1. Introduction
Migration, high birth rates, and religious conversions are significant contributors to the growing Muslim population in Europe. The European Union (EU) population has increased by 4% over the past two decades, reaching 431.2 million on 1 January 2023, and further rising to 449.2 million by 1 January 2024. The total population includes the United Kingdom (UK), with 69.1 million, which makes Europe roughly inhabited by 518.3 million people. In Western Europe, particularly Germany, the country has become the primary destination for immigrants, with a total of 2,072,000 individuals (30%), followed by Spain with 1,259,000 (18%), France with 431,000 (6%), and Italy with 411,000 (6%) since 2022. Many of these immigrants originate from predominantly Muslim countries such as Morocco, Turkiye, Syria, and Albania (
Eurostat 2024). The increasing percentage of Western European immigrants directly correlates with the broader dissemination of Islam and the migration of Muslims in this region. According to
Brubaker (
2012), the study of Muslims as part of the immigration wave in European countries is increasing significantly as the category of ‘Muslim’ is utilized to identify oneself and to identify others.
In the post-7/7 era, the depiction of Islam and Muslims in Western Europe in the 21st Century is also closely linked to the influence of mass media and social media, which enable individuals to access information and news effortlessly, both negative and positive images. Although Muslim communities have been growing since the 1950s and are a contemporarily integral part of the social fabric of Western Europe, many non-Muslims continue to hold negative stereotypes about Muslims (
Ahmed 2013). Events such as the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States of America (US) and the 2005 London bombings have reinforced the perception among American and European societies, and the West more broadly, that Muslims are synonymous with violence or terrorism. This has given rise to new challenges, including the proliferation of Islamophobia. Issues surrounding identity and loyalty remain contentious, with widespread Western accusations that Muslims prioritize their religious identity and allegiance to Islam over their national identity as citizens of countries like the United Kingdom, France, or Spain. For instance, Germany has applied overt discriminatory practices, such as binary oppositions, to question the loyalty of Muslims residing in European nations (
Esposito and Kalın 2011).
The term “Islamophobia” or “Islamophobie” first appeared in print in France in the early 20th Century. It later emerged as a formal concept when Étienne Dinet and Sliman Ben Ibrahim authored a biography of the Prophet Muhammad in 1918 and an essay in 1921 (
Vakil 2009). The term gained further traction after Edward Said introduced his seminal work
Orientalism, which laid the groundwork for its operational definition. It was subsequently popularized by Tariq Modood, a researcher at the Policy Studies Institute (PSI), in the late 1980s. Islamophobia became a topic of deeper academic discourse with the publication of a report by The Runnymede Trust in the UK at the end of the 20th Century, which framed it as “unfounded hostility or fear towards Islam”.
Several scholars and organizations have debated the contextual understanding of the term Islamophobia, particularly its social and political dimensions, including the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC), Hyde Park Christian Fellowship, The Runnymede Trust, and the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) (
Allen 2010, p. 18). Some also rejected the idea of Islamophobia, even among Muslims like Kenan Malik, who argued that the charge of Islamophobia could probably be used as a vehicle to suppress discussion and disapproval of the cultural traditions of particular Muslims and their societies (
Esposito and Kalın 2011). Generally, Islamophobia manifests in discriminatory acts, hostility, and violence against individuals who practice Islam. The proliferation of certain mass media in the propagation of extreme and far-right groups in Western Europe significantly shapes public perceptions of Islam, fueling hatred and leading to widespread anti-Islamic sentiments and discriminatory practices toward Muslims in various countries.
In the US, Islamophobia persists as a recurring issue, with cases escalating sharply in 2024. Between January and June 2024, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) reported 4951 complaints related to violence and discrimination, marking a 69% increase compared to the previous year. Discrimination in the education sector surged, particularly in May, coinciding with student campaigns urging universities to condemn the genocide in Palestine (
Council on American-Islamic Relations 2024). In Western Europe, particularly Germany, anti-Muslim sentiment continues to target immigrants. For instance, in February 2020, a far-right extremist attack in Hanau involved gun violence that resulted in nine fatalities and five severe injuries. Investigations revealed that the motives behind the attack were rooted in Islamophobia and racism against Muslims (
Olterman and Connolly 2020).
In the aftermath of the London bombing, the interlink of Islam and multilateralism in line with the rise in Islamophobia as United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour expressed the attitude of prejudice or bigotry towards Muslims in Europe is a common thing as she reiterated a report by Doudou Diène from Senegal (
Esposito and Kalın 2011). The concern of Islamophobia could create greater disparity among ethnicities and deepen the social divide, at the same time increasing the ultra-nationalist and far-right movements in many Western countries, which emasculate White Supremacy and might result in violent conflict.
Almost two decades later, the European Commission observed that following 7 October 2023, the prevalence of anti-Muslim hate speech has significantly worsened. Marion Lalisse, appointed as the coordinator for combating anti-Muslim hatred on 1 February 2023, has been working to assist the EU in formulating appropriate policies to protect Muslim communities across Europe. The European Commission has also issued a Joint Statement asserting that Muslims and their representatives have increasingly become targets of physical and verbal assaults, leaving them feeling unsafe and threatened both online and offline (
European Commission 2023).
Another factor driving the rise in Islamophobia is the anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim policies implemented by individual countries. In Western European societies, such policies are prominently represented by five major countries: Spain, the Netherlands, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Moreover, political strategies and media reporting—often laced with propaganda and discrediting Islam as a radical religion have further blurred the line between immigration and Islam, perpetuating negative stereotypes about Muslims. This phenomenon has escalated social tensions and deepened public confusion in Western Europe regarding issues surrounding immigrants and Muslims. Many researchers discussed issues regarding immigration, anti-Islam, and Islamophobia.
A study by Ivan Kalmar in 2018 examined Islamophobia in Eastern Europe, highlighting its close connection to prejudice against Muslims and its role as a political tool for negotiating the positions of countries such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia within the EU. The migration crisis from 2015 to 2016 accelerated the rejection of Muslim immigrants. The phenomenon of “Islamophobia without Muslims” underscores how fear of Islam has grown in countries with very small Muslim populations, driven by nationalist politics, populism, and resistance to Western dominance in EU policies. In this region, Islamophobia is also linked to economic and social insecurity despite overall economic growth. This issue has contributed to the rise in populist policies, the erosion of democracy, and increased anti-immigrant and anti-EU sentiments (
Kalmar 2018). Kalmar actually does not extensively discuss the role of media in spreading Islamophobia. He is just briefly mentioning how the governments of Poland and Hungary have restricted press freedom and controlled Islamophobic narratives to serve their political interests.
On the other hand, in 2019, Adam Konopka identified how right-wing media in Poland during the 2015 migration crisis constructed an Islamophobic discourse by distinguishing between “us” (the Polish society and conservative Christian values) and “
them” (Muslim refugees and liberal elites supporting multiculturalism). Polish media outlets such as
Gazeta Polska, Do Rzeczy, and
W Sieci portrayed Muslims as a cultural and security threat, while liberal elites were seen as undermining Europe’s Christian identity. Islamophobia was used both to reject Muslim refugees and as a political tool to reinforce nationalism and conservatism. A tangible impact of this discourse was Poland’s refusal to adopt the EU refugee relocation policy and the growing anti-immigrant sentiment among the public (
Konopka 2019). Konopka’s study demonstrates that the media played a crucial role in shaping public opinion, leading to increased opposition to Muslim immigration in Poland.
Another related study conducted by Adrián Groglopo et al. in 2025, using a longitudinal survey on attitudes toward ethnic diversity in Sweden since 2005, reveals that Islamophobia emerges within the context of structural racism against Muslims in the country. Political debates and national institutions further reinforce this negative narrative. Groglopo et al. explain that right-wing media and politicians portray Muslims as a threat to Swedish values (
Groglopo et al. 2025). This finding aligns with the studies of
Kalmar (
2018) and
Konopka (
2019), which highlight that the media serves as a crucial tool for politicians to gain public support.
Although various studies have examined Islamophobia in Europe, there remains a gap in understanding how the media has shaped and disseminated Islamophobic narratives during the 2015–2023 period, marked by the migration crisis, terrorist attacks, and the rise in right-wing populism. Previous studies, such as those by
Kalmar (
2018),
Konopka (
2019), and
Groglopo et al. (
2025), have explored Islamophobia within political and structural racism contexts but have not specifically analyzed how European media framed this issue from a phenomenological perspective or collected specific literature-based analysis.
Against this backdrop, this study aims to examine the construction of anti-Muslim propaganda, which is intentionally shaped, and analyze the intersection of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments in Western Europe. This study is essential as it explores how media reports influence public perception and policies related to Islam and Muslims, providing deeper insights into the role of media in constructing social narratives of Islamophobia in post-migration crisis Europe.
Nevertheless, the reason to select these countries is the history of colonialism in Muslim-populated countries since the 18th Century and the contemporary influx of Muslim migration in the aftermath of World War II. Many nations in the world share historical factors in certain phenomena due to their relationship with colonial powers, which exposes the problem of Muslims living in a nation-state that is strongly influenced by Western countries (
Ramadhan et al. 2024, p. 452). It is widely known that in the era of colonialism, the harsh treatment of European settlers of non-European (indigenous) residents, expressed in the form of segregation, social exclusion, and marginalization based on race, religion, tribe, and wealth, constituted the colonial world order. Then, the split between colonialism and racism made Islamophobia appear differently from racism (
Sayyid 2015, p. 17).
The concept of Islamophobia as a phenomenon will be described through a discourse analysis toolkit.
Neumann (
2008) stated that tool one meant to carve texts out of the social world, tool two equalizes other phenomena into the material to be analyzed equally with text, tool three groups all phenomena to seek the similarities, tool four aims to slice the phenomena into different representations of the similar thing, tool five contrasts with the meaning dimension of the material phenomenon, and last tool such a self-reflection pen for what has been written.
The method aimed to discover and decipher the media role and media propaganda about Islamophobia and its implications for Western European society thoroughly. The one-sided and frequent irresponsible media coverage of events linked to Muslims has turned into a breeding ground for Islamophobic attitudes and sentiments. From the text context, Islamophobia comes into being in Western European society (
Esposito and Kalın 2011).
In the context of measuring Islamophobia, there are four distinct theatres where the Islam performance is staged (
Sayyid 2015). First, in one particular place, a group of countries culturally and socially dominate the society by the Islamicate, which is called Muslimistan. Second, Muslim is a visible minority, a marginal group in the formed territories, and their presence is negated despite it predating the formation of the state. Third is that Muslims are represented mainly as immigrants, which often leads to Islamophobia being performed. Fourth is that the Muslim presence is negligible, and Islamophobia occurs virtually or vicariously (
Sayyid 2015).
Nevertheless, manifestations of Islamophobia are categorized into six principal clusters—first, attacks on persons assumed to be Muslims. Second, an assault on property is perceived as linked to Muslims. Third, acts of intimidation target perceived Muslims. Fourth, institutional settings where Muslims received unfavorable treatment than their peers. Fifth, incidents that involve a sustained and systemic elaboration of comments within the domain of the public to humiliate Islam or Muslims. Sixth, the state involvement, whether direct or indirect, such as the intensification of surveillance of the Muslim population and secret police operations, less favorably criminal justice system to Muslims, where the degree takes extra burdens on sections of the Muslim population (
Sayyid 2015).
According to Schattschneider (as cited in Piven 2004, p. 85), social scientists often treat the variable relationship as causal consequences linking outcomes or valued goals are strategies in the power theater and shape policy by performance into an investigation of cause and effect, then used as a political strategy, argument or stories-making to influence the outcome in a political contest (
Piven 2004). That is why those in political contestation frame media coverage to pursue broader opinions that support individual or party policies.
Notwithstanding the media coverage, the media on the Internet provides people with a platform to (inter)actively deconstruct the official version of the ‘truth,’ to extract recourse accounts, and to produce society’s theories through websites, online forums, and YouTube (
Aupers 2012). The policy is a manifestation of government and national interest, whilst the media coverage represents business and interest groups. From these two elements, the research aimed to look at their impact on the emergence and prolongation of Islamophobia in Western society.
Based on this background, this study will focus on two main research questions: (1) How did the media shape and spread Islamophobia in Western Europe from 2015 to 2023?; and (2) How does anti-Muslim sentiment intersect with anti-immigration narratives in Western European countries such as Spain, the Netherlands, France, Germany, and the UK?
2. Methods and Theoretical Framework
This study analyzed data sources contributing to Islamophobia studies. The baseline was the European Islamophobia Report from 2015 to 2023, firstly issued by Siyaset, Ekonomik ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı (SETA) and, from 2021 onwards, published by Leopold Weiss Institute. One of the sources was from the archivist of the School of Strategic and Global Studies video podcast with Professor Barbara Ruiz-Bejarano from UNESCO-University of Alicante, Spain, entitled “An Overview of Europe: Islamophobia and White Extremism”, aired on 6 November 2024. The other relevant resources included academic literature, books, recordings, journals, and relevant electronic sources.
This study employs the thematic coding method, in which data analysis was conducted through three main stages: (1) open coding, which involved identifying key concepts in reports, the literature, and other data sources, such as “negative stereotypes”, “discriminatory policies”, and “violence against Muslims”; (2) axial coding, which grouped these codes into broader categories, such as “anti-Islam media and propaganda” and “the social and political implications of Islamophobia”; and (3) selective coding, which formulated the main themes that explain the patterns of Islamophobia within Europe’s social, political, and cultural landscape. The findings from this thematic coding process are then synthesized to understand how Islamophobia develops, the factors influencing it, and its impact on Muslim communities in Europe.
The study also applied the interpretative qualitative method to the Islamophobia phenomenon in Western European countries such as Spain, the Netherlands, France, Germany, and the UK. The qualitative approaches to collecting data, writing analysis, making interpretations, and writing reports are based on purposeful sampling, open-ended data collection, text or picture analysis, representation of information in the report, and personal interpretation of the findings (
Creswell 2014, p. 24).
This study recorded the data of Islamophobia cases related to media from the European Islamophobia Report 2015–2023 (
Bayraklı and Hafez 2016,
2017,
2018,
2019,
2020,
2021,
2022,
2023,
2024) articulated into a table and then converted it into a graphical form to be explained in the Results Section. The categorization included the country context, year of publication, and the number of issues contained in the report. Additionally, the interpretation in this study was outlined in the form of a graph. With this approach, researchers can produce organized findings and identify research gaps, enriching related literature. The research was also strengthened by a recent study by
Aslan and Yıldız (
2024), which focuses on young people dealing with Islam’s depiction in the media.
On the other hand, this study applied the Propaganda Model (PM) theory by Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky (
Herman and Chomsky 1988). This theory explains that in a capitalist system, mass media functions as a propaganda tool serving the interests of political and economic elites. It highlights the five primary filters that influence how news is created and presented: (1) media ownership, where media outlets are controlled by large corporations with specific economic and political interests; (2) advertising revenue, which makes media dependent on advertisers and discourages coverage that might harm business interests; (3) news sources, where media primarily relies on information from governments or powerful institutions, often neglecting alternative voices; (4) flak, referring to pressure from elite groups that can suppress or disseminate. This theory asserts that the media is not a neutral source of information but rather reinforces the status quo by filtering and shaping public opinion in alignment with the interests of those in power (
Klaehn 2003;
Pedro-Carañana et al. 2018).
3. Landscape of Religious Development in the West
The rapid growth of the Muslim population in Europe began in the 1990s, which was marked by a high birth rate among Muslim immigrants from Morocco who migrated to Spain and other countries (
Aslan 2020, p. 68). In the same period, the US experienced a significant wave of immigration spurred by the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965. This legislative reform abolished national-origin quotas, provided preferences for residency in the US, opened employment opportunities, and offered protection to immigrants fleeing conflicts in their home countries. Consequently, almost half of the immigrants entering the US originated from Asia, Latin America, and Africa (
Hsu 2023). According to a report published by the Pew Research Center in 2020, the percentage of Muslims in the US during that year was 1.1%, equivalent to 3.85 million individuals (
Pew Research Center 2022). This figure remains relatively small compared to the overall non-Muslim population in the US. In contrast, compared to Europe, the Muslim population in the region experienced a significant increase of 6% between 1950 and 2020, reaching approximately 44.6 million individuals (
Kettani 2010).
Contemporarily, the Islamic presence represented by the Muslim population in Western Europe has reached approximately 20 million inhabitants. In France, the Muslim presence was almost not tolerated until Algeria was occupied in 1830, then the numbers began to grow, as expected to reach approximately 5 million Muslims or 8% of the total 67.4 million population. In Spain, since the freedom of religion was allowed in 1967, more Muslims are coming, particularly from Morocco; as estimated in 2020, there are more than 1.4 million, or 3% of the total 46.8 million population, and the majority of Muslims are Moroccan. However, in the Netherlands, the first Muslims came from Indonesia around the 1800s, but in the 1980s, Muslims from Turkiye and Morocco became more visible in the public as “guest workers”, and then refugees and asylum seekers from the Middle East and East Africa arrived. The number of Muslims in the Netherlands is expected to reach 1 million or 6% of the total 17.1 million population in 2020 (
Kettani 2017;
Aslan 2020).
Similarly, Germany encountered a significant increase in Muslim presence in the 1970s when “guest workers” from Turkiye arrived. It is estimated that around 5 million Muslims exist in Germany, which is around 6.7% of the total 84 million population in 2020, as Turkish Muslims occupied more than 60% of the total Muslim population or approximately 3 million people (
Pfündel et al. 2021). As of now, many Turkish descendants are part of the working class in Germany, especially in dense areas and big cities. The Muslim quarter is mainly occupied surrounding the Mosque and educational institutions, or a market where small and medium enterprises can operate without too many restrictions.
In the UK, the majority of Muslims came from or were descendants of former colonies like Malaysia, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Somalia, and Yemen, or the Commonwealth. According to the
Muslim Council of Britain (
2022), the Muslim population in England and Wales is estimated to be 3.8 million or 6.5% of the total 59 million in 2021. In many big cities in the UK, like London and Birmingham, Muslims’ livelihoods are guaranteed, where they can actualize their religiosity and take part in a diverse British society. The winning of Sadiq Khan and the representation of Muslims in the House of Commons, as well as public figures in football, contribute to the good reception of Muslims in the UK.
On the one hand, demographic changes occurring in several European countries are influenced by religious disaffiliation, which creates a brand new landscape in religious development. The decline in adherence to certain religions and the shift toward non-religious identities have contributed to a transformation in population composition, making it increasingly diverse. Islam has its face and its part in Europe, whilst the Christian population in Europe is projected to decrease by approximately 100 million between 2010 and 2050, the Muslim population is expected to grow from 43 million to 71 million within the same period (
Pew Research Center 2017c).
Unfortunately, the new landscape of religious development has a higher possibility of raising social tensions, specifically among individuals who feel that their cultural, primordial, and religious identities are being threatened and facing crisis. On the other hand, the growing trend of individuals disaffiliating from religion could lead to a spiritual void where secular or nationalist ideologies become a more dominant depiction of European countries. This phenomenon may further exacerbate anti-Muslim sentiments, as Islam is often perceived as “the other” within the context of a secular European culture. Discrimination against Muslims in Europe is frequently rooted in hatred directed at Islamic ethnicity or religion (
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2024). Consequently, religious disaffiliation is one of the contributing factors to the persistence of Islamophobia in Europe across different eras.
The unfounded hatred toward Islam and Muslims, or so-called Islamophobia, has deep and long historical roots, not all of a sudden come to exist in the post-9/11 event, which was caused by the notable influx of Muslims in the West during the Cold War (
Esposito and Kalın 2011). Remarkably, the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the series of Arab-Israel Wars triggered significant numbers of asylums and asylum seekers to prosperous and promising places like Europe. The migration policy of countries such as France and the UK to invite Muslim workers from former colonies and Germany to invite workers from Turkiye has made Muslim immigrants more visible in Europe. In those countries, once-Muslim immigrants have now turned to diaspora who reside permanently, whether holding two citizenship or a mere working contract.
In addition, with the intensification of war and sectarian violence in the Middle East, the almost failure of the “Arab Spring”, and the economic impoverishment after the post-colonial era, there has been a significant increase in immigrants coming to Europe from Northern Africa towards Spain and France, to Germany from Turkiye, and to the UK and the Netherlands from Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and India (
Cipriani 2009;
Demichelis 2019). Immigration from outside Europe makes Muslims and Islam more visible in European society, especially Muslims with Islamic attributes such as
hijab (scarf),
niqab (veil),
jallabiya (long dress),
thobe (long garment), long beard or bearded man, speaking Arabic,
kufi or
taqiyya (cap), and
imama (turban). When Europeans encounter people with those attributes, even though they are not Muslim, some Europeans will feel uneasy. Cultural centers or prayer properties and Muslim-friendly restaurants or shops have a deeper involvement of Muslims in the business and social sectors. The influx of irregular Muslim migration to Europe was strongly influenced by the Arab Spring; for example, more than 5 million Syrians went out of Syria, and almost 4 million were stranded in Turkiye to find their way to Europe for refuge and asylum. The rest and more have made their way to Europe through smuggling or an inside network. Although the new regime in Syria brought a brand new hope and return of millions of refugee to their homeland, the hostility remains.
Muslim population in Europe continues to experience consistent growth annually, a trend also observed in the US, as this matter pushes a representation of Islam in the public officially and more recognition of higher public demand. While Muslims remain a minority in the US, their numbers are projected to steadily increase as a percentage of the country’s total population. According to projections by the Pew Research Center regarding the growth of the Muslim population in Europe under a Zero Migration scenario by 2050, the Muslim population is expected to rise from 4.9% to 7.4%. Under a moderate migration scenario, the Muslim population is projected to reach 11.2% by 2050, while under a high migration scenario, it could increase to 14%. However, these percentages will remain smaller compared to the populations of Christians and the religiously unaffiliated in Europe (
Pew Research Center 2017a). The negative projection also occurred due to the second Trump administration, despite the US having Hamtramck as an example of Muslim society in America.
The growth rate of the Muslim population in both Europe and America surpasses that of non-Muslim populations, driven by fundamental factors such as higher fertility rates, life expectancy at birth, and migration. Generally, Muslim communities exhibit higher fertility rates than non-Muslim populations. Muslim women tend to have more children than their non-Muslim counterparts, particularly those who adhere to Islamic values and prioritize traditional family norms that emphasize larger families. In Europe, the Muslim birth rate has been significantly higher than the mortality rate during the 2010–2015 period. This phenomenon was evident in countries like Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Russia, and France, where Muslim births reached approximately 250,000 during this timeframe (
Pew Research Center 2017b). Additionally, migration plays a critical role in driving the growth of the Muslim population in Europe and America. The prospect of economic opportunities continues to attract Muslim immigrants to settle in these regions each year. Some of them have taken an important part in political life as a leader of a party, a mayor of the city, a representative in the parliament, or a conglomerate in the country.
The increasing number of Muslim communities in both Europe and the US has led to various Islamic organizations being established, such as Musulmans de France (1983), Fédération des Musulmans de France (1985), Der Indonesische Islamische Verein (1991), Muslim Council of Britain (1997), Muslimisches Zentrum Wien (1979), Muslim Students Association of the US and Canada (1963), Islamic Circle of North American (1968), Islamic Society of North America (1982), GreenFaith (1992), the Council on American-Islamic Relations (1994), and Muhammadiyah Deutschland (2007). In addition, several Muslim women’s organizations in the US have also been established, such as The Sisters’ Wing of the Islamic Circle of North America (1978), International League of Muslim Women (1984), Muslim Women United (1989), Muslim Women’s League (1992), Women in Islam (1992), Rahima Foundation (1993), Karamah: Muslim Women Lawyers for Human Rights (1993), Peaceful Family Project (2000), Muslim Women Resource Center (2001), Muslim Advocates (2005), dan Womens’ Islamic Initiative in Spirituality and Equality (2006) (
Howe 2019, pp. 119–33;
Subarkah 2020).
Multiple factors influence the landscape of religious development in the West. Among the many factors discussed, it can be concluded that immigration rates and fertility rates are two of the most crucial factors related to religious development in the US and Europe. Although Islam remains a minority religion, it continues to see a rising number of adherents each year. Therefore, it is not surprising that Muslim organizations established in the 1960s are still present today.
4. Islamophobic Framing in Western Media
The emergence of Islamophobia accurately conceptualizes new categories of different kinds of racism, from anti-Semitism in mobilizing opposition to injustice forms, as it continuously circulates in the public discourse (
Sayyid 2015). Several mass media outlets play a leading role in raising the insecurity and inauthenticity of individual subjective awareness regarding the manipulation and depiction of one’s world of life (
Aupers 2012). Hence, when the conversation related to “the media” brought by young Muslim people, most of them will refer to the hybrid formations as the effect of Islam’s negative images by the media caused deep effects on the lives and religious orientations of young people (
Aslan and Yıldız 2024). The descendants of Muslim immigrants are exposed to a wide web of explicit discourse about Islam and Muslims produced by Muslims and Non-Muslim (
Brubaker 2012), mainly spread by the media.
The influence of digital platform algorithms on the spread of Islamophobic sentiment has further intensified the dynamics of hate speech and created complex audience interactions. These systems tend to prioritize content that aligns with users’ pre-existing beliefs, resulting in closed information environments that reinforce negative stereotypes, including those directed at Muslim communities. The study conducted by
Vidgen (
2019) examined the patterns of Islamophobic hate speech among followers of political parties in the UK on Twitter. The four parties analyzed were the British National Party (BNP), the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), the Conservative Party, and the Labour Party. The findings indicate that social media algorithms, particularly on Twitter, have reinforced ideological biases through positive feedback loops, accelerating the spread of extreme narratives and deepening social divisions. Additionally, the study reveals that Islamophobic radicalization is not confined to extremist groups but also occurs among individuals with mainstream political affiliations (
Vidgen 2019). Another related study is from Donghee Sin in 2024, who examined the role of social media algorithms, particularly TikTok, in driving radicalization by reinforcing ideological tendencies through a positive feedback mechanism. His research findings reveal that artificial intelligence (AI) systems contribute to the spread of far-right extremist content by analyzing user interaction patterns, platform structure, and the broader dynamics of the AI ecosystem (
Shin 2024).
On the other hand, when the Runnymede Trust defined Islamophobia through its report in 1997, the challenge of British ethnospace became more complex with the introduction of new principal subject positions, which is a Muslim identity as it easily contrasted with the spectrum of ethnically subject positions in an influential number to subvert the racial logic (
Sayyid 2015). The analysis obtained from the nine main European Islamophobia Report from 2015 to 2023 (
Bayraklı and Hafez 2016,
2017,
2018,
2019,
2020,
2021,
2022,
2023,
2024) can be presented in
Figure 1.
The findings presented in the table clearly illustrate that each country faces significant issues due to the role of the media in negatively portraying immigrants and Muslim communities. Both print and digital media contribute significantly to worsening the perception of Muslim communities in Western Europe, reinforcing negative stereotypes and leading to increased sentiments and acts of violence against Muslims.
In German media, coverage of Muslim and Islamic themes shows a narrow focus on political issues and bloody conflict in the Middle East, which constructs an unduly political depiction of the region. This selective framing directs public perception toward essentialist and reductionist narratives, similar to how British media framed Muslim youth involved in the London bombings as “home-grown terrorists”. In contrast, Northern Irish-born individuals engaged in terrorist activities were not labeled in the same way (
Esposito and Kalın 2011). The PM theory analysis depicted that this discrepancy arises due to elite-driven ideological frameworks, where narratives supporting state policies and geopolitical interests receive preferential treatment. While mainstream media perpetuates these stereotypes, some independent and public broadcasters attempt to counteract Islamophobic narratives by presenting diverse experiences of Muslim communities, though they often face institutional resistance.
As Barbara stated in her interview, “The core idea is that Muslims will eventually invade Europe, change the lifestyle, and impose Sharia on everybody, and they behead everybody and they will snatch their wives and they will abuse their daughters and all these propaganda” (
SKSG UI 2024, 09:52–10:09). This statement illustrates how Islamophobic discourse is deeply embedded in certain media narratives, perpetuating fear-based perceptions that align with dominant ideological filters described in PM.
Moreover, movements such as PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident) have leveraged media platforms to spread hate speech and mobilize anti-Muslim sentiment. Their repeated protests and rallies have increased public pressure against Muslims, affecting their sense of belonging and participation in European society. Islamophobic attitudes further impede self-criticism within Muslim communities, as many feel communal stigmatization for defending their faith rather than engaging in constructive discourse (
Esposito and Kalın 2011). As referred to in PM theory, these movements thrive because their narratives align with broader political and corporate interests, ensuring favorable media coverage while suppressing dissenting voices. However, counter-movements and organizations advocating for Muslim rights actively work to debunk misconceptions and promote inclusivity in German society.
European countries could look to the Netherlands as an example of policy-driven protection of Muslim minorities, with robust anti-discrimination and anti-Islamophobia measures. The country’s multicultural policies have helped mitigate hate crimes, as reflected in the European Islamophobia Report, which notes a lack of reported violent incidents in 2023. Nevertheless, this does not imply the absence of Islamophobia, as far-right politicians like Geert Wilders continue to push anti-Muslim rhetoric and restrictive policies (
Shehadi 2024). Meanwhile, media outlets in the Netherlands provide more balanced representations of Muslim communities, offering a counterpoint to dominant Islamophobic narratives seen elsewhere in Europe. Barbara further highlighted, “What they claim is that Halal is discriminatory that is creating a need where it doesn’t exist … is … also claiming that the benefits of Halal are going to earn terrorist groups … they claim that this is attacks on Muslim people living in … non-Muslim countries … there’s all sorts of propaganda in their website” (
SKSG UI 2024, 07:12–07:20). This example underscores how propaganda-driven narratives shape public perceptions, reinforcing fear and misconceptions rather than presenting factual, unbiased reporting.
In addition, the UK has been concerned about Islamophobia matters since the late 1980s when “Rushdie Affairs” appeared and the Runnymede Trust released the report. According to
Tahir Abbas (
2004), many Muslims in the UK and Western Europe are experiencing notable challenges compounded by the means by which Western countries mostly consider Muslims as the epicenter of the “problems” experienced. The British government campaigns to encourage multicultural integration, equality of opportunity, and freedom of speech, and the policy seeks to develop a multicultural society where the Muslim community has a place. Unfortunately, the British media kind of promulgated the stereotype of Muslims as terrorists and radicals, compared to minimal coverage of peaceful rallies often held that represented most of the Muslim community in the UK. So, media bias is deemed as the extent of coverage of “Islamic terrorism” or “extremist Muslim”, especially in the post-9/11 and 7/7 (
Esposito and Kalın 2011). The candidacy of Sadiq Khan as London Mayor further exposed Islamophobic rhetoric in media and political discourse, showcasing how political narratives influence media portrayals. Referring to PM theory, it can be said that these biases arise due to government and corporate influence on news framing, ensuring that Muslim communities remain scapegoated in broader discussions on security and immigration.
Meanwhile, France, as the defender of secularism and freedom, cannot avoid having satirical magazines like Charlie Hebdo and figures such as Marine Le Pen, who leads the National Front and promotes anti-immigrant and anti-Islam policies (
Esposito and Kalın 2011). The depiction of Muhammad or Muslims as terrorists by French media, which is in favor of populist public attitudes and prejudices, creates disharmonisation among people (
Allen 2010, p. 116). It is becoming worse with the instrumentalization of social media to spread political rhetoric, which contains hate speech and hateful messages against Muslims. The case of Tariq Ramadan caused public disappointment and a negative depiction of Muslims, where the media played a part in blowing up the issue and framing negative sentiment toward the figure and his religion. Furthermore, when President Macron uttered that Islam is a religion in crisis, it also worsened public opinion and made media from both sides fabricate the political rhetoric.
Despite this, many Muslims have contributed to nation-building and participated in the modernization that the French promoted. From the PM theory, the ownership and funding structures of French media contribute to the persistence of Islamophobic discourse, as corporate and political elites benefit from maintaining secular-nationalist rhetoric. However, despite these challenges, many French Muslims actively contribute to national development and modernization, which remains underreported in the mainstream media.
Similarly, in Spain, the media representations have historically framed Muslims as internal enemies, reinforcing public anxieties about Muslim migrants (
Allen 2010, p. 116). The media is utilizing bias and false coverage to depict Islam negatively. This caused the negative sentiment of the public over Muslim migrants and, somehow, anxiety within the Muslim community. The media propaganda creates an Islamophobic industry and benefits the political agenda carried out by ultra-nationalists or far-right movements and those in favor of anti-Muslim racism or discrimination. Based on the PM perspective, in Spain, elite control over media narratives enables the propagation of Islamophobic sentiments, as such framing aligns with nationalist political objectives and migration policies. However, some Spanish media outlets and civil society organizations have worked to challenge these biases, advocating for accurate and fair representations of Islam.
Islamophobia situates a post-racial subject linked to the exclusionary practices of Muslims or perceived Muslims and marks the shift in the balance of power and the de-centering or provincializing of the West that generates anxieties in Western countries (
Sayyid 2015). That is why the Western media intertwine anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim narratives to depict Muslims as an exclusive community that does not fit the European way of life, the “center of the world”. This is likewise related to the historical root of colonialism in which Western European countries have created Islamophobia by constructing the identities and segregation due to race in most nation-states as legacies within the former-colonized societies (
Ramadhan et al. 2024, p. 463) even after they migrate to the former colonizer’s countries.
Overall, while European media has played a significant role in perpetuating Islamophobic narratives, it is important to acknowledge the structural and ideological mechanisms that drive these biases. The Propaganda Model theory provides a crucial lens for understanding why these narratives persist and how systemic factors influence the media’s role in shaping Islamophobic perceptions. Professor Barbara concluded, “Spain and Europe are generally safe places… we have nearly 90 million tourists, we are the number one destination in the world and we have a lot of these tourists coming from Islamic countries to visit Al-Andalus” (
SKSG UI 2024, 32:00–32:42). This highlights the contrast between media-driven fears and the everyday reality of many European Muslim communities.
5. Conclusions
This study concludes that the phenomenon of Islamophobia in Western Europe is the result of a complex dynamic involving migration policies, media propaganda, and the influence of ultranationalist politics. The representation of Muslims as immigrants and symbols of vicarious presence in the Media has created a negative narrative rooted in traumatic events such as the 9/11 attacks and the 2005 London Bombings. This highlights the ongoing rise in anti-Muslim sentiment. On the other hand, anti-immigrant policies from sovereign governments further exacerbate stereotypes and create opportunities for discrimination by non-Muslim citizens against Muslim communities in countries such as Spain, the Netherlands, France, the UK, and Germany. Meanwhile, the role of the media also plays a significant part in constructing the negative public image of Muslims and Islam, which powerful interest groups deliberately shape to advance their political agendas.
Referring to the findings of the European Islamophobia Reports 2015–2023, efforts to combat Islamophobia at the national and supranational levels in various European countries are indicated. However, these efforts still face challenges from right-wing politicians who continue to perpetuate anti-Muslim rhetoric through the media as a tool to gain electoral support. Initiatives such as the appointment of a coordinator by the European Commission and the establishment of the Anti-Muslim Hatred Working Group in the UK demonstrate a commitment to combating anti-Muslim hatred. Nevertheless, this commitment has yet to be fully realized, as some European countries have not consistently implemented it, and there is still a paradox between the ideal campaign for diversity and the political reality, which tends to be discriminatory, where politicians use their own media outlets to propagate hate speech and gather populist votes. This indicates a contradiction between the European countries’ principles of inclusivity and diversity and the actual practices on the ground.
This study identifies that despite the increase in the Muslim population in Western Europe due to migration and high fertility rates, Islamophobia remains a significant challenge for the lives of Muslim communities due to the promulgation and propaganda made by the media in favor of a political agenda. The presence of major Islamic organizations in these countries has not yet been able to address the issue of Islamophobia, as it requires synergy between individuals and all law enforcement agencies within the government. Efforts to combat this phenomenon of Islamophobia require a holistic approach that includes the reform of migration policies, regulations against discriminatory media propaganda, and strengthening the commitment of regional institutions to protect the rights of Muslim communities or immigrants regardless of their race, faith, gender, socio-economic status, and political orientation. Thus, in the future, Europe can become a region that values human dignity regardless of religion, race, or ethnicity.
On the other hand, this study suggests several recommendations that countries in Western Europe can implement to overcome Islamophobia. First, migration policy reform should be fairer and uphold human rights. Second, there are needs to be fair and anti-racial and religious discrimination regulations for the media so that the image of Muslims is reported accurately and unbiased. In addition, media literacy and public awareness of the impact of Islamophobia are essential for every individual. Then, collaboration between European countries and human rights institutions must be strengthened to ensure policies are implemented consistently. Finally, there is a need for synergy between the government, media, and society in overcoming and mitigating Islamophobia so as to create a society that is highly tolerant and upholds human rights.