Questions of Truth vs. Questions of Trust: Nuancing the Influences of Religiosity, Political Conservatism, and Christian Nationalism on Attitudes Towards Science

Abstract

Religiosity and political conservatism are often hypothesized to be negatively associated with attitudes towards science. Yet, past research has often failed to distinguish between trust in science versus the acceptance of science as a source of truth. Using data generated from a probability survey of U.S. adults, we identify four latent factors within a battery of items asking about individuals’ views on science. Two of these represent science’s power as a source of truth, while the other two represent trust in science and scientists. A structural equation model finds that, all else being equal, measures of religiosity tend to be negatively associated with an individual’s view of science as a source of truth and unrelated to their trust in science. Adherence to Christian nationalism is negatively associated with an individual’s trust in science, while political conservatism and Republican identification is negatively associated with both trust in science and seeing science as a source of truth.

1. Introduction

While by no means the only relevant factors, religiosity and political conservatism tend to be particularly strong and consistent predictors of individuals’ skepticism towards scientific claims and distrust of science (Evans 2002; Morrison et al. 2015; O’Brien and Noy 2020). Although the influence of religiosity and political conservatism on science-related attitudes and outcomes has been well-explored, many questions remain about the nuances of these relationships. For instance, some research has focused on how religiosity or political conservatism influence trust in science. Other research has focused on how religion or political conservatism influences the acceptance of science as a source of truth. The theoretical literature, though, has not always made such distinctions clear, and empirical analyses have often lacked the measures to distinguish how religiosity and political conservatism might relate differently to questions of truth and questions of trust.

Only adding to this complexity is recent work exploring the role of Christian nationalism in shaping attitudes towards science. Christian nationalism is a politically conservative religious ideology supporting the infusion of Christianity throughout American civil life (Perry et al. 2021; Whitehead and Perry 2020a). How Christian nationalism fits into the acceptance of scientific truth and trust in science alongside religiosity and political conservatism has only begun to be considered.

In this study, we first develop expectations concerning the independent associations between religiosity, political conservatism, Christian nationalism, and individuals’ attitudes towards science and scientists. We then use original survey data from a nationally representative survey of U.S. adults featuring a comparatively extensive battery of questions measuring individuals’ attitudes and orientation towards science to test our predictions to first assess the measurement structure of items related to questions of scientific truth and items related to questions of trust. Finally, we use structural equation modeling to test our expectations concerning religiosity, political conservatism, and Christian nationalism.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Religion and Science: A Question of Truth

It is often assumed that opposition to science resulting from religiosity is grounded in questions of truth. That is, religiosity is assumed to lead individuals to reject scientific truth claims about the world and the methods used to derive those truth claims. Social science research has attempted to assess the existence of truth-based conflict between religion and science by assessing whether religious individuals are more likely to reject specific scientific facts or truth claims (e.g., the earth goes around the sun, antibiotics kill viruses, center of the earth is very hot, and so on) (Evans 2002, 2011; Evans and Evans 2010; Evans and Feng 2013; Morrison et al. 2015; O’Brien and Noy 2015). This research has found that religious individuals are more likely to reject certain scientific facts that present direct conflicts with religious truth claims. However, most scientific claims do not contradict religious claims. Religious individuals typically do not have a problem with photosynthesis, gravity, momentum, or other scientific claims that are not religiously charged (Evans 2011; Guhin 2020). The weak support for epistemological or truth-based conflict between religion and science has led some to argue that what conflict does exist is centered around issues of trust and morality rather than truth (Ellison and Musick 1995; Evans 2002, 2011, 2013; Evans and Evans 2010; Evans and Feng 2013; Noy and O’Brien 2016).

At the same time, though, research does suggest the existence of a more foundational epistemological tension between religion and science. Specifically, these studies highlight the fact that—when there is a contradiction between religious truth claims and scientific truth claims—religious individuals will tend to assess the scientific claim as false (Evans 2011). As Evans notes, “this approach establishes religious methods of knowing as superior to the scientific method, but does not invalidate that scientific method for most scientific claims” (Evans 2011, p. 712). This suggests that religious individuals would be more likely to reject scientism—“a term which refers to the conviction that the scientific method is the only reliable way to understand the world around us” (Ecklund and Johnson 2021, p. 108). Scientism argues that “nothing is beyond science,” science is “the only legitimate way to understand the world,” and “there is no reality outside of the natural, material world.” (Ecklund and Johnson 2021, pp. 108–11). Opposition to scientism is likely at the core of the truth-based religion and science conflict that exists. Past research has typically used direct measures of religion-science conflict perceptions (i.e., asking if the respondent views there to be a conflict) or asked questions regarding trust in science. These questions fail to capture scientism, which is a matter of perceptions of truth, both the extent and source of, rather than trust. We argue that religion will conflict with claims of scientism as they represent different epistemological views of truth. This leads to the following hypotheses:

H1.

Religiosity will be negatively associated with perception of science as sole or best source of truth, independent of political conservatism and Christian nationalism.

2.2. Political Conservatism and Science: A Question of Trust

While religion is often assumed to have truth-based conflicts with science, political conservatism’s conflict with science is typically assumed to be driven by questions of trust. O’Brien (2013) notes that if scientists wish to use their research to influence policy, they must wade into political waters to do so. As a result, certain scientific topics become highly politicized (Gauchat et al. 2017; O’Brien and Noy 2020). Scientists become seen not as neutral parties but as political actors associated with liberal causes, which leads conservatives to see them as biased and untrustworthy leading to a conflict between political conservatism and science (Mooney 2005; Pittinsky 2015).

This trust-based conflict between political conservatism and science does not cover all scientific topics. Instead, it is more focused and directed. This suggests that the issue may not be the science itself, but rather with those who are conducting the research. There is a perception among political conservatives that scientists hold more liberal views and are liberally biased as a result (Gross 2013; Martin 2013). Research suggests that political conservatives take issue with scientists and the scientific community, rather than the scientific method or research being conducted (Mann and Schleifer 2020; O’Brien and Noy 2020). Evans and Hargittai (2020) found that, with regard to COVID-19, Republicans were less likely than Democrats to believe that scientists shared their values.

The conflict between political conservatism and science is similar to the conflict between religion and science, in that they are both focused on conflicts regarding particular scientific claims. However, whereas the religion-science conflict focused on issues of truth, the political conservatism-science conflict revolves around concern over trust in scientists—trust that scientists do not have a personal agenda, trust that their work is not compromised by their own political or social biases, and trust that scientists have knowledge of what they are studying (Evans and Hargittai 2020). This leads us to the following hypotheses:

H2.

Political conservatism will be negatively associated with trust in science and scientists, independent of religiosity and Christian nationalism.

2.3. Christian Nationalism and Science: Truth, Trust, or Both?

Christian nationalism combines elements of both political and religious conservatism, which makes it an interesting hybrid in the context of thinking about how it may relate to trust in science and the acceptance of scientific truth. Individuals adhering to Christian nationalism believe that the United States was founded as and should continue to be a Christian nation, but their interpretation of Christianity is distinctly authoritarian in nature (Whitehead and Perry 2020b).

Much of the recent work has explored the relationship between Christian nationalism and COVID-19 policy recommendations. Corcoran et al. (2021) found that Christian nationalists were significantly less likely to engage in medically recommended responses to COVID-19. Christian nationalism was actually found to be the second strongest predictor that Americans would choose not to engage in safety precautions like using hand sanitizers or masks (Perry et al. 2020). This relationship extended to anti-vaccine attitudes (Whitehead and Perry 2020a) and also vaccine hesitancy and uptake (Corcoran et al. 2021).

Less research has explored the relationship between Christian nationalism and science attitudes or beliefs more generally. Perry et al. (2021) find that with regard to scientific literacy, Christian nationalism is the strongest predictor of incorrect answers on those questions that deal with scientific claims contested by religion. They find no such relationship between Christian nationalism and questions that are not contested by religion. Baker et al. (2020) note that Christian nationalism perceives science and scientists to be a threat to its moral authority, and that Christian nationalists are more likely to reject evolution, while supporting the teaching of creationism in public schools.

Perry et al. (2021) note that Christian nationalists are more likely to challenge scientific claims that threaten the truth of the beliefs that they hold as well as the scientists who make those claims. They also find that the Christian nationalism-science conflict is one of authority—a conflict rooted in trust. However, Baker et al. (2020) did not find a significant association between Christian nationalism and a measure of science and truth—“Science will eventually provide solutions to most of our problems,” while religiosity was negatively associated with this measure. They note that Christian nationalism is more concerned about competition over scientific claims of moral authority, whereas religiosity is related to more general pessimism toward science. These findings lead us to the following hypotheses:

H3.

Christian nationalism will be negatively associated with trust in science and scientists, independent of religiosity and political conservatism.

3. Data

Data for this study were generated from a survey fielded using the AmeriSpeak Panel, a probability panel of over 40,000 households created and managed by NORC at the University of Chicago. The survey was made possible by a grant from the Science and Religion: Identity and Belief Formation initiative spearheaded by the Religion and Public Life Program at Rice University and the University of California-San Diego and provided by the Templeton Religion Trust via The Issachar Fund. The survey featured in this study was fielded from 17 May through 1 June 2021. A total of 8238 panelists representing a random selection of adults aged 18 or older were invited to complete the survey with a target final sample size of 2000. The survey was offered in English and Spanish. Panelists were offered the equivalent of $3 in incentives for their response.

In the end, 2003 panelists completed the survey for a completion rate of 24.3%. Most of these responses were through the web (1915), while 88 responses were collected by phone. The weighted cumulative response rate—which takes into account all stages of panel recruitment, panel retention, and survey completion—was 3.5%. NORC statisticians computed sampling weights using benchmarks produced from the Current Population Survey so that, when the weights are applied, the respondents mirror the U.S. adult population on age, gender, region, race and ethnicity, education, housing tenure, and household phone status. These weights are implemented in the analyses below.

4. Measures

A relative strength of the instrument used in this study is that it contained a wide-variety of questions related to individual’s orientation towards science, including multiple items intended to measure the concepts of interest for this study.

4.1. Questions of Trust

One block of the instrument featured seven items intended to assess respondents’ trust in science and scientists. These items were taken from the 21-item Trust in Science and Scientist Inventory, which has been shown to have strong internal reliability and to be associated with theoretically predicted variables (Nadelson et al. 2014). Individuals were asked to “consider the following statements and indicate your level of agreement”:

• Scientists ignore evidence that contradicts their work.
• We should trust the work of scientists.
• We cannot trust scientists because they are biased in their perspectives.
• I trust the work of scientists to make life better for people.
• We can trust science to find the answers that explain the natural world.
• Scientific theories are trustworthy.
• Scientists do not value the ideas of others.

The order of these items was randomized, and possible responses were (1) strongly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, (3) neither agree nor disagree, (4) somewhat agree, or (5) strongly agree.

We note that the Trust in Science and Scientist Inventory does not consider or distinguish between sub-scales within its items. However, we assess the presence of such sub-scales among these seven items in our analyses below.

4.2. Questions of Truth

A separate block featured six-items intended to measure respondents’ perceptions of science as a source of truth—that is, scientism. Respondents were asked to “[p]lease tell us to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements”:

• We can only rationally believe in what is scientifically provable.
• Science tells us everything there is to know about what reality consists of.
• The scientific method is the only reliable path to knowledge.
• Science is the most efficient means of attaining truth.
• Science only tells us about one part of reality.
• Some forces in the universe are not limited by the laws of science.

The first four items come from the Belief in Science Scale (Farias et al. 2013), while the last two items were original to the instrument and meant to assess perceptions of the limitations of science as a source of truth. Items were presented in random order and possible responses were (1) strongly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, (3) neither agree nor disagree, (4) somewhat agree, or (5) strongly agree. As with the items measure trust in science and scientists, we assess below whether there may be sub-scales within these items.

4.3. Religiosity, Political Conservatism, and Christian Nationalism

The focal predictors for this study represent measures of individuals’ religiosity, political conservatism, and adherence to Christian nationalism. Regarding religiosity, we utilize two measures representing individuals’ general religious saliency and practice. The first item asked, “To what extent do you consider yourself a religious person?” Possible responses were (1) not religious at all, (2) slightly religious, (3) moderately religious, or (4) very religious. We also include a measure for the individual’s frequency of religious service attendance. Responses ranged from (1) never to (9) several times a week.

We also include two measures representing political conservatism from both an ideological and political party dimension. The first measure asked respondents whether they consider themselves “to be a liberal, moderate, or conservative?” Follow-up questions asked whether they consider themselves to be very or somewhat [liberal or conservative]. Responses were then coded as (1) very liberal, (2) somewhat liberal, (3) moderate, (4) somewhat conservative, or (5) very conservative. We also include a separate measure for the individual’s identification with the Republican party. This item ranges from (1) strong Democrat to (7) strong Republican. Including these measures will allow us to assess the independent associations of political conservatism more generally from Republican Party identification more specifically.

We also include two measures representing individuals’ adherence to specific forms of conversative Christian beliefs—Christian nationalism and biblical literalism. Our measure of Christian nationalist belief asked, “To what extent do you agree or disagree that the federal government should declare the United States a Christian nation?” Possible responses were (1) strongly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, (3) neither agree nor disagree, (4) somewhat agree, or (5) strongly agree. This is the only item available in our data that would serve as a measure of Christian nationalism. However, it is an item that more clearly addresses the core of Christian nationalism, as other measures that have often been employed to measure Christian nationalism have been criticized as lacking face validity or clear connections to Christian nationalism (Smith and Adler 2022). Alongside this measure of Christian nationalism, we also include a measure representing the extent to which an individual adheres to a literal belief in the Bible. This is measured with a question asking, “Which of the following comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?” Possible responses were as follows: (1) The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral codes. (2) The Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word. (3) The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word.

4.4. Controls

The aim of this study is to isolate the associations between religiosity, political conservatism, and individuals’ orientation towards science and scientists. To this end, we include a variety of control measures that could also influence these associations.

Past research has found differences in science attitudes by religious tradition (Evans 2011, 2013; Evans and Feng 2013; Evans and Hargittai 2020; Gauchat 2008; Rutjens et al. 2018). Since we aim to assess the role of religiosity net of an individual’s particular religious tradition, we include a set of indicators representing individuals’ religious tradition. These indicators were coded into the following categories: (1) evangelical Protestant, (2) non-evangelical Protestant, (3) Catholic, (4) non-Christian, (5) agnostic, (6) atheist, (7) nothing in particular, or (8) something else.1

Our analysis also includes controls for individuals’ education and income. Education is measured on five points ranging from (1) less than high school degree to (5) postgraduate study or degree. Household income is measured on nine points ranging from (1) under $10,000 to (9) $150,000 or more. Also included are controls measures representing individuals’ age, marital status, gender, and race or ethnicity. Age is measured on seven points ranging from (1) 18–24 to (7) 75 or older. Marital status is coded as (0) not currently married or (1) currently married.2 Gender is measured using a question asking “Which best describes your current gender identity?” Three responses were offered: (1) woman, (2) man, or (3) something else (e.g., non-binary, gender fluid, agender, genderqueer, gender non-conforming). Finally, race or ethnicity is measured with indicators representing six groups: (1) white, non-Hispanic, (2) Black, non-Hispanic, (3) Asian, non-Hispanic, (4) other, non-Hispanic, (5) multiple races, non-Hispanic, or (6) Hispanic.3

A summary of all the measures included in this study can be found in

Table 1. Descriptive statistics.

	Mean or Percentage	Standard Error	Min–Max	Non-Missing N
Questions of Truth
We can only rationally believe in what is scientifically provable.	2.96	0.03	1–5	1995
Science tells us everything there is to know about what reality consists of.	2.73	0.03	1–5	1995
The scientific method is the only reliable path to knowledge.	2.89	0.03	1–5	1991
Science is the most efficient means of attaining truth.	3.29	0.03	1–5	1994
Science only tells us about one part of reality.	3.45	0.03	1–5	1988
Some forces in the universe are not limited by the laws of science.	3.44	0.03	1–5	1986
Questions of Trust
Scientists ignore evidence that contradicts their work.	2.84	0.03	1–5	1987
We should trust the work of scientists.	3.68	0.02	1–5	1983
We cannot trust scientists because they are biased in their perspectives.	2.54	0.03	1–5	1991
I trust the work of scientists to make life better for people.	3.65	0.02	1–5	1993
We can trust science to find the answers that explain the natural world.	3.57	0.02	1–5	1994
Scientific theories are trustworthy.	3.48	0.02	1–5	1998
Scientists do not value the ideas of others.	2.62	0.03	1–5	1987
Religiosity	2.33	0.03	1–4	1989
Religious Service Attendance	3.71	0.08	1–9	1998
Biblical Literalism	1.92	0.01	1–3	1975
Christian Nationalism	2.51	0.04	1–5	1990
Political Conservatism	3.07	0.03	1–5	1969
Republican Identification	3.68	0.06	1–7	1997
Religious Tradition
Evangelical Protestant	17.98%	--	--	1971
Other Protestant	28.79%	--	--	1971
Catholic	14.59%	--	--	1971
Non-Christian	4.54%	--	--	1971
Agnostic	6.61%	--	--	1971
Atheist	7.26%	--	--	1971
Nothing in particular	14.90%	--	--	1971
Other religion	5.33%	--	--	1971
Education	3.02	0.04	1–5	2003
Income	5.40	0.07	1–9	2003
Age	3.82	0.06	1–7	2003
Married	49.74%	--	0–1	2003
Gender
Woman	52.00%	--	--	1998
Man	46.82%	--	--	1998
Other gender	1.20%	--	--	1998
Race and ethnicity
White, non-Hispanic	62.41%	--	--	2003
Black, non-Hispanic	11.98%	--	--	2003
Asian, non-Hispanic	4.79%	--	--	2003
Other, non-Hispanic	1.26%	--	--	2003
Multi, non-Hispanic	2.68%	--	--	2003
Hispanic	16.89%	--	--	2003

.

5. Analysis Plan

Our analyses occur in two stages. In the first stage we aim to assess the measurement structure of our items assessing individual’s orientation towards science and scientists. As noted above, the instrument contained thirteen questions related to science as a source of truth and trust in science. We start by conducting an exploratory factor analysis to consider whether these items represent one, two, or possibly more sub-dimensions. We will also consider the associations between the factors identified in this stage.

In the second stage we will utilize the factors identified in this exploratory factor analysis as latent outcomes within a structural equation model, with religiosity, political conservatism, and Christian nationalism as the focal predictors. SEM analysis has several advantages for the purpose of this study. First, we will have at least one outcome measured by multiple items. SEM allows us to build this measurement component into the model. Second, it is possible that we will have multiple latent outcomes, each of which will likely be associated with each other. SEM allows us to estimate models for multiple outcomes simultaneously while also estimating the correlation between the error terms for those outcomes.

All analyses are conducted in Stata/SE 15.1 and utilize the software’s svy command to implement the sampling weights. The structural equation model is estimated using a maximum likelihood with missing values (mlmv) method. This method has advantages in that it utilizes any available information for cases that have some missing values and would otherwise be excluded with listwise deletion. Some also argue that this method has advantages over other strategies for addressing missing values, such as imputation (Allison 2009).

6. Results

To assess the measurement structure of the items representing our outcome measures, we first conducted an exploratory principal factors analysis with an oblique promax rotation. This analysis identified four underlying concepts or latent factors within the two blocks of truth and trust questions. Two of these factors were found within the questions of truth, while the other two were found within the questions of trust. That is, there were no items that loaded across the respective blocks of questions.

Table 2. Exploratory principal factors analysis (oblique promax rotation).

Item	Factor: Scientism	Factor: Anti-Scientism	Factor: Trust in the Work of Science and Scientists	Factor: Scientists Are Biased
We can only rationally believe in what is scientifically provable.	0.68	−0.04	−0.03	0.02
Science tells us everything there is to know about what reality consists of.	0.69	−0.03	0.01	0.01
The scientific method is the only reliable path to knowledge.	0.74	−0.01	0.01	0.01
Science is the most efficient means of attaining truth.	0.67	0.08	0.14	−0.07
Science only tells us about one part of reality.	0.01	0.55	−0.01	0.05
Some forces in the universe are not limited by the laws of science.	−0.05	0.57	0.01	0.02
Scientists ignore evidence that contradicts their work.	−0.04	0.05	−0.01	0.76
We should trust the work of scientists.	−0.02	0.01	0.79	−0.06
We cannot trust scientists because they are biased in their perspectives.	0.01	−0.03	−0.15	0.68
I trust the work of scientists to make life better for people.	0.01	0.03	0.76	−0.04
We can trust science to find the answers that explain the natural world.	0.14	−0.06	0.68	0.02
Scientific theories are trustworthy.	0.03	−0.02	0.68	−0.02
Scientists do not value the ideas of others.	0.01	−0.01	−0.01	0.75

presents these four latent factors.4

As seen in this table, the six items concerning science as a source of truth were found to represent two underlying factors. The first truth factor includes agreement with statements like, “The scientific method is the only reliable path to knowledge” and “Science is the most efficient means of attaining truth.” We label this factor as scientism. The second truth factor includes agreement with the statements “Science only tells us about one part of reality” and “Some forces in the universe are not limited by the laws of science.” We label this factor anti-scientism.

The seven items concerning trust in science were also found to represent underlying factors. The first trust factor includes agreement with statements like “Scientific theories are trustworthy” and “We should trust the work of scientists.” We label this factor as trust in science and scientists. The second trust factor includes agreement with statements like “Scientists do not value the ideas of others” and “Scientists ignore evidence that contradicts their work.” We label this factor as scientists are biased.

Table 3. Correlations between latent factors.

	Questions of Truth		Questions of Trust
	Scientism	Anti-Scientism	Trust in the Work of Science and Scientists	Scientists Are Biased
Scientism	--	−0.42 **	0.61 **	−0.39 **
Anti-Scientism	--	--	−0.25 **	0.40 **
Trust in Science and Scientists	--	--	--	−0.63 **
Scientists Are Biased	--	--	--	--

Note: ** p < 0.01; N = 2003; Maximum likelihood with missing values estimation method.

presents the correlations between the four factors just identified. We find that those who tend to agree with scientism are less likely to think that is a reality and forces beyond science (anti-scientism), more likely to trust science and scientists, and less likely to think that scientists are biased.

Having established the structure of our measures of individuals’ perceptions of science as a source of truth and their trust in science, we turn now to the second stage of our analysis. In this stage we estimate a structural equation model to assess how measures of religiosity, political conservatism, and adherence to Christian nationalism predict the four latent factors just identified. Figure 1 summarizes this model. As indicated in this figure, we allow the error terms for the four latent outcomes to correlate with each other.5

The results from this model are shown in

Table 4. Standardized coefficients from full structural equation model.

	Latent Outcomes
	Questions of Truth		Questions of Trust
	Scientism	Anti-Scientism	Trust in the Work of Science and Scientists	Scientists Are Biased
Religious Person	−0.09 **	0.14 **	0.06	−0.01
Religious Service Attendance	−0.11 **	−0.01	−0.03	−0.04
Biblical Literalism	−0.10 **	−0.05	−0.16 **	0.12 **
Christian Nationalism	0.02	0.02	−0.10 **	0.17 **
Political Conservatism	−0.06 *	0.05	−0.09 **	0.16 **
Republican Identification	−0.15 **	0.11 **	−0.24 **	0.24 **
Religious Tradition
Evangelical Protestant (ref.)	--	--	--	--
Other Protestant	0.06 *	−0.11 **	0.01	−0.02
Catholic	0.10 **	−0.09 **	0.06 *	−0.03
Non-Christian	0.05 *	−0.09 **	0.02	−0.02
Agnostic	0.09 **	−0.19 **	0.06 *	−0.03
Atheist	0.15 **	−0.34 **	0.10 **	−0.09 **
Nothing in particular	0.07 *	−0.16 **	0.01	−0.02
Other religion	0.05 *	−0.07 **	0.01	0.01
Education	0.01	0.05	0.09 **	−0.05 *
Income	0.01	−0.03	0.09 **	−0.08 **
Age	0.02	−0.02	0.01	−0.03
Married	−0.01	0.01	−0.02	0.01
Gender
Woman (ref.)	--	--	--	--
Man	0.09 **	−0.06 *	0.01	0.02
Other gender	−0.03	−0.01	0.01	0.03
Race and ethnicity
White, non-Hispanic (ref.)	--	--	--	--
Black, non-Hispanic	−0.03	0.01	−0.12 **	0.09 **
Asian, non-Hispanic	0.06 **	0.03	0.02	0.04
Other, non-Hispanic	−0.01	−0.02	−0.04 *	0.02
Multi, non-Hispanic	−0.01	0.01	−0.01	0.02
Hispanic	0.01	0.01	−0.04 *	0.08 **
R2	0.24	0.24	0.33	0.34

Note: * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01; N = 2003; Maximum likelihood with missing values estimation method.

in the form of standardized coefficients. Of most interest for this study are the coefficients seen in the first five rows of this table. We find, for instance, that religiosity—independent of the other measures in the model—is significantly associated with the two truth-based latent factors. Specifically, those who identify as more religious are significantly less likely to agree with scientism and more likely to agree with anti-scientism. On the other hand, religiosity is not significantly associated with either of the trust-based latent factors. Somewhat similarly, we find that religious service attendance is negatively associated with scientism.

Compared to these religiosity associations, we find the opposite pattern when looking at our measure of adherence to Christian nationalist ideology. That is, adherence to Christian nationalist ideology is significantly associated with both trust-based latent factors but not significantly associated with either truth-based latent factor. Net of other variables, Christian nationalists do not differ in their orientation towards scientism or anti-scientism. Christian nationalists, however, are significantly less likely to say that they trust science and scientists and more likely to say that scientists are biased. Biblical literalists also show reduced trust in science and greater belief that scientists are biased, but they also are more likely to reject scientism. In a sense, then, the Biblical literalism measure combines the pattern combines the effects seen for the general religiosity measures and the Christian nationalism measure.

So far, then, our analysis has shown that measures of general religious saliency and practice are primarily associated with questions of scientific truth, while Christian nationalism is primarily associated with questions of scientific trust. When we turn to our findings for political conservatism, though, we find significant associations with both truth-based and trust-based latent factors. Those individuals identifying as politically conservative—independent of other predictors—are less likely to say they trust science and scientists and more likely to say that scientists are biased. Political conservatives are also significantly less likely to agree with scientism. We find similar findings for strength of Republican identification. In sum, while religiosity’s and Christian nationalism’s associations are isolated to either issues of truth or trust, respectively, political conservatism appears to have consequences for both truth and trust. We will discuss these core findings further below, but before turning to that discussion it is worth examining some of the findings for the control measures as well.

Looking at the indicators for religious tradition we find that, relative to evangelical Protestant, most of the other religious traditions tend to score higher on the scientism outcome and score lower on the anti-scientism outcome. These findings are, of course, independent of religiosity and religious service attendance. This suggests that there is something unique to evangelical Protestantism that has consequences for these questions of scientific truth.

Our findings for the associations between education and our latent outcomes are likely to be somewhat surprising to some. We find no significant independent association, for instance, between education and agreement with scientism. Perhaps more in line with what many might expect, we do find that education is significantly and positively associated with an individual’s trust in the work of science and scientists. We also find that more educated individuals are less likely to say that scientists are biased.

Finally, our model does indicate some gender and race or ethnic differences. Relative to women, for example, men are significantly more likely to agree with scientism. Looking at the race or ethnicity indicators we find that, relative to White individuals, Black and Hispanic individuals are significantly less likely to say that they trust the work of science and scientists.

7. Discussion

Although religiosity and political conservatism have often been seen as being associated with individuals’ attitudes and orientation towards science, our understanding of these relationships has remained muddy. In part, this is because research has often lacked measures to distinguish between potentially distinct phenomena. The literature, for instance, has often implicitly or explicitly made a distinction between issues related to the acceptance of science as a source of truth and issues related to trust in science and scientists, yet studies rarely examined these two issues concurrently. Moreover, studies that have focused on issues of scientific truth have tended to do so through relatively narrow strategies, such as measuring the acceptance of specific scientific facts, while largely ignoring broader but more fundamental questions about how religiosity and political conservatism might shape perceptions of science as a source of truth. Also complicating our understanding is the reality that religiosity and political conservatism are intertwined and even hybridized into distinct phenomenon like Christian nationalism, the latter of which has only recently been recognized as relevant in understanding individuals’ orientation towards science (Baker et al. 2020; Perry et al. 2021).

The study presented here leveraged survey data from a nationally representative sample of U.S. adults featuring a wide range of measures of individuals’ orientation and attitudes towards science and scientists to overcome many of the limitations of past studies. From our battery of items, we identified four latent factors, two of which address questions of truth and two of which address questions of trust. Importantly, our two truth outcomes represent broader orientations towards science as a means of truth rather than narrow scientific facts. These truth dimensions represent what some have called scientism—the idea that science is the best or only means of truth and that there are no forces or realities beyond the lens of science.

We argued that, all else being equal, religiosity would be negatively associated with questions of truth, whereas conservative political ideology and Christian nationalism would be negatively associated with questions of trust. Our expectations were partially supported. Adjusting for the other predictors and controls, we found that religiosity was negatively related to belief in scientism and not significantly associated with trust in science/scientists. This suggests that perceived conflict between religion and science may go beyond just particular morally charged topics and, for some, may be rooted in larger epistemological conflicts between religion and claims of scientism.

Although this may seem to contradict prior research finding a negative association between religion and trust in science, prior studies generally do not control for Christian nationalism, which has been found to alter the relationships between traditional religion measures and a variety of outcomes once adjusted for. This highlights the need for future research to control for Christian nationalism.

Independent of religiosity, political conservatism, and other controls, we found that Christian nationalism is negatively associated with trust in science/scientists but is not significantly associated with scientism. This suggests that, net of traditional measures of religion, Christian nationalism’s relationship with questions regarding science is much more focused on a conflict over institutional power and perceptions of elites, than it is on broader epistemological concerns. This is consistent with research emphasizing Christian nationalism’s distrust of scientific claims of moral authority (Baker et al. 2020).

While the conflict with science resulting from political conservatism is often thought to be rooted in the social and political influence of science and scientists on policy, our findings show, unexpectedly, that there are some epistemological tensions as well. Controlling for the other predictors and controls, political conservatism and Republican identification are negatively related to both trust in science/scientists and scientism. The latter finding may be rooted in the fact that political conservatives are more likely to accept conspiracy theories, which provide views of the world in stark contrast to mainstream, empirically grounded explanations of the world (Featherstone et al. 2019; Min 2021). As they are more likely to accept conspiratorial beliefs regarding paths to knowledge and truth, this may make them less likely to accept beliefs of scientism.

Although the cross-sectional nature of the data prohibits us from making causal interpretations, this study is the first to find stark differences between how religion, political conservatives, and Christian nationalism relate to questions of scientific truth and trust. The findings highlight the need for future religion and science survey research to include questions that capture both scientific truth and trust as well as the need to control for Christian nationalism to disentangle its influence from that of religion and political conservatism. There is also a need for more research on scientism. Ecklund and Johnson’s (2021) recent book on atheism identifies different forms of scientism accepted by certain types of atheists. Additional research is needed on what types of people—religious, spiritual, and non-religious—are more or less likely to accept scientism and under what conditions as well as the potential effects of belief in scientism on other outcomes of interest.