective, it is worth emphasising that Italian secularism and the associated system of State–Church relations differ markedly from other European and Western models. They contrast, in particular, with the French model of laïcité de combat (militant secularity), which regards religion as essentially a private matter and largely irrelevant to public life (Weil 2021; Delafaye 1997). At the same time, the Italian system departs from the communitarian–multiculturalist framework prevalent in many Anglo-Saxon countries, where national cohesion is fostered through the recognition of differences expressed by various groups and communities, incorporated into the public sphere via institutionalised mechanisms of reasonable accommodation (Nussbaum 2008; Mancini and Rosenfeld 2010).

Grounded in four constitutional pillars—religious freedom, the prohibition of discrimination, the non-establishment clause, and the principle of bilateralism—the Italian model of secularity guarantees individual freedom of belief, including non-belief, while collective entities remain subject to differentiated treatment. This framework is institutionalised through legislation negotiated between public authorities and representatives of religious denominations, reflecting the enduring political influence and historical-cultural predominance of the Roman Catholic Church and other long-established religious communities (Colaianni 2024).

4. Theory and Practice in Italy’s Pluralism

These features are particularly evident in the context of Italy’s regulation of contemporary cultural and religious pluralism. Here, the principle of bilateralism and the highly politicised procedures for concluding agreements (Article 7 of the Constitution) and intese (Article 8(3)) generate both positive and negative outcomes.

The positive aspect of this system lies in its ability to enact legislation that takes into account the specific identity of each religious denomination, whose particular needs might otherwise be constrained under general, uniform laws. Through bilateral legislation, religious groups are recognised as credible public interlocutors, each distinguished by its own distinct identity. By contrast, while these bilateral instruments aim to accommodate the specific characteristics and requirements of each religious group, general laws apply indiscriminately to all individuals and organisations. Such laws do not, by their very nature, differentiate between distinct religious actors or traditions; rather, they tend to impose a single, uniform legal framework in which diverse religious needs are treated in a largely standardised manner (Cavana 2025).

However, the practical implementation of bilateralism has also produced structural inequalities. Agreements with the Catholic Church (Article 7 of the Constitution) grant prerogatives not available to non-Catholic denominations under the intese (Article 8(3)). Further disparities stem from the impossibility of concluding intese with all religious groups active in the State’s territory. Consequently, bilateralism establishes a hierarchy between minority denominations with intese and those without. The latter can only seek recognition as “cults” under law 1159/1929, enacted under the Fascist regime, or must rely on the general provisions of the civil code. In practice, bilateralism often functions as an elitist mechanism, conferring benefits on a limited circle of religious entities while excluding others, thereby generating significant legal inequalities among denominations (A. Ferrari 2025).

It should also be specified that the intese tend to cover the same subject matter as the Agreement of Villa Madama, even though the specific prerogatives they confer are less favourable than those granted to the Catholic Church under the 1984 Agreement. Moreover, when comparing the intese with one another, it becomes evident that, to date, they largely reproduce the provisions of a single model. Consequently, from 1984, when the first intesa was negotiated with the Waldensian Church, to 2019, when the most recent intesa was concluded between the Italian Government and the Association of the Church of England (Bordonali 2024), all understandings concluded pursuant to Article 8(3) of the Constitution have typically acquired content that is not only standardised but also perpetuated over time (Cardia 1980; Casuscelli 1984; Margiotta Broglio 1986; Battista Varnier and Parlato 1995; Casuscelli 2012; Pasquali Cerioli 2016; D’Angelo 2012; Colaianni 2024; D’Arienzo et al. 2024; Alicino 2025).

This approach to implementing relations between the State and non-Catholic denominations, and to interpreting the mechanism established in Article 8(3), has at times had a significant impact on the legal status of minority religions. These communities are often compelled to accept so-called “photocopied” understandings (intese fotocopia), shaped by the practice that has developed since 1984. The result is effectively a kind of ius commune of the intese, which could, in theory, acquire the force of general law only if the State were to approve intese for all religious groups present and active in Italy. In practice, however, this scenario is unattainable.

On the other hand, this standardisation reflects both the entrenched procedural approach to Article 8(3) bilateralism and the practical constraints of regulating a highly pluralistic religious landscape. While the ius commune of the intese establishes a de facto normative framework for minority religions, it also highlights the limitations of a system in which legal recognition and access to specific prerogatives depend on political negotiation and historical precedent, rather than on an equitable, universally applicable constitutional standard. For the same reasons, the elitist and standardised content of this ius commune reproduces itself through a kind of parthenogenesis—that is, it regenerates from its own elements. Its appeal grows as its privileged status becomes increasingly entrenched: once a denomination has concluded an understanding under Article 8(3) of the Constitution, it is no longer subject to the far less favourable 1159/1929 law on admitted cults. This dynamic helps to explain the attraction of the intese: the more this form of ius commune is perpetuated over time, the greater its appeal for minority denominations that lack bilateral legislation.

Consequently, the logic of favor religionis comes into tension with the constitutional right of all denominations to enjoy equal freedom before the law, thereby affecting the very principle of State secularism, particularly from the perspective of favor libertatis. Indeed, the negative externalities of the ius commune of the intese shape the governance of religious pluralism and produce legally and constitutionally unreasonable distinctions. Italy’s bilateral State–Church legislation thus creates a persistent gap between theory and practice. This gap, evident in efforts to uphold equality and regulate religious diversity, is further deepened by the discretion exercised by public authorities, including at regional and local levels (D’Angelo 2025).

5. The Reasonableness Test and Unconventional Bilateralism

It should also be noted that, in Italy, the arrangement-based legal status and benefits deriving from the mechanisms established in Articles 7 and 8(3) of the Constitution have gradually expanded. Consequently, the application of a reasonableness test (test di ragionevolezza) has become increasingly necessary. Developed through constitutional case law, this test gives concrete effect to the principle of equality (Article 3) and to the equal freedom of religious denominations (Article 8(1)). It ensures that special or privileged regimes—such as those arising from agreements or intese—and distinctions between religious groups are neither arbitrary, disproportionate, nor incompatible with the supreme principle of secularism, which guarantees the equal freedom of all individuals and of all religious and non-religious communities. In other words, the reasonableness test functions as a parameter of constitutional scrutiny, designed to prevent discriminatory treatment and to ensure that all limitations on rights, as well as any advantages granted, are rational, proportionate, and constitutionally coherent (Morrone 2001; Scaccia 2000).

The need for a reasonableness test is particularly acute for cultural and religious groups excluded from Italy’s system of bilateral legislation. The Constitutional Court’s case law illustrates this clearly. Since its landmark judgment no. 203 of 1989, the Court has progressively redefined the scope of bilateral legislation, ensuring that the special framework it creates remains bounded by the supreme principle of secularism4. This development has repeatedly highlighted the necessity of unilateral, general legislation—especially given the evolving cultural and religious pluralism of contemporary Italy. Yet Parliament has remained silent, failing to enact such legislation, thereby perpetuating a regulatory vacuum that is rendered even more problematic by the persistence of the 1929 law on admitted cults and the inherently selective architecture of the bilateral system (Zaccaria et al. 2019).

These normative gaps have consequently been progressively addressed through initiatives undertaken by specific branches of the State administration, most notably the Ministries of the Interior and Justice. Unsurprisingly, such initiatives have focused primarily on the practical and operational dimensions of religious freedom (to borrow an expression from Jemolo 1961)—including the regulation of places of worship and the provision of spiritual assistance in detention facilities—thus mirroring Italy’s increasingly pluralistic religious landscape. Yet, in this evolving context, regulatory authority tends to be exercised through informal and unconventional administrative practices, effectively bypassing the formal mechanisms envisaged under Article 8(3) of the Constitution. The evolving interactions between the Italian public administration and Muslim organisations provide a particularly illustrative example of this development.

From this perspective, it should be noted that Islamic organisations not only lack access to the system of intese, but—with the exception of a single entity—they are also not recognised as admitted cults under law no. 1159 of 19295. It is as if, under the Italian legal order, these organisations did not exist as religious groups. Yet, beyond such political and legal fictions, Islam in Italy does exist (Pin 2020). Moreover, taken together, Muslim organisations now constitute the country’s second largest religion, after the Catholic Church. Given the presence of Islam, practical issues concerning the religious freedom of Muslims inevitably arise, both in relation to the fundamental rights of individuals and their freedom to adhere to a religious denomination in which, as Article 2 of the Italian Constitution affirms, the human personality can be developed. In the absence of legislative intervention by Parliament, these are precisely the kinds of issues that have been addressed by specific branches of the State administration (Alicino 2025).

In 2005, the Italian Ministry of the Interior established the Council for Islam in Italy, which produced a series of documents aimed, on the one hand, at reaffirming the “values” of the Italian Constitution and, on the other, at encouraging the creation of an Italian federation of Islamic groups. Three years later, the Council adopted the Charter of Values for Integration and Citizenship, conceived as the foundation for a future understanding between the State and what was referred to as “Italian Islam” (Macrì 2025). In 2010, the Ministry of the Interior established another consultative body, the Committee for Islam in Italy, composed of nineteen members, including Muslim representatives and non-Muslim academic experts, some of whom were known for their critical positions towards Islam. In 2015, a further body was created, the Council for Relations between Italy and Islam, mainly composed of university professors, who together with representatives of the main national Muslim associations drew up a common agenda (Cardia et al. 2015). In 2016, this Council issued the National Pact for an Italian Islam6. Divided into three parts, the Pact first recalls the constitutional provisions on religious freedom, while the second and third set out guidelines addressed, respectively, to representatives of Muslim communities and to the Ministry of the Interior7. The Pact was also intended to promote the establishment of an Italian federation of Islamic communities, which could help prevent and counter region-based violent radicalization and terrorism (Naso 2021).

Similar approaches have also been adopted by other branches of the public administration. This is exemplified by the establishment of consultative forums that bring together representatives of Islamic communities and experts in religious affairs. A notable instance is the so-called mini-intese (mini-understandings) formed between the Italian Department of Penitentiary Administration and, on the other side, Jehovah’s Witnesses, certain Protestant Churches, and the Union of Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy (UCOII). These mini-intese took the form of informal understandings, allowing representatives of religious groups without intese and even those without legal recognition under the 1929 law on admitted cults, to provide spiritual assistance to detainees in Italian prisons (Zwilling and Martínez-Ariño 2020). These mini-intese were renewed in January 2020 and extended in October of the same year to include another Muslim organisation, the Italian Islamic Conference (Belli 2020; see also Alicino 2020). During that period, additional measures were introduced in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with particular focus on the protocol governing religious ceremonies signed between the Government and representatives of religious communities, including Muslim groups (Macrì 2020)8.

In the meantime, the process of regional and local decentralization was advanced through the implementation of the new Title V of the Italian Constitution, as amended by Constitutional law no. 3 of 2001. Its provisions grant the Regions exclusive or concurrent legislative powers over a range of issues, including those directly or indirectly related to religious phenomena and freedom of belief. This encompasses, for example, spiritual assistance in hospitals, permits for places of worship and burials, the authorization of religious holidays, and the presence of religious denominations and their symbols in public schools (D’Angelo 2021).

Driven by the uncertainties generated by State legislation, these developments have taken shape not through formal instruments but rather through unconventional bilateralism. Encompassing various branches of the public administration, this bilateralism has evolved from the national level, through the regional tier, down to local municipal entities. It has, in turn, resulted in a significant degree of discretion for public officials, producing a form of geographical differentiation—both between Regions and among Municipalities—in the actual exercise of religious freedom. Such differentiation, however, raises serious concerns from the standpoint of constitutional law, particularly regarding the supreme principle of secularism. In these contexts, the discretion exercised by political actors often conflicts with standards of reasonableness, especially those articulated by the Constitutional Court concerning the right to freely profess one’s religion in public and to access places of worship (Mazzola 2025)9.

Conditioned by extensive administrative discretion, this form of unconventional bilateralism risks reproducing the same unreasonable distinctions that have emerged under formal bilateralism pursuant to Articles 7 and 8(3) of the Constitution. To mitigate this risk, it is first necessary to identify good practices developed at the local, regional, and national levels. Building on these practices, guidelines could then be formulated to assist public authorities in regulating and managing emerging forms of cultural and religious pluralism in accordance with constitutional norms. Grounded in empirical evidence, this framework could foster regulatory arrangements capable of ensuring the effective protection of freedom of religion in both its individual and collective dimensions.

This objective was indeed pursued by the Council for Relations with Italian Islam, composed of university professors and established in 2020 by decree of the Ministry of the Interior. Conceived as a body detached from political orientation and firmly situated on a technical and legal plane, the Council was convened on 13 July 2023, when a work plan was approved10. Drawing on specialist expertise, the Council developed proposals, including guidelines on places of worship, aimed at supporting local authorities in responding to requests from religious communities lacking both intese and legal recognition under the 1929 law on admitted cults. Thereafter, however, the Council was no longer convened, work on the proposed projects was suspended, and no further initiatives were launched. In October 2024, all members submitted their resignations to the Ministry of the Interior11.

This institutional trajectory must be understood within broader political dynamics. Following the national elections of October 2022, both the parliamentary majority and the governing coalition changed. At the same time, it should be noted that religious issues have increasingly become subject to political instrumentalisation, intersecting with the politicisation of the so-called “Muslim question” and its connection to long-standing socio-economic challenges, particularly immigration (Saint-Blancat 2014). Under such pressures, practical issues of religious freedom—such as those concerning places of worship—are often politically weaponised, thereby undermining their constitutional significance and normative effectiveness (Allievi 2025).

This situation becomes even more complex when one considers that the Italian cultural landscape has expanded to include not only new religious groups but also philosophical and non-confessional organisations (Baldassarre and Broglio 2020), encompassing various forms of atheism, including militant atheism (Parisi 2025; Licastro 2021; Pasquali Cerioli 2025). This growing pluralism coexists with a traditional State–Church framework that continues to privilege the Catholic Church and a limited number of minority denominations. As a result, constitutional tensions frequently emerge and are often resolved through judicial intervention, producing outcomes that are not always coherent or consistent. Illustrative examples can be found in Italian case law concerning Scientology12, the Sikh community13, Islam (Alicino 2023), and the request submitted by the UAAR (Union of Atheists, Agnostics and Rationalists) to conclude an intesa pursuant to Article 8(3) of the Constitution14.

In this respect, the jurisprudence of the Italian Constitutional Court provides particularly significant insights from a comparative perspective. The Court has held that, with regard to bilateralism under Article 8(3) of the Constitution, the Government enjoys a wide margin of discretion: it may recognise a group as a religious denomination for legal purposes, decide whether to open negotiations with a given association, and determine whether to conclude an intesa. Such governmental choices are subject to political accountability before Parliament, but not to judicial review. At the same time, the Court has declared unconstitutional a number of laws adopted by Regions that were aimed at restricting Muslim freedom of worship (Italian Constitutional Court, judgment of 16 March 2026, no. 52).

Similar comparative considerations arise in the case of the display of the crucifix in public school classrooms, a practice whose regulation dates back to the 1920s, at the time of the Lateran Pacts. Indeed, in 2021, in order to resolve the long-standing crucifix controversy, the United Sections of the Italian Court of Cassation (Colaianni 2021; Licastro 2021; Ceccanti 2021; Prisco 2021) referred not only to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)’ judgments in Lautsi (no. 1)15 and Lautsi (no. 2)16, but also integrated domestic law with principles derived from other national jurisdictions, especially Canada, where the Supreme Court has applied the doctrine of reasonable accommodation in disputes relating to religion17. This constitutes an interpretative canon grounded in the premise that, within a pluralistic society, the impersonal application of a legal rule may produce unreasonably distortive effects on the principle of equality—notably in the domain of fundamental rights, foremost among them freedom of conscience and religion. This approach finds a particularly clear expression in the Supreme Court of Canada’s landmark judgment in Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys18, expressly cited by the United Sections of the Italian Court of Cassation in their decision of 9 September 202119, in which a significant reorientation in the conceptualization and application of the principle of secularism in Italy was introduced. Influenced by doctrines that have emerged and developed within the experience of other countries and related legal traditions, reasonable accommodation is here incorporated into—and justified by—the Italian principle of State secularism, which is itself informed by the protection of both the individual and collective dimensions of freedom of religion.

On a more concrete and less theoretical level, this approach has led to an emphasis on the duty of Italian authorities to employ mediation-based procedures in order to reach equitable solutions in disputes concerning religious freedom. In controversies of this kind, public actors are therefore required to adopt a position of institutional neutrality and, through a reasoned and proportionate balancing exercise, to formulate an ad hoc rule tailored to the specific case, following an accommodating process capable of taking into account even dissenting positions vis-à-vis those of the majority (Italian Court of Cassation, United Civil Sections, judgment no. 244149/2021, para. 24). From this perspective, it is instructive to revisit the reasoning developed in the Multani judgment, in which the Supreme Court of Canada held that, in matters of discrimination, “there is a duty to make reasonable accommodation for individuals who are adversely affected by a policy or rule that is neutral on its face, and that this duty extends only to the point at which it causes undue hardship to the party who must perform it”.20

It is interesting to note that this approach aligns with broader Italian jurisprudence addressing issues of high ethical and religious sensitivity, including end-of-life regulation. Notable examples include the Englaro judgment of 200721 and Constitutional Court’s various decisions between 2018 and 2025 concerning the criminalisation of assisted suicide22. Within a comparative constitutional framework, these cases illustrate a shift from objective, top-authority-determined conceptions of “life” and “human dignity” toward more subjective, individual-centred considerations. Whereas these values were previously defined by public authorities and often shaped by religious references—primarily those of the Catholic Church—they are now increasingly interpreted through the lens of personal convictions, without, however, descending into radical juridical relativism or nihilism. In other words, they are guided by a cautious, more secular, and democratically informed form of relativism.

Paradoxically, this jurisprudential trajectory operates effectively precisely through the absence of explicit references to religious freedom and the supreme principle of secularism. Implicitly, however, these principles—which constitute the essential core of what has been termed favor libertatis—constrain State interference in personal choices and reduce the dominance of particular religious traditions, along with the associated favor religionis. In short, they promote a cautious relativisation of the ius existentiae—that is, the protection of the right to a free and dignified life. Without disregarding the full complexity of individual experiences, this jurisprudence considers both what happens to each person and what each person is, owns, values, and aspires to.

6. Conclusions

Indeed, all of these legislative and jurisprudential developments become more intelligible when analyzed through the lens of favor religionis (Dalla Torre 2017), a perspective that, in the Italian context, often comes into tension with the countervailing principles of favor libertatis (Colaianni 2024). This tension is reflected in three political orientations, each corresponding to a proposed reform of the laws governing Italy’s contemporary pluralism: the first emphasizes the need to preserve the specificity of the Catholic Church and its historic legal status; the second advocates for a stronger principle of secularity through the removal of the special legal status and privileges accorded to religion in general, and to Catholicism in particular; and the third upholds the right of cultural–religious minorities to enjoy equal freedom, safeguarded against both direct and indirect forms of discrimination.

I argue that a more realistic and pragmatic approach can be developed by examining the tangible effects of Italy’s normative and jurisprudential history over the past fifty years. Far from being infallible or offering definitive solutions, this approach can at least illuminate the “epistemological obstacles,” to borrow the terminology of Bachelard’s (1938) scientific framework. These obstacles, in turn, have undermined the capacity of political actors to respond effectively to the challenges of an era marked by cultural–religious diversity and heightened ideological polarization. This dynamic is particularly evident in Italy, where the 2022 elections, for the first time in the history of the Republic, brought a far-right party to lead a center-right coalition government. The party has aligned itself with prominent national and international figures known for politically conservative and extreme stances, including Donald Trump (U.S.), Santiago Abascal Conde (VOX, Spain), Marine Le Pen (France), and Viktor Orbán (Hungary).

In other words, this approach can at least facilitate an effective exchange of ideas and knowledge, illustrating, for example, that a unilateral, general law on religious freedom is insufficient to eliminate unreasonable distinctions between diverse human experiences. Conversely, the principle of bilateralism alone cannot adequately govern an increasingly pluralistic socio-cultural landscape. From this perspective, a pragmatic approach must focus on the concrete and practical issues of religious freedom, such as provisions of the penal code (including offenses against religion or blasphemy), the financing of religions, places of worship, religious holidays, religious education, dress codes in public and private workplaces, conscientious objection, and the provision of spiritual assistance in constrained environments such as prisons and hospitals.

In domains directly or indirectly related to religion, the principle of secularism should presuppose and ensure a reasonable and pragmatic governance of cultural pluralism, alongside careful regulation of the exercise of rights by adherents of the majority religion, members of minority faiths, and non-believers or “nones” (including atheists, agnostics, rationalists, and humanists). These measures should aim to create a legal framework that accommodates diverse beliefs while effectively safeguarding individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms.

At the end of the day, the human person, together with their inherent dignity and a reasonable application of the principle of equality, must remain the central focus; it is on this foundation that the roles of social formations—whether religious or non-religious—should be defined.