Religious Freedom, Governance of Religious Diversity, and Interreligious Dialogue: The Case of Turin
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Notes: For a Sociology of Interreligious Dialogue
3. Methodology
4. Voices from the Field: Turin as a “Virtuous Exception” or a “Battlefield”?
As far as interreligious dialogue is concerned, Turin is certainly a city that, although like other large Italian metropolises, has a very strong characteristic of pluralism, both in terms of the coexistence and the presence of different faiths. I am thinking of a dialogue that is not only theoretical, but also daily, with meetings between religious communities that exchange experiences of faith in the urban context. Turin is a heterogeneous city from many points of view, and this plurality is also reflected in the variety of places of worship in the area […]. If I had to summarise, I would say that it is a dialogue that puts people at the centre, because the encounter is the focus.(Religious Leader, 043)
Similar to Griera’s (2020, p. 328) analysis of the Spanish context, in Turin “most of the interreligious groups do not place the main emphasis on the theological dialogue but on the idea of dialogue as space of encounter, as a site for creating opportunities for bridging and bonding among members of different religions”. More specifically, many informants traced Turin’s exceptionalism back to the Statuto Albertino of 1848, which, while proclaiming Roman Catholicism as the state’s sole religion, granted legal tolerance to Waldensian and Jewish communities. This historical precedent contributed to Turin’s enduring reputation for openness and inclusion:Of course, dialogue means collaborative, peaceful dialogue, and it is natural that everyone has different theories and scriptures, so it would be foolish to have verbal conflicts or something like that, since dialogue is meant to find solutions or common ground through various perspectives. Of course, there are differences and divergences, but it is wise to find common solutions. This should be the aim of interreligious dialogue.(Religious Leader, 022)
Turin’s legacy of dialogue and inclusion was further solidified with the founding of the Interfedi Committee in 2006, established during the Winter Olympics under the leadership of Valentino Castellani, the city’s former mayor. Inspired by the Salt Lake City Olympics, the Committee aimed to provide religious support to athletes and staff (Politician/Administrator, 001). In 2020, the Interfedi Committee became an official advisory body to the City of Turin, which, to the best of our knowledge, is a unique institutional development in the Italian landscape. The Interfedi Committee now has the authority to “formulate non-binding opinions on proposed Municipal Council resolutions affecting the religious sphere”.9 However, while pioneering, its mere consultative status limits its influence:I am reminded of the whole history of modern and contemporary Turin. Since the time of Carlo Alberto, there has been talk of interreligious dialogue in Turin and Piedmont, and from there the concept has spread throughout Italy. Certain symbols of Turin dating back to the mid-19th century, for example Gianduiotti, created by the Caffarel chocolate company in 1865, are more modern than interreligious dialogue in the city.(Religious Leader, 032)
The Turin administration, therefore, is distinguished by institutions and initiatives that are unique at the national level. In addition to the Interfedi Committee, one of the most notable examples is the Sharing Pact with Islamic communities, originally signed in 2016 and renewed in 2023. This agreement has helped solidify and make visible the Islamic presence in Turin, while promoting coexistence and mutual respect in line with the values proclaimed in the Italian Constitution. More specifically, the Sharing Pact between the City of Turin and local Islamic centers serves as an instrument for interreligious dialogue and cultural integration and, due to its success, the Turin administration has sought to replicate this model beyond religious communities.The Interfedi Committee is a reality that is unique in Italy […] and I am aware of the many initiatives that have been carried out […]. In addition to this, there have also been more independent initiatives that have involved the academy, academics, the university, and hospitals, even if they have all flowed into the Committee, which is inevitably the centre, the fulcrum from which the various interreligious dialogue initiatives start and converge.(Religious Leader, 011)
The model was always the same, that is, gathering around a table, a text and objectives all the various groups, associations and categories linked to the Chinese community, in that case leaving aside the religious aspect, but concentrating on the community aspect. The same has been tried, but has not yet succeeded, with the Peruvian community, which struggles to come together, being internally quarrelsome and conflictual. However, if nothing else, we have managed to set up the coordination of all the groups, the Peruvian associations, and this is already half a success.(Politician/Administrator, 003)
- Issues of representation: Religious communities without centralized leadership, particularly within Islam, Christian Orthodoxy, Hinduism, and Buddhism, struggle to engage effectively with institutional bodies, such as the Interfedi Committee. Some religious leaders perceive the Committee as “ceremonial” rather than “substantial” (see Section 4.1);
- Top-down governance models: Protocols like those involving the Care of the Spirit project are appreciated for addressing the rights and religious needs of non-Catholic patients, yet they are criticized for their rigid, top-down approach, which sidelines religious groups’ own concerns and perspectives (see Section 4.2);
- Global and international politics: Local interreligious initiatives and dialogue opportunities have been drastically affected by international events, particularly the ongoing genocide in Palestine, which has disrupted regular religious and interreligious activities in Turin (see Section 4.3).
In the next section, we will examine the normative framework governing religious rights and defining the legitimate boundaries of religious communities in Italy today. Many informants expressed frustration with delays in legal adaptation, arguing that Italy’s response to 21st century religious pluralism remains inadequate. One religious leader encapsulates this concern as follows: “Italian society still lacks adequate literacy on the subject of interreligious dialogue” (Religious Leader, 043). As we will clarify, despite Turin’s progressive history, institutional efforts continue to face obstacles, highlighting the need for a more inclusive and adaptive governance model and changes to legislation.I think it works from the bottom. Turin is a city of great associationism, so the tradition of working from the bottom-up with the private social sector is a consolidated tradition. This makes it possible not to drop initiatives from above and also to intercept questions, critical issues, and fears authentically with respect to people, not with pre-constituted big plans. I believe this is the great value. This requires a lot of patience, because it is a very slow process, always very slow, but in my opinion, it is the only way to make a realistic impact, to make a real impact.(Politician/Administrator 029)
4.1. The Normative Framework and Issues of Representation
Alongside the Constitution, two key legal instruments, the Concordato and the Intesa, provide formal recognition of signatory religious denominations within the Italian system. Additionally, Law No. 158/1929 on Admitted Cults, which remains in force due to the absence of updated legislation, still governs religious communities without an Intesa, including Islam, and its national and local associations. Despite the constitutional guarantee established in Article 19, stating that “Everyone has the right to freely profess his or her religious faith in any form, individually or in association, to propagate it and to worship in private or in public, as long as it is not contrary to morality”,10 many informants expressed skepticism about its practical implementation, as illustrated in the following testimony:I think that it is not that there is a lack of norms, the fact is to implement these norms. We speak of religious freedom and our Constitution says so! It is not that there is a lack of norms, it is the application, or at least there are also missing steps, because as I think you now know, look at the norms for the funeral police, the long-distance care of the farewell. I want to tell you that these are norms that are applied at perhaps regional level and then from region to region fails. It would take one, absolutely one, how should I put it, regulation that would apply nationally and then maybe declined in the individual regions with precise agreements.(Religious Leader, 009)
Among the most pressing concerns is the total legislative vacuum regarding Islam, which lacks an Intesa. This absence means that the daily and collective religious practices of approximately five million Muslim residents remain unprotected, as one informant points out:There is no real legislation. In fact, it is a race to plug gaps. Which from a legal point of view is something our state does about inconvenient things […]. Freedom of religion is a big issue […]. You go and read the articles, and you read that yes, the citizen must be guaranteed freedom of religion, then what that means we do not know. Also, because then we need the system of the Intese and we end up with a majority religion like Islam, which does not have the Intesa, which does not have the right to have its prayer rooms protected, because it is still a gym from a legal point of view. And so, in my opinion it is a very dangerous formulation because it leaves in the balance everything that is not recognised.(Privileged Informant, woman, 050)
Many religious leaders, particularly those outside of Catholicism, perceive a systemic imbalance in legislative protections: “At the normative level, there are some unwritten rules that apply to the majority religion and a total absence of rules with regard to religious minorities” (Religious Leader, 015).Insofar as Islam is concerned, there is a total vacuum. In the absence of an Intesa, everything that should regulate the daily and collective practice of some 5 million Muslim residents is not protected. This is one of the most important aspects. As for other religious communities, there are Intese; I am thinking, for example, of the Buddhist and Hindu communities, which fall within the legislative framework.(Politician/Administrator, 013)
Despite these structural challenges, the Turin administration has worked to engage and support the local Islamic archipelago through years of direct outreach, ensuring that religious communities are not instrumentalized. Informants also highlighted close cooperation with law enforcement agencies, particularly Digos,11 to prevent interactions with groups linked to fundamentalism:First of all, because not all Arabs are Muslims and not all Muslims are Arabs; secondly, because even in the Islam of the diaspora, there are many differences: there are national differences, so being Moroccan, Algerian, Tunisian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi implies diversity, and that we come together by nationality.(Politician/Administrator, 002)
One notable intervention was the legal recognition of an Islamic center during its transition into a mosque:Years spent going from one Islamic centre to another to build the conditions for the administration not to be instrumentalised […], a close relationship with the forces of law and order dealing with Islamic affairs, in particular with the Turin Digos, in order to avoid, as city administrator, talking and interacting with realities on which expulsion decrees for fundamentalism were hanging.(Politician/Administrator, 002)
In addition to institutional support, Turin hosts several cultural initiatives aimed at promoting public recognition of Islam, challenging stereotypes, and encouraging interreligious dialogue. One widely cited example is the Open Mosques initiative, in which “several Islamic places of worship, on the occasion of #Ramadan, opened their doors to the citizens, for a day of mutual acquaintance, under the banner of the common belonging to Turin’s varied community. Various members of the city administration and of the City Council and Constituencies […] visited the mosques in the various districts, such as Aurora, Borgo San Donato, San Salvario and others”,12 thus reinforcing a sense of shared community within Turin’s diverse population:When the mosque in Corso Giulio Cesare n. 6 began the process of buying a building in Via Urbino to make it a mosque, we built the conditions to be able to recognise them, suggesting that they change their statutes to include worship among their activities, because the law does not say that they cannot do this. So, they are basically APS—associations for social promotion—with worship among their aims. This has made it possible to systematise this model and has set a precedent in Italy for allowing Islamic centres to come out of garages, hence the purchase of an asset and the redevelopment of a place. Using the Via Urbino affair, we constructed an administrative procedure that accompanied the Islamic communities to change their statutes in such a way that there were no procedural flaws that could hinder their success.(Politician/Administrator, 002)
The Turin administration’s pragmatic approach toward Islamic prayer rooms was further praised:Thinking about, let’s say, the aspect that has characterized the potential tensions in recent years, and therefore let’s talk about the Muslim religion and therefore the aspect of tensions relative first to post-terrorism. Then to all that concerns the approach of Islamic culture with respect to the territory, all the work that has been done with the Open Mosques is now a very in-depth work that has led to the establishment of a network and a community to help mosques to open up, to present themselves and give the citizens of the various territories the image of an open place.(Politician/Administrator, 029)
Summarizing the perspectives of the informants, the Italian Constitution is widely praised, yet the absence of a national religious freedom law creates significant gaps. On one hand, this vacuum perpetuates the “double standard approach embedded in the Concordato and the Intesa system”; on the other, it forces local administrations to intervene creatively in managing religious diversity and compensating for the inconsistencies at the national level.I believe that Turin is a city where religious freedom is promoted and respected. Councillor Curti, for example, had found a loophole so that Islamic prayer rooms could exist. It would certainly be desirable to have places of worship that are also architecturally recognised and recognisable, for example mosques.(Politician/Administrator, 013)
Ultimately, while the regulatory framework of religious freedom serves as the foundation for governance policies and interreligious dialogue, fully grasping the complexity and internal dynamics of Turin’s religious and interreligious landscape requires a deeper analysis of its practical implementation.But I do not think that a law imposed from above can change things. I think that with regard to this issue, we really have to start from the bottom and from there build new values, morals and customs that can then, in some way, be the spokesman for the promotion of new rules. But if we do not start from people’s consciences, there will never be any law, imposed from above, capable of truly changing the thinking of many.(Privileged Informant, 007)
4.2. Interreligious Dialogue, Institutional Logics, and Experiences from the Ground up
My impression is that interreligious dialogue works most of all when it is limited to getting to know each other. This kind of confrontation does not require communities to change or question their own principles and traditions. When, on the other hand, one tries to achieve something concrete together, the effort required is greater, and difficulties can arise.(Religious Leader, 042)
Some informants argued that religious communities should be supported to facilitate bottom-up initiatives that better align with the needs of their members. At the same time, they should proactively engage with the local administration and navigate the legal, social, and cultural matrix of Italian society.Dialogue, which is not just academic, implies that you have to be a person who knows how to communicate also through their own faith and not prevent others from communicating with theirs. This is a very delicate thing in the area because it is full of ambiguities and half-truths.(Religious Leader, 005)
Unhelpful and very burdensome representation for minorities.(Religious Leader, 032)
Our informants emphasize that interreligious dialogue primarily concerns religious communities themselves, particularly minority religions, while local institutions should act as facilitators, supporters, and mediators between different faith traditions. This widespread sentiment translates into the perception that, although local governments and national regulations could certainly improve through ad hoc policies and norms, it is religious communities that must take the lead in regard to their own activation.Everyone says, ‘Yes, we are interested!’ But then in the end, when you have to move, then the unity ends. Religious confessions are many, they have perplexities, problems, who does what, etc. etc., so what? This, perhaps, is the critical issue—moving from thought to concrete action.(Religious Leader, 009)
Building on this framework, Bossi and Ricucci (2023, p. 2015) apply Bourdieusian analysis to the religious field of Turin, highlighting how minority religious communities, already lacking symbolic and material capital, face structural obstacles in regard to their efforts to gain recognition and legitimacy:Civil society, like other societal fields, has always been filled with power relations and competition between actors. Competition over resources, which are often limited, is a natural part of the field, whether in relation to public funding, members, volunteers, donors, public attention, or access to policymaking. Competition over these resources perpetuates a dynamic of winners and losers among the involved actors, leading to an unequal distribution of power within the field. At times, however, this aspect of internal competition has been overshadowed by a dominant view of civil society as a social space for nurturing social trust and expressing solidarity, with an emphasis on collaboration rather than competition. It is nevertheless clear that civil society organizations (hereafter abbreviated as CSOs), interest groups, and social movements not only tend to compete with each other, but at times might also become engaged in challenging each other and counteracting each other’s actions over ideological cleavage.
Moreover, religious groups with weaker ties to other faith communities or local institutions tend to remain confined within their own congregations, engaging only minimally in interreligious initiatives:Already endowed with little symbolic and material capital, subaltern minorities are unable to realise the conditions necessary to emancipate themselves and improve their positioning in the religious field. They cannot access public aid, and thus cannot structure themselves sufficiently (physically, or politically) to obtain legal recognition; and without legal recognition, they struggle to improve their capital endowment.
As our analysis shows, interreligious dialogue in Turin takes multiple forms, namely institutional and ceremonial processes, religious groups’ strategic positioning, and bottom-up initiatives. However, current interreligious dialogue efforts at the local level are often co-organized by one or two religious groups, with support from local government and civil society organizations. In this landscape, Catholicism plays a central role, sometimes functioning as a resource for dialogue, but, at other times, acting as a barrier to inclusion.Of course, everyone has contacts, and so in Turin it is not difficult, for example among Christians, to get to know each other at the level of their respective communities: this does not mean, however, that they attend each other assiduously or have common projects.(Religious Leader, 032)
In Verduno, for example, I pointed out that it is all beautiful, beautiful, super modern hospital and so on and so forth. Because with the hospital really, with all the will they have to work seriously even in the interreligious field. But inside, for example, the Catholic Church manages this whole aspect of the relationship between the hospital and other religious denominations. Do you understand what I am saying? I mean let’s talk about it, of course, let’s talk about it.(Religious Leader, 009)
In summary, while religious organizations, local government, and civil society all contribute to Turin’s complex and multilayered network of interreligious events and initiatives, each actor faces unique challenges. Catholicism, for instance:It tends to be the Christians who seek dialogue; the others keep to themselves or enjoy the privilege of having neutral territory on which to range. Even at the local level, it is the Christian who moves. Other religious traditions do not feel this need.(Religious Leader, 005)
Meanwhile, minority religions, although appreciative of local government support, seek greater recognition within the social, cultural, and institutional landscape of the city. At the same time, local authorities must regulate religious freedom, diversity, and interreligious dialogue across multiple departments (e.g., migration, culture, education), despite budgetary constraints. While many of the challenges faced by religious organizations are tied to Turin’s unique historical and local context, the city’s religious and interreligious field is not immune to global political tensions. Cultural, ethnic, and religious conflicts elsewhere have significant repercussions for local religious dynamics. This aspect, which emerged prominently in our research, will be explored in the following section.Finds itself having to face this challenging confrontation with other religious traditions at a time when it has to deal with problems of great weight internally, which are the restructuring of its own community life.(Religious Leader, 005)
4.3. The Local and the Global: How International Politics Impacts Interreligious Dialogue
Several informants emphasized that, following October 7, the Jewish community significantly adjusted its engagement in local interreligious initiatives, instead prioritizing identity-based programs, aligned with Israeli government perspectives:For example, this year we had some difficulties with the Jewish community precisely on the theme of peace […]. The main critical issues often relate to the difficulty of finding the time to organize well-structured initiatives. In addition, different ways of approaching issues can create tensions […] the issue of peace led to a certain divergence of views with the Jewish community. However, we managed to find common ground.(Religious Leader, 041)
Additionally, interfaith dialogue initiatives that had previously been active and well-established experienced a noticeable decline, as noted by another informant:Even the Jewish Community, since October 7th, [has taken] a pro-Israeli governmental attitude that is creating problems for us in the development of relations that have always been flourishing because they deliberately chose and even said so publicly in a meeting […] their reasons for the attack on Gaza. This is a small example. Among these extreme positions that are dictated by political reasons—not religious ones—are political choices.(Religious Leader, 010)
In the context of the reconfiguration of the interreligious field, some informants expressed dissatisfaction with the local administration’s handling of the Israel–Palestine conflict, arguing that informal networks provided more adaptable spaces for dialogue, particularly in times of crisis, than the formal regulations on religious diversity:Honestly, until October 7th there were no critical issues. Then after that date, unfortunately, a whole series of initiatives came to a halt, as did the dialogue […]. In particular, there is not one initiative that has stopped, but the ability to continue a path that made this neighbourhood unique and rare has stopped.(Privileged Informant, 015)
One particularly high-profile event related to the conflict took place during the occupation of the University of Turin last fall, when Imam Brahim Baya was accused by mainstream media of espousing anti-Zionist and pro-terrorist rhetoric. The controversy attracted significant local and national coverage, with public condemnations from the then-Rector of the University of Turin, Stefano Geuna, the Minister for Universities and Research, Anna Maria Bernini, and the Governor of the Piedmont Region, Alberto Cirio, who reiterated the university’s secular stance. Reflecting on this incident, one informant voiced concerns over problematic alignments in activism related to the conflict:I perceive an asymmetry between a great richness of diversity in the territorial scenario and somewhat a fragility, a slowness, in the spaces of institutional dialogue. On this, I give a recent example, the latest explosion of the Israel–Palestine conflict. I perceived it as a moment of increased informal dialogue, in that it also brought a reversal to the fore in even secular spaces of people who also claimed, for example, to be Muslim. But at the institutional level, formal dialogue was fragile, so much so that some groups, I am thinking for example of Christian–Islamic friendship, Christian–Islamic dialogue, have experienced crises and splits.(Privileged Informant, 022)
The Palestinian genocide and the diverse positions it has provoked represents just one example, although a dramatic one, of how global conflicts penetrate local dynamics. Other related concerns, raised in the interviews, include intolerance toward religious and ethnic minorities and criticism of so-called “woke ideology”. As Sean Phelan (2023, p. 63) notes in his analysis of cancel culture, this phenomenon shapes political discourse, normalizing culture-war conflicts that polarize identities.For example, on the Israeli–Palestinian issue, we see questionable stances. There are LGBTQ+ activists who support Hamas, without realizing that Hamas does not guarantee any rights to women or minorities. It is a paradox.(Privileged Informant, 034)
Conversely, critiques of “woke ideology” have emerged in discussions about progressive cultural shifts. One informant expressed concern that increasingly politicized notions of inclusivity might alienate conservative religious communities, arguing that these minorities tend to uphold traditional values:In some schools, some teachers are unwelcoming, and in some areas—especially among certain sections of the population—there are attitudes of rejection. But these attitudes are partly due to ignorance, of course, and also to a policy that fuels fear of foreigners. There is a narrative that wants to make foreigners look like people who do wrong: they steal, rape, behave badly, kill […] and one hears this every day while taking the tram. I live near Porta Palazzo and I take tram number 4, which runs through the whole city, from north to south. If you go up to the central area, near the Porta Palazzo market, which is really multi-ethnic, you hear these types of things daily. And it’s a problem because you can see that it’s an insecurity, a rejection that is fed by certain politics […]. Politics today leads people to think that the foreigner is always and only the immigrant. The American tourist, on the other hand, is never seen as a ‘foreigner’.(Privileged Informant, 044)
The tensions between progressive actors and religious minorities suggest two interconnected hypotheses. First, differences in political attitudes between local administration leaders, civil society organizations, and religious minorities may be attributable to socio-demographic differences. Progressive policymakers and activists tend to advocate for gender equality, migration rights, and religious freedom, while some religious communities, particularly immigrant groups, may uphold traditionalist perspectives on gender and sexuality. Whether this is due to pre-existing demographic distinctions or whether “the occupancy of leadership positions itself has an impact on attitude formation” (Lee and Scaramuzzino 2025, p. 272) remains an open research question.The administration should try to remember that immigrant religious communities usually have a tendency to be more conservative than local well-wishers believe […]. If the liberals of yesterday become the Wokists of today and try to impose even on their co-religionists certain examples of political correctness, this divide will become even more acute […]. Our pluralism comes largely from immigration from those other four-fifths of the world who view the Wokism of 20% of the planet with the same sympathy with which Wokism views racism. Not all members of minority communities will be like this, of course.(Religious Leader, 032)
Despite these aspects, the informants also highlighted the coexistence of different faith communities within Turin’s pluralistic urban spaces:I don’t see any [criticism] in the neighborhood, although seeing a synagogue manned by the army or the carabinieri gives one some anxiety and apprehension.(Privileged Informant, 015)
While Turin is historically recognized for its commitment to religious pluralism, and is rightly considered a national leader in interreligious dialogue, the spiritual and religious fabric of the city remains deeply contested. This section has explored how the Palestinian genocide affects local interreligious dialogue, shaping community participation and alliances; how far-right political narratives contribute to the social and discursive construction of the ‘foreigner’; and how merging ideological struggles over language and identity politics, framed in debates around woke ideology, further complicate the interreligious field.In our neighborhood, in front of the synagogue, there is a place run by Syrian refugees. A little further on, there is the Waldensian community, the Waldensian temple, and the Claudiana Editrice bookshop, which is the Waldensian publishing house that sells Hebrew books. So I do not see any problems, but I connect everything to the situation between Israel and Palestine, or rather, between the Israeli government and Hamas.(Privileged Informant, 015)
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
1 | For an exception, please see Körs et al. (2020). This edited collection integrates interdisciplinary and international research perspectives, examining how religious pluralism influences societal fields, such as theology, politics, civil society, education, and communication/media. |
2 | Including the state, local institutions, and also the religious communities themselves, interreligious networks, and civil society associations. |
3 | We understand civil society as “a societal sphere separate from the state, the market, and the family which is populated by a variety of collective actors, including organisations, networks, and movements” (Lee and Scaramuzzino 2020, p. 86). |
4 | They are, likewise, the outcomes of 18th century Enlightenment, the modernization process, and secular nationalism (Swidler 2013) and are also deeply indebted to colonial understandings of religion and Christian ecumenism (Adil Hussain 2024). |
5 | |
6 | It is important to note that Breskaya et al.’s (2024) definition of religious freedom is substantially based on their previous work on the SPRF approach, both in terms of its multidimensional nature and in reference to its theoretical sources of inspiration (e.g., most notably legal–judicial approaches, political secularism, and social constructivism). |
7 | Among the 47 informants interviewed, and despite our plural efforts in reaching out to both Muslim and Jewish religious leaders, only one representative from each of these communities was ultimately available, despite their prominent roles in Turin’s pluralistic religious environment. We will expand on the impact of the Palestinian genocide in Turin’s interreligious field in Section 4.3. |
8 | The projects mapped include the following: Cura dello spirito, Casa delle religioni, Moschee aperte, XVI Giornata del dialogo cristiano, Settimana di preghiera per l’unità dei Cristiani, XIV Giornata nazionale del dialogo cristiano islamico, Religioni e ambiente, XXXV Giornata per il dialogo tra Cristiani ed Ebrei, Ritual/Materials, and a plurality of other actors and initiatives, including lectures involving academics and interreligious networks, such as the Comitato Interfedi, Fedi Insieme, and Noi siamo con voi. |
9 | Available online: https://www.torinoclick.it/societa/dialogo-interreligioso-istituzionalizzato-il-comitato-interfedi-come-organo-di-garanzia-della-citta/ (accessed on 12 February 2025). |
10 | Available online: https://presidenza.governo.it/USRI/confessioni/norme/cost_art_19_20.html#:~:text=La%20Costituzione%20della%20Repubblica%20Italiana&text=Tutti%20hanno%20diritto%20di%20professare,20 (accessed on 11 February 2025). |
11 | Digos stants for the general investigations and special operations division of the Italian State Police. |
12 | Available online: https://www.cittagora.it/altre-notizie/ramadan-iftar-e-moschee-aperte-nella-torino-multietnica.html/ (accessed on 12 February 2025). |
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Di Placido, M.; Palmisano, S. Religious Freedom, Governance of Religious Diversity, and Interreligious Dialogue: The Case of Turin. Religions 2025, 16, 952. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16080952
Di Placido M, Palmisano S. Religious Freedom, Governance of Religious Diversity, and Interreligious Dialogue: The Case of Turin. Religions. 2025; 16(8):952. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16080952
Chicago/Turabian StyleDi Placido, Matteo, and Stefania Palmisano. 2025. "Religious Freedom, Governance of Religious Diversity, and Interreligious Dialogue: The Case of Turin" Religions 16, no. 8: 952. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16080952
APA StyleDi Placido, M., & Palmisano, S. (2025). Religious Freedom, Governance of Religious Diversity, and Interreligious Dialogue: The Case of Turin. Religions, 16(8), 952. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16080952