Pojo Chinul’s Contributions to the Philosophy of Forgetting in East Asian Sŏn Buddhism: The Ten Paths to No-Mind

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

This article is well-structured and developed.  If I could make a couple of "friendly suggestions" it would be these two:

1) remember that not all of your likely readers would know Korean and thus if you can always supply the appropriate ideograms (e.g. won-gak, etc.) this will be a help to them.  You might also indicate for major terms (like Zen, Chan, Son) that while the vocalization of these ideograms will differ among Japanese, Chinese, and Korean, the ideogram's meaning itself is the same.

2) several terms have rather different nuances/meanings when one leaves the Buddhist context.  For example, "soteriological" and "salvific" mean quite different things in a Judeo-Christian perspective than in the Buddhist perspective.  A very brief acknowledgement of this, and some stipulative definitions of these "inter-religious" terms would be helpful, especially given that in the English language the readership would likely be well aware of the Western traditions and making the distinctions with the Buddhist concepts would further underscore the article's basic thesis and methodology.  I am attaching a scan of some of the pages where these issues come up.

Comments for author File: Comments.pdf

Author Response

Thank you very much for taking the time to review this manuscript. I truly appreciate your constructive and friendly suggestions for improving my paper. Please find the detailed responses below and the corresponding revisions/corrections highlighted/in track changes in the re-submitted file.

*   This article is well-structured and developed.  If I could make a couple of "friendly suggestions" it would be these two:

• remember that not all of your likely readers would know Korean and thus if you can always supply the appropriate ideograms (e.g. won-gak, etc.) this will be a help to them.  You might also indicate for major terms (like Zen, Chan, Son) that while the vocalization of these ideograms will differ among Japanese, Chinese, and Korean, the ideogram's meaning itself is the same.

--> Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I agree with your observation and have made necessary adjustments. See, line 9-10: Sŏn (Chan/Zen 禪) master Chinul (知訥, 1158–1210)

Line 34: As a highly influential Sŏn (Chan/Zen禪) master and scholar, Chinul

• several terms have rather different nuances/meanings when one leaves the Buddhist context.  For example, "soteriological" and "salvific" mean quite different things in a Judeo-Christian perspective than in the Buddhist perspective.  A very brief acknowledgement of this, and some stipulative definitions of these "inter-religious" terms would be helpful, especially given that in the English language the readership would likely be well aware of the Western traditions and making the distinctions with the Buddhist concepts would further underscore the article's basic thesis and methodology.  I am attaching a scan of some of the pages where these issues come up.

--> Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I agree with your observation and have made the necessary adjustments. Instead of including a definition of soteriology in the body paragraph, I have provided a clarifying explanation in a footnote as follows:

See, footnote #1:In this paper, the term soteriology is used specifically in the Buddhist context to refer to the process by which individuals attain liberation from psychological and existential suffering. While in the Judeo-Christian tradition soteriology denotes theological doctrines concerning salvation through divine intervention, grace, and covenantal relationship with a transcendent God—including concepts such as original sin, atonement, and messianic redemption—Buddhist soteriology centers on the cessation of suffering (duḥkha) through personal realization of the Dharma. This involves ethical conduct, meditative cultivation, and insight into the nature of reality—particularly impermanence, non-self (anātman), and dependent origination. Thus, for the purposes of this study, soteriology refers to the internal, self-transformative path toward liberation as articulated within Buddhist traditions.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

This essay is a well-written piece of derivative scholarship. Because the author depends so heavily on Buswell’s translation of Chinul’s Chinsim chiksŏl and the ideas of other modern Buddhist thinkers (Park Sung Bae), it is hard to identify the author’s primary contribution. The main purpose of the essay seems to be to recontextualize or place Chinul’s soteriological discussion of no-mind using some terms from modern philosophical and psychological discourse, e.g. “Cognitive Transformation.” It mostly sticks to the traditional or historical context, which some readers will probably appreciate. This reviewer is confused by the author’s freely invoking philosophy, psychology, and therapy seemingly at random. For instance, although “therapy” is not mentioned previously in the paper, in the conclusion, the author asserts “Chinul’s thought is closely linked not only to a therapeutic understanding of one’s own suffering, but also to the cultivation of compassion and morality” (lines 832-833). This reviewer understands that this essay was written for inclusion in a Special Issue: “Soteriological and Ethical Dimensions of Forgetting in Asian Thought,” but who is the audience for this paper?

The paper attempts show parallels with the writings of modern thinkers, such as that of Wang Youru, Park Sung Bae, and Robert Traer, while recognizing Bob Sharf’s injunction to be careful about rhetoric.

If the author wants to make this paper more his/her own, the author should retranslate all the passages quoted from Buswell. The author cites the original text for some reason; this reviewer is not sure why. But if the original text is so important, the author should use the author’s own language to explain.

In terms of strengths, the author clearly is familiar with the scholarly issues surrounding the authorship of the Chinsim chiksŏl and provides a reasonable argument for why the author sticks with the traditional view that it is Chinul’s composition.

One of the more engaging sections in the paper is the discussion of faith, particularly Park Sung Bae’s ideas of patriarchal faith (zuxin 祖信) and doctrinal faith (jiaoxin 教信) (see Park 1983, 19). These terms are Park Sung Bae’s terms and serve Park Sung Bae’s purposes; they are not terms used by Chinul. This reviewer is confused about why the author often cites Traer’s 1991 essay when discussing Park Sung Bae’s views (lines 411–447). Why not just go to the source? In addition, one of the hallmarks of Park Sung Bae’s scholarship is his obsession with the East Asian philosophical dialectic of “essence and function” (ti-yong, Kor. ch’e-yong體用). He finds it everywhere and emphasizes it (see Park 1983, 35–42, 55–58, passim). On lines 423-424, the author glosses or translates “true nature” as ch’e and “active expression” as yong. I think the author needs to step back and explain why he/she is glossing these terms this way. The author seems to be following Park here who asserts that essence-function is a non-dual construction. Furthermore, what is the author’s point in drawing on Park’s understanding of Chinul’s understanding of enlightenment?  Where is the author’s understanding?

Chinul studied Li Tongxuan’s Commentary on the Huayan jing (Avataṃsaka-sūtra) but it is difficult to assert that he studied the “Hwaŏm tradition” (line 791). This, of course, depends on how one defines the Hwaŏm tradition. It might be best to follow what the author wrote earlier in the paper about doctrinal teachings (lines 35-36).

In terms of style, this essay needs some work. The author employs several different ways of referring to technical Buddhist terms. Sometimes the author provides the sinographs first with the Korean romanization both in parentheses (see line 123), other times the author provides the Korean romanization first with the sinographs second (see line 204). The author needs to be consistent. Pick one style and follow it. This reviewer recommends providing the romanization first followed by the sinographs, and all in parentheses: e.g. (wunian 無念).

Several book titles should be italicized; see the attached file where words and titles that should be italicized have been marked.

Line 216: Wuzhu 無住 (714–774)’s should be Wuzhu’s 無住 (714–774)

The abstract refers to Wang Youru (line 13), the body of the paper Youru Wang (line 134), and then the conclusion again Wang Youru (line 778). The author needs to be consistent.

Comments for author File: Comments.pdf

Author Response

Thank you very much for taking the time to review this manuscript. I sincerely appreciate your insightful and thoughtful suggestions for improving my paper. Please find the detailed responses below and the corresponding revisions/corrections highlighted/in track changes in the re-submitted file.

• This essay is a well-written piece of derivative scholarship. Because the author depends so heavily on Buswell’s translation of Chinul’s Chinsim chiksŏland the ideas of other modern Buddhist thinkers (Park Sung Bae), it is hard to identify the author’s primary contribution. The main purpose of the essay seems to be to recontextualize or place Chinul’s soteriological discussion of no-mind using some terms from modern philosophical and psychological discourse, e.g. “Cognitive Transformation.” It mostly sticks to the traditional or historical context, which some readers will probably appreciate. This reviewer is confused by the author’s freely invoking philosophy, psychology, and therapy seemingly at random. For instance, although “therapy” is not mentioned previously in the paper, in the conclusion, the author asserts “Chinul’s thought is closely linked not only to a therapeutic understanding of one’s own suffering, but also to the cultivation of compassion and morality” (lines 832-833). This reviewer understands that this essay was written for inclusion in a Special Issue: “Soteriological and Ethical Dimensions of Forgetting in Asian Thought,” but who is the audience for this paper?

Thank you very much for your careful reading and thoughtful feedback. I sincerely appreciate your recognition of the writing quality and your engagement with the key concerns regarding the originality, framing, and conceptual clarity of the paper.

I acknowledge your concern about the extent to which the paper relies on existing translations and secondary scholarship, particularly the works of Robert Buswell and Park Sung Bae. My intention was to offer a reinterpretation of Chinul’s Chinsim chiksŏl by situating his soteriological notion of “no-mind” within broader comparative and interdisciplinary discussions—especially in light of the special issue’s theme on “Soteriological and Ethical Dimensions of Forgetting.” While I do rely on Buswell’s widely respected translation, my contribution lies in drawing new connections between Chinul’s account of the cultivation of no-mind and certain modern frameworks that resonate with the transformative processes he outlines.

That said, I recognize that some of these connections—particularly to cognitive transformation and therapeutic discourse—may not have been clearly framed or sufficiently contextualized.

The therapeutic dimension of the discourse emerges in my paper during the discussion of Wang’s interpretation of Zhuangzi’s notion of forgetting. Wang characterizes Zhuangzi’s forgetfulness as “therapeutic” or “self-healing,” emphasizing its significance as a shift in mindset—from resistance to acceptance—through the letting go of attachments (lines 168–182). Building on this, I explore the parallels between Zhuangzi’s concept of forgetfulness and Chinul’s philosophy of no-mind in the following section, focusing on the similar outcomes they produce in terms of releasing attachment and fostering inner transformation (lines 183–188). Given that Chinul’s no-mind practice also aims to release attachment, I see a meaningful resonance between the two approaches.

Lastly, I have clarified the intended audience and purpose of the paper in the introduction. My aim is to speak to both scholars of Buddhist studies and readers interested in the contemporary applicability of classical East Asian Buddhist thought, including scholars of comparative philosophy, religion, and even psychology. I hope these revisions help to better convey the intended contribution of the paper.

See lines 166-169: “I hope that this paper will contribute to ongoing conversations among scholars of Buddhist studies as well as readers interested in the contemporary relevance of classical East Asian Buddhist thought, including those in comparative philosophy, religious studies, and psychology.”

• The paper attempts show parallels with the writings of modern thinkers, such as that of Wang Youru, Park Sung Bae, and Robert Traer, while recognizing Bob Sharf’s injunction to be careful about rhetoric.
• If the author wants to make this paper more his/her own, the author should retranslate all the passages quoted from Buswell. The author cites the original text for some reason; this reviewer is not sure why. But if the original text is so important, the author should use the author’s own language to explain.

--> Thank you for your thoughtful question. I found that Buswell’s translations are already excellent and require no revision for accurately discussing the content of Chinul’s text. For this reason, I have chosen to use his translations as they are. I would also like to clarify that the original version of my manuscript was not formatted using the Religions journal template. In that version, I had indented all passages from Buswell’s translations for clarity. However, during the formatting process to fit the journal’s template, some of the indentations as well as italicizations—such as for titles and key terms—were altered. In addition, to offer further clarification on the translated passages, I have added my own explanatory comments, as follows:

See lines 980-996: These four methods can be seen as stages of practicing non-duality—the complete dissolution of the distinction between subject and object, or essence and phenomena—that Sŏn Buddhism pursues. Chinul classifies this into four types as follows. First, as explained in the seventh method, the distinction between internal and external disappears, and all manifest phenomena become none other than the very essence of the true mind itself. Second, as described in the eighth method, the distinction between internal and external vanishes, and one views all manifest phenomena as nothing but the marvelous functioning of the true mind. Third, the method explained as the ninth is a practice in which essence and function become completely unified. At this stage, what must be carefully attended to is maintaining stillness within the luminous clarity of awareness—ensuring that the pure and bright awareness does not become entangled in delusive, idle thoughts. One should also avoid falling into a stillness resembling blankness, in which even awareness is absent; rather, this is a stage of practice where luminous awareness and complete tranquility coexist. Finally, the tenth stage is where all distinctions between internal and external, essence and phenomena, substance and function, have been thoroughly eliminated—everything becomes one. Chinul describes this as a state that transcends both essence and function altogether.

• In terms of strengths, the author clearly is familiar with the scholarly issues surrounding the authorship of the Chinsim chiksŏland provides a reasonable argument for why the author sticks with the traditional view that it is Chinul’s composition.
• One of the more engaging sections in the paper is the discussion of faith, particularly Park Sung Bae’s ideas of patriarchal faith (zuxin 祖信) and doctrinal faith (jiaoxin教信) (see Park 1983, 19). These terms are Park Sung Bae’s terms and serve Park Sung Bae’s purposes; they are not terms used by Chinul.

--> Thank you for bringing this to my attention. Indeed, Park Sung Bae uses the terms “patriarchal faith” (zuxin 祖信) and “doctrinal faith” (jiaoxin 教信) in his explanation of Chinul’s Chinsim siksŏl. While I noted in my paper that Park, drawing from Chinul’s text, identifies these two types of faith, I realize the wording may not have clearly conveyed this point. I’ve therefore added the following clarifications to better articulate the connection.

See lines 522-547: According to Chinul, there are two types of faith: patriarchal faith and doctrinal faith. In Straight Talk on the True Mind, Chinul explains the difference between patriarchal faith and doctrinal faith as follows:

Question: What difference is there between faith in the patriarchal Sŏn and scholastic sects? Chinul: There are many differences. The scholastic sects encourage men and gods to have faith in the law of karmic cause and effect. Those who desire the pleasures which come from merit must have faith that the ten wholesome actions are the sublime cause and that human or deva rebirth is the pleasurable result. Those who feel drawn to the void-calmness of nirvana must have faith that its primary cause is the understanding of the cause and conditions of arising and ceasing and that its holy fruition is the understanding of the four noble truths: suffering, its origin, its extinction, and the path leading to its extinction. Those who would delight in the fruition of Buddhahood should have faith that the practice of the six parāmitās over three asaṃkhyeya kalpas is its major cause and bodhi and nirvana are its right fruition.

Right faith in the patriarchal sect is different. It does not believe in condi- tioned causes or effects. Rather, it stresses faith that everyone is originally a Buddha, that everyone possesses the impeccable self-nature, and that the sublime essence of nirvana is complete in everyone. There is no need to search elsewhere; since time immemorial, it has been innate in everyone. (Chinul trans. by Buswell 1992, 120)

Drawing on this passage, Park identifies two distinct Buddhist views on attaining enlightenment through faith: doctrinal faith and patriarchal faith (Park 1983, 19-20). Doctrinal faith regards the Buddha as an external object of belief, creating a dualistic perspective that contradicts the Buddhist principle of dependent origination (Park 1983, 19-24).

This reviewer is confused about why the author often cites Traer’s 1991 essay when discussing Park Sung Bae’s views (lines 411–447). Why not just go to the source?

--> Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I agree with your observation and have made necessary adjustments.

• In addition, one of the hallmarks of Park Sung Bae’s scholarship is his obsession with the East Asian philosophical dialectic of “essence and function” (ti-yong, Kor. ch’e-yong體用). He finds it everywhere and emphasizes it (see Park 1983, 35–42, 55–58, passim). On lines 423-424, the author glosses or translates “true nature” as ch’eand “active expression” as yong. I think the author needs to step back and explain why he/she is glossing these terms this way. The author seems to be following Park here who asserts that essence-function is a non-dual construction. Furthermore, what is the author’s point in drawing on Park’s understanding of Chinul’s understanding of enlightenment?  Where is the author’s understanding?

--> Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I agree with your observation and have now incorporated the following points in lines 548-571:

In contrast, patriarchal faith, as interpreted by Chinul, is non-dualistic in nature. Em-phasizing the innate purity of self-nature in all beings, it does not posit an external object of faith but instead involves re-realizing this intrinsic nature. Park interprets this view as identifying the Buddha with the true nature (ch’e 體) inherent in all sentient beings, with faith functioning as its active expression (yong 用), highlighting their inseparability (Park 1983, 37; Traer 1991, 91). I find Park’s interpretation appropriate, especially given that Chinul later emphasizes the unity of ch’e and yong in his discussion of the ten methods of no-mind. In particular, the essence/function (ch’e/yong in Kor.; ti/yong in Ch. 體/用) schema in Huayan Buddhism articulates a non-dual vision where ultimate reality (li 理) and phenomenal manifestation (shi 事) are interdependent and mutually inclusive. Chinul endorsed Li Tongxuan’s theory of Nature origination (xingqi 性起, which holds that all phenomenal appearances are simply the functional manifestations (yong 用) of an in-herent nature (xing 性) that serves as their essential ground (ti 體) (Gregory 2002, 233).

Chinul’s soteriology of sudden awakening followed by gradual cultivation also reflects this non-dual vision of the simultaneous cultivation of samādhi and prajñā. In this context, samādhi is identified as the essence (ch’e) of the self-nature, while prajñā is its function (yong) (Buswell 1986, 208). Though they may appear distinct in how they manifest—stillness versus activity—they both arise from the same nondual self-nature. Thus, samādhi and prajñā are not separate or sequential but mutually embedded: samādhi is the inner ground of prajñā, and prajñā is the dynamic expression of samādhi (Buswell 1986, 208). This reflects the non-dual Huayan logic in which essence and function are interpenetrating aspects of the same reality. Chinul’s patriarchal faith can be traced to Li Tongxuan, particularly in its emphasis on the non-duality of practice and enlightenment (Park 1983, 20-21; Traer 1991, 91; Buswell 2012, 47-55).

• Chinul studied Li Tongxuan’s Commentary on the Huayan jing(Avataṃsaka-sūtra) but it is difficult to assert that he studied the “Hwaŏm tradition” (line 791). This, of course, depends on how one defines the Hwaŏm tradition. It might be best to follow what the author wrote earlier in the paper about doctrinal teachings (lines 35-36). --> Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I agree with your observation and have made necessary adjustments.
• In terms of style, this essay needs some work. The author employs several different ways of referring to technical Buddhist terms. Sometimes the author provides the sinographs first with the Korean romanization both in parentheses (see line 123), other times the author provides the Korean romanization first with the sinographs second (see line 204). The author needs to be consistent. Pick one style and follow it. This reviewer recommends providing the romanization first followed by the sinographs, and all in parentheses: e.g. (wunian 無念). --> Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I agree with your observation and have made necessary adjustments.
• Several book titles should be italicized; see the attached file where words and titles that should be italicized have been marked. -->  Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I agree with your observation and have made necessary adjustments.
• Line 216: Wuzhu 無住 (714–774)’s should be Wuzhu’s 無住 (714–774) -->  Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I agree with your observation and have made necessary adjustments.
• The abstract refers to Wang Youru (line 13), the body of the paper Youru Wang (line 134), and then the conclusion again Wang Youru (line 778). The author needs to be consistent. -->  Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I agree with your observation and have made necessary adjustments.

 

 

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 3 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

This paper presents a highly original and philosophically engaging study of the concept of “forgetting” (忘) in East Asian Sŏn Buddhism, with a particular focus on Pojo Chinul’s interpretation of no-mind. Rather than treating forgetting as a simple loss of memory, the author reframes it as a positive, transformative process with clear soteriological implications.

Overall, the paper represents a meaningful academic contribution to contemporary Buddhist philosophical discourse.

I would like to suggest a few minor comments for improving structural and textual clarity.

Line 35: The parenthetical expression “by harmonizing Sŏn (meditative practice) with (doctrinal teachings, Hwaŏm)” is syntactically abrupt. You may consider rephrasing: “harmonizing meditative Sŏn practice with doctrinal Hwaŏm teachings.”

Line 94-96: In the sentence of “Ultimately, however, whether Straight Talk on the True Mind is attributed to Chinul or to Zhengyan may be of less consequence than the insights the text offers into the conception and practice of forgetting within the broader Chan tradition.” “May be of less consequence” weakens the argumentative style.

Lines 133–154: In this section, the author relies heavily on secondary citations through Wang (2025). Directly citing original sources such as Ricoeur, Connerton, and Assmann are required to enhance scholarly research.

Lines 137–138: The general claim that “forgetting is traditionally seen as a failure of memory” is also required citing some sources from cognitive psychology or philosophical literature beyond Wang’s interpretation.

Lines 152–153: The author asserts that Western typologies of forgetting may not fully apply to Chan/Daoist frameworks is conceptually provocative but underdeveloped. Why is it so? You may elucidate the epistemological or ontological divergences that render these models inadequate.

Lines 160–163: The reframing of forgetting as release rather than loss is compelling. However, it should be grounded in textual evidence concerning “forgetting the self” (忘己).

Line 176–177: The phrase “Zhuangzi’s notion of forgetting emphasizes conveyed through therapeutic stories...” is syntactically flawed. It would be better to rephrase it.

Line 190: The transliteration “wuniam” should be corrected to wúniàn (無念) in Hanyu Pinyin. You may check it.

Lines 207–210: The phrase “a subtle undercurrent” regarding wholesome thoughts is vague.

Line 243–244: The phrase “positive recollection in achieving Buddhist enlightenment” needs clarification. What kind of recollection is implied—doctrinal, ethical, meditative?

Line 258-259: The sentence “At the same time, he presents doctrinal school’s practices—such as various virtuous wholesome actions like acts of —as supportive methods.” is incomplete. Please check it the original writing or translation.

Lines 296–297: The phrase “not two separate things, but one and the same” is logically ambiguous and requires further clarification to elucidate its precise meaning

Lines 421–423: It would be good to explain further about the ch’e/yong (體/用) schema within the Mahayana Buddhist tradition. (i.e., Huayen Buddhism)

Lines 516–519: The terms “relative and absolute samādhi-prajñā” require further clarification for readers who may not be familiar with the technical vocabulary of Korean Sŏn Buddhism. It requires a more precise exposition of the distinction between the relative and absolute dimensions of samādhi and prajñā within the Sŏn tradition.

Lines 618–621: The meaning of the phrase “the external world reveals itself just as it is” requires clarification. Does it refer to saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth) perceived without conceptual grasping, or to paramārtha-satya (ultimate reality) realized as nondual awareness?

Lines 743–750: The expression “recognizing the identity—and ultimately the transcendence—of essence and function” appears internally contradictory and requires clarification. It would be helpful to explicate how essence (tǐ) and function (yòng) can be understood as identical in one respect, while also being transcended in another.

Lines 800–807: It requires to strengthen this section by distinguishing doctrinal śraddhā from the existential sin (信) seen in Chinul’s texts.

Author Response

Thank you very much for taking the time to review this manuscript. I sincerely appreciate your insightful and thoughtful suggestions for improving my paper. Please find the detailed responses below and the corresponding revisions/corrections highlighted/in track changes in the re-submitted file.

This paper presents a highly original and philosophically engaging study of the concept of “forgetting” (忘) in East Asian Sŏn Buddhism, with a particular focus on Pojo Chinul’s interpretation of no-mind. Rather than treating forgetting as a simple loss of memory, the author reframes it as a positive, transformative process with clear soteriological implications.

Overall, the paper represents a meaningful academic contribution to contemporary Buddhist philosophical discourse.

I would like to suggest a few minor comments for improving structural and textual clarity.

Line 35: The parenthetical expression “by harmonizing Sŏn (meditative practice) with (doctrinal teachings, Hwaŏm)” is syntactically abrupt. You may consider rephrasing: “harmonizing meditative Sŏn practice with doctrinal Hwaŏm teachings.”

--> Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I agree with your observation and have made necessary adjustments. See lines 34-36:  “Chinul played a pivotal role in shaping Korean Buddhism by harmonizing meditative Sŏn practice with doctrinal Hwaŏm teachings”

Line 94-96: In the sentence of “Ultimately, however, whether Straight Talk on the True Mind is attributed to Chinul or to Zhengyan may be of less consequence than the insights the text offers into the conception and practice of forgetting within the broader Chan tradition.” “May be of less consequence” weakens the argumentative style.

--> Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I agree with your observation and have made necessary adjustments. See lines 126-128: “Ultimately, however, whether Straight Talk on the True Mind is attributed to Chinul or to Zhengyan is secondary to the insights the text offers into the conception and practice of forgetting within the broader Chan tradition.”

Lines 133–154: In this section, the author relies heavily on secondary citations through Wang (2025). Directly citing original sources such as Ricoeur, Connerton, and Assmann are required to enhance scholarly research.

 Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I agree with your observation and have now cited the original sources of Ricoeur, Connerton, and Assmann accordingly.

Lines 137–138: The general claim that “forgetting is traditionally seen as a failure of memory” is also required citing some sources from cognitive psychology or philosophical literature beyond Wang’s interpretation.

--> Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I agree with your observation and have now cited some sources of Miller and Tulving. See lines 169-171: While traditionally seen as a failure of memory (Miller 2021), modern psychology defines forgetting as the temporary inaccessibility of information (Tulving 1974, 74; Wang 2025, 3).

Lines 152–153: The author asserts that Western typologies of forgetting may not fully apply to Chan/Daoist frameworks is conceptually provocative but underdeveloped. Why is it so? You may elucidate the epistemological or ontological divergences that render these models inadequate.

--> Thank you for this valuable comment. I agree with your observation and have incorporated the following points into the revised text. See lines 196-206:  “As discussed above, Western typologies of forgetting typically frame it in relation to memory, identity, and historical continuity, often within a linear temporality and subject-centered epistemology. Forgetting is generally viewed as a loss, distortion, or repression of something that ought to be remembered. In contrast, Chan and Daoist frameworks are grounded in a non-dualistic ontology that emphasizes emptiness, spontaneity, and the dissolution of the constructed self. Within these traditions, forgetting is not seen as a failure or deficit but as a method of spiritual cultivation—a conscious release from discursive thought, attachments, and the conditioned structures of memory and ego. As such, forgetting can be generative, liberating, and soteriologically significant. These differences suggest that applying Western models risks misrepresenting the ontological stakes of forgetting in Chan and Daoist contexts.

Lines 160–163: The reframing of forgetting as release rather than loss is compelling. However, it should be grounded in textual evidence concerning “forgetting the self” (忘己).

--> Thank you for this valuable comment. I agree with your observation and have incorporated the following points into the footnote # 4: For a detailed analysis of therapeutic forgetting in relation to “forgetting the self” in the Zhuangzi, along with supporting textual evidence, see Wang 2025, 22–27. Accordingly, I will not repeat it here.

Line 176–177: The phrase “Zhuangzi’s notion of forgetting emphasizes conveyed through therapeutic stories...” is syntactically flawed. It would be better to rephrase it.

--> Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I agree with your observation and have now revised it. See lines 229-231: “While Zhuangzi’s notion of forgetting is conveyed through therapeutic stories that support mental well-being and existential wholeness, Chinul’s concept of no-mind presents a more structured path for transcending habitual cognition and realizing enlightened awareness.”

Line 190: The transliteration “wuniam” should be corrected to wúniàn (無念) in Hanyu Pinyin. You may check it.

--> Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I agree with your observation and have now revised it. See line 246: “no-thought” (wunian in Ch.; munyŏm in Kor. 無念)

Lines 207–210: The phrase “a subtle undercurrent” regarding wholesome thoughts is vague.

--> Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I agree with your observation and have now revised it.  See line 265: They persist as “a faint presence,”

Line 243–244: The phrase “positive recollection in achieving Buddhist enlightenment” needs clarification. What kind of recollection is implied—doctrinal, ethical, meditative?

--> Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I agree with your observation and have now revised it.  See 341-342: Firstly, this instance confirms the importance of positive meditative recollection in achieving Buddhist enlightenment (Buddha-nature) (Wang 2018, 84).

Line 258-259: The sentence “At the same time, he presents doctrinal school’s practices—such as various virtuous wholesome actions like acts of —as supportive methods.” is incomplete. Please check it the original writing or translation.

--> Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I agree with your observation and have now revised it.  See 356-358: At the same time, he presents doctrinal school’s practices—such as various virtuous wholesome actions as supportive methods (Chinul trans. by Buswell 1992,135).

Lines 296–297: The phrase “not two separate things, but one and the same” is logically ambiguous and requires further clarification to elucidate its precise meaning

--> Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I agree with your observation and have now revised it.  See Lines 406-409: The Sŏn tradition, on the other hand, refers to this realm as “beyond words and speech.” Yet Chinul reaffirms that these are ultimately not two separate things, but one and the same—both pointing to the true mind.

Lines 421–423: It would be good to explain further about the ch’e/yong (體/用) schema within the Mahayana Buddhist tradition. (i.e., Huayen Buddhism)

--> Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I agree with your observation and have now incorporated the following points in lines 536-559:

In contrast, patriarchal faith, as interpreted by Chinul, is non-dualistic in nature. Em-phasizing the innate purity of self-nature in all beings, it does not posit an external object of faith but instead involves re-realizing this intrinsic nature. Park interprets this view as identifying the Buddha with the true nature (ch’e 體) inherent in all sentient beings, with faith functioning as its active expression (yong 用), highlighting their inseparability (Park 1983, 37; Traer 1991, 91). I find Park’s interpretation appropriate, especially given that Chinul later emphasizes the unity of ch’e and yong in his discussion of the ten methods of no-mind. In particular, the essence/function (ch’e/yong in Kor.; ti/yong in Ch. 體/用) schema in Huayan Buddhism articulates a non-dual vision where ultimate reality (li 理) and phenomenal manifestation (shi 事) are interdependent and mutually inclusive. Chinul endorsed Li Tongxuan’s theory of Nature origination (xingqi 性起, which holds that all phenomenal appearances are simply the functional manifestations (yong 用) of an in-herent nature (xing 性) that serves as their essential ground (ti 體) (Gregory 2002, 233).

Chinul’s soteriology of sudden awakening followed by gradual cultivation also reflects this non-dual vision of the simultaneous cultivation of samādhi and prajñā. In this context, samādhi is identified as the essence (ch’e) of the self-nature, while prajñā is its function (yong) (Buswell 1986, 208). Though they may appear distinct in how they manifest—stillness versus activity—they both arise from the same nondual self-nature. Thus, samādhi and prajñā are not separate or sequential but mutually embedded: samādhi is the inner ground of prajñā, and prajñā is the dynamic expression of samādhi (Buswell 1986, 208). This reflects the non-dual Huayan logic in which essence and function are interpenetrating aspects of the same reality. Chinul’s patriarchal faith can be traced to Li Tongxuan, particularly in its emphasis on the non-duality of practice and enlightenment (Park 1983, 20-21; Traer 1991, 91; Buswell 2012, 47-55).

Lines 516–519: The terms “relative and absolute samādhi-prajñā” require further clarification for readers who may not be familiar with the technical vocabulary of Korean Sŏn Buddhism. It requires a more precise exposition of the distinction between the relative and absolute dimensions of samādhi and prajñā within the Sŏn tradition.

--> Thank you for this helpful comment. I have added a footnote (#5) to clarify the distinction between relative and absolute samādhi and prajñā in the Korean Sŏn context.

See footnote #5: The relative approach to samādhi and prajñā (susang chŏnghye 隨相定慧) refers to meditative and cognitive practices used as expedient means to counteract afflictions and ignorance. Samādhi calms distraction by aligning with the principle of emptiness, while prajñā dispels dullness by engaging the diversity of phenomena. In contrast, the absolute approach to samādhi and prajñā (chasŏng chŏnghye 自性定慧) are understood as inseparable aspects of the innate self-nature. Rooted in sudden awakening, this approach sees samādhi and prajñā as non-dual functions of the same enlightened mind, as emphasized in the Heze Chan tradition and Chinul’s own Sŏn thought. See, Buswell 2012, 69.

Lines 618–621: The meaning of the phrase “the external world reveals itself just as it is” requires clarification. Does it refer to saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth) perceived without conceptual grasping, or to paramārtha-satya (ultimate reality) realized as nondual awareness?

--> Thank you for the thoughtful question. I agree with your observation and have now incorporated the following points in lines 814-816:

In this state of true mind, the external world reveals itself just as it is, without added interpretation or emotional coloring. Challenging conditions may still exist externally, but the internal interpreter that turns those conditions into personal suffering is no longer active. As a result, the root of suffering dissolves. In this sense, while conventional appearances (saṃvṛti-satya) continue to function, they are perceived through the lens of emptiness, without grasping.

Lines 743–750: The expression “recognizing the identity—and ultimately the transcendence—of essence and function” appears internally contradictory and requires clarification. It would be helpful to explicate how essence (tǐ) and function (yòng) can be understood as identical in one respect, while also being transcended in another.

--> Thank you for the thoughtful question. I agree with your observation and have now incorporated the following points in lines 955-971:

These four methods can be seen as stages of practicing non-duality—the complete dissolution of the distinction between subject and object, or essence and phenomena—that Sŏn Buddhism pursues. Chinul classifies this into four types as follows. First, as explained in the seventh method, the distinction between inner and outer disappears, and all manifest phenomena become none other than the very essence of the true mind itself. Second, as described in the eighth method, the distinction between inner and outer vanishes, and one views all manifest phenomena as nothing but the marvelous functioning of the true mind. Third, the method explained as the ninth is a practice in which essence and function become completely unified. At this stage, what must be carefully attended to is maintaining stillness within the luminous clarity of awareness—ensuring that the pure and bright awareness does not become entangled in delusive, idle thoughts. One should also avoid falling into a stillness resembling blankness, in which even awareness is absent; rather, this is a stage of practice where luminous awareness and complete tranquility coexist. Finally, the tenth stage is where all distinctions between inner and outer, essence and phenomena, substance and function, have been thoroughly eliminated—everything becomes one. Chinul describes this as a state that transcends both essence and function altogether.

Lines 800–807: It requires to strengthen this section by distinguishing doctrinal śraddhā from the existential sin (信) seen in Chinul’s texts.

--> Thank you for this insightful suggestion. I have revised the section to more clearly distinguish doctrinal śraddhā as a form of faith based on doctrinal assent and devotional confidence, from the existential sense of faith (sin in Kor. or xin in Ch.信) in Chinul’s writings, which reflects a deeper trust in the innate Buddha-nature and the immediacy of awakening.

See lines 534-574: In Straight Talk on the True Mind, Chinul explains the difference between patriarchal faith and doctrinal faith as follows:

Question: What difference is there between faith in the patriarchal S6n and scholastic sects? Chinul: There are many differences. The scholastic sects en-courage men and gods to have faith in the law of karmic cause and effect. Those who desire the pleasures which come from merit must have faith that the ten wholesome actions are the sublime cause and that human or deva rebirth is the pleasurable result. Those who feel drawn to the void-calmness of nirvana must have faith that its primary cause is the understanding of the cause and conditions of arising and ceasing and that its holy fruition is the understanding of the four noble truths: suffering, its origin, its extinction, and the path leading to its extinction. Those who would delight in the fruition of Buddhahood should have faith that the practice of the six parāmitās over three asaṃkhyeya kalpas is its major cause and bodhi and nirvana are its right fruition.

Right faith in the patriarchal sect is different. It does not believe in condi- tioned causes or effects. Rather, it stresses faith that everyone is originally a Buddha, that everyone possesses the impeccable self-nature, and that the sublime essence of nirvana is complete in everyone. There is no need to search elsewhere; since time immemorial, it has been innate in everyone. (Chinul trans. by Buswell 1992, 120)

Drawing on this passage, Park identifies two distinct Buddhist views on attaining enlightenment through faith: doctrinal faith and patriarchal faith (Park 1983, 19-20). Doctrinal faith regards the Buddha as an external object of belief, creating a dualistic perspective that contradicts the Buddhist principle of dependent origination (Park 1983, 19-24). In contrast, patriarchal faith, as interpreted by Chinul, is non-dualistic in nature. Emphasizing the innate purity of self-nature in all beings, it does not posit an external object of faith but instead involves re-realizing this intrinsic nature. Park interprets this view as identifying the Buddha with the true nature (ch’e 體) inherent in all sentient beings, with faith functioning as its active expression (yong 用), highlighting their in-separability (Park 1983, 37; Traer 1991, 91). I find Park’s interpretation appropriate, especially given that Chinul later emphasizes the unity of ch’e and yong in his discussion of the ten methods of no-mind.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf