Bosnian Muslims and Institutionalisation of Islam: A Case Study of Austria

Abstract

This article examines the process of institutionalisation of Islam in Bosnia and Austria, with a particular focus on the Islamic Community of Bosniaks in the Republic of Austria (IZBA, Islamska zajednica Bošnjaka u Austriji) as an umbrella organisation for Bosnian Muslims in the country. The objective is to ascertain the extent to which this institution succeeded in establishing stable religious organisational structures and how immigration affects the religious–institutional landscape in Austrian society by establishing new networks. In addition, this article examines the challenges in establishing an integrated religious network and hierarchical structure faced by the IZBA, its position within the Islamic Religious Community in Austria (IGGÖ, Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich), and its relations with the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICBH). A key issue in this context is the appointment of imams, as they have a significant impact on the understanding of Islam among the believers. The activities of mosque congregations, as well as the challenges they face, are also brought into focus. The empirical basis of this article consists of five expert interviews with stakeholders involved in the work of the IZBA.

1. Introduction

The shared history between Bosnian Muslims1 and Austria dates back to the 19th century, during the time of the Habsburg Monarchy, and has continued, albeit to varying degrees of intensity, up to the present day. While migration remained relatively low in the period following World War II, the mass migration of Bosniaks to Western Europe, including Austria, occurred primarily in the 1990s as a result of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H).2 Alongside existing Muslim religious institutions, such as the Islamic Religious Community in Austria (IGGÖ, Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich), Bosnian Muslims began to form additional communities and religious networks, such as mosque congregations, to facilitate communal religious practices and provide religious education. These communities predominantly took the form of associations, such as clubs (Vereine) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). By the late 1990s, many of these associations blended into umbrella organisations, which were characterised by a weakly integrated network and an unstable hierarchical structure.

While there is research on the Islamic Community in B&H (ICBH, Islamska zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini), its history, organisational structure, and other topics related to this institution (Bećirović 2012; Duranović 2017; Durmišević 2009; Hesová 2021; Karčić 1997; 1999; Larise 2015; Nakičević 1996; Radić 2005; Rexhepi 2019), there is currently no academic work focusing on the Islamic Community of Bosniaks in the Republic of Austria (IZBA, Islamska zajednica Bošnjaka u Austriji) as the umbrella organisation representing Bosnian Muslims in the country.

Over the past two decades, Muslims in Europe have frequently been discussed from a variety of perspectives, often treated as a homogeneous group. As a corporation of public law, the IGGÖ has received greater academic attention than Muslim umbrella organisations, resulting in a number of studies. Hafez (2016), for instance, presented an overview of the IGGÖ and briefly discussed other Muslim umbrella organisations from an organisational sociology perspective, while Aslan (2024) examined the process of the IGGÖ’s state recognition from a historical standpoint.

Following the adoption of the Islam Law in 2015, additional studies were published. Hafez (2017) conducted a discourse analysis of the political debates surrounding the legislative process. In a subsequent study, Dautović and Hafez (2019) carried out a comparative legal analysis of the 2015 Islam Law and its first version from 1912. Kramer (2023) also provides an overview of the legal framework governing the establishment of the IGGÖ.

Aslan (2009), by contrast, offers a brief overview of Muslim umbrella organisations in Austria. In addition, Çitak (2013) provides a more in-depth account of the institutionalisation of Islam, focusing in particular on the role of the Diyanet and its influence as one of the Turkish umbrella organisations. This article, however, examines the Bosnian Muslim community and its religious institution and networks in Austria, which are shaped by the tradition of institutional organisation familiar from their country of origin. On the one hand, it highlights a specific understanding of how to organise the religious life and, on the other hand, the diversity within the Muslim community in Austria.

The rest of this qualitative study is structured as follows: After providing a brief overview of the establishment of ICBH, it introduces its organisational structure. This is followed by a summary of Bosniak migration to Austria, which is divided into three phases. The article then proceeds to analyse five expert interviews and present the corresponding findings. It concludes with a summary of key insights and final remarks.

2. Establishing Islamic Institutions in B&H and the Question of Religious Authority Among the Bosnian Muslims

Islam arrived in the territory of present-day B&H in the fifteenth century with the Ottoman Empire. Although there is some evidence of earlier conversions to Islam initiated by Sufi travellers,3 the wider Islamisation of the Bosniaks took place in the centuries following the Ottoman occupation. Hence, the Bosniaks, along with the peoples of Southeast Asia, are considered one of the last ethnic groups to embrace Islam on a mass scale.

The Ottomans incorporated the territory into the European part of the empire (Rumeli) and introduced their own administration, which was based on the principle of the organic unity of religious and political authority (din-u-devlet) (Berkes 1998, p. 10). Thus, the religious authorities (muftī, mudarris, khaṭīb) and Islamic institutions that were later established in B&H, such as madrasas (schools) and waqfs (endowments), were part of the Ottoman state system (Devlet-i ‘Aliyye-i ‘Osmaniyye). Muftīs were appointed by the Shaykh al-islām for each province and usually lectured at the local madrasa (Karčić 1999).

Four centuries later, at the Congress of Berlin in July 1878, the European powers granted the Habsburg Monarchy, a predominantly Catholic country, the right to occupy and administer Bosnia (Murakami 2017; Smajić 2018; Šuško 2014). The new reality raised theological, political, social and administrative questions for Bosnian Muslims, including uncertainty about whether the new rulers would restrict religious practice. This, in turn, led to discussions about whether it was permissible to live under non-Muslim rulers and whether hijra was religiously required. Two conflicting fatwās were issued on the topic.4

Nevertheless, the four-decade period of Habsburg governance in Bosnia exerted a profound influence on societal structures, economic systems, political landscapes, cultural expressions, and, most significantly within the scope of this study, the further institutionalisation of Islam in that particular region of Europe. As Karčić (1999) observes, the Habsburg monarchy was unified by a common ruler and institutions that were German in character. These institutions were based on Roman and German legal systems and administration and were characterised by a high degree of organisation and efficiency. The status of religion and its relationship with the state was determined by the concept of “recognised religious communities” (Germ. anerkannte Religionsgesellschaften) as corporations of public law (Germ. Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts), based on the “Law on the Legal Recognition of Religious Communities” (Gesetz betreffend die gesetzliche Anerkennung von Religionsgesellschaften) (Österreich 1874). Four years after the occupation, by imperial decree of 17 October 1882, the raisu-l-ulama (Bosn. reisu-l-ulema; Ar. raʾīs al-ʿulamāʾ, grand mufti and the highest religious authority in the country) and four members of the ulama majlis (Bosn. ulema medžlis, Ar. maǧlis al-ʿulamāʾ, council of scholars, governing body), modelled on the Synod of Christian Churches, were appointed (Karčić 1985) to manage the Islamic religious affairs in B&H. In any case, this confirmed the continuity of the existing Islamic institutions in Bosnia and at the same time initiated their separation from the Shaykh al-islām and his office (Meşihat-i Islamiye) in Istanbul. This sequence of events subsequently facilitated, as Potz (2010) would say, the ‘churchification’ (‘Verkirchlichung’) of the existing Islamic institutions, which would ultimately evolve into the ICBH.

However, the mentioned decree and the appointment of the raisu-l-ulama raised the question of religious authority among Bosnian Muslims, which was fundamentally based on the institution of the Shaykh al-Islām and the hierarchical structures subordinate to him. The Shaykh al-Islām represented the highest religious authority for Sunni Muslims, whose legitimacy was based on the religious authority granted to him by the Caliph. The historical continuity of this religious and spiritual link with the Prophet Muḥammad was ensured over the centuries through the line of Caliphs. Therefore, the appointment of the raisu-l-ulama and the granting of the manshura (Bosn. menšura, Ar. manshūr)5 by the Shaykh al-Islām and his office (Meşihat-i Islamiye) in Istanbul was the most delicate issue in the later negotiations between the representatives of the Movement for Religious and Educational Autonomy (Pokret za vakufsko-mearifsku autonomiju) and the Austro-Hungarian administration in B&H between 1900 and 1909 (Šehić 1973). The Bosnian Muslims sought the right to administer their religious affairs independently, including the election of the raisu-l-ulama, the management of waqf (endowments) property through the majlis (council), and the maintenance of Islamic education (Hesová 2021). These efforts ended after a decade, on 15 April 1909, with the Statute for the Autonomous Administration of Islamic Religious, waqf and Educational Affairs (Štatut za autonomnu upravu islamskih vjerskih i vakufsko-mearifskih poslova u Bosni i Hercegovini) (Durmišević 2009). It also regulated the election, appointment, and confirmation of the raisu-l-ulema by the manshura to ensure the continuity of the religious authority and link it to the Prophet Muḥammad. The curia was responsible for selecting three candidates (§130), the Kaiser appointed one of them (§131), and the Shaykh al-Islām in Istanbul confirmed the candidate through the manshura (§132) (Zemaljska Vlada za BiH 1909). Furthermore, the statute guaranteed the autonomy of the Islamic community and confirmed and legitimised the religious authority of the raisu-l-ulama. The legal status of IC within a secular state–legal framework was subsequently consolidated further by the Law on Islam of 1912 (Germ. Gesetz betreffend die Anerkennung der Anhänger des Islam nach hanefitischem Ritus als Religionsgesellschaft—Islamgesetz), which was pivotal for the status of Islam in the modern Republic of Austria.

At the same time, the manshura preserved the continuity of religious authority, the spiritual link with the Prophet, and ensured its future transmission. With the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, the granting of the manshura to the elected raisu-l-ulama was carried out by the Committee for the Granting of the manshura (Islamska Zajednica u BiH 2025). This practice has continued to the present day, whereby the raisu-l-ulama represents the highest religious authority and stays at the head of the ICBH, which today consists of a complex organisational structure with a number of different organs and numerous institutions, which will be described in more detail in the following section.

3. Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICBH)

Since the establishment of the Islamic Community in B&H in 1882, there have been several reforms of its constitution and, consequently, of its organs and institutions. Often, these were adaptations to the state–legal frameworks and the structures of the respective state, which were established over the twentieth century on the territory of present-day B&H and in south-eastern Europe. Also, the official name of the IC has been changed several times.

After the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1918, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, later known as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, was established. In the early years of the kingdom, various Muslim ethnic groups maintained separate religious organisations. However, in 1930, the regime of King Aleksandar Karađorđević sought to centralise and control Muslim religious life by establishing a unified religious community for all Muslims in the country. This community was officially named the Islamic Religious Community (IRC, Islamska vjerska zajednica) and, on 9 July 1930, a new constitution was passed that abolished its autonomy. Its jurisdiction was extended to the entire kingdom, the seat of the raisu-l-ulama was moved to Belgrade, and new administrative structures were created (Karčić 1999).

Further changes followed in the turbulent years that ensued. During World War II, Muslim officials attempted to keep the IRC functioning. In socialist Yugoslavia, a new constitution was adopted for the IRC, and a federal structure was introduced, reflecting the state’s own political organisation. In republics with Muslim populations, institutions such as the majlis al-ulama and the Waqf Assembly were established. By the late 1960s, the Yugoslav regime had adopted a more liberal stance, and religious communities were given more space for their activities (Karčić 1999). However, the basic structure of the Habsburg era remained.

According to Article 3 of the current Constitution of the ICBH, the organisational and institutional structure of the ICBH is based on the guidelines of the Qur’an, the practice of the Prophet, the Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks, and the requirements of the time (Islamska Zajednica u BiH 2015). In general, the ICBH consists of representative bodies, religious leadership bodies with religious authority, administrative bodies, Waqf or Endowments Directorate (Vakufska direkcija), and religious educational and cultural institutions. According to Article 33 of the Constitution, there exist three levels of hierarchy, and depending on the level, the two, representative and leadership bodies with religious authority correspond to the general organisational structure of the ICBH, which is organised as follows: (a) Jamat (congregation with 200 families) and Majlis (usually a group of seven jamats in a municipality or town), (b) Muftiate (muftī office, covering the area of few majlis) or Mashikhat (Ar. mashikha) (organisational unit for Bosnian Muslims living abroad), (c) Assembly of the ICBH, raisu-l-ulama, Council of Muftīs, Riyasat and Constitutional Court (Islamska Zajednica u BiH 2015; Kovač and Smajić 2010).

The hierarchy of religious leadership with religious authority corresponds to these levels as follows: imam (jamat), chief imam (majlis), mufti (muftiate or mashikhat), and raisu-l-ulama. While imams are appointed, muftis are elected by the Assembly on the recommendation of the raisu-l-ulama for two five-year terms (Article 52). The raisu-l-ulama is elected by a special body composed of members of the Assembly, members of the Riyasat, all muftīs, presidents of mashikhats, deans and directors of Islamic educational institutions, chief imams, and presidents of the majlises (Article 63) for seven years for a maximum of two terms (Article 64) (Islamska Zajednica u BiH 2015).

Furthermore, the ICBH distinguishes between its structures in its home countries (B&H, Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia) and its structures in the diaspora, i.e., Western Europe, North America, and Australia. The structures in the neighbouring countries (Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia) are organised as mashikhats and have functional hierarchies. They are mostly centralised, and the mashikhat control the waqf properties. This phenomenon can be attributed to the historical presence of a unified Islamic Community of Yugoslavia within the former Yugoslavia, which subsequently led to the preservation of existing structures within the new states after the dissolution. In contrast, the structures observed in Western Europe, North America, and Australia were not established as a result of a unified Islamic Community. Rather, these structures were established primarily in the 1990s, following the migration of Bosniaks caused by the war. Consequently, while the communities in Germany, the United States, and Australia are organised as mashikhats, it is more similar to the so-called umbrella organisations in other European countries than to the mashikhats in neighbouring (or home) countries. In the context of this article, the relationship between the ICBH and the mashikhats and umbrella organisations in Western Europe, which also includes the IZBA, is of particular importance.

The Constitution of the ICBH, as such, is exclusively concerned with the diaspora in one article, which states that the IC in the diaspora organises itself according to uniform and equal principles through umbrella organisations formed for one or more countries. These umbrella organisations have their own representative and executive or administrative bodies, and the organisation of IC in the diaspora will be regulated by a special act passed by the Assembly (Islamska Zajednica u BiH 2015, Article 55). This regulatory framework is delineated in the Internal Regulations of the organisation of IC in Diaspora (Pravilnik o organiziranju IZ BiH u dijaspori), which was adopted by the Assembly on 23 December 2017 (Islamska Zajednica u BiH 2017).

4. Migration of Bosniaks to Austria After World War II

As demonstrated in the preceding discussion, the long shared history of B&H and Austria cannot be reduced to the institutionalisation of Islam alone. The influences in the fields of education, economy, and administration should not be ignored, as they had a significant impact on the integration of Bosniaks into Austrian society.

According to official statistics, the population of Austria is slightly over 9 million, of which 746,000 individuals are Muslims, constituting 8.3 percent of the whole population (Statistik Austria 2025). Ascertaining the number of individuals of Bosnian origin is more challenging; furthermore, the statistics provide information on the countries of birth of migrants residing in Austria. According to the Integrationsfonds, B&H was the country of birth for approximately 180,000 people, constituting the second-largest group of migrants after Germans in Austria (Österreichischer Integrationsfonds 2024). However, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of the available data, which exclude information on religious affiliation, resulting in the necessity of relying on estimates. Assuming that 70 percent of them are Bosniaks, the number of Bosnian Muslims in Austria could reach more than 120,000. This figure, however, does not include individuals of Bosnian origin who were born in Austria, suggesting that the actual number of Bosniaks in Austria is likely to be higher.

The migration of Bosniaks to Austria can broadly be divided into three distinct phases. The first phase covers the period after World War II, with an increase since the 1960s, when so-called guest workers (Gastarbeiter) arrived during the expansion of the country’s economy. In addition to the Bosniaks, other ethnic groups from former Yugoslavia also arrived, as well as guest workers from other countries, including Turkey, Germany, Italy, and Egypt (Nalborczyk 2016). During this initial phase, the number of Bosniaks was relatively small; they mostly lived in Vienna and the surrounding area, where they gathered around the Muslim Social Service (MSD, Moslemischer Sozialdienst).6 Later, on 26 January 1971, four representatives of the MSD submitted an application (Gesuch) for state approval for the establishment of the Islamic Religious Community in Vienna (Islamische Kultus/Religionsgemeinde zu Wien). This, along with the constitution of the IGGÖ, paved the way for its reinstatement following the decision (Bescheid) of 2 May 1979 (Dautović 2019). The Bosniaks thus played the most significant role in the reinstatement of the IGGÖ, with which the ICBH is considered a sister organisation.

The second phase, which can be regarded as the most significant, commenced in the aftermath of the aggression against B&H in 1992 and persisted for the subsequent few years. It is estimated that 100,000 Bosniaks were compelled to migrate (Nalborczyk 2016), predominantly from B&H itself but also from other former Yugoslav countries, including Serbia (Sanjak), Montenegro, North Macedonia, and subsequently, Kosovo. However, the majority of these individuals, primarily motivated by economic factors and political instability in their home countries, opted to remain in Austria. Consequently, the establishment of most mosque associations occurred during this period.

The third phase of the migration of Bosniaks to Austria commenced in the post-war period and continues to the present day. As would be expected, the numbers were smaller, but there was a migration trend. Often, these were family reunifications, and later also students who stayed after completing their studies. A notable factor contributing to this migration in recent years was the shortage of skilled workers in Austria for certain professions (Fachkräfte in Mangelberufen), a situation that was filled by workers from B&H and other countries. During this period, the migration had a considerable impact on the Bosnian Muslim community in Austria, resulting in a substantial shift in the membership composition of mosque congregations within the IZBA.

In any case, the first mosque association (Germ. Verein) after MSD, established by Bosniak guest workers in Austria, was the Association of Bosnian Muslims ‘Gazi Husrev-beg’ in Vienna. Despite the fact that the association started its work in 1987, the official date of its foundation is recorded as 6 October 1990. In the subsequent years, during the second phase of the migration of Bosniaks, additional mosque associations were founded throughout Austria. The establishment of these mosques followed an uncoordinated process, whereby wherever there were more Bosnian Muslims in need of a mosque, they would organise an association and rent a room in which to practise their religion. The initiators were often imams who had left B&H because of the war, or a group of believers who then looked for an imam to lead the congregation. During this period, the imams generally possessed madrasa degrees from B&H and were not appointed by any religious authority, a practice that contrasted with the situation in B&H. It is anticipated that this situation will undergo a transformation once the war in B&H has been concluded and the Islamic community of Bosniaks in Austria has been established as an umbrella organisation.

5. Methodology

Since this study focuses on research on a religious institution and its networks, expert interviews were selected as a suitable qualitative method for collecting the necessary data. This approach allows access to different types of expert knowledge—including technical knowledge, knowledge of processes, and interpretative knowledge (Bogner et al. 2014, p. 17f). As the IZBA, being a religious institution, has not yet been studied from an internal perspective, this was the only viable approach. Accordingly, five expert interviews were conducted between February and May with stakeholders familiar with this organisation. Three interviewees are long-standing activists who have been involved in shaping or supporting the organisation’s reform processes and have held—and in some cases continue to hold—various positions within the IZBA. One interviewee is actively involved in the ICBH, while the other is a regular member of a congregation who does not hold an official position within the IZBA but closely observes institutional and social developments within the Bosnian community in Austria. Accordingly, the interviews provide insight into diverse perspectives.

Two of these interviews were conducted in person, while the remaining three took place via Zoom. All interviews were conducted in Bosnian, recorded, and subsequently transcribed. Prior to each interview, participants were informed about the intended use of the data, and their consent was obtained at the outset.

The interviews were theme-guided, and the questions can be grouped into four thematic areas: general information about the IZBA; the relationship between the IZBA and other religious institutions (such as the IGGÖ and the ICBH); the structure and functioning of mosque congregations; and their religious and social activities.

The data of this qualitative study was analysed using content analysis, following the approach presented by Bogner et al. (2014, pp. 73–75), based on the methodologies of Gläser and Laudel (2009) and Mayring (2000). The following topics were critically examined:

• The founding of the IZBA and the networking of mosque congregations.
• The relationship between the IZBA and other Islamic religious organisations (IGGÖ and ICBH).
• The appointment of imams and the role of the murasala (decree).
• The financing of mosque congregations and the remuneration of imams.
• Activities of the mosque congregations.
• Religious instruction challenges within the mosque congregations.

6. Islamic Community of Bosniaks in Austria (IZBA): A Case Study

6.1. IZBA Before the Islam Law of 2015

The interactions and legal regulations that existed during the Habsburg monarchy had a significant and ongoing impact on both countries, B&H and Austria, which later ensured the continuity of religious communities in new and different state–legal frameworks. Despite the reinstatement of the IGGÖ as a corporation of public law (Germ. Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts) in 1979, in accordance with the provisions of the Islam Law of 1912, all mosques in Austria prior to 2015, including those belonging to the Bosnian Muslim community, were established and subsequently organised into associations (Vereine). Consequently, these mosques became subject to the prevailing Law of Associations. V A similar situation is observed in other European countries where Islam is not a recognised religion and there are no Islamic Communities as corporations of public law, yet the mosque associations in Austria were part of the IGGÖ at the same time.

However, the umbrella organisation of Bosniaks—Federation of Bosniak Islamic Associations (Germ. Verband bosniakisch-islamischer Vereine in Österreich, Bosn. Islamska zajednica Bošnjaka u Austriji—IZBA) was established in October 1995 as the result of a concerted effort by a number of imams and Bosniak activists. For this purpose, “in 1995 there were meetings in Upper Austria and Vienna” (IP5; I = interview, P = participant). This organisation has since become the overarching body for Bosniak mosque associations in Austria. The establishment of the IZBA was predicated on the objective of unifying all Bosniak mosque associations under a single umbrella organisation, thereby facilitating collaborative endeavours. Bosniaks, as “accustomed to acting within institutional frameworks” (IP5), sought to emulate the organisational frameworks of the IC, as evidenced in B&H, but the issue of the aforementioned continuity of religious authority and the spiritual link to the Prophet was of central importance. This is still an issue in the community of Bosniaks in Austria. The imams employed by the IZBA are still confirmed by the raisu-l-ulama, as confirmed by an interview participant:

The religious legitimacy of the officials [of IZBA] is derived from the manshura, which dates back [is linked] to the Prophet.

(IP2)

Consequently, the organisation strengthened its ties with the ICBH, focusing on the appointment of imams by so-called murasala (decree or letter of authorisation), which could only be issued by a higher religious authority, such as the raisu-l-ulama. Similar to manshura, the legitimacy of the imams to interpret the Islamic religion was derived from the murasala. This development served to extend the established religious hierarchy that was already in place in B&H to the Bosniak diaspora. However, since 2015, there have been structural changes in the IGGÖ and the Muslim umbrella organisations.

6.2. IZBA After the Islam Law of 2015 and Its Current Organisational Structure

The Islam Law of 2015 introduced a more detailed regulatory framework for the IGGÖ, which had a direct impact on the umbrella organisations and, consequently, the IZBA. The associations that had previously existed and were subject to the Law of Associations would have been required to subordinate themselves to the IGGÖ. In accordance with § 31 (3) of the Islam Law 2015, associations whose objective is the dissemination of religious doctrine are obligated to either adapt to the Islam Law 2015 or face dissolution (Österreich 2015). Additionally, the law established the formation of religious communities (KG, Kultusgemeinden), which are subordinate to the IGGÖ and simultaneously classified as corporations of public law (§ 8). Nevertheless, this does not mean that members of associations not organised under the IGGÖ, and which are subject to the Law of Associations, are not permitted to practise common religious rituals in their association premises. This was confirmed when the Vienna Administration Court annulled the decision by the Vienna Provincial Police Directorate to close an association whose statutory purpose was the “cultivation and preservation of Islamic culture”. The ruling was based on the fact that the association did not operate a public mosque, and the quantity of religious activities was not proven (Landesverwaltungsgericht Wien 2022). Accordingly, while the associations, in contrast to congregations, are simply not permitted to operate public mosques, the practice of religious rituals by the members in the association’s premises is not prohibited.

However, the Islam law of 2015 resulted in structural changes to the IGGÖ and Muslim umbrella organisations, including the IZBA. At present, IZBA refers to two interconnected organisations. The first is the umbrella organisation, i.e., Federation (Verband), which has existed since 1995, and the second is the newly formed Bosniak religious community, one of ten subordinated to the IGGÖ, which is officially called the Bosniak religious community of the IGGÖ (Bosniakische Kultusgemeinde der Islamischen Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich—BKG).

It is difficult to talk about the Bosniak Islamic community in Austria, because we understand the term ‘Bosniak Islamic community in Austria’ [IZBA] to mean two organisations, one of which is the Bosniak religious Community [BKG], officially known in Bosnian [language] as Islamska zajednica Bošnjaka u Austriji. […] In addition to this, there is another structure that assists IZBA, namely the Federation of Bosniak Islamic Associations [Federation, Verband]. Until the adoption of the Islam Law, this structure was responsible for IZBA’s activities. With the new law, this responsibility has been transferred to the religious community [BKG]. Given that these structures existed previously, we have retained them for all matters that are not religious, namely property issues and issues relating to work with citizens’ associations that are property owners.

(IP2)

This dual structure is subject to two different laws, the Islam Law of 2015 and the Law of Associations of 2002. The functionality of the two was regulated in such a way that the same persons were elected to both executive committees, thus ensuring synchronised functioning:

The statutes stipulate that the executive committees of the Religious Community [BKG] and the Federation [Verband] are the same persons. The committees must be identical so that there is no conflict of interest between these two structures.

(IP2)

This means that there is a kind of personal union, and the same individuals hold leadership positions in both organisational structures. However, this appears to be an internal regulation to ensure the functionality of the IZBA. Another interviewer puts it this way:

It is likely that there is some agreement that whoever is at the top of the IZBA is also at the top of what we call the BKG, and the reason for this is so that they can function practically, because if they are in the structures of the IGGÖ, which is legally binding, then the IZBA is our spiritual line [link]. […] What is positive is that they probably have some authority.

(IP4)

The mosque congregation (not associations) are subordinate to the BKG, while the individual associations are subordinate to the Federation (Verband). Members of an association are also members of the mosque congregation. The BKG and mosque congregations are responsible for all religious matters, while the associations own the properties. The aim was to preserve the acquired properties, so the existing structures were retained:

We were convinced that this would be the best way to protect the property because the state guarantees special protection for citizens’ associations and because the democratic will of our members is expressed through the association.

(IP2)

The importance of property-related issues is also reflected in the attempts to apply waqf regulations to it and to restrict its use and sale through additional approval by the IZBA:

It is stipulated in the Federation’s statutes that this property, although it is the property of these individual associations, must be protected in the same way as waqf property, i.e., its purpose cannot be changed, it cannot be sold, or it cannot be used for other purposes without the consent of the Federation as the umbrella organisation.

(IP1)

Furthermore, following the establishment of the BKG, efforts were made to strengthen the hierarchical structure of the IZBA. This led to the adoption of unified statutes by the affiliated mosque congregations and associations. These statutes include a clause stating that the mosques and associations agree to abide by the decisions of the IZBA:

Every association is a member of the Federation, which is the umbrella organisation, and is obliged to follow all decisions made by the Federation.

(IP1)

However, it is difficult to say to what extent this is feasible in practice. The reason for this seems to be that certain structural traditions have become entrenched over the last three decades, making them difficult to change. One interviewee continues to advocate for maintaining a certain level of autonomy:

I think it’s good that a certain amount of autonomy should be maintained, because too much centralization is not good either. With too much centralization, people lose their creativity.

(IP5)

Another participant expressed scepticism about whether the IZBA currently possesses adequate mechanisms to implement its decisions independently of the mosque congregations’ consent:

We have this hierarchy on a voluntary basis, because legally we operate on the basis of the IGGÖ hierarchy. […] The chief imam or president of the IZBA has no mechanisms that would allow him to impose anything on any imam or any mosque.

(IP4)

Therefore, strengthening the hierarchy of the IZBA will remain an important issue in the future. The most effective way to change the existing procedures is to increase the number of IZBA staff and strengthen their presence in the mosques. Moreover, a gradual reform of the current procedures appears necessary.

It should also be mentioned that some Bosniak mosque congregations have not accepted these statutes and are therefore not considered part of the IZBA. Instead, they operate within the framework of another religious community (Kultusgemeinde) called al-Taqwa. According to its website, Al-Taqwa operates more than ten mosque congregations across the country, including in Vienna, Graz, Salzburg, Linz, Wels, Gmunden, Ried, Innsbruck, Braunau, and Radstadt (Al-Taqwa 2025). Four of these congregations were part of the Federation (Verband) until 2016, when unified statutes were adopted. The remaining congregations are affiliated with Salafist, Arab, or a few newly established Bosniak communities. In recent years, the IGGÖ initiated proceedings to dissolve Al-Taqwa, leading to a formal request being submitted to the Federal Chancellery of the Republic of Austria (Bundeskanzleramt). In addition, several court proceedings regarding these disagreements were held before the Vienna Administration Court. In any case, it is difficult to predict what status al-Taqwa will have within the IGGÖ in the future.

6.3. Imams and Religious Life in the Mosques

As of now, there are 45 IZBA mosques in Austria, distributed across the country, with “approximately 75% owning their own property” (IP2). Each mosque congregation is represented externally by two persons: the chairman and the imam. The former is responsible for administrative affairs and the latter for religious matters. Chairmen are elected, whereas imams are appointed. To be appointed as an imam, a candidate must have completed formal training (theological education) and received a decree (murasala) from the raisu-l-ulama. This decree (murasala) is issued upon application by the BKG, and it constitutes the basis of the imam’s religious authority. This establishes a hierarchical structure in which local imams are subordinate to the BKG’s chief imam.

Imams are employed at mosque congregations, who can only be appointed by decree of the raisu-l-ulama. This decree [murasala] is issued on two grounds: firstly, that the person has the qualifications to be an imam, which is a formal requirement, and secondly, that the BKG submits a request for the decree to be issued. Therefore, the raisu-l-ulema does not issue decrees arbitrarily, but respects our internal decisions, based on the autonomy and independence of the BKG, which recognises him as the supreme religious authority.

(IP2)

It is evident that the raisu-l-ulama does not interfere in the internal affairs of the IZBA; rather, his role is primarily to ensure religious legitimacy and to safeguard theological tradition. This appears to be a significant issue for Bosnian Muslims, particularly because of the long-standing tradition of institutionally organised religious life in the Balkans, as noted above. This is why efforts are being made to replicate the structures and procedures of the ICBH, which, however, proves to be challenging. Even on this essential issue—the appointment of imams by murasala—certain challenges appear to exist:

The statute mentions that the raisu-l-ulama decrees [gives consent to] the imams, but I am not sure how much this happens in practice. […] Or in practice, I think it’s different.

(IP4)

This may be because murasala is only sought after employment and for the transmission of theological contents; this question remains of essential importance.

In any case, the role of the murasala for imams is threefold: first, to preserve the spiritual link to the Prophet; second, to ensure that those appointed as imams possess theological training; and third, to provide a means of accountability for those who preach publicly. One of the interviewees explains it as follows:

But I also believe that an imam who speaks, who leads a congregation, gives speeches, delivers sermons, has a responsibility.

(IP5)

Imams are paid by the mosque congregation, which is funded through membership fees and donations. Each mosque has its own approach to financing its imam. Salaries depend on the size of the mosque congregation and the agreement with the imam. There does not seem to be any uniform regulation. The qualifications of the imams are not always taken into account:

As far as I know, one or two mosques have a payment policy for imams, which takes into account experience, which takes into account professional qualifications, and most mosques give as much as they can offer, and if the imams accept, they are included in such work. They may later improve their status in the congregation through their work or through a better economic situation in the congregation.

(IP4)

However, the BKG has increasingly begun to employ imams directly, with financial support continuing to come from the mosque communities. “A large number of imams are paid by the BKG and are direct employees of the BKG.” (IP2) In this case, the mosques transfer the sums to the BKG, who then pay the imams. However, this only applies to imams who have been newly employed.

The Bosniak mosques in Austria have diverse areas of activity, but three of them can be identified as follows: religious, educational, and cultural. The first two are the primary activities:

Primarily, the congregation has an obligation to organize religious life […] [and] that children learn about religion.

(IP5)

In addition, the focus is placed on promoting religious identity. One of the participants explains:

So there are a number of areas. In addition to this religious one, there is a cultural one, even a sports one. In that regard, I think we are colourful and diverse.

(IP4)

However, over the past three decades, different habits and traditions have emerged within the mosque congregations. This diversity is due to the circumstances in which these congregations were formed. These habits and traditions, to this day, influence the mosque activities. This means that each congregation organises its activities and religious life in its own specific way:

Every congregation was forced to create everything. And in this way, some habits and traditions were acquired in our congregations that are difficult to change.

(IP2)

So, when we try, each in their own way, as creative as they are and as much as they have resources, to somehow strengthen that religious identity.

(IP4)

All interview participants emphasise the need to strengthen religious identity. They are convinced that the teaching provided at the mosque on weekends (makatab) is of central importance. This form of religious instruction is not merely about imparting knowledge; rather, it is intended to prepare the younger generation to become active members of the religious community:

[Maktab] should also preserve the existing religious identity of our pupils. […] So, maktab education is not just education, […] [i.e.,] formal religious education about rituals, but education about who we are as Muslims.

(IP2)

However, this is a difficult undertaking in a globalised world with the challenges posed by technological advances and social media. It seems that the demands are too great, especially since identity is not something that can be learned from books:

This dimension of knowledge is difficult to transfer into textbooks. […] Faith is not only learned from the text, it is learned from life inside a mosque, and that is why I believe that the maktab is particularly important.

(IP2)

Nevertheless, enormous difficulties appear to exist in youth work. It is questionable whether young people have truly found their place in the community. Questions of identity are once again coming to the fore. One interview participant describes this as follows:

Well, honestly… when we talk about Bosniak youth in Austria, I personally believe that we are in a serious identity crisis. […] I see every day how distant our young people are—not only from B&H as their homeland, but also from their own culture, language and religious identity.

(IP3)

Closely linked to the question of identity is the question of language. The younger generations seem to be having increasing difficulties with the Bosnian language, and this seems to be at the top of the list of challenges in the future, as confirmed by another interview participant:

How much we will be able to transfer [the theological contents] in the future to those who will understand German better [than Bosnian]. The issue of language is a challenge that will be even more pronounced in the future.

(IP4)

To date, there appears to have been no systematic evaluation of the various areas of mosque work. This may be due to the fact that mosques have operated as independent congregations. One participant commented on this as follows:

Congregations independently create their own activities. When it comes to quality control, it is non-existent.

(IP4)

There also appears to be a lack of quality control in mosque-based religious instruction (maktab), as described by another participant:

After maktab, which itself has never been seriously evaluated, we don’t even have concrete data on its effect.

(IP3)

The IZBA, along with all its mosques and stakeholders, will have to face this challenge in the future. Until now, the focus has clearly been on establishing infrastructure—which is undoubtedly necessary—but the next phase must involve the systematic planning, implementation, and evaluation of educational content. This, however, requires well-qualified personnel.

7. Conclusions

The institutionalisation of Islam in B&H and the establishment of ICBH were shaped by two empires: the Ottoman and the Habsburg. More recently, the Habsburg Empire played a decisive role in establishing the current hierarchical religious community, known as ICBH (Duranović 2017). These historical developments also influenced the Islamic religious networks in the Republic of Austria and the reinstatement of the IGGÖ.

Since these hierarchical structures were enforced by the Habsburg Monarchy to separate Bosnian Muslims from the Sultan and, at the same time, protect their interests in the newly acquired territories, efforts were made to centralise religious and waqf affairs. In contrast, Bosnian Muslims sought to retain as much autonomy as possible, which can be summarised in three main points: the independent administration of waqf properties and educational institutions, as well as the autonomous election of the highest religious authority, the raisu-l-ulama. Consequently, these were the main demands of the Movement for Religious and Educational Autonomy between 1900 and 1909.

Similarly, following the adoption of the Islam Law of 2015, new structures such as the BKG were established, and some Bosniak stakeholders sought to strengthen the hierarchical organisation of the IZBA. While such efforts may contribute to institutional stability—and certain structures are indeed necessary for the collective practice of religion and the provision of quality religious instruction—religious organisations, including the IZBA, must not evolve into a self-serving institution.

On the other hand, some interviewees emphasised that “a certain amount of autonomy should be maintained” (IP5), noting that centralisation is, in practice, difficult to implement. After all, the Bosniak congregations are geographically dispersed and differ significantly in their specific characteristics. In addition, over time, decentralised structures have become deeply entrenched, making change exceedingly difficult.

The questions surrounding the murasala and the appointment of imams are also of considerable importance. Given that imams play a central role within congregations, it is essential to ensure that they possess the necessary qualifications to address the educational needs and challenges faced by Muslims in Austria.

As a diaspora community, the IZBA faces a number of challenges, particularly in relation to religious identity, the preservation of the mother tongue, and the provision of meaningful content for younger generations, who represent the community’s future membership. These issues were occasionally raised by some interviewees, and it remains uncertain how they will be addressed in future. Nevertheless, makatabs (religious instruction in the mosques) and work with youth will play an essential role in shaping future developments.