The “Tripitaka Diplomacy” in the East Asian World During the 10th–12th Centuries

Abstract

During the 10th to 12th centuries, the Song, Liao, and Goryeo Dynasties and Japanese regimes in East Asia engaged in frequent activities of requesting and granting the Chinese Tripitaka (the Chinese Buddhist Canon), forming a distinctive diplomatic phenomenon termed “Tripitaka Diplomacy”. This paper examines the political and cultural dynamics underlying these cross-border interactions by analyzing the historical records of such activities among the polities. It also explores the multifaceted role of the Tripitaka in East Asian international relations, which transcended its religious significance to shape diplomatic strategies and power dynamics. Through this lens, this paper reveals the complexity of the East Asian international order during this period, emphasizing how the circulation of the Tripitaka served as both a cultural bridge and a tool for political negotiation.

1. Introduction

The relationship between Buddhism and politics has been a subject of ongoing discussion in academia. For example, some scholars have noted the connections between Buddhist doctrine, politics, and international relations (e.g., Moore 2016; Shimizu and Noro 2020; Shimizu 2021). In addition, scholars have discussed the concept of “Buddhist Diplomacy” in ancient East Asia. These studies argue that Buddhism not only held special significance in cultural transmission but also played a unique role in the realms of politics and diplomacy (e.g., Borgen 1982; Han 1999; Zhang 2012; Teshima 2014; Wei 2021; Zhao and Chen 2022). In this paper, we define “Buddhist Diplomacy” as a model of diplomacy employed among polities sharing a common Buddhist faith in ancient East Asia. This manifested in various ways, including Buddhist monks serving as official envoys traveling between states, Buddhist institutions serving the needs of state diplomacy, Buddhist scriptures or artifacts acting as mediums for states to shape the global order through tributes or gifts, and Buddhist temples being assigned specific diplomatic functions, among others. “Tripitaka Diplomacy”, in turn, represents a concrete form of “Buddhist Diplomacy”.

For a long time, research on the role of the Chinese Tripitaka in relations among the East Asian countries has primarily focused on its function in cultural transmission (Zhang 2009; Cui and Li 2013; Ying 2024). However, several studies have also begun to uncover the hidden political strategies and power dynamics embedded within exchanges of the Tripitaka (Ku 1992; Kamikawa 1999; Park 2015; Wu and Dziwenka 2015). Significantly, Kida (2017) and Zhao (2017) explicitly employed the concept of “Tripitaka Diplomacy” in their research, though neither provided a clear definition of its connotation. Kida (2017) investigated the historical process of Japan requesting and the Qing Dynasty granting the Qianlong Tripitaka. Zhao (2017), by analyzing the historical records of Japan and Korea requesting and granting the Tripitaka during the early Ming Dynasty, explored the role, significance, and patterns of Japan’s foreign policy regarding the “Tripitaka Diplomacy” in East Asian international relations during the early Ming period. Subsequently, in another paper, Zhao (2023) discussed “Tripitaka Diplomacy” between Song and Japan. He defined the “Tripitaka Diplomacy” between the Song Dynasty and Japan as a diplomatic activity wherein the Song Dynasty “utilized the granting or gifting of the Tripitaka, conducted through Japanese monks carrying formal diplomatic letters or by dispatching Song merchants as envoys with state letters, to improve bilateral relations” (Zhao 2023, p. 56).

We argue that the “Tripitaka Diplomacy” refers to a distinctive diplomatic practice conducted among nations. This practice, built upon the shared foundations of the Sinosphere 漢字文化圈 and the Buddhist faith sphere 佛教信仰圈, refers to the activities of requesting and granting the Chinese Tripitaka in the East Asian world. It represents the politicized application of Buddhist culture, distinct from hard-power diplomacy characterized by military deterrence or economic incentives. This phenomenon underscores the unique role that specific cultural symbols (such as the Tripitaka) play in constructing and maintaining international relations.

In China, during the 10th to 12th centuries, alongside the decline of the Central Plains (zhongyuan 中原) dynasties’ influence and the rise of northern nomadic regimes, the tributary system of China (chaogong tixi 朝貢體系), which had long sustained the international order among the East Asian states, underwent significant changes (See Figure 1). The fundamental principle of the tributary system was the suzerain–vassal relationship underpinned by the Hua-Yi ideology (hua-yi guannian 華夷觀念). This suzerain–vassal relationship meant that the succession of a vassal state’s king required formal investiture by the suzerain state to gain legitimacy, while the vassal state was obliged to pledge allegiance and offer regular tribute to the suzerain (Song 2007, pp. 1–6). This relationship in ancient East Asia evolved dynamically: Whenever a unified regime emerged in the Central Plains, surrounding states would flock to pay tribute, forming an extensive suzerain–vassal system centered on China. Conversely, when the dynasties in the Central Plains declined, vassal states closely aligned with China would establish new suzerain–vassal relationships with the nearest and most powerful regional or neighboring regimes (Song 2007, p. 10). The Hua-Yi ideology served not only as China’s principle for handling foreign relations but was also adopted by neighboring states (such as Korea, Japan, and Vietnam) in constructing their own miniature all-under-heaven (tianxia 天下) worldview (Huang 2014, p. 9). Prior to the 10th century, East Asia had established a tributary system and suzerain–vassal relationships centered on dynasties in the Central Plains such as the Han and Tang. Following the establishment of the Song Dynasty, nomadic regimes such as the Khitan, Jurchen, and Mongols rose successively and confronted the dynasties in the Central Plains. Consequently, the tributary system centered on the Central Plains gradually waned, and distinct suzerain–vassal relationships developed among the various contending regimes.

The request for and bestowal of the Chinese Tripitaka held particular significance in the claims to suzerainty by various regimes. Consequently, the “Tripitaka Diplomacy” played a unique role in constructing the international order of East Asia. As we have discussed above, while some studies have mentioned the “Tripitaka Diplomacy” between the Song Dynasty and Japan, they have largely neglected regimes like the Liao and Goryeo, and thus have failed to incorporate them into the discussion, overlooking the “Tripitaka Diplomacy” in Song–Goryeo and Liao–Goryeo relations. Therefore, this paper seeks to systematically analyze historical interactions related to the Tripitaka across three key bilateral relationships—Song–Japan, Song–Goryeo, and Liao–Goryeo—to address three interconnected questions. First, why did the Tripitaka emerge as a privileged medium of diplomacy? Second, how did these states tactically utilize the Tripitaka to advance their political agendas? Third, in what ways did such diplomatic practices reveal the complexities of the East Asian international order? To this day, Buddhism continues to play a significant role in advancing civilizational dialogue. Various events, including the “China-Japan-Korea Buddhist Friendship Exchange Conference” (ni chū kan bukkyō yūkō kōryū kaigi 日中韓仏教友好交流会議) and the “World Buddhist Forum” (shijie fojiao luntan 世界佛教論壇), have made substantial contributions to this endeavor. This ongoing engagement prompts us to further reflect on the contemporary significance of the “Buddhist Diplomacy”.

2. Requesting and Granting the Tripitaka Between the Song Dynasty and Japan

The Japanese pursuit of Chinese Buddhist scriptures dates back to the Nara 奈良 period (710–794), during which the Japanese court continuously imported Chinese Buddhist texts through diplomatic envoys (known as kentōshi 遣唐使) to Tang China. In 736, Genbō 玄昉 (?–746), the fourth patriarch of the Japanese Hossō sect (Hossō shū 法相宗), returned from China to Japan with over 5000 scrolls of handwritten Buddhist scriptures, marking Japan’s earliest recorded acquisition of the Tripitaka (Kokan 1901, vol. 16, p. 900; Wu 1998, p. 583). By the late 10th century, these efforts had evolved into a structured pattern of diplomatic requests and grants between Japan and Song China.

In 983, the Kaibao Canon 開寶藏, known as the first woodblock-printed collection of Buddhist texts in the history of Chinese Buddhism, was printed in Sichuan. In the eighth month of the same year, the Japanese monk Chōnen 奝然 (938–1016) and his disciples, permitted by the Japanese imperial court, traveled to Song China aboard a merchant ship. During their stay, they twice met Emperor Taizong of Song 宋太宗 (r. 976–997), presenting tribute and giving the emperor several books, including the Genealogy of the Japanese Imperial Family (Ōnendai-ki 王年代紀) and a copy of the Taihō Codes (Shikiin-ryō 職員令). In return, Emperor Taizong granted him a purple robe (ziyi 紫衣) and the honorific title Master Dharma Aid (Faji Dashi 法濟大師). It is worth noting that the emperor also granted Chōnen a complete set of the printed Kaibao Canon alongside 41 volumes of newly translated scriptures (Toqto’a 2013, vol. 491, p. 14135).

When Chōnen returned to Japan, the Japanese court mobilized 300 laborers to transport the Tripitaka, a statue of Standing Śākyamuni, and other artifacts to Kyoto, where a solemn and grand ceremony welcomed these treasures (Takeuchi 1968, p. 176; Mangen 1913, vol. 67, p. 365). The scriptures were initially enshrined at Seika Temple (Seika-ji 棲霞寺), which was closely tied to the imperial family, indicating the imperial household’s involvement in the acquisition. Later, Chōnen’s disciples presented the Tripitaka to Fujiwara no Michinaga 藤原道長 (966–1028), the head of the Council of State (daijō daijin 太政大臣), who ultimately enshrined it in Hōjō Temple (Hōjō-ji 法成寺), constructed under his patronage (Fujiwara no Michinaga 1926, vol. 2, p. 223). Michinaga was a central political figure in mid-Heian-period Japan and the quintessential representative of the “Sekkan politics” at its zenith. The term “Sekkan politics” (sekkan seiji 摂関政治) refers to a political system in which the Fujiwara clan, as maternal relatives of the emperors, monopolized state affairs by holding the positions of Sesshō 攝政 (regent) and Kanpaku 関白 (chief advisor), effectively reducing the emperor to a nominal ruler. This system reached its peak from the late 9th to the late 11th century.

Following Chōnen, the next Japanese monk traveling to Song China to request the Tripitaka was his disciple Kain 嘉因 (dates unknown). Kain had accompanied Chōnen to Song China in 983. According to an official document issued by the Grand Council of State (daijōkanpu 太政官符) dated February 8, 988, Kain’s second mission to Song China was initiated at Chōnen’s formal request and served two purposes. The first was to fulfill Chōnen’s unfinished pilgrimage of offering material tributes to Mañjuśrī at Mount Wutai (Wutai shan 五臺山). The second objective was to request newly translated Buddhist scriptures during the two years following Chōnen’s return. The quest for these texts carried explicit political undertones—invoking divine blessings for the Japanese emperor’s longevity and Japan’s prosperity (Takeuchi 1998, vol. 9, pp. 3487–88). The Japanese imperial court ultimately approved the petition. In 988, Kain returned to Song China, where he was granted an audience with Emperor Taizong of Song and formally requested the newly translated scriptures. However, historical records remain silent on the outcome of Kain’s appeal to Emperor Taizong (Toqto’a 2013, vol. 491, pp. 14135–36).

Another monk, Jakushō 寂照 (962–1034), who arrived in Song China in 1004, was also commissioned by the regent house (Sekkan-ke 摂関家) to request the Buddhist Canon during his stay. Initially, the Japanese imperial court denied Jakushō’s petition to undertake a pilgrimage to Mount Wutai until 1003, when he received permission to depart (Kōen 1965, vol. 27, p. 264). During that time, Jakushō maintained close ties with Fujiwara no Michinaga, the de facto ruler of Japan. In 1013, when Jakushō’s disciple Nenkyū 念救 (dates unknown) returned to Song China to visit him, Michinaga seized the opportunity to entrust Nenkyū with 100 tael of placer gold to deliver to Jakushō for purchasing Buddhist texts (Fujiwara no Michinaga 1926, vol. 2, p. 115). This hints that Jakushō’s mission to Song China was backed by the regent house, whose demand for Buddhist texts likely served as a key impetus for his journey.

In March 1072, the Japanese monk Jōjin 成尋 (1011–1081), accompanied by his disciples, defied maritime rule (tokaisei 渡海制) and surreptitiously entered Song China aboard a merchant ship. Upon reaching Kaifeng 開封, Jōjin was granted an audience with Emperor Shenzong of Song 宋神宗 (r. 1067–1085), to whom he presented tribute (Toqto’a 2013, vol. 491, p. 14137). Emperor Shenzong not only granted him a purple robe, silk fabrics, and other gifts but also, upon learning of Jōjin’s request for newly translated Buddhist scriptures, issued an edict ordering the Xiansheng Temple (Xiansheng-si 顯聖寺) to print the texts for him. In addition to these gifts, the emperor also instructed the Chuanfa Temple (Chuanfa-yuan 傳法院) to cover the printing expenses (Jōjin 2009, vol. 8, pp. 628–29).

The cases examined above demonstrate that Japan consistently dispatched monks closely associated with the imperial family to Song China. This model of monk-envoys acting as imperial diplomats carried a dual implication. Firstly, it constituted the construction of an independent diplomatic identity. Japan consistently refrained from submitting formal diplomatic letters (kokusho 国書) to Song, signaling its refusal to recognize Song’s suzerainty and the tributary relationship between Japan and Song. Secondly, it represented a form of cultural appropriation. By adopting the identity of a Buddhist, they sought to circumvent political submission while simultaneously acquiring internal and external Buddhist scriptures, including the Tripitaka, thereby appropriating the advanced culture of the Song Dynasty. In the mid- to late 12th century, the warrior families (buke 武家) of the Taira 平 and Minamoto 源 clans directly intervened in the central power struggle through civil conflict. Ultimately, Minamoto no Yoritomo 源頼朝 (1147–1199) established the Kamakura shogunate (kamakura bakufu 鎌倉幕府), ushering in Japan’s medieval period characterized by the dual polity, a system of shared governance between the imperial court (represented by the emperor) and the warrior class centered on the shogunate. Though the warrior regimes emphasized developing trade relations with the Song Dynasty, there is no evidence indicating their direct participation in the “Tripitaka Diplomacy” during the 12th century.

The court of the Northern Song (960–1127) treated these monks as de facto envoys. Despite lacking formal diplomatic letters from the Japanese side, the Song court granted them imperial audiences and extended ceremonial protocols comparable to those accorded to envoys from neighboring tributary states—a policy even applied to the unauthorized monk Jōjin (Wei 2021, p. 144). This revealed Song’s pragmatic adaptation to a shifting geopolitical landscape.

Guided by traditional Hua-Yi 華夷 thought, Song initially sought to construct a universal order centered on “Harmony Between Hua and Yi” (hua-yi yitong 華夷一統) on its self-proclaimed status as the “Heavenly Kingdom” (tianchao shangguo 天朝上國) and the “Orthodox Chinese Civilization” (zhonghua zhengtong 中華正統). However, repeated military defeats against northern nomadic regimes ultimately shattered this vision. The glorious Tang-era spectacle of “all under heaven” competing to send tribute envoys had long faded. The Liao Dynasty (907–1125), established by the Khitans, erected a rival tributary system through military dominance, while Song’s political influence over peripheral states waned (Huang 2014, pp. 109–10). Song emperors were compelled to compromise, adopting flexible diplomatic strategies. They strategically treated prominent Japanese monks visiting Song China—often with official backing—as de facto tributary envoys, using them to forge indirect ties with the Japanese court. For instance, when Jōjin’s disciple Raien 賴緣 (dates unknown) prepared to return to Japan, Emperor Shenzong summoned him, granting a purple robe and commissioning him to deliver a gold-scripted Lotus Sūtra, approximately 190 m of brocade, and an imperially authored credential (yubi wenshu 御筆文書) addressed to the Japanese court (Jōjin 2009, vol. 8, p. 727). Such gestures towards Japanese monks, through granting the Buddhist scriptures, purple robes, and honorific titles, transcended mere “conciliatory policy to distant people” (huairou yuanren 懷柔遠人). It carried potent political symbolism, such as positioning the Song emperor as a supra-political religious sovereign to assert dominance in East Asia’s Buddhist world. Moreover, by considering those monks as tributary envoys and symbolically integrating Japan into a Sino-centric tributary system, Song reconstructed the idealized universal order during that period.

Japan’s response to the Song Dynasty’s positive diplomacy was marked by cautious ambivalence—a “prudent collaboration” that balanced cultural allure with political wariness. On the one hand, Song’s cultural prestige, particularly the appeal of the Tripitaka, remained irresistible to Japan’s elite. The Buddhist-oriented imperial court relied on the Tripitaka for doctrinal renewal and rituals for defending the state, making engagement with Song necessary. Yet, to preserve its political autonomy, Japan adopted an indirect approach: dispatching monks, ostensibly on spiritual missions, to negotiate with the Song court while avoiding formal diplomatic subordination. On the other hand, by the mid-11th century, Japan had grown increasingly alert to Song’s political designs. The Song court’s bestowal of purple robes and its use of monks as couriers for state letters and gifts were interpreted as attempts to recast Japan as a tributary vassal. In response, Japanese authorities gradually tightened restrictions on monastic travel to Song China, shifting from enthusiastic support to reluctant approval and finally to outright prohibition (Teshima 2014, p. 75). This evolving policy—evident in the changing treatment of monks like Chōnen, Jōchō, and Jōjin—reflected Japan’s dual strategy: selectively assimilating Song’s cultural capital while vigilantly safeguarding political independence by maintaining a deliberate detachment from the Hua-Yi order (hua-yi zhixu 華夷秩序).

3. Requesting and Granting the Tripitaka Between the Song and Goryeo Dynasties

3.1. Goryeo’s Tripitaka-Requesting Activities Under the Song–Goryeo Suzerain–Vassal Relationship

In 918, Wang Kon 王建 왕건 (r. 918–943), also known as King Taejo of Goryeo 高麗太祖, established the Goryeo Dynasty on the Korean Peninsula. From its founding, Goryeo adopted a policy of Buddhism as the state-protecting religion, positioning Buddhism at the core of its political and cultural life. In 928, Wang Kon personally received the Buddhist Canon brought back by monks from the Later Tang Dynasty 後唐 (923–937) and enshrined it at the Jeseokwon Temple 帝釋院 제석원 (Chong 2014, vol. 1, pp. 30–31). As a royal monastery of exceptional prestige, Jeseokwon became a frequent destination for successive Goryeo kings, who visited to conduct prayers or attend sermons. Thus, this act by Taejo not only reflected his devotion to Buddhism but also established a royal precedent for enshrining the Buddhist Canon, laying the groundwork for subsequent transnational exchanges centered on the Tripitaka.

During the first three decades of the Song Dynasty (963–994), Song and Goryeo established a relatively stable suzerain–vassal relationship, marked by continuous diplomatic missions. Yang (1997, pp. 246–50) indicates that Goryeo dispatched tribute missions to the Song Dynasty 22 times, with 5 records of reciprocal bestowals from Song to Goryeo. Their interactions regarding the Tripitaka between the two states began during Emperor Taizong’s reign (r. 976–997). According to The History of Song (Song Shi 宋史), before King Seongjong of Goryeo 高麗成宗 (Wang Ch’i 王治 왕치, r. 981–997) dispatched official envoys in December 989, the monk Yeoga 如可 여가 (dates unknown) had already been sent by Wang Ch’i to present a memorial requesting the Tripitaka. Emperor Taizong granted Yeoga the Tripitaka and the purple robe and then instructed him to return with the envoy delegation dispatched in 989 (Toqto’a 2013, vol. 487, pp. 14039–40).

In December 990, Goryeo dispatched Han Eongong 韓彥恭 한언공 (939–1004), a Vice Minister of the Military in Goryeo (byeonggwan sirang 兵官侍郎), to the Song Dynasty to request another copy of the Tripitaka (Toqto’a 2013, vol. 487, p. 14040; Chong 2014, vol. 3, p. 74). Emperor Taizong of Song not only granted the King of Goryeo’s request but also conferred upon Han the honorific titles of the Grand Master of the Palace with Golden Seal and Purple Ribbon (jinzi guanglu dafu 金紫光祿大夫), the Acting Minister of Military Affairs (jianjiao bingbu shangshu 檢校兵部尚書), and Censor-in-Chief (yushi dafu 御史大夫 (Chong 2014, vol. 93, p. 2898). In April of the following year (991), Han returned to Goryeo and presented the Tripitaka to King Seongjong, who “welcomed it into the inner palace, summoned monks to chant its texts, and issued an edict of amnesty” (Chong 2014, vol. 3, p. 74). Later, in October 991, King Seongjong dispatched an imperial scholar (hallim haksa 翰林學士), Baek Sayu 白思柔 백사유 (dates unknown), to Song to express gratitude for granting the Tripitaka (Chong 2014, vol. 3, p. 75).

Emperor Taizong’s consistent support for Goryeo’s requests for the Tripitaka stemmed from dual motivations: the need to construct a political narrative of “ten thousand nations coming to pay tribute” (wan guo lai chao 萬國來朝) and the strategic imperative of “allying with Goryeo to counter the Liao” (lian li zhi liao 聯麗制遼). Before the Yongxi Northern Expedition (yongxi beifa 雍熙北伐) in 986, the Song–Goryeo suzerain–vassal relationship remained relatively stable. However, after the expedition’s failure, Song’s political influence in East Asia waned, thus making a shift from offensive to defensive strategies against the Liao inevitable. As Goryeo gradually distanced itself from Song, the suzerain–vassal relationship weakened. Consequently, Song sought to culturally appease Goryeo through activities like granting the Tripitaka, striving to uphold the diplomatic prestige of the “Heavenly Kingdom,” and maintaining the suzerain–vassal framework. This also aligned with Song’s repeated conferral of titles upon King Seongjong of Goryeo before and after the Northern Expedition.

3.2. The “Tripitaka Diplomacy” Between Song and Goryeo Under the Military Pressure of Liao

In 993, the Liao Dynasty launched its first invasion of Goryeo, profoundly affecting Song–Goryeo relations. Under mounting military pressure from Liao, Goryeo severed the suzerain–vassal relationship with Song and adopted Liao’s era name. However, Goryeo did not completely cut ties with Song. While superficially submitting to Liao, it dispatched envoys to Song on multiple occasions and resumed using Song’s era name in 1016—a reflection of Goryeo’s complex strategic posture amid the rivalry of great powers between Song and Liao.

In 1019, Goryeo sent Choe Wonsin 崔元信 최원신 (dates unknown) to the Song court to present tribute and request the Tripitaka. Emperor Zhenzong of Song 宋真宗 (r. 997–1022) granted the request, bestowing upon Choe ceremonial robes, silks, and other gifts, while returning the tribute items (Toqto’a 2013, vol. 487, p. 14044).

According to the stele inscription from the Great Temple of Compassionate Grace and Mysterious Transformation (daesaeun hyeonhwasa 大慈恩玄化寺) in Goryeo, King Hyeonjong of Goryeo 高麗顯宗 (Wang Sun 王詢, r. 1009–1031) relocated the tomb of his predecessor, King Seongjong, near the capital to fulfill his filial duties. He also established the temple nearby and specifically dispatched envoys to Song to formally request the Tripitaka. To commend the king’s filial piety, Emperor Zhenzong issued an edict of praise and gifted a printed copy of the entirety of the Tripitaka, again returning the tribute (Liu 1982, vol. 8, pp. 9–10). Zhang (2009) has suggested that this request occurred between 1020 and 1021 (Zhang 2009, pp. 37–38).

In 1020, Goryeo sent envoys to Liao, “requesting to resume their status as a vassal and resume tribute as before” (Chong 2014, vol. 4, p. 113). In June of the following year (1021), King Hyeonjong dispatched envoys to Song, announcing the restoration of amicable relations with Liao and requesting texts (Toqto’a 2013, vol. 487, p. 14044). Emperor Zhenzong not only granted them texts such as Sagacious Benevolence Formulary (Sheng Hui Fang 聖惠方), Treatise on Yin-Yang Geomancy (Yinyang Er Zhai Shu 陰陽二宅書), and the Qianxing Calendar (Qianxing Li 乾興曆), but also specially granted an entirety of the Tripitaka (Chong 2014, vol. 4, p. 118). This act, we argue, constituted a diplomatic maneuver by Song to court Goryeo’s allegiance after learning of Goryeo’s reconciliation with Liao.

Even after becoming a tributary state to Liao, Goryeo continued to send envoys to Song, driven by its inability to sever political, economic, and cultural ties with Song, particularly its indispensable need for texts such as the Tripitaka from Song. Around the Third Goryeo–Khitan War 第三次高麗契丹戰爭 (1018–1019), the frequency of Goryeo’s tribute envoys to Song increased, likely reflecting attempts to counterbalance Liao’s pressure through closer ties with Song. These actions underscore Goryeo’s pragmatic diplomatic principles.

For Song, establishing and maintaining a suzerain–vassal relationship with Goryeo remained a persistent pursuit. However, following the failure of its military strategy of “allying with Goryeo to counter the Liao”, Song could do little to contest Goryeo’s nominal submission to Liao. Emperor Zhenzong’s actions—returning Goryeo’s tribute goods and granting gifts such as garments and books—represented an attempt to maintain the suzerain–vassal tie through a pattern of material exchange characterized by the “generous reciprocity” (hou wang bo lai 厚往薄來) principle. This approach served the dual purposes of preserving Song’s perceived superior status and sustaining its connection with Goryeo, thereby preventing Goryeo from fully aligning itself with the Liao Dynasty.

During the reign of King Hyeonjong of Goryeo (1009–1031), the carving of the Tripitaka Koreana 高麗藏 was initiated on the Korean Peninsula. Around the end of Hyeonjong’s reign, Goryeo completed the carving of the main part of the Tripitaka Koreana, reducing its reliance on Song editions of the Tripitaka. As a consequence, under escalating military pressure from Liao, formal diplomatic exchanges between Song and Goryeo ceased for four decades (1031–1071) (Yang 1997, pp. 152–53), leading to a prolonged suspension of requesting and granting the Tripitaka. This phenomenon reveals the dialectical relationship between “cultural autonomy” and “political alignment”. By carving the Tripitaka, Goryeo asserted its cultural equality with both Song and Liao (Wu and Dziwenka 2015, p. 257), reflecting a heightened consciousness of cultural autonomy. Meanwhile, as its cultural dependence on the Song Dynasty diminished, Goryeo prompted a shift toward a more flexible dual-track diplomacy between Song and Liao.

3.3. The Strategic Adjustments and “Tripitaka Diplomacy” During Emperor Shenzong’s Reign

In the late 11th century, during the reign of Emperor Shenzong of Song, the geopolitical landscape of East Asia shifted. Relations between Song and the Western Xia 西夏 (1038–1227) gradually stabilized, while Liao’s influence over neighboring states waned due to internal strife. In this context, Emperor Shenzong actively sought to revive ties with Goryeo, reintroducing the strategy of “allying with Goryeo to counter the Liao”.

In 1068, Song took the initiative to dispatch envoys to Goryeo to discuss re-establishing official diplomatic relations (Chong 2014, vol. 8, p. 235). Goryeo promptly reciprocated and, in 1071, dispatched a delegation of over 100 envoys to Song to present tribute and memorial. Emperor Shenzong received the envoys lavishly and entrusted them with five formal diplomatic letters (guoshu 國書) for return (Chong 2014, vol. 9, p. 242).

In March 1083, King Munjong of Goryeo 高麗文宗 (Wang Hui 王徽, r. 1046–1083) ordered the crown prince to welcome the Tripitaka from the Song Dynasty and enshrined it at the Nation-Founding Temple (gaeguksa 開國寺), where a Bodhimaṇḍa (daochang 道場) was established. On March 26, Munjong personally visited the Gaeguk Temple (Chong 2014, vol. 9, p. 267). Initially built by Wang Kon in 935, the Gaeguk Temple had maintained close ties with the Goryeo royal family since its founding. Goryeo’s acquisition of the Tripitaka and the accompanying establishment of the doryang may have been linked to Munjong’s declining health. Plagued by illness in his later years, Munjong had petitioned the Song court for medical officers and herbs as early as 1078 (Chong 2014, vol. 9, pp. 256–57). In the following year, Emperor Shenzong dispatched 88 physicians to treat him (Chong 2014, vol. 9, pp. 258–59; Toqto’a 2013, vol. 487, p. 14047). The acquisition of the Tripitaka was likely aimed at dispelling misfortune, absolving obstacles, and safeguarding the monarch through devotional rites. However, Munjong passed away four months later.

On 5 March 1085, Emperor Shenzong of Song died, and Emperor Zhezong 宋哲宗 (r. 1085–1100) ascended the throne. Song’s policy toward Goryeo shifted during this period: throughout Zhezong’s reign, Song ceased sending envoys to Goryeo, reflecting a strategy of receiving but not reciprocating envoys (zhi wang bu lai 只往不來). This policy was also tied to internal political strife, as the dominant conservative faction opposed proactive diplomacy with Goryeo (I 2024, p. 115). Nevertheless, Goryeo continued to send frequent tribute envoys to Song, seeking to sustain friendly relations. Emperor Zhezong adhered to the “generous reciprocity” principle in treating Goryeo envoys to consolidate bilateral ties (I 2024, p. 113). The granting of the Tripitaka to Goryeo precisely exemplified this approach.

In April 1085, Prince Uicheon 義天 의천 (1055–1101) of Goryeo traveled to Song China to seek Buddhist teachings. Uicheon had repeatedly requested permission from the Goryeo royal court to journey to Song, and although King Seonjong of Goryeo 高麗宣宗 (Wang Un 王運, r. 1083–1094) was inclined to grant it, consistent opposition from his ministers prevented it from approval. Consequently, Uicheon secretly traveled to Song (Chong 2014, vol. 90, p. 2827). Lee suggests that Uicheon’s eventual journey to Song was facilitated by covert support from the Song court (Lee 1992, pp. 104–7). This has led to speculation that his visit represented a continuation of the Northern Song’s policy of “allying with Goryeo to counter the Liao”. When the Song court learned of Uicheon’s arrival, they attached great importance to it, specially arranging welcoming ceremonies and dispatching officials to greet him upon his entry into the capital, Kaifeng. Emperor Zhezong received Uicheon in audience twice in Kaifeng, demonstrating the exceptionally high level of courtesy extended to him (Li 1990, vol. 358, p. 8569; vol. 369, p. 8911). Upon his return to Goryeo, Uicheon brought back a large quantity of Buddhist texts from Song. He later procured additional texts from both Liao and Song, ultimately compiling and publishing the Goryeo Supplement to the Tripitaka (Goryeo Sokjanggyeong 高麗續藏經) at the Temple of Royal Prosperity (heungwangsa 興王寺). Although Uicheon did not formally request the complete Tripitaka during his stay in Song, the Song court’s support enabled him to obtain and bring back a vast collection of scriptures, which were then engraved to create the Supplement to the Tripitaka. This event can also be seen as a reflection of Emperor Zhezong’s intentions to enhance bilateral relations between the two states.

In August 1085, the same year when Uicheon traveled to Song China, Goryeo dispatched Kim Sanggi 金上琦 김상기 (1031–?), Minister of the Board of Revenue (ho-bu sang-seo 戶部尚書), to offer condolences, and Im Gae 林槩 임개 (?–1107), Minister of the Board of Works (gong-bu sang-seo 工部尚書), to congratulate the new emperor (Toqto’a 2013, vol. 487, p. 14048; Chong 2014, vol. 10, p. 275). In December, Goryeo envoys petitioned to purchase the entirety of the Tripitaka and a copy of the Buddhāvataṃsaka Sūtra 華嚴經, which was permitted. They further requested legal texts, but this was denied (Li 1990, vol. 358, p. 8671). Emperor Zhezong’s approval of the Tripitaka purchase rewarded Goryeo’s “serving the greater” (sadae 事大) gestures of condolence and congratulation while maintaining amity. The denial of legal texts, however, was perhaps because of security concerns to prevent Goryeo from acquiring knowledge, potentially threatening Song’s sovereignty and regional dominance. We suggest that this contrast highlights how the Tripitaka, as a religious text, was deemed a safer instrument of diplomacy than other texts.

Historical records suggest that the Tripitaka continued to be granted during the Yuanfu元符 era (1098–1100) of Zhezong’s reign. The Illustrated Report on the Diplomatic Mission to Goryeo in the Xuanhe Era 宣和奉使高麗圖經 (Xu 1991, vol. 17, p. 34) notes that the Tripitaka granted by Song in the Yuanfu era was housed at the Temple of Royal Prosperity, a representative royal temple of Goryeo. Under Emperor Huizong (r. 1100–1126), Song actively re-engaged with Goryeo, yet the Tripitaka was no longer granted.

4. Liao’s Granting of the Tripitaka to Goryeo

4.1. Buddhist Policies of the Liao Dynasty and the Printing of the Khitan Canon 契丹藏

As a nomadic regime, the Liao Dynasty adopted a dual-track religious policy. On the one hand, the imperial court preserved traditional shamanistic practices as vital cultural and spiritual bonds for the Khitan people. On the other hand, it promoted Buddhism by constructing temples, translating scriptures, and fostering Buddhist institutional growth. During the reigns of Emperors Xingzong 興宗 (r. 1031–1055) and Daozong 道宗 (r. 1055–1101), Buddhism reached its zenith in the Liao Dynasty. This period witnessed the widespread construction of temples, a surge in Buddhist adherents, and the religion’s entrenchment as a cornerstone of Liao’s socio-cultural life.

The Liao Dynasty commissioned the carving of two Tripitaka editions, including the Khitan Canon, completed in 1062. Although based on Song’s Kaibao Canon, the Khitan Canon surpassed its predecessor in scale and craftsmanship. Liao’s printing of the Tripitaka served not merely to meet domestic religious demands but, more critically, to assert its cultural orthodoxy. Historically, the dynasties in the Central Plains (zhongyuan wangchao 中原王朝) employed the Hua-Yi distinction (hua-yi zhi bian 華夷之辨)—a conceptual division between the “civilized” (Hua) and “barbarian” (Yi)—to legitimize their cultural superiority over peripheral regimes. By printing the Khitan Canon, Liao showcased its sophisticated Buddhist scholarship and institutional maturity, seeking to undermine Song’s cultural hegemony and amplify its own cultural influence and discourse in the East Asian world.

4.2. The Four Acts of Granting the Tripitaka by Liao to Goryeo and Their Political Intentions

From the late 10th to early 11th century, Liao launched three major invasions of Goryeo, in 993, 1010, and 1018, respectively, compelling Goryeo to establish a suzerain–vassal relationship with it. Nevertheless, Liao recognized that its geopolitical rivalry with Song required Goryeo’s support and thus necessitated a blend of coercion and conciliation. This dual approach manifested in four acts of granting the Tripitaka to Goryeo between 1063 and 1107.

In 1063, shortly after completing the Khitan Canon, Emperor Daozong of Liao granted it to Goryeo. King Munjong of Goryeo welcomed the Liao envoys with grand ceremonial rites, with “the king preparing chariot and receiving them at the western outskirts” (Chong 2014, vol. 8, p. 225). This reception underscored Goryeo’s deference to Liao while reaffirming Liao’s suzerain status. Daozong’s act served dual purposes: demonstrating goodwill to strengthen ties and showing Liao’s Buddhist cultural prowess to consolidate the suzerain–vassal relationship through cultural interactions.

The restoration of Song–Goryeo relations in 1072 heightened the diplomatic exchanges between Song and Goryeo. Liao detected this change and, to counterbalance Song’s influence, dispatched Zhang Rihua 張日華 (dates unknown), the Acting Grand Commandant (jianjiao taiwei 檢校太尉), to congratulate King Munjong’s birthday, presenting the Tripitaka as a gift (Chong 2014, vol. 9, p. 244; Toqto’a 1974, vol. 23, p. 274). This targeted action aimed to reaffirm Liao’s prioritization of Goryeo and preserve their suzerain–vassal relationship.

In 1099, when King Sukjong of Goryeo (Wang Ong 王顒 왕옹, r. 1095–1105) sent envoys to Song to announce his succession and present tribute, Liao again granted the Tripitaka to Goryeo (Chong 2014, vol. 11, p. 317). Ostensibly a gesture of goodwill, this act implicitly cautioned Goryeo against deepening ties with Song.

In 1105, King Yejong of Goryeo (Wang U 王俁 왕우, r. 1105–1122) ascended the throne. In January 1107, Liao dispatched Gao Cunshou 高存壽 (dates unknown) to congratulate the king’s birthday and granted the Tripitaka (Chong 2014, vol. 12, p. 356). Though the Liao Dynasty still maintained its status as a significant power in East Asia, albeit superficially, internal corruption and external pressures such as the rise of the Jurchens had gradually destabilized its position, leading to a decline in its national strength and regional influence. As a result, its deterrent power over Goryeo had significantly diminished. We suppose that the acts of granting the Tripitaka during this very period were likely aimed at sustaining the suzerain–vassal relationship with Goryeo through cultural diplomacy.

As discussed above, Liao’s strategy towards Goryeo consistently centered on reinforcing their suzerain–vassal relations, with the Tripitaka serving political and cultural purposes. This practice epitomized Liao’s shift in strategy from military deterrence to cultural statecraft—transforming the legacy of three violent invasions into a civilizational narrative predicated on cultural benefaction.

It is worth noting that, unlike the Song–Goryeo exchanges, where Goryeo actively requested scriptures, Goryeo never petitioned Liao for the Tripitaka. While the completion of the Tripitaka Koreana reduced demand, the deeper reason lay in Goryeo’s cultural superiority complex: though militarily subjugated to nomadic Liao, Goryeo—steeped in the Sinosphere, especially the cultural space of Chinese characters—viewed itself as culturally superior to Khitan “barbarians,” precluding any symbolic subordination through scripture requests. The phenomena described above reflect both the Liao Dynasty’s deployment of culture as the instrument of diplomatic acumen and expose the complex dynamic interplay between power politics and cultural identity within East Asian international relations.

5. Conclusions

By surveying the diplomatic activities centered around the Chinese Tripitaka in the East Asian world during the 10th–12th centuries, it has been found that the Tripitaka functioned as a crucial medium for sustaining and constructing suzerain–vassal relations among diverse polities. It was not merely a collection of Buddhist scriptures but also a cultural symbol imbued with political significance and infused with power dynamics.

As Martin Wight proposes, a states-system requires a degree of cultural unity among its members to form—further questioning whether this necessitates deeper religious or ideological common assumptions (Wight 1977, pp. 33–34). There are two main factors for the ability of Chinese Tripitaka to function as a diplomatic tool transcending religious realms. First, as a universal religion in the 10th–12th century East Asia, Buddhism provided an intellectual foundation for the “Tripitaka Diplomacy”. Second, the common linguistic framework of the Sinosphere, especially the cultural space of Chinese characters, facilitated the Tripitaka’s circulation among different East Asian polities. The colossal scale of the Tripitaka required immense human, financial, and material resources for its printing, making it a tangible manifestation of state power. Therefore, the act of granting the Tripitaka carried profound hierarchical symbolism.

The East Asian regimes employed distinct strategic logics in the “Tripitaka Diplomacy” based on their own capabilities and needs. The Song Dynasty, leveraging its cultural superiority, pursued a “generous reciprocity” policy to sustain an imagined tributary hierarchy. However, this cultural statecraft faced limitations against militarily dominant powers. The Liao Dynasty combined military coercion with cultural appeasement, asserting its civilizational orthodoxy through printing the Khitan Canon. Yet, its nomadic identity constrained cultural appeal, failing to bridge civilizational gaps with Goryeo. As a smaller state navigating great-power rivalry, Goryeo adeptly exploited Song–Liao tensions through its sadae pragmatism. By formally submitting to Liao to avoid conflict while actively engaging Song in Tripitaka exchanges for tangible benefits and diplomatic maneuvering space, it secured practical benefits and expanded diplomatic autonomy. In the case of Japan, it dispatched monks to request the Tripitaka while vigilantly guarding political autonomy to maintain independent foreign relations.

The “Tripitaka Diplomacy” in the 10th–12th centuries explains the significant fact that the international relations in premodern East Asia cannot be described merely as a monolithic Hua-Yi order, but as a polycentric, multi-layered interactive network. Within this framework, polities mutually influenced and constrained one another, collectively shaping the region’s international dynamics.

In summary, the Chinese Tripitaka, owing to its unique attributes, emerged as a crucial medium for strategic interactions among East Asian states. At its core, the “Tripitaka Diplomacy” constituted the transformation of a religious–cultural vehicle into political capital. In our contemporary era, which emphasizes dialogue among civilizations and soft power competition, this historical practice illuminates that constructing international relations necessitates both realpolitik calculations of power dynamics and the adhesive power of shared cultural values. The historical experience of the “Tripitaka Diplomacy” thus continues to offer valuable insights for modern states navigating international affairs.