Can Ethics Exist Without God? A Thomistic Critique of James Sterba’s Axiomatic Morality

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

I recommend its publication. I think, anyway, that there are two points that could be deepened: 1) If rejecting a certain ethical objectivity would be the path that an atheist position should follow to avoid the developed criticism 2) If theism really can be considered a better explanatory path of ethical objectivity, since in part the criticism points to lack of evidence in favor of it. It seems that theism requires belief in God, faith, as an explanatory presupposition. And since it is understood as a gift, it is not that it can be acquired in a similar way as it is acquired by knowledge.

I had no major critical observations. I consider that the main point that could be improved is to deepen in the two aspects that I mentioned, the article is brief and could perfectly do that.    1 In addressing the position of St. Thomas, the paper could delve into the saint's texts, something that is only partially developed.   2 The gap addressed by the text is the blind spot of an atheistic position in the face of ethics understood as divine order, and the central notion of natural law. The text could deepen in what sense the spirit of establishing an atheistic ethics must dialogue with the is/ought tension that natural law from a theistic position resolves. In other words, the atheistic position does not resolve the is/ought tension, but it is not clear why it should resolve it either.   3 The notion of human nature, and its link to creation, strains the idea that an evolutionary atheist position can account for this human nature. However, this presupposes the existence of God, or stipulates it if observed from an atheistic position. Partly because of this, it seems to me that what I mentioned in number 2 of my first post can be developed, the conclusion does not develop why theism would be a better way to explain ethics.   4 It seems to me that the main strength of the paper is to clearly show the knots of the atheistic position. That said, several of the questions that support this critical position could be further developed, for example by quoting specific passages of the criticisms that are raised. This would give greater bibliographical rigor to the reflection.   Finally, I insist that the article seems to me to be publishable in its present state. But if it is a question of making a critical contribution, it seems to me that the above does it. I think it should be taken care that it is assumed that a brief and positive review is synonymous of a superficial review, this has not been the case.

Author Response

Reviewer's Comments: I recommend its publication. I think, anyway, that there are two points that could be deepened: 1) If rejecting a certain ethical objectivity would be the path that an atheist position should follow to avoid the developed criticism 2) If theism really can be considered a better explanatory path of ethical objectivity, since in part the criticism points to lack of evidence in favor of it. It seems that theism requires belief in God, faith, as an explanatory presupposition. And since it is understood as a gift, it is not that it can be acquired in a similar way as it is acquired by knowledge.

I had no major critical observations. I consider that the main point that could be improved is to deepen in the two aspects that I mentioned, the article is brief and could perfectly do that.    1 In addressing the position of St. Thomas, the paper could delve into the saint's texts, something that is only partially developed.   2 The gap addressed by the text is the blind spot of an atheistic position in the face of ethics understood as divine order, and the central notion of natural law. The text could deepen in what sense the spirit of establishing an atheistic ethics must dialogue with the is/ought tension that natural law from a theistic position resolves. In other words, the atheistic position does not resolve the is/ought tension, but it is not clear why it should resolve it either.   3 The notion of human nature, and its link to creation, strains the idea that an evolutionary atheist position can account for this human nature. However, this presupposes the existence of God, or stipulates it if observed from an atheistic position. Partly because of this, it seems to me that what I mentioned in number 2 of my first post can be developed, the conclusion does not develop why theism would be a better way to explain ethics.   4 It seems to me that the main strength of the paper is to clearly show the knots of the atheistic position. That said, several of the questions that support this critical position could be further developed, for example by quoting specific passages of the criticisms that are raised. This would give greater bibliographical rigor to the reflection.   Finally, I insist that the article seems to me to be publishable in its present state. But if it is a question of making a critical contribution, it seems to me that the above does it. I think it should be taken care that it is assumed that a brief and positive review is synonymous of a superficial review, this has not been the case.

Response: Thank you very much for the insightful comments. I have addressed your main concerns by adding additional text. I have attached the revised documents and the editions are highlighted. Thank you.

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

This paper nicely summarizes and encapsulates a long and ongoing debate about morality, ethics, and role of divine authority within it. Though not cited here, I suspect the author would support the natural law theory (the essay explicitly says so) that has been well expressed by C. S. Lewis’s The Abolition of Man (1944 and still in print): “This thing which I have called for convenience the Tao, and which others may call Natural Law or Traditional Morality or the First Principles of Practical Reason or the First Platitudes, is not one among a series of possible systems of value. It is the sole source of all value judgements. If it is rejected, all value is rejected. If any value is retained, it is retained.” What this essay bears out, I think plainly stated, is the criticism leveled by Lewis long before Sterba, but nonetheless applicable that “The effort to refute it [the Tao as he calls it] and raise a new system of value [by means other than divine command] in its place is self-contradictory. There never has been, and never will be, a radically new judgement of value in the history of the world.” Indeed, Sterba’s stripping of Natural Law of its ontological nature will not make it so. The author is quite correct in stating that an abstract principle itself is not enough to offer a universal obligation to act morally across all humanity and all cultures.
But the fact that they are generally universal suggests an ontology rooted in the divine.

I support the publication of this essay because I believe its central point in its critique of Sterba is the same as Lewis’s indictment of the so-called “Conditioners” (those who would refashion morality in their own image). In fact, the Conditioners cannot escape their own efforts to avoid the Tao. If they accept these moral injunctions “they are no longer the makers of conscience but still its subjects . . . However far they go back, or down, they can find to ground to stand on. Evey motive they try to act on becomes at once a petitio. It is not that that they are bad men. They are not men at all. Stepping outside the Tao, they have stepped into the void. Nor are their subjects unhappy men. They are not man at all: they are artifacts. Man’s final conquest has proved to be the abolition of Man.” This is the world Sterba would have us enter.

It is true that “morality is bound up in our nature” and it is “the crux of the debate.” Here I can only echo Lewis that naturalism qua naturalism cannot provide the necessary grounds for an objective moral framework. This essay restates the central thesis of The Abolition of Man with newer source, and therefore, makes a contribution. But in the interest of historical context, the author may wish to at least introduce the reader to this important work on the nature of morality.

Author Response

Reviewer's Comments: 

This paper nicely summarizes and encapsulates a long and ongoing debate about morality, ethics, and role of divine authority within it. Though not cited here, I suspect the author would support the natural law theory (the essay explicitly says so) that has been well expressed by C. S. Lewis’s The Abolition of Man (1944 and still in print): “This thing which I have called for convenience the Tao, and which others may call Natural Law or Traditional Morality or the First Principles of Practical Reason or the First Platitudes, is not one among a series of possible systems of value. It is the sole source of all value judgements. If it is rejected, all value is rejected. If any value is retained, it is retained.” What this essay bears out, I think plainly stated, is the criticism leveled by Lewis long before Sterba, but nonetheless applicable that “The effort to refute it [the Tao as he calls it] and raise a new system of value [by means other than divine command] in its place is self-contradictory. There never has been, and never will be, a radically new judgement of value in the history of the world.” Indeed, Sterba’s stripping of Natural Law of its ontological nature will not make it so. The author is quite correct in stating that an abstract principle itself is not enough to offer a universal obligation to act morally across all humanity and all cultures. 
But the fact that they are generally universal suggests an ontology rooted in the divine.

I support the publication of this essay because I believe its central point in its critique of Sterba is the same as Lewis’s indictment of the so-called “Conditioners” (those who would refashion morality in their own image). In fact, the Conditioners cannot escape their own efforts to avoid the Tao. If they accept these moral injunctions “they are no longer the makers of conscience but still its subjects . . . However far they go back, or down, they can find to ground to stand on. Evey motive they try to act on becomes at once a petitio. It is not that that they are bad men. They are not men at all. Stepping outside the Tao, they have stepped into the void. Nor are their subjects unhappy men. They are not man at all: they are artifacts. Man’s final conquest has proved to be the abolition of Man.” This is the world Sterba would have us enter.

It is true that “morality is bound up in our nature” and it is “the crux of the debate.” Here I can only echo Lewis that naturalism qua naturalism cannot provide the necessary grounds for an objective moral framework. This essay restates the central thesis of The Abolition of Man with newer source, and therefore, makes a contribution. But in the interest of historical context, the author may wish to at least introduce the reader to this important work on the nature of morality.

Response: Thank you very much for the  kind words and thoughtful review. I do agree with your overall point and made a footnote (note 25). I did not want to go into detail in the main text since I am trying to (1) keep this concise, and (2) focus on the Thomistic response. I thought that adding another train of thought, though relevant and interesting, would detract from my overall task. I did however, as mentioned, make a footnote of your point. Thank you.