Conflict and Cooperation Between the Armenian and Byzantine Churches in the Late 9th and 10th Centuries

Abstract

The question of the relationship between the Armenian and Byzantine churches has always interested researchers, often becoming a problem of study. Since the chosen problem concerns not only the mentioned churches but was also a fierce problem of the entire Christian world in the context of the debate between the supporters of Monophysitism and Dyophysitism, we set ourselves the goal of studying the issue in this context within the framework of the end of the 9th century and in the 10th century, when particularly important development took place. One of the main results of the article is that despite the accepted opinion that the Armenian Church has always insisted on its confession, based on political considerations, the Armenian political and religious leaders sometimes expressed readiness for a church union with Byzantium. The main method of this article is the genetic method, with the help of which the origin, sequence of events, and patterns of development of the phenomenon under research are studied.

1. Introduction

In Armenian–Byzantine relations, the 5th–11th centuries were marked by alliances between the two Christian states and peoples against Sasanian Iran and the Arab Caliphate. However, these realities never overshadowed the confessional differences between the churches of Byzantium and Armenia. The elimination of these differences was almost always on Byzantium’s agenda in bilateral relations. Byzantium—sometimes amicably and, at other times, when possible, resorting to coercive measures—tried to achieve Armenian–Byzantine church unity, in other words, to have the Armenian Church acknowledge Chalcedon or the Chalcedonian Creed.

The study of Byzantine–Armenian politico-ecclesiastical relations is of significant importance for illuminating the nature and motivations of relations between the two states during different periods.

In this context, the study of Armenian–Byzantine politico-ecclesiastical relations during the period of Byzantium’s strengthening and the restoration of the Armenian Kingdom, specifically in the late 9th and 10th centuries, becomes particularly crucial. During this time, Byzantium’s power and successes in the East allowed it to sometimes speak with Armenia from an imperious and coercive position. However, Armenia, which was also significantly strengthening during this period, developed a partnership–alliance dynamic in its relations with Byzantium, often pushing ecclesiastical—confessional issues to the background.

In the Armenian–Byzantine relations, conditioned by the influence of the churches of both states and sometimes by political interests, issues related to religion and confession had a great influence, which is evident from the analysis of the dynamics of these relations in the late 9th–early 10th centuries.

From the information of primary sources, it can be concluded that the churches of both states sometimes, due to political events, acquired a major role in Armenian–Byzantine relations. A clear example is the activity of the Catholicos of Armenia Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi (898–925), who, after the death of the Armenian King Smbat I (891–914), entered into correspondence with the Byzantine Emperor and the Patriarch of Constantinople, having clear political proposals and expectations.

The study of Armenian–Byzantine politico-ecclesiastical relations in the late 9th and 10th centuries is important from the perspective of illuminating the purely political processes of that historical period, often revealing the essence and motivations of specific developments.

2. Armenian–Byzantine Politico-Ecclesiastical Relations During the Period of the Restoration of the Armenian Kingdom

The development of Armenian–Byzantine politico-ecclesiastical relations was remarkable, especially considering the existing theological difference between the two churches, dating back to the Council of Chalcedon in 451. Even earlier, the Byzantine Church had tried, unsuccessfully, to bring the Armenian Church, in addition to the Georgian Church, into its orbit1.

It is known that in 451 the Armenians were unable or unwilling to participate in the Council of Chalcedon, where the formula of the two natures of Jesus Christ was accepted (Shepard 2019, p. 23; Tanner 1990, p. 86). The Armenian Church did not accept that formula and remained faithful to the decisions of the three previous Ecumenical Councils (the Council of Nicaea in 325, the Council of Constantinople in 381, and the Council of Ephesus in 431). The direction accepted by the Armenian and some Eastern churches, now often called Miaphysitism (Winkler 1997, pp. 33–40; Parry 2010, p. 88), was the idea of the one united nature of Christ (Parry 2010, pp. 30–34). The non-participation of the Armenians, and then their refusal to accept the decisions of the Council of Chalcedon, subsequently led to significant contradictions in Armenian–Byzantine political relations, often turning the ecclesio-spiritual agenda into an agenda of international relations.

And then, during the process of the restoration of the Armenian Kingdom under the Bagratids, Byzantium again attempted to alter the Armenian Church’s confession. This imperial policy is clearly evident in the activities of Photios (858–867, 877–886), the Patriarch of Constantinople. At that time, Armenia already possessed significant potential, and it is no coincidence that both Byzantium and the Caliphate pursued a policy of appeasement towards Ashot Bagratid, Prince of Princes of Armenia (Sparapet or commander of Armenian army and Prince of Princes of Armenia: 855–887; King of Armenia: 887–891). Photios’ declared goal was to establish Armenian–Byzantine church unity or a union of faith (Vahanay Nikiay episkoposi banq 1968, vol. 7–9, pp. 257–58; Ananean 1988, vol. 1–4, p. 10). In this regard, his letter of 862 to Catholicos Zachary I of Dzagk’ (855–876/877) of Armenia is noteworthy. The letter has been preserved only in Armenian and is mentioned in Armenian sources (Tught’ Potay 1968a, vol. 1–3, pp. 65–100; 1968b, vol. 4–6, pp. 129–56). According to Armenian author Vardan Vardapet, Photios’ letter was a response to Catholicos Zachary I inquiry: “Why was the fourth council (i.e., the Council of Chalcedon—A.Y.) held?” (Thomson 1989, p. 184). Photios also sent an envoy to Armenia to present the content of the letter and justify Constantinople’s position; this was Vahan or Hovhan, Archbishop of Nicaea. The latter participated in the council convened in Shirakavan, Armenia, in 862 on the occasion of Photios’ letter2 and delivered a speech (Vahanay Nikiay episkoposi banq 1968, vol. 7–9, pp. 257–58).

The fact that Photios’ letter was written in response to Catholicos Zachary I’s unpreserved letter is evident from parts of the Patriarch of Constantinople’s letter, where it states, “…you wrote about the Council of Chalcedon” (Tught’ Potay 1968a, vol. 1–3, pp. 67–68). However, it should be noted that, considering that in a later letter to Ashot Bagratid, Prince of Princes of Armenia, Photios writes, “We wrote many times to your leaders and Catholicoses” (Girq t’ght’oc 1901, p. 281), it has been assumed that a regular debate took place between Photios and Zachary through letters (Ananean 1988, vol. 1–4, p. 15), and it might seem that these letters have not reached us. In reality, however, the phrase “your leaders and Catholicoses” written to Ashot, the leader of Armenia, implies that he is referring not only to the correspondence of the period in question but also to earlier ones. That is, we know about an unpreserved letter from Catholicos Zachary I, but as for his regular correspondence with Photios, that is merely a hypothesis based on an unclear interpretation of the phrase “your leaders and Catholicoses.”

During the council, Ashot, Sparapet of Armenia, was also in Shirakavan, but there are no grounds to assume his participation in the council, as he was in Shirakavan with his army and preparing to campaign north (Vahanay Nikiay episkoposi banq 1968, vol. 7–9, pp. 257–58).

In his letter to the rulers of Armenia, Photios expressed hope that the Emperor would liberate the Christians of the East and unite them all within a new ecumenical council. Consequently, he invited the Catholicos of Armenia to ecclesiastical unity3. In his letter, Photios stated that the Armenians had not initially opposed the Council of Chalcedon, which they had not attended at the time due to war with Sasanian Iran, and had accepted this council until the Council of Dvin in 554 in Armenia, which, as is known, was convened against the Council of Chalcedon4. He also presented instances of Armenian leaders acknowledging Chalcedon at various times, indicating that unity with the Byzantine Church was neither new nor unprecedented for Armenians (Tught’ Potay 1968a, vol. 1–3, pp. 67–72).

At the Shirakavan Council, Photios’ representative, Vahan-Hovhan, spoke, and the provisions of his speech were essentially Photios’ message to the Armenian secular and spiritual leaders (Vahanay Nikiay episkoposi banq 1968, vol. 7–9, pp. 257–80). It is difficult to say how the Shirakavan Council proceeded, but a few years later, Photios noted in his letter to the Eastern patriarchs that “the Armenians returned to the true faith (Photii Patriarchae Constantinopolitani Epistulae 1983, vol. I, p. 41)”, which shows that he considered the council’s decisions to be the Armenians’ “return to the true faith.” Perhaps this is why, in the Armenian version of Vahan-Hovhan’s speech at the council, 15 anathemas are also included alongside the speech, titled “15 anathemas, which were established.” Judging by the logic and structure of the text, these represent jointly drafted and mutually acceptable anathema-canons by the representative of the Patriarch of Constantinople and the participants of the Shirakavan Council (Ananean 1989, vol. 1–4, p. 42). It is highly probable that these were not only discussed but also adopted at the council. Presumably, the Patriarch essentially considered their adoption to be the Armenians’ “return” to the principles of the Council of Chalcedon. However, the adopted 15 anathema-canons contained no mention of the Armenians’ acceptance of the Council of Chalcedon; rather, they only anathematized those who had accepted the Council of Chalcedon for mercenary reasons and those who rejected the Council of Chalcedon by associating it with the teachings of Nestorius (Vahanay Nikiay episkoposi banq 1968, vol. 7–9, pp. 261–66). Essentially, this latter point was considered a great success, as it had been viewed as one of the main obstacles to the acceptance of the Council of Chalcedon in Armenia; Armenian clergy usually cited the similarity between the Chalcedonian Creed adopted at the Council of Chalcedon and Nestorianism to justify their refusal to accept the council (Patasxani t’ght’oyn P’otay 1968, pp. 453–56). This is also evident from Photios’ letter to Prince of Princes Ashot Bagratid years later, where he asserts that Nestorius’ teachings were refuted and rejected at the Council of Chalcedon (Pat’tchen tghtoyn 1968, vol. 10–12, pp. 443–44).

The Shirakavan Council’s outcome was considered to be the establishment of peaceful coexistence between Chalcedonians and non-Chalcedonians in Armenian–Byzantine border regions, based on mutual recognition (Dorfmann-Lazarev 2016, p. 313).

In this context, it should be added that in the regions of Armenia bordering the Chalcedonian states of Byzantium and Georgia, as a result of external religious influences among the Armenian population, and in addition to the Armenians of the original Armenian Miaphysite confession, Armenians of the Chalcedonian (Dyophysite) confession gradually began to appear. And since a fierce struggle sometimes arose between the Miaphysites and the Dyophysites, the opinion of I. Dorfmann-Lazarev is based precisely on this.

However, the recently emerged opinion in historiography that the goal of Byzantium’s religious policy was to eliminate the independence of the Armenian Church and unite it with the imperial church, and that Photios’ activities led to a temporary religious rapprochement between Armenians and Greeks (Aleksanyan 2025a, pp. 1–23), does not correspond to reality. Firstly, there could be no talk of religious rapprochement, as it is evident from the letter written to Prince of Princes Ashot of Armenia years later that he had achieved no success in his relations with the Armenians previously, which, as we will see, did not happen as a result of the letter to Ashot either. As for the goal of Byzantium’s religious policy to unite the Armenian Church with the imperial one, this is an exaggeration; Photios’ goal was the Armenian Church’s acceptance of the Chalcedonian confession, and this did not a priori mean unification with the imperial church, just as it was not the case for the Georgian and other churches that accepted the Chalcedonian confession. He only succeeded in having those who linked the Chalcedonian confession with Nestorius’ teachings anathematized at the council. In this regard, the opinion that Photios sought a union of churches (and not unification), which failed, is more realistic (Shepard 2019, p. 38).

On the other hand, the opinion that the fact that before becoming Catholicos, Mashtots I Yeghivardetsi (897) abolished the differences established by the Armenian patriarchs between Armenians and Chalcedonians, for which he was excommunicated by Catholicos Gevorg II Garnetsi (876/7–897), and also the fact that in the following decades, “debates” (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, p. 133) took place in Armenia around the Chalcedonian creed, shows that Photios did a lot to restore or activate the Chalcedonian movement in Armenia, although the failure to achieve the goal of the union of the churches can be considered a failure (Greenwood 2006, pp. 165, 167), can be perceived as only a general assessment of the activities of Patriarch Photios in relations with the Armenian Church.

The complexity arises because, beyond this general assessment, two opposing evaluations of Photios’s efforts are found in different primary sources. One, as mentioned, considered the outcome of the Shirakavan Council as “the Armenians’ return to the true faith”. The other, however, is Patriarch Nicholas Mystikos of Constantinople (901–907, 912–925) recording Photios’s failure to unite the churches in a 925 letter to the Armenian King (Nicholas I Patriarch of Constantinople Letters 1973, p. 451). Clearly, even Byzantine politico-ecclesiastical thought struggled to interpret the results of Photios’s actions, though Nicholas Mystikos’s account might be considered the prevailing view in Constantinople. Of course, interpreting the outcome of Archbishop Vahan-Hovhan’s delegation as “the Armenians’ return to the true faith” is an obvious exaggeration. His mission did not definitively resolve the core issue of ecclesiastical–confessional unity. Consequently, years later, Photios entered into correspondence with Ashot Bagratid, Prince of Princes of Armenia, again without success.

It is worth noting that while K. Maksoudian’s opinion—that the results of the Shirakavan Council contributed to the Caliph recognizing Ashot as Prince of Princes (Maksoudian 1988, pp. 335–40)—might seem exaggerated, it is plausible that the Caliphate indeed perceived the council’s outcomes as a sign of Ashot Bagratid’s and the Armenians’ loyalty.

In summary, Archbishop Vahan’s mission at the Shirakavan Council managed to achieve consensus with the Armenians on several canons, which can conditionally be called the Canons of Shirakavan (Vahanay Nikiay episkoposi banq 1968, vol. 7–9, pp. 261–66). While this seemed like a significant achievement at the time, it was later considered insufficient. This led Photios, years later, to personally appeal to the ruler of Armenia, Ashot Bagratid.

Before delving into the letter addressed to Ashot Bagratid, it is essential to clarify the Armenians’ motives for receiving Photios’s envoy, discussing the Patriarch of Constantinople’s conditions and partially accepting them. The core issue is that such precedents existed and were almost always tied to political circumstances, where Armenian leaders leveraged these interactions to gain Byzantine support. Photios himself presented such precedents in his letter to the participants of the Shirakavan Council (Tught’ Potay 1968a, vol. 1–3, pp. 67–72).

The presentation of the historical timing of the Shirakavan Council is extremely important here. The council took place in the Armenian year 311 (25 April 862–24 April 863) (Vahanay Nikiay episkoposi banq 1968, vol. 7–9, pp. 257–58). In the same year, Ashot Bagratid was proclaimed Prince of Princes by the Caliphate (Stepʻanos Tarōnecʻi 2017, p. 197). However, a chronicle concerning the council notes that Ashot Bagratid, who was in Shirakavan with his army at the time, is mentioned as sparapet. This indicates that he had not yet been proclaimed Prince of Princes during the council. Nevertheless, this pivotal event, full of great opportunities for Armenia, was very near. In fact, the council took place after 25 April 862.

Ashot Bagratid’s proclamation as Prince of Princes is highly praised in Armenian primary sources because, at that time, significant events were unfolding in and around Armenia, particularly related to the process of restoring the country’s independence. In such circumstances, securing the support of increasingly powerful Byzantium was crucial for Ashot Bagratid. Therefore, while Ashot Bagratid could not fully accept Photios’s demands, he also was not inclined to reject them entirely. This led to the outcome mentioned previously: Photios regarded the Shirakavan Council’s decisions as “the Armenians’ return to the true faith,” but later revisited this “return” with Ashot Bagratid. The anathema adopted in Shirakavan, targeting those who accepted the Council of Chalcedon for mercenary purposes, was, in essence, intended for precisely such situations.

Photios’s letter to Ashot Bagratid is dated “…during the patriarchy in Armenia Georg and in the year 320 (in Armenian, “թուին ՅԻ”) of A… prince of princes” (Girq t’ght’oc 1901, p. 278). Evidently, the second person mentioned is Ashot Bagratid. The other individual, Catholicos Gevorg II of Garni, reigned from 876/877–897, while Ashot Bagratid was Prince of Princes from 862–887.

If “in the year 320” (if under “in the year 320 (in Armenian, “թուին ՅԻ”)”) refers to a year of the Great Armenian Era, then the Armenian year 320 corresponds to 871–872. However, at that time, Photios’s patriarchate was interrupted, and he was isolated (Shepard 2019, pp. 31, 301). There is an alternative reading of “in the year 320” (in Armenian, “թուին ՅԻ”) as “in the 20th year” (in Armenian, “յԻ ամին”), meaning the reference would be to the 20th year of Ashot’s reign as Prince of Princes. The 20th year of Ashot’s rule as Prince of Princes was 881–882. At that time, Photios had been reinstated to the patriarchal throne (Shepard 2019, p. 301). The plausibility of such a correction is supported by the presence of several numerical errors in that part of the letter (Girq t’ght’oc 1901, p. 278). I. Dorfmann-Lazarev suggests that the letter was written between November 881 and October 882, based on the belief that the Patriarch must have written it after the “Council of 393 Bishops” held in Constantinople in 879–880 and in the 20th year of Ashot’s rule as Prince of Princes (Dorfmann-Lazarev 2002, pp. 183–84).

However, one Armenian primary source describes the mission of Nicomedes, an envoy sent by Byzantine Emperor Basil I (867–886) to Prince of Princes Ashot in the Armenian year 327 (878–879) (Patmut’iwn yaghags giwti 1902, pp. 1179–83). Although the essence of this envoy’s mission, according to the “History,” was quite different from the logic of Photios’s letter, it is possible that it concerns two different aspects of the same delegation. Moreover, due to damage to the text of Photios’s letter to Prince of Princes Ashot, the corrupted text of “in the year 320” (in Armenian, ՅԻ) could potentially be read as “in the year 327 (in Armenian, ՅԻԷ),” corresponding to 878–879—a period when Photios had been reinstated to the patriarchal throne.

Photios’s letter to Ashot Bagratid has also been preserved only in Armenian5. In this letter, Photios addresses Ashot Bagratid with great respect, considering him supreme among his peers (i.e., princes). At the same time, he uses quite stern language to threaten supporters of miaphysitism (The Armenian Church considers itself not Monophysite, but Miaphysite)6 with divine punishment and calls on the Prince of Princes to convey “the true confession of faith” to his people and establish it through councils (Pat’tchen tghtoyn 1968, vol. 10–12, pp. 447–48). From this letter, it can be inferred that Photios, having lost hope in the Armenian clergy (which he directly states) (Pat’tchen tghtoyn 1968, vol. 10–12, pp. 447–48), tried to resolve the issue through Prince of Princes Ashot. This is why he praises Ashot and criticizes the Miaphysite confession of the Armenian Church (Girq t’ght’oc 1901, pp. 281–82).

Photios’s letter left a significant impression on Ashot Bagratid’s court, necessitating a comprehensive response. Thus, by order of Ashot Bagratid, Sahak Mrut Vardapet, a prominent Armenian clergyman, replied to him. This was the same clergyman who had been persecuted by the Chalcedonians from the monastery of Ashunk (Oshk) in Tayk (Thomson 1989, p. 186).

In his reply, Sahak Vardapet, while outwardly maintaining politeness, clearly refuted Photios’s claims and rejected the Chalcedonian confession, formulating, “We cannot accept Chalcedon, which divides the one Christ into two parts” (Patasxani t’ght’oyn P’otay 1968, pp. 455–56). The letter also justified Christ’s single nature by using the example of humanity: a person is composed of body and soul but is considered one nature. Therefore, according to him, if Christ is attributed two natures, it actually results in three: two humans and one divine (Patasxani t’ght’oyn P’otay 1968, pp. 457–58). Sahak Vardapet also linked the Council of Chalcedon with Nestorius’s teachings, pointing out several similarities between them (Patasxani t’ght’oyn P’otay 1968, pp. 453–56).

By refuting the tenets of Photios’s letter and rejecting his demands, Ashot Bagratid nevertheless promised to maintain “obedience” to the Byzantine Emperor (Patasxani t’ght’oyn P’otay 1968, pp. 469–70). This indicated that the Armenian ruler highly valued Byzantium’s role in his policy of restoring the Armenian Kingdom and practically suggested considering ecclesiastical matters separately from political ones.

The political relations between Basil I, the founder of the Macedonian dynasty in Byzantine, and Ashot Bagratid were strategic and allied. It is known from Armenian primary sources that Basil I requested and received a crown from Ashot Bagratid (Thomson 1989, p. 186). Even if this information is not entirely accurate, it at least demonstrates close cooperation between the two rulers. Therefore, any undertaking that threatened this cooperation and Ashot Bagratid’s plan for the restoration of the Armenian Kingdom was unacceptable to him. In this situation, he could not afford to alienate an influential figure like Patriarch Photios of Constantinople. For this reason, he informed the Patriarch that, while he was practically declining to accept the Chalcedonian confession, he would undoubtedly continue cooperation with the Emperor. And as a result of the Armenian–Byzantine political alliance, Basil I recognized Ashot I’s enthronement (Stepʻanos Tarōnecʻi 2017, p. 211).

3. Communication Between Armenian Catholicos Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi and Patriarch Nicholas Mystikos of Constantinople in the Context of Armenian–Byzantine Ecclesiastical–Political Relations

Soon, the efforts of two ecclesiastical and political figures, Patriarch Nicholas Mystikos of Constantinople (901–907, 912–925) and Catholicos Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi of Armenia (898), began to emerge in the development of Armenian–Byzantine political relations.

Catholicos Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi, who authored “History of Armenia”, a crucial primary source describing events from ancient times up to 924 concerning the history of Armenia and neighboring countries, reigned during a critical and pivotal period for the Kingdom of Armenia. This was a time when, initially under King Smbat I Bagratid, the Armenian Kingdom reached the zenith of its power (Garsoian 1997, pp. 148–53), but then, following an enemy attack in 909, it plunged into a severe crisis (Garsoian 1997, pp. 155–58).

During Smbat I’s reign, Armenian–Byzantine relations in general, and ecclesiastical relations in particular, saw interesting developments, with the latter being a dependent variable of the former. Initially, Smbat I even faced significant problems with the Arab Caliphate due to deepening relations with Byzantium. He was attacked by the Sajid Emirate, which he only averted by offering lavish gifts and justifying that the strengthening of Armenian–Byzantine relations would only benefit the Caliphate (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, p. 138). However, years passed, and the Caliphate did not forget Armenia’s efforts to strengthen and deepen relations with Byzantium. During this time, Armenia was attacked in 894 by the Sajid Emirate, a vassal of the Caliphate, but managed to resist victoriously (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, pp. 142–44).

During this period, there is no known attempt by the Patriarch of Constantinople to achieve ecclesiastical union with the Armenian Church. The situation changed when, between 909 and 914, the Kingdom of Armenia was subjected to the campaigns of the Sajid Emirate’s forces and found itself in a state of crisis. The war of Sajid Amir Yusuf (901–919, 922–927) against the Armenian Kingdom continued, with some interruptions, throughout his entire reign.

In this critical situation for the Kingdom of Armenia, when, according to Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi, the Byzantine emperors could not come to the aid of King Smbat I (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, p. 174), Patriarch Nicholas Mystikos of Constantinople became active, entering into correspondence with the Catholicos of Armenia and the Armenian King. In total, there were four letters. Two of them, authored by the Patriarch, have been preserved in Greek, while the others, one also by the Patriarch and the other by the Armenian Catholicos, have been preserved in Armenian in Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi’s work, “History of Armenia”.

For dating the correspondence, the following is essential: Nicholas Mystikos was the Patriarch of Constantinople during a difficult period in Byzantine and Armenian history. Reigning initially from 901–907 and resuming his patriarchate from 912, the Patriarch was most likely removed from the church by Empress Zoe in 914 (Theophanes Continuatus 2025, pp. 64–93), and the Empress herself was subsequently exiled and returned from exile in the same year, 914 (Shepard 2019, p. 505). Nicholas Mystikos later regained his throne (Theophanes Continuatus 2025, pp. 64–93), but these events rule out the letters being sent in 914 CE.

Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi writes about Nicholas Mystikos’s letter, preserved in his own work, stating that it was sent to him after the Patriarch heard about the misfortunes that befell Armenia. This implies that the initiative for the correspondence came from the Patriarch. The latter’s letter, preserved in its Greek original, actually followed the one he himself wrote and which was preserved by Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi, as it was written after the coronation of Smbat I’s son, Ashot II (914–929), which took place in 914 (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, pp. 179, 189–91). Furthermore, before the Patriarch’s letter in the Catholicos’s work, there were also events that took place in Transcaucasia in 914 or 915 CE. These refer to military operations that occurred among the peoples of Abkhazia, Georgia, Kakheti, and Aghvank [“the northern races living at the foot of the Caucasus” (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, p. 185)] and against Armenia (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, p. 185; Kartlis Tskhovreba 2014, p. 145). Upon hearing about the ensuing misfortunes (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, pp. 185–89), the Patriarch of Constantinople wrote his first letter to Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi. The Catholicos of Armenia quotes the entire text of this letter. The Patriarch expresses sorrow for the misfortunes that befell Armenia, Georgia, and Caucasian Albania, caused by the Sajid Emirate. He offers several pieces of advice to the Catholicos for resolving the problems and outlines his actions: he appeals to the elder of Abkhazia to be at peace with the Armenian rulers for the purpose of joint struggle against the Sajid Emirate’s forces. The Patriarch exhorts them to unite with the other Christian rulers of the region, to act actively for this unity until the Emperor can come with troops to help, expecting the cooperation of the Armenian, Georgian, Abkhazian, and Caucasian Albanian rulers in the fight against the enemy (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, pp. 189–91).

It is noteworthy that in the letter, the Patriarch considers the Armenian Catholicos the supreme leader of the Christians of Armenia, Georgia, and Caucasian Albania (“on behalf of the Armenians, the Iberians (Georgians), and the Albanians, who collectively comprise your faithful flock,” “your flock, namely the Armenians, the Iberians (Georgians), and the Albanians”) (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, pp. 189–90), which is more of a promise to the Armenian Catholicos in exchange for what is expected of him in Constantinople. This letter was most likely written in 915, but earlier than the Patriarch’s Greek-preserved letter presented below.

The Catholicos received the letter while in the domains of the Georgian King Aturnerseh (899–923). He succeeded in persuading the Georgian King to live in peace and unity with the other Christian rulers of the region and obtained an oath from him confirming this promise (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, p. 191). But since Yusuf Sajid was in Dvin and launching attacks from there in all directions of the country, battles began in the south and southeast of Armenia. At the same time, Ashot II was fighting both against the Sajid Emirate and in the Georgian regions (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, pp. 191–92).

Subsequently, the Catholicos, recounting events that took place in 915 (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, pp. 191–92), presented his letter addressed to Byzantine Emperor Constantine VII (913–959). It is highly significant here that the Catholicos, who had previously received a letter from the Patriarch of Constantinople regarding extricating Armenia and neighboring countries from their difficult situation, wrote a letter with the same problems not to the Patriarch, but directly to the Emperor. In that letter, he recounted the misfortunes that befell Armenia, the hardships suffered by the people, his imprisonment and tribulations, and the tragic death of Smbat I (7 January 914 CE), requesting the Emperor’s assistance. He wrote that he had long intended to visit Constantinople, but the course of events prevented him from doing so (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, p. 196). He urged the Emperor to come with an army and conquer Armenia [“you should subordinate those parts which you had received in the beginning by virtue of your desirable laws” (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, p. 196)]. The letter was full of descriptions of Armenia’s difficult situation and lines reflecting the desire and hope for its liberation by Byzantium (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, pp. 196–97).

In response, the Emperor sent his envoy, Theodoros Vasilikos, to Armenia to invite him and Ashot II to Constantinople. Theodoros Vasilikos first went to the Catholicos in Taron, after which he went to meet Ashot II, with whom he eventually departed for Constantinople (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, p. 198). There, Ashot II was received with honors (Skylitzes 2010, p. 196), and by throne, he was recognized as higher than all the throne-holders of Armenia. The Armenian nakharars (princes) who traveled with him to Constantinople also received great honors (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, p. 198). However, the Catholicos, who did not go to Constantinople, stated that he was worried that “perhaps someone might be found who would ostensibly consider my going there as proof of my association with the Chalcedonians” (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, p. 198). In summary, the Catholicos wrote that he did not go “lest I might scandalize the minds of the weak” (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, p. 198). After staying in Taron for about nine months, the Catholicos then returned to Ayrarat (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, pp. 199–200).

It is important to note here that Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi highly praises his predecessor, Catholicos Mashtots I Yegivardetsi (897) (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, p. 132), even though he knew about a transgression Mashtots committed before 897, for which Gevorg II Garnetsi had anathematized him. This refers to Mashtots’s independent abolition of the differences established by the Armenian patriarchs between Armenians and Chalcedonians (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, p. 133). Even after the anathema, which Mashtots himself accepted as a rightful act (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, p. 133), he became the Catholicos of Armenia. This fact can be interpreted as a sign of Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi’s softened attitude towards the Chalcedonians, as his letter to the Emperor also seems to suggest a similar thought.

Ashot II, after staying in Constantinople for about 10 months and hearing news of Yusuf’s new attacks, returned to Armenia. The Emperor sent a Byzantine army with him to Armenia, with the help of which the central parts of Armenia were liberated (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, pp. 201–2). In terms of the Armenian–Byzantine alliance formed as a result of Ashot II’s visit to Constantinople and related issues, Nicholas Mystikos’s two Greek-preserved letters are significant. There are different opinions regarding the timing of these letters. The first of these letters, which was considered to be addressed to Armenian King Ashot II and Catholicos Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi and whose date of writing was considered to be 922 (Jenkins 1961, pp. 75–80), was actually written, judging from the text, only to the Armenian Catholicos and most likely in 915, when King Ashot II had traveled to Byzantium (Skylitzes 2010, p. 196), was in Constantinople, and was recognized there as superior over Armenia and the surrounding countries (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, p. 198; Bart’ikyan 1966, p. 252).

In the letter, the Patriarch writes to the addressee, Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi, that the Emperor has done him a benevolence and expresses hope that he fully understands this and is obliged to repay the Emperor with services. The Patriarch adds that in that case, he would feel satisfied that he had become the mediator for such a grateful person. It is evident that the addressee of the letter had previously appealed to the Patriarch to become a mediator in the relations between the Armenian King and the Emperor. This is not discernible from previous letters, although here the discussion is clearly about the Patriarch’s support for Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi’s appeal to the Emperor by letter. The Patriarch then makes it clear that the Emperor has heeded the addressee’s request and has given the Armenian King (who, according to the correspondent, was destined for Armenian rule) “confirmation and honor,” which the latter greatly desired. The Patriarch then writes that the Emperor, in response to his benevolence, expects the Armenian Catholicos and King to fulfill his will, to be in agreement and loyal to him, and to become his true friends (Nicholas I Patriarch of Constantinople Letters 1973, pp. 371–73). The addressee of the letter is clearly Catholicos Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi, whom the Patriarch calls “your Perfection” and sends a robe as a gift (Nicholas I Patriarch of Constantinople Letters 1973, pp. 371–73). And he who is destined for the Armenian rule and whom the Emperor has confirmed in his status and granted the aforementioned honor (of supreme ruler—A.E.) is none other than King Ashot II Bagratid, who, as we saw, had been in Constantinople and received great honors.

This was the second letter from Nicholas Mystikos to the Armenian Catholicos. The Patriarch’s letter is filled with expectations of receiving services from the Emperor in return for his actions, provided he remained a loyal friend. This clearly shows the Patriarch’s anticipation of later approaching the Armenian Catholicos with specific demands.

Time passed, and the stabilized situation of the Armenian Kingdom once again provoked its adversaries. Starting in 922, Yusuf Sajian resumed his campaigns against Armenia, which again found itself in a difficult position (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, pp. 230–33).

From another letter preserved in the original Greek, it becomes clear that Nicholas Mystikos continued to be interested in the affairs of Armenia. This letter, written to King Ashot II, indicates that the Armenian Catholicos had died, and the Armenian King had sent envoys to Constantinople to convey this news. The Patriarch’s letter reveals that Ashot II’s representatives in Constantinople stated his desire for the new Catholicos to be ordained by the Patriarch of Constantinople. The Patriarch wrote to the Armenian King that, by showing wisdom in due time, he had received many benefits. He also wrote that Ashot II should choose and send a Catholicos candidate to Constantinople. This candidate would stay in Constantinople as long as necessary to receive the “exact doctrine” (doctrine of piety) and become familiar with matters of piety and the ecclesiastical situation, after which he would be ordained and return. The Patriarch believed it was necessary for the Armenian King, as much as he was a friend to the Emperor and the Byzantine Church, to be equally attached to the confession of faith and the correct doctrines. The Patriarch, in his letter, recalls Photios, who, despite his efforts, had not found a solution to the issue. He believed it was time to achieve agreement in the doctrines of piety between the two Christian states, specifically for the Armenians to accept the Chalcedonian doctrine. Therefore, given Ashot II’s expressed desire, he urged the prompt sending of the Catholicos candidate to Constantinople (Nicholas I Patriarch of Constantinople Letters 1973, pp. 447–51).

It is evident from the letter that Ashot II, under certain conditions, agreed to the idea of church union, provided the Chalcedonian Council’s doctrine was accepted. Perhaps this occurred during his stay in Constantinople in 915, when, “in your wisdom of how many benefits you have been granted.” Since he had agreed, they expected him to send a Catholicos candidate to Byzantium who would be prepared to accept the Chalcedonian doctrine. Furthermore, the Catholicos was to be ordained in Constantinople, as the local Patriarch was considered the supreme ecclesiastical leader among the Chalcedonians and possessed the right to ordain.

It is crucial to precisely determine the date of the letter’s writing, as this would shed light on the events and their significant details. Various dates have been proposed for the Patriarch of Constantinople’s letter, sometimes considering the dates of his and the Armenian Catholicos’s deaths. Nicholas Mystikos died on 15 May 925, and Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi, according to the latest dating, also in 925, after reigning for 28 years starting from 898 (Garsoian 1997, p. 162; Yeghiazaryan 2020, pp. 172–74). Thus, it appears that Nicholas Mystikos died later than Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi and was undoubtedly aware of the latter’s death. Those who propose an earlier date for Nicholas Mystikos’s letter, specifically 912–913, emphasize that 913 was a crisis year for the Armenian Kingdom. The information regarding the deceased Catholicos is explained by the fact that the Catholicos was actually alive but effectively incapacitated due to prolonged imprisonment by the Sajians, which led King Smbat I of Armenia to consider electing a new Catholicos (Bart’ikyan 1966, p. 254). That is, proponents of this view believe the letter was written to King Smbat I of Armenia. R. Jenkins suggests 922 as the letter’s date, leaving the final resolution to Armenian specialists (Jenkins 1961, p. 80), while V. Grumel proposes 924–925 (Les Regestes des Actes 1936, pp. 197–98). It should be noted that those who dated the letter earlier than 925 were particularly influenced by the previously incorrect dating of Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi’s death to 929 or 930 (Ter-Ghewondyan 1976, pp. 2, 135). In fact, based on the evidence, V. Grumel’s view is correct, as it is highly improbable that a new leader would be elected while a religious leader was still alive but considered deceased. The new, precise dating of Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi’s death to 925 resolves the issue: he died before Patriarch Nicholas Mystikos of Constantinople, and the latter approached Ashot II with the proposal to send a new Catholicos candidate to Constantinople.

From this, an important conclusion emerges. Although Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi, as seen in his letter to the Emperor, expressed hope and believed that the Emperor would come with an army and conquer Armenia, freeing the Armenians from the enemy, in essence, he did not inspire the Patriarch with any hope regarding the acceptance of the Chalcedonian Council’s doctrine. Therefore, the Patriarch, despite hinting in his 915 letter to the Catholicos about the expectation of services and compensation in return for the Emperor’s benefactions, was forced to “wait” until the Catholicos’s death to demand from Ashot II a response to the mentioned benefactions and, as we will see below, the fulfillment of the promises made in Constantinople in 915 by sending a Catholicos candidate ready to accept the Chalcedonian Council’s doctrine.

The above, combined with the dating and content of the Patriarch’s last letter, allows for the reconstruction of the following sequence of events: In the last years of Smbat I’s reign, between 909 and 913, Prince Ashot, who found himself in an extremely difficult situation and suffered defeat on the battlefield, took refuge in Byzantium at the court of Leo VI (Stepʻanos Tarōnecʻi 2017, p. 221). After this, he returned and waged successful liberation battles. Later, when the support of the empire was needed, Ashot II, by then proclaimed King, again, but this time officially, visited Constantinople in 915. There, his paramount rights in Armenia were recognized. He arrived in Armenia with Byzantine auxiliary troops, in exchange for which, in all likelihood, he promised significant concessions in ecclesiastical matters, which the Patriarch hinted at in his last letter of 925. The Armenian Catholicos was also aware of these promises. Although in his letter to the Emperor he suggested that the Emperor conquer, i.e., take Armenia under his patronage, when the Emperor’s envoy came in 915 and invited him to Constantinople with Ashot II, he did not dare to go, citing probable accusations against him regarding his ties with the Chalcedonians. Here it is important to remember that, before that, in Nicholas Mystikos’s letter to him, quoted by Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi, the Patriarch called him the leader of “the unified faithful flock of Armenians, Georgians, and Albanians,” which researchers have had difficulty interpreting due to the factual impossibility of the Armenian Catholicos being supreme over the Georgian Church and its faithful given the differences in the doctrines of the mentioned churches. The above allows us to assume that the Catholicos had previously received his share of promises in the case of church union, namely supremacy over the Georgian and Caucasian Albania’s churches. Therefore, in his subsequent letter to the Emperor, he invited the Emperor to conquer Armenia and take it under his patronage. However, when the moment came to take concrete steps and travel to Constantinople, the Catholicos did not dare to do so, aiming to avoid accusations of ties with the Chalcedonians. Incidentally, the Catholicos himself mentions the nature of the probable accusations—namely the connection with the Chalcedonians—which supports the aforementioned assumptions. It can be believed that the Catholicos’s correspondence and Ashot II’s awareness of and non-opposition to the promises regarding church union were temporary diplomatic ploys, made with the expectation of saving a country in a difficult situation. Subsequently, Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi’s relations with Ashot II were almost always strained (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, pp. 203–16), possibly due to these very promises, which had not been forgotten in Constantinople.

The further course of events shows that Ashot II had no desire to fulfill the promises extracted from him in a difficult situation, and thus the situation dragged on until 925. Nicholas Mystikos died in 925, after which, in essence, his demand for Chalcedonianization, which was more of a coercion, became null and void. After Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi, Stephanos II was the Catholicos of Armenia for one year (925–926). Stepʻanos Tarōnecʻi, a historian almost contemporary with the events, does not mention Stephanos II, as if he did not even reign (Stepʻanos Tarōnecʻi 2017, pp. 221–23). It can be assumed that he was precisely the candidate for the Armenian Catholicosate whom the Patriarch had wished to see in Constantinople and ordain. His omission can be attributed to the fact that he had been in Constantinople, or at least, as stated in Nicholas Mystikos’s last letter, was ready to accept the Chalcedonian doctrine. However, King Ashot II was no longer inclined to fulfill Constantinople’s demand. The consequence of this can be seen in both Stephanos II’s short rule and the worsening of relations between Armenia and Byzantium and, consequently, in the year of Yusuf Sajian’s death, Hijra 315 (8 March 927–24 February 928), the Byzantine army’s campaign against Armenia in the direction of Dvin (Constantine Porphyrogenitus 1967, p. 209), which Ashot II resisted in alliance with the Arab commander Nasir al-Subuqi (Ibn Al-Asir 1987, pp. 35–36; Stepʻanos Tarōnecʻi 2017, pp. 221–22).

Thus, Armenian–Byzantine ecclesiastical–political relations in the early 10th century recorded notable developments. This was when the spiritual leaders of the two states negotiated through correspondence about Armenian–Byzantine ties, Armenia’s position regarding the Byzantine Empire, the recognition of the Armenian ruler by Byzantium and the services to be rendered in return, the liberation of Armenia by Byzantine troops, and the expectations of the empire. In essence, despite inter-church dogmatic disputes and sometimes escalating conflicts, the spiritual leaders were well aware of the mutual importance of the two states for each other. The Patriarch of Constantinople harbored hope of achieving ecclesiastical union, and the Armenian Catholicos, wittingly or unwittingly, inspired such hopes in him. From this perspective, with the mentioned facts and arguments, the recently expressed idea that “To get rid of the oppression of the Arab emirates, Armenians preferred to accept the patronage of Christian Byzantium” (Aleksanyan 2025b, vol. 15, p. 219) does not correspond to reality, as no such preference existed, and the issue of Byzantine patronage, and that too only as a political card, was played by Ashot II.

4. The Chalcedonian Movement in Armenia in the 940s–950s in the Context of Processes During the Reigns of Kings Ashot II and Abas Bagratid

In the context of the activation of the Chalcedonian movement in Armenia, key issues that need clarification include the absence of the Armenian Catholicos during the coronations of Ashot II and Abas Bagratid and the organization of their coronations by Georgian rulers.

After the restoration of the Armenian Kingdom, the coronation ceremonies of the first two kings, Ashot I and Smbat I Bagratid, were, as expected, performed by the Armenian Catholicos, George II Garnetsi (876/877–897) (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, pp. 128, 132). However, later, the coronations of Ashot II and Abas (929–953) Bagratid were conducted without the participation of the Armenian Catholicos. Catholicos Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi, in his work “History of Armenia,” twice mentions that Ashot II was crowned by the Georgian King Atrnerseh in 914, without any hint of his own participation in the event. The very fact that he writes, “the king of Iberia (Gorgia) and his armies … made Asot king in place of his father” (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, p. 179), and then repeats, “Ašot, the son of Smbat, whom the king of Iberia (Georgia) and his forces had set up as king over the Armenians” (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, p. 192), already testifies that he did not participate in this ceremony; otherwise, he would have been the one performing the coronation. Information from Armenian primary sources indicate that after the defeat of the army led by Ashot II in the Battle of Dzknavačar in 910, he went to Byzantium, to Emperor Leo VI (886–912)7. He was there once again during the reign of Emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus in 915 and was recognized as supreme throughout Armenia (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, p. 198). As a result, by 925, the Patriarch of Constantinople, in a letter to him, hinted at his inclination towards church union and, more precisely, the acceptance of the Chalcedonian doctrine by Armenians. These realities confirm that the organization of Ashot II’s coronation by the Georgian King, although not a step towards church union and could not have been, nevertheless demonstrated Ashot II’s non-principled position on ecclesiastical–dogmatic issues. It is not even known whether the cleric who performed the coronation ceremony was a representative of the Armenian or Georgian Church. However, Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi’s second mention of Ashot II’s coronation being organized by the Georgian King indicates that it was extremely difficult for the Catholicos.

It appears that Ashot II’s brother and successor, Abas Bagratid, was also crowned without the participation of the Armenian Catholicos. Since there is no actual mention of Abas Bagratid’s coronation in the sources, there has been a circulating assumption that it was organized in 929 by the Armenian Catholicos Theodore I (926–937), who resided in Vaspurakan, at the command of King Gagik Artsruni of Vaspurakan (908–943) (Chamcheanc 1785, p. 822). However, this is not a well-founded view, as Gagik Artsruni was an opponent of Abas Bagratid for the Armenian throne. Like the latter, he also held the title of King of Armenia Yeghiazaryan 2016: pp. 77–94), and, consequently, he could not have had any interest in organizing Abas’s coronation as King of Armenia. And it is impossible that Abas would agree to be crowned by a Catholicos who resided in the region of his political opponent, Vaspurakan. (It is known that after Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi moved to the Kingdom of Vaspurakan in 924, Armenian Catholicoses Stephanos II, Theodore I, Yeghishe (937–941), and Anania I Mokatsi (941–966), during the first five years of his reign, resided in Vaspurakan.) The aforementioned facts and arguments show that King Abas Bagratid was also not crowned by the Armenian Catholicos. And considering that his father-in-law was Gurgen, one of the Georgian princes (Yovhannēs Draskhanakertcʻi 1987, p. 207; Stepʻanos Tarōnecʻi 2017, p. 221), there is a possibility that Abas was also crowned in Virk (Georgia), where he remained until Ashot II’s death. In essence, on the one hand, the political situation in Armenia, and on the other hand, the absence of the Armenian Catholicos from his domains in the central part of Armenia, led to Abas Bagratid’s coronation taking place without his participation.

Perhaps this was the reason why the Chalcedonian movement in Armenia became active precisely during the reign of Abas Bagratid. Taking advantage of the Catholicos of Armenia’s inactive approach, stemming from his isolated situation in Vaspurakan, Chalcedonism began to spread actively in the southeastern and eastern parts of Armenia. The rise of Chalcedonian successes coincided with the 940s–950s. At that time, the Armenian Catholicos was Anania I Mokatsi, who in 945 returned the Catholicosate to the center of Armenia and began actively strengthening the positions of the Armenian Church. In doing so, he inevitably clashed with the active Chalcedonian movement. According to him, during that period, “the Chalcedonian heresy… consumed our country like cancer” (Tear’n Ananiayi Hayoc kat’oghikosi 2009, p. 259). Since the activation of the Chalcedonians was a consequence of the separatist tendencies of the rulers of Syunik and Khachen, to overcome the leaders of this movement—the secular and spiritual rulers of the mentioned regions—he even appealed to King Abas to receive a royal decree. As a result, in two phases, in 949 and during the reign of King Ashot III Bagratid (953–978) in 959, he was able to not only isolate and weaken these rulers but also overcome the advance of the Chalcedonians in Armenia. As a result, the latter ceased to be a significant factor (Tear’n Ananiayi Hayoc kat’oghikosi 2009, pp. 256–73).

In fact, under the conditions of the activation of the Chalcedonian movement, the 940s–950s were years of alarm for the Armenian Church, related to the schism of various factions and the spread of Chalcedonism. This period is sometimes called “the great war in the Church” in primary sources (Step’annos Orbelean 2012–2015, ch. 52), in terms of the great dangers shaking the church. However, Anania Mokatsi succeeded in overcoming all this by 959, with the support of Ashot III: “by the grace of this mighty one and the prayers of the saints” (Tear’n Ananiayi Hayoc kat’oghikosi 2009, p. 273; Step’annos Orbelean 2012–2015, ch. 52–53).

It is interesting that in the Armenian reality of the period in question, when Chalcedonism was mentioned, it was presented with either “Greek” (Byzantine) or “Georgian” qualifiers, which clearly indicates which particular Chalcedonian church or country’s influence was being referred to. The Chalcedonian movement active in Armenia during King Abas’s reign aimed to cooperate with the Georgian Church, which clearly shows the influence of Georgian spiritual rulers in Armenia’s internal political developments, most likely as a consequence of Ashot II’s and Abas’s policies and attitudes. However, the Georgian church’s policy was active in eastern Armenia, which was more or less close to Virk (Georgia), whereas below we will see that in southern Armenia, in Vaspurakan, Byzantium’s policy became active.

Regarding external influence or pressure, it is important to remember that the policy of the Georgian and also Abkhazian or Egrisi (the second Chalcedonian state in the South Caucasus besides the Kingdom of Georgia) rulers towards the Miaphysite church was also emphasized during King Abas’s reign by the forced migration of Miaphysite monks from Abkhazia and Virk (Kirakos Gandzakets’i 1986, p. 76; Stepʻanos Tarōnecʻi 2017, p. 224), who then carried out extensive activities in Armenia (Kirakos Gandzakets’i 1986, p. 76; Stepʻanos Tarōnecʻi 2017, pp. 224–25), and subsequently by the Abkhazian army’s invasion of Armenia and the threat of consecrating the Holy Apostles Church of Kars, which was built by Abas Bagratid’s order and completed in 942, with a Chalcedonian rite (Stepʻanos Tarōnecʻi 2017, pp. 222–23). Abas succeeded in defeating the Abkhazian army on the banks of the Kura River, removing this danger from Armenia.

In other words, there was clearly considerable pressure on the Armenian Church from the Georgian and Abkhazian rulers on one side, and from Byzantium on the other. As a result, the Chalcedonian movement became active and gained serious positions in Armenia. However, as we have seen, Armenian Kings Abas and Ashot III, with the support of the Armenian Catholicos, were able to overcome the pressure from neighboring Chalcedonian states and the advancement of the Chalcedonian movement within the kingdom.

In essence, if we also discuss the activities of Catholicos Anania Mokatsi against Chalcedonism in Armenia during the reigns of Kings Abas and Ashot III Bagratid and their results, then the events of the 940s–950s can unequivocally be considered a period of strengthening the positions of the Armenian Church against external and internal political and ecclesiastical–dogmatic pressures.

To summarize this section, we note that, most likely, the decisive position of the Bagratid kings on dogmatic issues was the reason why Byzantium’s policy, in pursuing its interests, began to bet on other local kings of Armenia, more specifically, King Hamazasp Abusahl of Vaspurakan (959–969).

5. Byzantine Policy Towards the Armenian Kingdom of Vaspurakan and the Reactivation of the Chalcedonian Movement in Armenia in the 960s

Due to the resolute position adopted by Kings Abas and Ashot III Bagratid on ecclesiastical–dogmatic issues, Byzantium, already during the reign of Emperor Nikephoros Phokas (963–969), attempted to exploit Hamazasp Abusahl, the ruler of the Kingdom of Vaspurakan, one of Armenia’s local kingdoms, for its own interests. Since Hamazasp Abusahl’s father, King Gagik (908–943), had aspirations to be proclaimed supreme throughout Armenia and even appropriated Ashot II’s title of “Shahanshah/King of Kings” (Ibn Ẓāfir 1999, p. 63; Yeghiazaryan 2016, pp. 77–94), Hamazasp Abusahl was also swayed by similar ideas, which Byzantium sought to use for its own benefit. This issue has never before been examined from this perspective. These aspirations become clear from the mission of Father Pandaleon. In 965, as a symbolic gesture, the King of Vaspurakan sent Father Pandaleon to Constantinople to bring back fragments of holy relics (Alishan 1901, pp. 122–23). Despite his priestly status, Pandaleon was an Armenian actively involved in diplomatic affairs. Matthew of Edessa, presenting John I Tzimiskes’s (referred to as Chmshkik in Armenian sources) (969–976) letter to Ashot III from approximately 975, then adds that he also wrote to the Armenian doctor Ghevond, addressing him by his Greek name “Pandaleon” (i.e., all-encompassing Leon), thanking him for resolving the dispute between himself and Ashot III and inviting him to Constantinople (Matthew of Edessa 1993, p. 33). This was, in fact, the same Leon the Philosopher who, among other envoys, participated in the 974 negotiations between John I Tzimiskes and Ashot III, achieving peace between the two rulers (Matthew of Edessa 1993, p. 27). Prior to this, he was effectively serving the local King of Vaspurakan, having been delegated by him to Constantinople.

Hamazasp Abusahl sent Pandaleon to Constantinople in the Armenian year 414 (March 965-March 966) but not initially for the relics of Saints Peter and Paul, which he indeed became interested in later. Pandaleon writes, “In the years of Nikephoros, the master of the universe, emperor of the Greeks… I, the suffering Pandaleon, and not according to the merits of a priest, …by the command of my second master of the universe, Abusahl Hamazasp, King of Kings of this great state, the house of Armenians, to go on the journey … to Constantinople, in the 414th year of our Armenian reckoning (965/966) …” (Alishan 1901, pp. 122–23).

Pandaleon calling Hamazasp Abusahl “second master of the universe” and “King of Kings” meant the following. First, as stated, the first master of the universe was the Byzantine Emperor. Second, in Armenian and South Caucasian reality, the Bagratid ruler, particularly Smbat I and his successors, was called “master of the universe” (Kartlis Tskhovreba 2014, p. 144; Thomson 1989, p. 1898; Matthew of Edessa 1993, p. 1049). That is, if in a regional–global sense the title “master of the universe” reflected the Emperor’s status, then the same title represented the status of the Armenian King in the region where he was supreme. However, when it was necessary to present the two rulers in comparison, the Armenian King became the “second master of the universe”. As for the title “King of Kings”, which was synonymous with “Shahanshah,” again, the Bagratid kings were called that (Stepʻanos Tarōnecʻi 2017, p. 221; Yeghiazaryan 2022, pp. 43–58).

In fact, Pandaleon honors the King of Vaspurakan with titles that his father, Gagik Artsruni, had borne. From this, it can be concluded that Byzantium, through Pandaleon, instilled hopes in Hamazasp Abusahl regarding the recognition of his supremacy in Armenia, which was carried out for a specific purpose. And when Hamazasp Abusahl gave refuge in Vaspurakan in 968 to Catholicos Vahan, who had been dethroned on charges of accepting Chalcedonism (Stepʻanos Tarōnecʻi 2017, p. 233), it became clear that in terms of cooperating with Byzantium, he had understood the empire’s objective and was ready to support its implementation.

It is unknown how Armenian King Ashot III Bagratid reacted to his actions. However, the annexation of the Taron region of Armenia to Byzantium in 966/967 (Stepʻanos Tarōnecʻi 2017, p. 235; Shepard 2019, p. 357) also worried the rulers of Vaspurakan. Thus, it is not accidental that in 974, Hamazasp Abusahl’s sons, the kings of Vaspurakan Hovhannes Senekerim and Gurgen Khachik, were present with troops in Ashot III’s army when he camped in Hark against John Tzimiskes’s forces that had arrived in Taron (Matthew of Edessa 1993, pp. 27–28). Incidentally, here Pandaleon, who was the same Pandaleon, played the role of mediator between the Emperor and the Armenian King and earned the Emperor’s gratitude (Matthew of Edessa 1993, p. 33).

Byzantium’s activation and cooperation with Hamazasp Abusahl led to the revival of the Chalcedonian movement. After Anania Mokatsi’s death in 966, Vahan Syunetsi (966–968) became Catholicos (Stepʻanos Tarōnecʻi 2017, p. 233), having previously been Bishop of Syunik (960–966) (Step’annos Orbelean 2012–2015, ch. 53). A year after ascending the throne, he began to show clear signs of adhering to Chalcedonism: he had icons brought from Virk (Georgia) placed in churches, and in churches in areas bordering Byzantium, it was forbidden to celebrate liturgy without such icons. His actions raised suspicions that he had come to an agreement with the Greeks, that he had an alliance with them, and complaints were sent to the King (Step’annos Orbelean 2012–2015, ch. 53). Stepʻanos Tarōnecʻi testifies that “And then Vahanik10 became catholicos, from the district of Bałk’, son of Juanšēr, prince of Bałk’. Through letters, this man wanted to foster close relations and achieve agreement with the Chalcedonians” (Stepʻanos Tarōnecʻi 2017, p. 233). According to Kirakos Gandzakets’i, Vahan, who had reigned for one year, “negotiated unity of faith with the Georgians” (Kirakos Gandzakets’i 1986, p. 77). In fact, both authors accuse him of desiring to achieve official ecclesiastical union.

In fact, the ecclesiastical life in Armenia, which had just recently been pacified, was again agitated. The burgeoning Chalcedonian movement was this time led by the newly elected Armenian Catholicos. Moreover, despite the aforementioned information that the Catholicos had made an alliance with the Georgian Church, the activation of the Chalcedonian movement in Armenia is debatable exclusively in the context of Byzantium’s advancement, because, as we saw, there was talk of establishing a new order of liturgy in churches located on the Byzantine border.

The created situation in Armenia raised a wave of protest. In 968, an ecclesiastical council was convened in Ani against Catholicos Vahan, who, anticipating what would happen, fled and took refuge in Vaspurakan, receiving the support of Hamazasp Abusahl. This confirms the aforementioned view that the activation of the Chalcedonian movement was caused by Byzantium’s policy; otherwise, Catholicos Vahan would have gone to Virk (Georgia). His path to his native Syunik region, where he had been a bishop before becoming Catholicos, was closed due to the loyalty of the local princes to Ashot III. The council, with the support of Ashot III, confirmed that Catholicos Vahan was sympathetic to the Chalcedonian church (“…a council of blessed fathers at Ani, at which they examined [the beliefs of] Vahan, the kat’oghikos who was from Baghk’ and who was sympathetic to the Iberians/Georgians. He had introduced images into the churches of the Armenians and removed the glorious Cross from all altars, decorating [the altars] with images. They anathematized him and put a certain Step’annos in his place”) (Step’annos Orbelean 2012–2015, ch. 53), dethroned him, and elected Stephanos Sevansti (968–970) as the new Catholicos (Stepʻanos Tarōnecʻi 2017, p. 233).

However, from Stephanos Orbelian’s information, “for two years it remained—Step’annos was seated as kat’oghikos in Ani, while Vahan was in Vaspurakan” (Step’annos Orbelean 2012–2015, ch. 53), it can be concluded that Catholicos Vahan was considered unlawfully dethroned in Vaspurakan and, with the support of Hamazasp Abusahl, reigned as Catholicos under his patronage.

At that time, ecclesiastical councils were held in various parts of Armenia, condemning the conduct of Catholicos Vahan and Hamazasp Abusahl (Stepʻanos Tarōnecʻi 2017, pp. 233–34).

In 970, after the death of the dethroned Catholicos Vahan, who had constantly obstructed Catholicos Stephanos’s affairs, ecclesiastical life in Armenia was pacified. According to Stepʻanos Tarōnecʻi, “Vahanik (i.e., Vahan—A. Y.) and Step’anos died in the same year and disorder was removed from this country of Armenia” (Stepʻanos Tarōnecʻi 2017, p. 234).

In fact, the anxieties of the Vaspurakan rulers concerning Byzantium and the death of Catholicos Vahan led to the decline of the Chalcedonian movement in Armenia.

6. Instead of an Epilogue: The Reconciliation Between Byzantium and Armenia During John Tzimiskes’s Taron Campaign and Ashot III’s Counter-Mobilization

In the early 970s, Byzantium launched a campaign towards Armenia with the goal of taking possession of Taron, which had passed to them by will in 967. However, realizing the resistance of the Armenian Kingdom, which was in a period of great power, John Tzimiskes entered Taron with his army only after reaching an agreement with Armenian King Ashot III, who had mobilized an army of 80,000 soldiers in the plain of Hark, east of Taron (Matthew of Edessa 1993, p. 27).

It was 974. Most likely, anticipating that Emperor John Tzimiskes, who had come east with a large army, might not be satisfied with Taron alone, Ashot III’s mobilization signaled that he would not tolerate a Byzantine invasion further east from Taron. However, the Emperor, in turn, was not in a hurry to enter Taron without reaching an agreement with Ashot III. He had also undertaken a major campaign to Palestine and did not wish to antagonize his ally, the Armenian King, with “minor” issues. The two rulers exchanged envoys, after which they reconciled. The Byzantines entered Taron, and the Emperor received auxiliary troops from the Armenian King and departed for his campaign (Matthew of Edessa 1993, p. 28), the results of which he later wrote to him about. That letter has been preserved only in Armenian and contains interesting information about both the mentioned campaign and Armenian–Byzantine relations (Matthew of Edessa 1993, pp. 29–33). The letter reveals that not all parts of Taron had passed to Byzantium, and after the great campaign, the Emperor agreed that they should remain in Armenian hands (Matthew of Edessa 1993, p. 33).

In essence, the 974 reconciliation between Ashot III and John Tzimiskes was a non-intervention and non-aggression agreement, which solidified the Armenian–Byzantine border along Taron’s eastern boundary. Moreover, the non-intervention agreement undoubtedly applied to both political and ecclesiastical–dogmatic issues.

However, by the early 980s, under significantly changed political circumstances, the empire agreed to the conquest of the territories east of Taron by the Chalcedonian Curopalates David of Tayk (in Georgian-Tao) (Stepʻanos Tarōnecʻi 2017, p. 244; Shepard 2019, p. 358).

Later, at the end of the 10th century, due to the complex internal political situation in Byzantium, the empire did not exert particular effort for the advancement of Chalcedonians in Armenia. The revolt of Bardas Skleros (976–979), as well as his and, subsequently, Bardas Phokas’s revolts (986–989), diverted the empire’s attention from Armenian affairs. Its active involvement in Armenia resumed only after 1000, when it seized Tayk (Shepard 2019, pp. 359–60).

7. Conclusions

The processes of Byzantium’s strengthening and the restoration of the Armenian Kingdom coincided at the end of the 9th century. These had a significant impact on the relations between the two countries, which, despite occasional contradictions, were mostly allied and friendly over the next century and more. However, there was a fundamental issue that significantly influenced Armenian–Byzantine relations, predetermining certain developments. Byzantium continued to strive for dogmatic union between the Armenian and Byzantine churches. The main activity in this regard belonged to the Patriarchs of Constantinople, who constantly sought to spice up interstate political relations with ecclesiastical–dogmatic issues.

From the perspective of establishing Armenian–Byzantine ecclesiastical union, Patriarchs Photios (858–867, 877–886) and Nicholas Mystikos (901–907, 912–925) of Constantinople actively promoted it in the late 9th and 10th centuries. In their relations with Armenian secular and spiritual rulers, the Patriarchs of Constantinople generally maintained a friendly tone but one peppered with demands presented from the empire’s stance. However, both Armenian Catholicoses and secular rulers successfully managed to evade the demand for church union. This study shows that Armenian King Ashot II (914–929), being in a very difficult situation, had agreed to church union, the idea of which, at that stage, became null and void due to the death of Nicholas Mystikos in 925 and the invasion of the Byzantine army into Armenia in 927. In the 930s–950s, Byzantium and the Georgian rulers primarily patronized the Chalcedonian movement in Armenia, whose activity was suppressed by the efforts of Armenian Kings Abas (929–953) and Ashot III (953–978). Ultimately, Byzantine Emperor John Tzimiskes (969–976) and Ashot III reached a reconciliation, agreeing not to interfere in each other’s affairs, remaining allies.