Reason, Authority and Theology in Francisco de Vitoria’s Concept of Magic

Abstract

The analysis of knowledge derived from the relection of De magia distinguishes between science, magic, and religion. The first is the result of an investigation based on natural causes. The mystery and solitude that surround the scientist in pursuit of their objectives not only constitute a context of discovery in which not everyone is capable of operating but also allow Vitoria to intuit that people of very different backgrounds are present within it. However, what is important here is not so much the intention that guides them, but rather that the resources employed depend on nature and are available to anyone and, therefore, do not imply any reprehensible action.

1. The Relection De Magia and Its Context

Relections, or repetitions, are lectures of about two hours in length that professors at the University of Salamanca were required to give once a year on non-teaching days. Francisco de Vitoria (1483–1546) delivered the relection On the Indies on 1 January 1539, and on The Law of War six months later (18 June 1539). Everything suggests that he would have continued addressing issues related to the Indies had he not received, at the Convent of San Esteban, where he had resided since winning the Chair of Prima of Theology in 1526, the Emperor’s letter of 10 November 1539, instructing the prior that any religious masters who had discussed the monarch’s right to those lands “I command you, on our behalf and yours, that now or at any time without our express permission they shall not discuss, preach, or dispute the aforementioned matters, nor print any writing concerning it, for otherwise I will consider myself greatly displeased” (Getino 1930, p. 151)1.

The Dominican friar never again publicly concerned himself with the affairs of the Indies, and, thus, was forced to find another topic for his next relection. This is where the lecture De magia (On Magic), delivered on 18 July 1540, appears. It is the last lecture given by Vitoria that has survived, although there is some doubt as to whether he delivered another on the same subject, as he announces in the final part of this one, but without any trace of its text or delivery (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1291).

The research on magic undertaken by the man from Burgos differs considerably from the two previous lectures, although it still includes a mention of the indigenous peoples of the Americas. From the point of view of its content, the theological and moral aspect raised by the relection has often been valued (Urdánoz 1960, p. 1224). Based on this, the double structure of the text, as indicated by the Dominican Teófilo Urdánoz, editor of the lectures, is analyzed: its first part, which covers the first three questions, studies “natural magic” and investigates the nature and scope of magical power and its origins. The second part, which comprises the remainder of the lecture, deals with spiritual causes and constitutes a veritable treatise on demonology. This structure has been accepted and developed by other scholars (See Díaz Jimeno (1987); Frayle Delgado (2006, p. 26) and Valadares (2022, p. 6)).

For our part, we will focus primarily on matters related to knowledge, the devil, and action. Our aim is to address issues such as the existence of magic, whether it has a natural or other cause, its difference from religion and an analysis of its associated elements, the influence of the stars on magical practices, its scope and influence on people, its origin, the connection of those who practice it with the devil, the source of its power, its relationship to miracles, the divinatory capacity it implies, etc.

The subject of magic has not attracted the interest of Vitoria’s scholars to the same extent as other facets of his thought. However, the thematic novelty of this study compared to others addressed by the professor speaks volumes about his intellectual curiosity and originality. To this must be added that there are at least two aspects of the relection that have been practically ignored. On the one hand, its formal aspect, which I believe is quite important because in De magia the Dominican shows great familiarity with ancient authors, biblical passages, and the works of the great Christian philosophers, and even with contemporary authors. Many of these references to the distant past do not always correspond to direct knowledge, but are drawn from works and authors with whom he was very familiar, such as Thomas Aquinas’s De potentia Dei (Aquino, https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/qdp5.html, accessed on 12 January 2026, Aquinas 1953), which is especially present in this relection. In any case, the numerous quotations that appear in the text should not go unnoticed, since, on the one hand, they demonstrate both Vitoria’s erudition and his taste for the classics and the most renowned Christian authors, so characteristic of the period, and, on the other hand, they constitute one of the hermeneutical keys to his work.

Secondly, the moderate interest generated by the relection of De magia has focused on the ideological analysis of its statements, largely neglecting the practical effect that lies at its origin and development. To put it succinctly: as a Dominican, and even more so as an observant member of his order, Vitoria could not have been oblivious to the world of unfounded beliefs, superstition, and the presence of the devil in the world; therefore, we must not forget his aim to go beyond the debate of ideas and also to solve worldly problems.

2. Criteria, Scope, and Limits of Knowledge in De Magia

Vitoria’s analysis initially leans toward casting doubt on the works of magicians and the accounts that attribute all kinds of prodigies to them. He supports this opinion by pointing out the scant support that the most prestigious historians have given to these accounts, which would be unthinkable if they believed in their validity. Nor does any trace remain of their creations in the form of images, statues, or rings that they so often claim to have made. Vitoria uses Horace’s famous expression, “The mountains will go into labor and a mouse will be born” (Horacio 2008, p. 139), to highlight this lack of written support and material evidence that accompanies magic.

However, although many of these works are forgeries and the actions of the magicians to whom they are attributed are feigned, the Dominican friar does not maintain a radical skepticism about the possibilities of magic and, therefore, does not rule out that some of what is said about it may be true. In this sense, the relection consistently displays an ambivalence that extends beyond the scholastic method, which Vitoria, at the beginning of his exposition, indicates he will employ and which, in the debate surrounding the issues, demands the examination of various alternatives. In De magia, the questions raised are rarely resolved with a universal statement that settles them in a single direction; rather, they reveal an almost constant exceptionality: many of the works attributed to magicians are false and fabricated, but not all (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1233); some are fictions of the senses, while others have a real existence (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1237); and so on.

What is the criterion for accepting that exceptions exist to the lack of evidence regarding magic? Vitoria himself refers to biblical testimony at the beginning of the second proposition of the relection: “Not all the works of the Magi are vain and feigned. This is clearly proven by the authority of Sacred Scripture, as seen in the case of Pharaoh’s Magi, who turned their staffs into dragons, and the sorceress who resurrected Samuel” (de Vitoria 1960, pp. 1233–34).

This interpretation is reinforced by the other examples that Vitoria points out, most of them drawn from Saint Thomas Aquinas, as I have said; the Bible; civil and canon law; the Church Fathers; and even from ancient authors (Cicero, Livy, Valerius, etc.), some of whom he has mentioned previously precisely to highlight the lack of information on the matter.

However, it would be more accurate to say that, more than the authority of the biblical text, what truly leads the Dominican to validate magic and the works of the Magi, at least partially, is something prior to that testimony. Vitoria had at his disposal almost from the beginning of his relection an interpretation, endorsed by Saint Augustine (Agustín 1958, p. 1274), that would have spared him problems in accepting magical influence. It would have sufficed for him to admit that the intervention of the Magi did not affect reality, but rather the senses or the imagination, disturbing the knowledge we believe we have of it. In his own words, “that those transformations [attributed to the Magi] were not real, but apparent, carried out through deception or by some means that impressed the imagination of men” (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1235).

Faced with this assumption that completely disqualifies magic, the Dominican friar remains credulous and only acknowledges its influence on perception in some cases, while in others he chooses to concede that the works of magicians have a real existence (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1237). This thesis, the most common in his time, but which also had detractors since classical times, such as Pliny (See Pline (1877, p. 322); Urdánoz (1960, p. 1232, misquoted) and Frayle Delgado (2006, p. 56, misquoted)), and in the Middle Ages, such as Nicholas of Oresme (Grant 2007, p. 177), is supported by other testimonies from Saint Augustine himself and from other saints and Church Fathers, such as Thomas Aquinas, Origen, etc., and from Scripture itself. Some episodes from this narrative, such as that of Pharaoh’s magicians who transformed their staffs into dragons in Exodus (7:12) and that of the necromancer who resurrected Samuel (1 Kings (=1 Samuel), vol. 28, pp. 12–13), are interpreted literally by the Dominican friar to support his position, although he later readily resorts to a “secret disposition of God” to justify the resurrection (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1266).

Magic, therefore, is not the product of deception, or at least not entirely. It is not, in principle, when its works are the product of natural processes. When magical action has this origin, it sheds the lack of rationality attributed to it and becomes, rather, a natural philosophy which, being mastered by a few instructed in its secrets, is subject, during the time of its discovery, to the distrust of an ignorant majority. When its mysteries are revealed, they cease to be magic and become part of an art, in the vocabulary used by Vitoria, which we can equate to our science or technique. The magician would thus be a specialist who, during their investigation, is misunderstood, but upon completion of their work, gains recognition for their contribution and for themselves. From this perspective, the association of great philosophers such as Democritus, Pythagoras, Empedocles, and Plato with magic is justified. Since this magic involves nothing other than the work and research of scholars, even Albertus Magnus, whose reputation as a magician always dogged him (See Resnick and Kitchell (2022, p. 235) and Weisheipl (1980)), despite his efforts to remain within orthodoxy (Athanasios 2015), and who was especially revered by the Observant Dominicans (Collins 2010), is included by Vitoria, who considers him one of “our own” (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1243), among those who followed these practices. It is also worth noting, in this narrow space where magic is mixed with science (See Copenhaver (1984) and Garay (2016)) e, or, to put it another way, the extraordinary in the form of astronomical images with medicines, that Vitoria also mentions Marsilio Ficino (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1241), which, moreover, demonstrates the Dominican’s knowledge of contemporary authors, even if they were not scholastic theologians.

It is curious that the man from Burgos draws a lesson from this association of magic with knowledge, a lesson that champions tolerance and respect for the unknown. However, with the examples of extraordinary phenomena he presents before concluding (stones that ward off wild beasts, herbs that awaken men’s love in the woman who carries them, goats that shoot arrows when they eat certain herbs, herbs that open locks, the saliva of a fasting man that is harmful to snakes, or the spring in Epirus that extinguishes burning torches and relights unlit ones), it is, rather, an argument in favor of credulity: “There is no reason, as we are seeing, to rush to protest and condemn as superstitious a fact that seems to us obscure and admirable” (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1244).

This equation of magic with art or natural philosophy, an option embraced by numerous authors before and after Vitoria (See Walker (2000) and Kors and Peters (2001)), with varying degrees of tolerance toward such practices, is not absolute. It can be considered valid for certain types of knowledge, but Vitoria also acknowledges the existence of discoveries that transcend rational understanding; one might even add, without falling into anachronism, that they surpass a verifiable cause-and-effect relationship. Such are prodigies like the transformation of people into animals, rejuvenation, flying through the air, or divination of the future (de Vitoria 1960, pp. 1230–31).

Magic based solely on natural causes is not incompatible with religion, but it only affects a portion of what is associated with magic. The other portion is that which does not depend entirely on natural causes, that is, that which is due to immaterial causes. Vitoria provides a series of examples (discovery of thefts and treasures, statues that speak or move, the creation of frogs or snakes, etc.) that would confirm its connection with what he defines in various ways: “intellectual being,” “extrinsic and living mover,” “separate and invisible power,” or “separate substance” (de Vitoria 1960, pp. 1245–46).

The magician, reserving the term for those who operate with this force, combines a series of knowledge and performs a series of mysterious and enigmatic activities, difficult to locate and place as belonging to a specific discipline. Vitoria does not doubt the overlap of actions performed by magic or by divine mandate (gratias gratis datas), such as “casting out demons, restraining snakes, giving health, speaking in various languages” (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1254), but he also acknowledges a realm of works where intersection is impossible, such as the spells of magicians and the prophecy that they cannot possess and that is only within the reach of God or his messengers.

Perhaps the important aspect of the magician is that his actions are illegitimate insofar as they are incompatible with God and religion, which explains why theology addresses them for analysis and condemnation (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1255) (See Giralt (2011, p. 61)). According to this idea, the actions undertaken by the magician could be considered as aimed at achieving a miracle that is not attained through a simple “fiat,” as in divine works, but rather requires the collaboration of other elements. Here, rare and extraordinary events would find a place, “outside of what generally occurs, coinciding with a specific position of the stars and through few natural causes, which would not be accomplished by any lesser cause” (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1243). Anyone who possesses this art, whatever their origin, can be called a magician.

What would ultimately characterize the magician—who is not to be confused with the natural philosopher, although not necessarily in a fixed way, but rather according to certain cases ascribed, as we see, to preternatural magic—would be his operation in a realm distinct from both science and religion. His knowledge would differ from the rationality of the scientist, even considering the connotations that such knowledge might have had in Vitoria’s time, and would lack the universal and morally valid claims attributed to the religious message (See Berlaffa Cenzano (2025, p. 5)).

3. Who Induces the Magicians?

By conceding that magicians act under causes beyond their control, Vitoria establishes the link between magicians and the devil, since, as he takes pains to prove, neither God nor angels can be credited with this support. Within Christianity, Saint Augustine was the architect of the construct that links magic and demons (See Sánchez-Oro Rosa (2006)), and much of the Dominican’s discourse can be considered connected to his teachings.

Vitoria validates the existence of demons based on the testimonies of numerous philosophers, but he adds to this supposed consensus of the wise an additional proof: their acceptance by humans living in barbarism, who consider themselves less influenced by philosophical knowledge. Among them are “those discovered some years ago by the Spanish, among whom there is a general belief in the existence of demons, who have frequently appeared to some in those regions” (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1250).

Although we cannot dwell on this, the mention demonstrates that Vitoria was giving credence to numerous testimonies and accounts that came from the New World (See Martinengo (1996, p. 122)). Such messages supported a view of indigenous religiosity, which included both their ancient cults and actions related to the Christianity preached to them, which tended to see the intervention of the devil behind their practices (See Cervantes (1996)).

Aside from this assumption, the allusion both to those who know the most and to those who are presumed to be ignorant or, at least, lack literate knowledge, shows the devil’s capacity to reach any individual. Against this backdrop of accessibility to any person, the first problem that arises regarding this malevolent figure emerges: how is his intervention characterized to distinguish it from that which can be carried out by good spirits? The Dominican friar establishes a difference in the capacity of magicians in relation to these substances: “neither God nor the angels are moved to intervene in the works of men because of an art or science, but rather out of piety or their own goodness or grace” (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1255). That is to say, the magician uses his knowledge to request the intervention of the devil, while in the case of God and the angels, the initiative comes from them and always stems from their virtuous intention (See Prieto (2024, p. 157)).

To explain this requirement, Vitoria seems to repeat the most commonplaces on the subject: magic occurs whenever knowledge is obtained through books or teachers and natural faculties are exceeded, if unknown words unrelated to the desired effects are used, or when effects are imitated through symbols, words, or sacred ceremonies. Furthermore, the magician’s actions are also present if these uses, unrelated to the intended effects, must be performed at certain times and under a specific star configuration.

Magic can also be seen in the use of natural substances such as herbs and plants, unknown to most, but which, thanks to the manifestation of the demon, become the domain of magicians, who from that moment on use them naturally, without the aid of the evil spirit, and can cure or cause illnesses and even perform miracles (de Vitoria 1960, pp. 1256–57, 1288).

In all these cases and similar ones, Vitoria considers that the demon, and not any divine spirit, is behind the magician’s actions. Natural magic, therefore, is not only a form of knowledge that can be rationally justified and requires no supernatural link for its practice, but it can occasionally manifest demonic intervention. This was one of the main themes of demonology at the time: the effects produced by demons (See Clark (1984, p. 353)). In these cases, it not only reveals itself as an instrument of knowledge, but also implies an action condemnable from a religious perspective, which Vitoria will apply strictly: where there is no link between the action and any saint, the Church, or God himself, the only possible explanation is the intervention of demons (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1275).

This does not mean that demons direct humans, as the Dominican takes care to clarify that the opposite can even occur: “Demons can be forced, and sometimes they are, by men” (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1270). However, since the demon has perfect knowledge of nature, of the qualities and efficacy of natural things, which elevates him above human ingenuity and allows him to intervene where human art cannot reach, his interference always appears behind the magicians (de Vitoria 1960, pp. 1287–88).

What we have been describing confirms an epistemology that has more to do with shared belief than with the search for certainty, but which imposes a truth that operates in a similar way: Vitoria describes the world of demons as forming part of a hierarchical universe, in the image and likeness of the one God forms with the angels. The latter has his Church for the salvation of people, just as the former constitutes his diabolical anti-church for worship (See Daxelmüller (1997, p. 96)). Higher demons can make pacts with magicians to intervene in their operations and can use their power in agreement with humans to put lower demons at their service. Action should not be explained nor obey any logic other than the will of the superior and remains always subject to the limit imposed by the order of the universe, which no demon can alter (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1282).

The only asymmetry between the demonic and divine worlds that Vitoria acknowledges is that he affirms the former’s permanent subordination to the latter, without ever explaining why its existence should be tolerated if it only contributes to generating evil. The Dominican thus addresses a problem—that of theodicy—which Christianity has never fully resolved (See Russell (1986, p. 293) and Russell (1995, pp. 222–60)).

4. On References to Vocabulary and Practice

The lecture De Magia is, of those delivered by Vitoria, probably one of those that mentions the greatest number of writers. I have already pointed out that many of these quotations belong to other authors, with Vitoria merely retrieving them from their texts. But, even taking this origin into account, the number of authors alluded to is considerable. We could classify them into three groups: classical authors, the Bible and Christian authors up to the Middle Ages, and contemporary authors.

The diversity of authors and their significant number correspond to the attention that has been paid to magical practices and beliefs throughout history. Before Christianity and from its origins, magic has always been a significant attraction for educated people, just as many less educated people have been drawn to everything surrounding that world. However, from the outset of his relection, Vitoria gives far more credence to biblical texts or those of saints and Church Fathers that affirm, doubt, or presuppose the existence of magic than to pagan authors and even to purely Christian ones, who always occupy a secondary place, serving as reinforcement or confirmation of the former (de Vitoria 1960, pp. 1233–35, 1237).

The same applies to magic that originates from the immaterial. It is Thomas Aquinas who guides him in discussing this and whom he follows in establishing that it comes from an intellectual being (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1244). He then has no qualms about referring to Neoplatonic authors such as “Porphyry, Iamblichus, Plotinus, and others of the same sect,” but the central defense of his arguments has already been established.

Even when it comes to defending the existence of demons, he resorts to the Bible, while disputing the opposing testimony he attributes to Aristotle and his followers, and even to Democritus himself (de Vitoria 1960, pp. 1247–48). Only then does he take a clear stance when it comes to finding sources that might support his thesis. This contrasts with the indecisiveness he demonstrates throughout his relection in drawing on other philosophers, from the Pre-Socratics to Plato and the Platonists, but also some Aristotelians and, albeit through a spurious source, Aristotle’s own De mirabilibus (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1249).

Ultimately, the quotations employed and the order and hierarchy in which they are used constitute an epistemological principle: greater credibility is given to testimonies with a Christian foundation, from the Bible to the saints or the Church Fathers, while the arguments and evidence of pagan authors are used either to reinforce or refute them.

The linear interpretation of biblical and saintly testimonies and the superior weight assigned to them not only diminishes Vitoria’s critical thinking but also leads him to constant changes of opinion regarding phenomena that could only be accepted by appealing to demonic intervention. This is how he addresses witches and the deeds attributed to them: he initially rejects the idea that their journeys and meetings with the devil are fabricated (de Vitoria 1960, pp. 1235–36), only to later acknowledge, in accordance with jurists, the possibility that they are real (de Vitoria 1960, pp. 1238, 1283), and finally accept the existence of a debate between the Franciscan Samuel [de Cassini], who denied such flights and covens, and the Dominican Juan Dodo (See Cavallero (2025, pp. 99–100)), who defended their existence, with whom Vitoria himself aligns, considering that “this is demonstrated and proven by many testimonies and experiences” (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1284). He even deviously dismisses Cardinal Torquemada’s position on the non-existence of these witches’ flights (See Izbicki (2016, p. 36)), stating that the text of the Canon Episcopi he comments on “does not deny that demons can carry women through the air” (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1284), only to conclude, finally, that these witches “believe they have been carried away by the air and that they have seen, done, and experienced things that never existed” (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1288).

These changes of opinion also extend to other facts associated with magicians, such as the effects achieved with images or rings, about which he concludes, after having reproduced several cases of their supposed effect, that “most”, and, therefore, not all, are fables (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1281).

The Dominican’s ideas, thus, appear to be in accordance with his most distinguished predecessors, such as Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas, with the linear interpretation of sacred texts, and with certain testimonies from other authors to whom he grants the greatest credence. However, the credibility he bestows upon them, coupled with his own hesitant attitude, causes him to lose not only his intellectual independence but, more importantly, his capacity to confront the inexplicable from a strictly rational perspective.

Another interesting aspect of the relection is the distinct conception he expresses regarding men and women who engage in magic. Vitoria always speaks of magicians as individuals who wield power based on three elements: knowledge of the natural world, understanding the influence of celestial bodies, and a pact with demons. Each of these domains contributes to actions that reinforce each other and which, although they may occasionally do good, are ultimately aimed at the perversion of others. However, Vitoria consistently distinguishes between the work of magicians, largely conscious and in which they exert a guiding influence, and that of women, themselves victims of operations no less sinful than those of their male counterparts, but in which they seem to be guided rather than act of their own volition. Thus, for example, in the case of witches already discussed, he considers that they act “seduced by illusions and hallucinations of the devil” (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1236), while granting autonomy, even to the point of dominating some demons, to magicians (de Vitoria 1960, pp. 1270–74).

This is just one aspect of the inferior power that Vitoria attributes to women compared to men in relation to magic. In fact, the very way he refers to them, similar to Torquemada in more than one instance (See Izbicki (2016)), reveals a severity he does not employ with sorceresses: perverse women (mulieres sceleratae) (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1236), women who use herbs to incite men’s love (quam si mulier portaverit, homines ad sui amorem pelliciet) (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1244), loose women (mulierculae) (de Vitoria 1960, pp. 1254, 1270, 1281, 1283), or foolish women (foeminae stultae) (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1276).

Another aspect to consider in the relection De magia is that Vitoria, as a man of the Church and as an observant Dominican advocating the purest form of religion, is guided not only by a theoretical zeal but also a practical one: the aim of eliminating from popular beliefs any impurity, any superstition, that might threaten or hinder religious practice (See Díaz Jimeno (1991)). Herein lies his rejection of superstitions, where he perceived the intervention of the devil (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1276), but also of certain customs that were spreading in his time and which he considered inappropriate: “I do not consider the custom that has corrupted modern men of waiting for and asking for help in their needs from the souls in purgatory to be very firm and religious” (de Vitoria 1960, p. 1262).

The relections, moreover, not only convey ideas on the matters that constitute their raison d’être, but also reveal, sometimes in small details and other times more broadly, the ideology of the one who wrote them. A text like De magia is no exception and, among other aspects relating to its author, reveals one that has gone unnoticed and that I find quite interesting. In the final part of the re-lection, Vitoria is discussing whether demons have the capacity to cure all kinds of diseases and, therefore, to “extend life to a thousand years,” which is what the Dominican friar believes Adam and some others lived. His answer is negative, but what is interesting is the reason he rejects such a possibility:

“The reason is that, due to the disorder and ignorance of humankind, nature is corrupted and diseased, and natural elements are no longer sufficient to restore it to its original robustness; and even food, due to human negligence, lacks its original vigor. The principal cause is perhaps celestial influence, for Divine Providence ordained that in those early times the natural celestial constellations should be healthier and more effective in prolonging human life, and that food, medicine, air, water, and everything that serves to preserve life should have greater energy”.

(de Vitoria 1960, pp. 1290–91)

Although Maravall was convincing in his analysis of the idea of progress in Vitoria’s time, and even explicitly mentions him as a representative of Scholasticism who contributed to paving the way for the new realities of the era, especially in the political and economic spheres, the Dominican friar reveals himself, through the cited paragraph, as an author whose premises are opposed to the idea of progress and the pride in the achievements of his time that the historian sought to highlight (See Maravall (1986, pp. 290, 514, 523)). On the contrary, not only is human apathy present in his discourse, incapable of producing food like that which may have existed in distant times, but nature itself, a victim of human flaws and incapacity, is shown to be unable to provide products and fruits like those enjoyed by its inhabitants in earlier times. What appears in Vitoria’s text is an acknowledgment of the superiority of ancient times over the present, in which current humans are incapable of achieving not only what their ancestors did, but also what God ordained in that Golden Age so that they might live longer.

5. Conclusions

The analysis of knowledge derived from the relection De magia distinguishes between science, magic, and religion. The first is the result of research based on natural causes. The mystery and solitude surrounding the scientist in the pursuit of their goals constitute a context of discovery that is misunderstood by most people. This gives rise to rumors and legends about their connection to magic, which may or may not be true. However, what is important here is not so much the intention that guides them, but rather that the resources employed depend on nature and are available to everyone, and therefore do not imply any reprehensible action.

The intervention of magic completely alters the above. Vitoria accepts its existence as valid, although he is aware of the doubts that it has generated throughout history and the difficulty of believing in its products. His tempered skepticism is not enough to dismiss the existence of magicians, whom he characterizes as those who use immaterial causes for their ends. Even when resorting to material causes, the magician may be guided by demons, who reveal these causes to him and grant him knowledge that would otherwise be beyond his reach. Vitoria also associates the magician with knowledge of the most opportune moments and positions for using the stars, whatever their effects may be.

The magician’s actions are, thus, linked to those of the demons, who constitute a world parallel to the divine, but with antithetical objectives. Although religion suffers the effects of their interventions, God permits their existence to test humanity. Based on these premises, Vitoria develops a demonology in which all the commonplaces on the subject are brought to light.

Finally, De magia not only focuses on the knowledge of magicians and witches, whom Vitoria does not consider equal, and demons and their effects but also presents a methodology in which the testimonies from the Bible are interpreted literally. These texts, along with those of the saints and the Church Fathers, are given greater credibility than those of philosophers or contemporary authors. Vitoria, from this perspective, which can be considered common among those of his station, prioritizes knowledge not so much on reason as on belief linked to sacred texts.