The Greek Philosophical Sources in Cicero’s De Fato

Abstract

Cicero’s treatise De Fato, written during the political crisis of the Roman Republic, is a fundamental work for understanding the development of philosophical thought on fate and free will in antiquity. Influenced by Academic Skepticism, Cicero aimed to critically examine the positions of the major Greek philosophical schools, such as Stoicism and Epicureanism, regarding causality and the determination of future events. The concept of fate, however, was not only a philosophical matter but also a religious one in antiquity, deeply intertwined with practices such as divination and the belief in the gods’ influence over the cosmos. This study explores the historical and philosophical context in which De Fato emerged, as well as the Greek sources that shaped Cicero’s arguments. It analyzes the debate between the Stoics and Epicureans on fate, highlighting how Cicero adopts, adapts, and critiques their ideas. Additionally, it examines the structure and method of his work, identifying the three main approaches—physical, logical, and ethical—that he employs to address the question of fate. Finally, this study considers how Cicero’s treatment of fate reflects not only philosophical but also religious concerns, especially regarding human freedom and the divine role in shaping the future. The enduring influence of De Fato on philosophical tradition and its relevance to contemporary discussions on human freedom is also considered.

1. Introduction

The question of fate and human freedom has been a central topic of philosophical inquiry since antiquity. However, it is crucial to recognize that the concept of fate was not only a subject of philosophical debate but also a deeply religious matter in ancient societies. Among the most influential ancient discussions on this issue is Cicero’s De Fato, a treatise that engages with the Greek philosophical traditions that preceded him. This study examines how Cicero draws upon the debates between the Stoics and the Epicureans, two schools of thought with divergent views on determinism and free will. While Stoicism posited a deterministic cosmos governed by an unalterable fate, Epicureanism sought to preserve a degree of human autonomy through the concept of atomic randomness. In both philosophical systems, however, fate is inextricably linked to religious ideas about the gods’ will and the role of divine forces in the cosmos. Cicero’s engagement with these doctrines is not merely one of passive reception; rather, he appropriates, critiques, and reconfigures their arguments to construct his own position.

The significance of this analysis also lies in exploring the religious dimensions of Cicero’s work, particularly the ways in which the question of fate intersects with religious practices like divination and augury, which were central to Roman belief systems. Cicero addresses these concerns within his philosophical framework, offering a complex view of fate that reflects the tension between human agency and divine predestination. The study also highlights how Cicero’s examination of fate engages not only with philosophical debates but also with religious concepts of divine intervention and cosmic order.

Cicero employs three principal approaches—physical, logical, and ethical—to tackle the question of fate, each providing a distinct perspective that reflects broader trends in Hellenistic philosophy. By assessing these dimensions, this study elucidates Cicero’s philosophical method and his attempt to reconcile or challenge the ideas he inherits.

Despite its relative brevity, De Fato has had a lasting influence on the philosophical tradition, shaping subsequent discussions on determinism, human agency, and responsibility. The treatise’s impact extends beyond antiquity, resonating in medieval, early modern, and contemporary debates on free will and causation. By situating Cicero’s work within both its historical, philosophical, and religious contexts, this study aims to demonstrate the continued relevance of De Fato in addressing fundamental questions about human freedom, divine will, and the role of fate in shaping the human experience.

2. Historical and Philosophical Context of the Treatise De Fato

Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BCE) was one of the greatest orators, politicians, and philosophers of ancient Rome. In his time, Rome was not only the center of a vast empire but also a melting pot of philosophical ideas, primarily emanating from Greece. Like many of his contemporaries, Cicero was profoundly influenced by Greek philosophical currents, which he adapted to the political and social realities of Rome (Cicero 1933, De Natura Deorum, I, 2). Indeed, the philosophical questions in Cicero’s works are inseparable from political, cultural, and pedagogical concerns1.

Philosophical syncretism is particularly evident in his treatise De Fato. In this work, Cicero addresses one of the most debated topics in both Greek and Roman philosophy: fate and its relationship to free will. However, the question of fate also carried profound religious implications in antiquity, influencing both personal belief systems and state rituals. The treatise was written during a period of political crisis in Rome, amid tensions stemming from the struggle for power within the Republic2. Although De Fato has not survived in its entirety, it remains a deeply complex work. Composed around June 44 BCE, shortly after the assassination of Julius Caesar, it is not an isolated work but rather part of a broader trilogy that includes De Natura Deorum and De Divinatione, both of which explore the nature of divinity, divination, and their relationship to human will. In this sense, Cicero’s treatment of fate cannot be fully separated from a religious context in which divination and divine will played an essential role in shaping the destiny of individuals and societies.

In the first of these philosophical treatises, De Natura Deorum, Cicero examines various Greek conceptions of the gods, paying particular attention to Stoic and Epicurean ideas. Through a dialog among representatives of different philosophical schools, Cicero analyzes divine nature, the existence of the gods, and their relationship with the human world. The Stoics portray the gods as rational and providential beings, whereas the Epicureans conceive of them as blissful entities indifferent to human affairs3. This critical analysis of Greek theological doctrines lays the foundation for the debate on fate and providence, which Cicero delves into more deeply in De Fato. Here, he questions the compatibility between the idea of predetermined fate and the possibility of free will. Thus, De Natura Deorum is not merely a theological treatise but also a reflection on the philosophical and ethical implications of believing in a world governed by fate or divine providence. Cicero not only engages with the philosophical implications of fate but also considers how divine providence and the will of the gods were seen as active forces shaping the cosmos and human lives.

As Wynne has insightfully observed4, Cicero—especially in the introduction to De Natura Deorum—appropriates Stoic concepts of religious virtues such as pietas (piety), sanctitas (holiness), and religio (religion) to construct a philosophical and rhetorical critique of Epicureanism. Drawing on Stoic definitions, Cicero presents pietas as “knowledge of the service owed to the gods” and sanctitas as “justice toward the gods.” If the gods, as the Epicureans claim, are neither able nor willing to engage with human beings, then these virtues become meaningless—they are no longer genuine virtues. Cicero suggests that religio, when understood as an external practice performed with virtue (i.e., true pietas), is likewise rendered void if the gods have no interest in human affairs. In this sense, religion ceases to be a meaningful set of practices when it is severed from a real relationship with the divine.

Cicero also explores the social and ethical consequences of Epicurean theology: if the gods are not part of the societas generis humani—the community of humankind—then even virtues such as fides (good faith) and justice lose their ultimate foundation. While this does not necessarily entail the immediate collapse of society, it does imply, philosophically, that its values are left without true justification.

Wynne argues that Cicero reveals the fundamental purpose of De Natura Deorum in the dialog’s opening sentence: a philosophical inquiry into the nature of the gods that is both intellectually beautiful and necessary for the moderation of religion. As the dialog states, “Inquiry into the nature of the gods […] is both most beautiful for the mind to grasp, and necessary for the moderation of religion” (Cicero 1933, De Natura Deorum I, 1). For Wynne, this opening statement is not mere rhetorical ornament—as some have suggested, citing Cicero’s letter to Atticus about reusing prologs—but rather a deliberate and thematically coherent introduction. As Wynne puts it, “It is plain that a large part, if not all of it, was written specifically for a philosophical work on the nature of the gods” (Wynne 2019, p. 3).

From this perspective, the “moderation of religion” (ad moderandam religionem) does not refer to altering public rituals or performances, but to reforming the private beliefs that give those rituals ethical significance. For Romans, religio was orthopraxic rather than orthodox; what mattered was the correct performance of rites, not the internal beliefs of the practitioner. “Orthopraxy required only performances […] Roman religion demanded certain performances, but did not mind what actions those performances were part of” (Wynne 2019, p. 7). However, Wynne shows how Cicero—and the characters in his dialogs—distinguish between a correct external performance and an act that is pious or impious depending on the agent’s beliefs: “A Roman could think that both men made a religiously correct performance, but that the first man did a pious action while the second did an impious one” (Wynne 2019, p. 9).

Thus, philosophical inquiry can moderate religion not by changing its external forms but by purifying the underlying beliefs. This moderation is not revolutionary, nor is it an institutional reform; it is an internal transformation of the believer.

In the second treatise, De Divinatione, Cicero examines the practice of divination, a widespread tradition in ancient Rome that was closely tied to the belief in predetermined fate and divine intervention in human affairs. For Cicero, the persistence of divination as an institution was fundamental to the harmony and stability of political and social organization5. Divination was not only a philosophical topic for Cicero but also a religious practice that expressed the belief that gods could reveal the future and guide human actions through various forms of omens, prophecies, and signs. In De Divinatione, he critically assesses the notion that the future can be known through methods such as augury, oracles, and prophetic dreams. Through dialog, Cicero questions the validity of these practices and the reliability of divination, arguing that if fate is immutable, knowing it does not alter its course—thereby calling into question the usefulness and logic of attempting to predict it. Furthermore, he raises doubts about the coherence of divination with free will, suggesting that if the future is predetermined and knowable, then human freedom of choice is undermined. These doubts and inquiries are further explored in De Fato, where Cicero analyzes the philosophical and ethical implications of an inevitable fate versus the human capacity for free decision-making. The religious role of divination is inseparable from the concept of fate, as it reveals how deeply intertwined the notions of divine intervention and human agency were in Roman religious thought.

As previously noted, Cicero wrote De Fato in the context of great political uncertainty, following the assassination of Julius Caesar and amid the tensions and power struggles that shook Rome. Cicero refers to these events in the introduction to his treatise6. This climate of instability deeply influenced his philosophical reflections, leading him to question the foundations of fate, causality, and free will. In this context, Cicero’s reflections on fate also echo the political and religious crises of his time, where questions of destiny were not only philosophical but had direct implications for the future of Rome itself and its religious practices. The work stands as the culmination of a trilogy in which Cicero explores, from different perspectives, the implications of fate in human life. Within this framework, the political crisis not only shapes the philosophical content of his work but also imbues it with a metapolitical dimension, wherein the analysis of fate can be interpreted as a reflection on the destiny of Rome itself.

The primary objective of De Fato is to synthesize and critique Greek ideas about fate, particularly those of the Stoics and Epicureans. Throughout the treatise, Cicero grapples with the central question of whether it is possible to reconcile the existence of fate with human freedom. The concept of fate had been a subject of profound speculation in Greek philosophy, from the Presocratics to the Stoics, and Cicero seeks to evaluate these theories in light of their ethical and moral implications.

In his analysis, Cicero not only examines the deterministic doctrines of the Stoics—who maintained that everything that happens is predetermined by an unbreakable chain of causes—but also considers the more atomistic conceptions of the Epicureans, who introduced the concept of clinamen7, or the random swerve of atoms, to explain free will. Throughout the work, Cicero synthesizes and critiques the ideas previously discussed in De Natura Deorum and De Divinatione, exploring how different philosophical perspectives attempt to reconcile fate with human decision-making capacity. In this process, Cicero underscores the religious implications of these ideas, acknowledging that in the ancient world, discussions on fate were intimately tied to the divine and the transcendent forces believed to shape human destiny.

At the culmination of his analysis, Cicero presents his own position, which seeks to balance the influence of fate with individual moral autonomy. He acknowledges that while some events may be determined by a causal chain, human beings retain a sphere of free action in which they can exercise judgment and ethical responsibility. For Cicero, this is the key to preserving human dignity and moral responsibility in a world that, in many respects, appears to be governed by forces beyond our control. Thus, Cicero’s treatment of fate becomes a nuanced inquiry into the balance between determinism and moral responsibility.

3. The Influence of Greek Philosophy on De Fato: Greek Philosophical Schools and Their Treatment of Fate

Since the dawn of Greek philosophy, fate (ἡ εἱμαρμένη) has been a central theme. Terms associated with fate, such as moira (μοῖρα) or tyche (τύχη), appear in Homeric poems and Greek tragedies, reflecting a vision of human life as being subject to forces beyond individual control8. This reflects not only a philosophical concept but also a deeply religious view, as fate in Ancient Greece was often seen as a divine force that governed the cosmos, with the gods playing a central role in determining the fate of individuals and nations. However, it was the Presocratics who rationally considered fate to be inextricably linked to the universal order and the immutable nature of the cosmos.

Heraclitus, for instance, viewed the cosmos as a series of constant changes that nevertheless obey an unchanging law, implying a universal fate governing all things9. This cosmic law was often equated with divine will in religious thought, suggesting that the gods were the agents through which fate was enacted in the world. Meanwhile, Empedocles posited philía (Φιλία) and neîkos (νεῖκος) as the primary forces that unite and separate the four elements (fire, water, earth, and air)10. For Empedocles, these forces were not merely natural but also spiritual, with divine agency playing a central role in the cosmic order. Democritus’ atomism implicitly presented a form of blind, mechanical determinism, asserting that everything occurred out of necessity11. Although this view leans toward a naturalistic explanation of fate, the broader religious framework of Ancient Greece also allowed for the possibility that the gods could intervene in these deterministic processes.

Interestingly, Cicero includes Aristotle among the Greek philosophers who defended fate (Cicero 1923, De Fato 17, 49). However, Aristotle developed a more nuanced theory of causality—his doctrine of the four causes (material, formal, efficient, and final)—and introduced the concept of chance (tykhe) as opposed to necessity (anágké)12. The idea of chance, however, was often viewed in religious terms as the moment when divine will could intervene or reveal itself in unpredictable ways. By distinguishing between necessary and accidental causes, he offered a more refined perspective on fate than his predecessors. Nonetheless, according to Cicero, for this first group of thinkers, fate constituted the essence of necessity (Cicero 1923, De Fato 5, 9–10)13.

It is noteworthy that in De Fato, Cicero does not explicitly mention Plato. However, it is well known that the founder of the Academy argued that reason and necessity operate jointly in the creation of the cosmos, as stated in the Timaeus (47e–48a)14. This view aligns with religious conceptions of fate, where the divine rationality of the cosmos is intimately connected with the will of the gods. This dialog, translated by Cicero himself shortly after composing De Fato, is directly related to his theological works De Natura Deorum and De Divinatione (Cicero 1942, De Natura Deorum I, 2–3)15. In these works, Cicero explores how fate, divination, and the divine interplay to reveal the nature of the cosmos and human life within it. Likewise, Socrates and his daimon are not considered in De Fato. Nevertheless, it is important to remember, first, that Cicero’s treatise contains gaps, and second, that it must be understood within a broader framework that includes the two aforementioned works.

In this context, Socrates is mentioned in the treatise dedicated to divination. Divination was a key practice in the religious life of Ancient Greece and Rome, seen as a means to understand the will of the gods and the forces that shape human destiny. As is well known, the philosopher received signs whenever he was about to act wrongly, which tradition, according to Cicero, considers a form of “almost divine” knowledge (mantikḗ) (Cicero 1923, De Divinatione I, 1)16. This connection between divine signs and fate underscores the religious dimension of the concept of fate, where divination is a way to engage with the divine and to align one’s actions with the gods’ will. During his trial, Socrates did not hear any divine voice, which he interpreted as a sign that his fate was rightly decided, allowing him to accept death with “a very serene spirit” (Cicero 1923, De Div. I, 54, 124). Socrates’ acceptance of death exemplifies the religious view of fate as something predetermined by the gods, and his ability to accept it peacefully reflects the Stoic virtue of aligning with divine will. Socrates’ acceptance of death without fear reflects his belief that his fate was predetermined and just. This resignation to fate exemplifies the philosophical approach to fate as something that should be accepted. This argument in the first book of De Divinatione introduces a defense of fate based on the existence of divination.

The next significant school is Stoicism, one of the philosophical currents that most influenced Cicero. The Stoics conceived of fate as an unalterable sequence of causes (causarum series sempiterna)17, closely linked to divine providence (prónoia). Let us consider Cicero’s definition:

I call fate what the Greeks call heimarmene (εἱμαρμένη), that is the order and series of causes, when cause linked to cause produces of itself an effect. That is an eternal truth which flows from all eternity. Because this is so, nothing has happened which was not going to happen and for the same reason nothing will happen the efficient causes of which nature does not contain. From this we recognize that Fate is not what is called superstitiously but what it is called scientifically, the eternal cause of things, why things that are passed have happened and why impeding events occur and why what follows will be.

(Cicero 1923, De Divinatione I, 55, 125–126).

The Stoic conception of fate closely aligns with religious views that understand fate as divine will, guiding all events through a rational and unalterable process. However, the Stoics also attempted to reconcile this determinism with a form of human freedom, a balance that Cicero explored in his work, particularly through Chrysippus, whom he called an “honorable arbiter” for his ability to “occupy the middle ground” in the debate on the existence of fate (Cicero 1942, De Fato 17, 40)18. This tension between fate and human freedom reflects the religious belief that, while the gods may determine the broad course of events, humans still possess the ability to align their wills with divine purpose through virtue and reason. Nevertheless, Cicero observes that the Stoic leans more toward those who wish the movements of the soul to be freed from necessity. Cicero suggests that the Stoic view on the freedom of the soul is more inclined toward freedom from necessity (Cicero 1942, De Fato 11, 23), even if their deterministic outlook on the universe remains dominant.

Additionally, the perspective of the Megarian philosopher Diodorus Cronus is introduced. He argued that “only what is true or will be true is possible” (Epictetus 1995, Discourses II, 19)19. Diodorus’ view of fate presents a deterministic vision that mirrors religious belief in a fixed, divinely ordained future, where the possibility of future events is inseparably tied to the will of the gods. By contrasting absolute necessity with conditional necessity, Diodorus sought to derive real necessity from logical necessity. In this approach, he identified the possible with the necessary—that is, with what is or will be true. In doing so, he suggested that everything that can happen must ultimately happen. This implies that any future event that is possible is also inevitable; if something is possible, it will necessarily occur, and if it does not occur, it was never truly possible. This implies a vision of fate in which the gods have already determined the course of all events, reinforcing the idea of an unchangeable, divine order.

This reasoning leads to a view of fate in which there is no room for chance or contingency: everything is predetermined. If the possible is equivalent to the necessary, then everything that happens in the world is inevitable, and the future is fixed in advance. The idea that “what is or will be true” is already determined reinforces a deterministic vision of the universe, where the course of events is governed by an inalterable logical necessity. The idea that everything that is possible will inevitably happen presents a deterministic worldview, where the future is already fixed, and human action cannot alter its course (Cicero 1942, De Fato 11, 24–25).

Although Stoicism occupies a central place in De Fato, Cicero also examines other philosophical doctrines that address the question of human freedom without resorting to the concept of fate. This is the case with Epicurus20, who, taking a perspective more inclined toward chance, introduced the concept of clinamen—the unpredictable deviation of atoms—as an escape from the laws of fate (fati foedera), thus allowing for a form of freedom (Lucretius 1992, De Rerum Natura II, 251–293). Epicurus’ view, while more naturalistic, still allows for the possibility that chance or divine intervention could alter the course of events, hinting at a more fluid understanding of fate in the context of religious belief. Unlike the Stoics, who held that every proposition is either true or false and that all events occur as a result of fate, Epicurus did not argue that all occurrences are determined by eternal causes or by the necessity of nature (Cicero 1942, De Fato 13, 30–32).

The other doctrine that stands in opposition to Stoic determinism is represented by Carneades, who criticized both Chrysippus’ doctrine and the idea of secondary causes, advocating for a more flexible conception of human beings as possessing a certain degree of freedom (Cicero 1942, De Fato 15, 33). Carneades, a scholar of the Academy, argued that the distinction established by Chrysippus between auxiliary causes—which stimulate the senses and initiate the process of assent—and principal causes—related to the intrinsic nature of the subject—did not effectively reconcile universal causality with individual autonomy. Carneades’ critique of determinism highlights the limitations of causal distinctions in reconciling freedom and fate. He argues for a more flexible view of human autonomy. His critique points to the inadequacy of any causal distinction that seeks to justify freedom within a universe where everything is predetermined (Cicero 1942, De Fato 15, 34–35). According to Carneades, if fate is absolute and everything follows an unbreakable causal chain, then the notion of individual freedom is ultimately illusory. This critique also reflects the religious tension between divine control over fate and human free will, where philosophical debates about autonomy often intersect with religious views on divine intervention and destiny.

4. The Debate Between the Stoics and the Epicureans on Fate

The debate between the Stoics and the Epicureans on fate and freedom did not focus so much on free will as we understand it today but rather on the nature of human beings within an ordered cosmos21, which was seen as being governed by divine principles. In this regard, it is essential to consider that the concept of fate in antiquity was deeply connected to religious beliefs, with gods playing an active role in shaping the course of human events. The idea of fate, therefore, cannot be fully understood without considering its religious dimension, particularly in relation to the role of divine providence and the practice of divination. The Stoics argued that fate was an aspect of the divine principle that governed the universe, or the “connecting cause of things”, whereas Epicurus maintained that, thanks to the clinamen, humans possessed a degree of autonomy (Long and Sedley 1987, pp. 323–28).

For the Stoics, freedom was not merely about doing as one pleased but about living in accordance with nature—that is, in harmony with the order of the universe (Bobzien 1998, pp. 87–91). This paradoxical view defines freedom as the capacity to voluntarily align oneself with fate. Those who fail to attain wisdom are dragged along by fate, much like dogs tied to a cart, according to the well-known Stoic metaphor. This metaphor illustrates the Stoic conception that while fate establishes a general framework within which events occur (the cart), human beings can act and make decisions within that framework—like the dogs22—which can move to the extent permitted by the rope (T. Brennan 2005, pp. 131–33).

Thus, the dog has only two options: to go along with the cart or to resist. For the Stoic, the former constitutes true harmony with fate, while the latter means opposing it. Seneca encapsulates this idea by stating, Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt (“Fate leads the willing and drags the unwilling”) (Epistulae Morales 107, 11). In other words, although fate establishes the context and limits of what happens in the world, individual actions and decisions still have relevance and effects within that context (Inwood 1985, p. 72). This view, however, is not entirely secular in nature, as it relies on the assumption of a divinely ordered universe, where human agency is in harmony with divine order.

Stoic determinism was based on several fundamental premises. First, it was rooted in the conception of the world as a continuous whole, where nothing escapes universal interconnection. This interconnection of bodies is governed by the Stoic logos, or reason. Within this framework, Chrysippus classified causes in various ways, although sources do not completely agree on the details (Frede 2011, pp. 52–55). The key point of these classifications is the distinction between primary and auxiliary causes, highlighting the importance the Stoics placed on differentiating between self-sufficient causes and accessory causes. An illustrative example used by Chrysippus, and later recorded by Cicero in De Fato, is that of a rolling cylinder. Here, a clear distinction23 is established: while the initial push acts as an auxiliary cause, the nature of the cylinder (its shape) is the primary cause that determines how it will move after being pushed (Cicero 1942, De Fato 10, 22). This idea, that certain external factors influence human actions only as secondary causes, positions the Stoic doctrine between absolute determinism and total independence of the will (Bobzien 1998, pp. 159–63).

The Stoic doctrine of fate was also closely related to logical problems. The Stoics contributed to discussions on possibility and necessity, which were of great importance to the Megarians. Furthermore, they connected the universal nature of fate with the principle of bivalence—that is, the idea that all statements about the future are either true or false, leaving no room for ambiguity (Bobzien 1998, pp. 124–26). This physical determinism arose from logical determinism, leading to the notion that future events are as fixed as past ones (Sedley 2006, p. 120).

The critique of the Stoic position was formulated by Carneades and the Academics, who made a clear distinction between cause and condition. Cicero points out that there is a difference between that without which something cannot happen and that in relation to which something necessarily happens. This distinction is fundamental to the Academic critique, which argues that the Stoic classification of causes confuses very different factors under the general concept of cause (Brittain 2001, pp. 187–90). As a result, the Stoic principle that everything happens due to prior reasons appears ambiguous, as it can be interpreted in multiple ways, including conflating cause with condition. Carneades’ critique, which challenges the notion of an unbroken chain of causes, also raises questions about the role of divine intervention in determining human actions. If everything is predetermined by fate, how can divination, which relies on the interpretation of divine signs, function within such a deterministic worldview?

Carneades opposed the idea that everything is determined by an unbroken chain of causes, as argued by Chrysippus. His argument offered an alternative to the determinist dilemma, suggesting that there are caused events that are not part of an endless causal chain, implying that not everything is predetermined by fate. By challenging the idea of an unbroken causal chain, Carneades opens the possibility that some events are not predetermined and that human freedom may exist in a less rigidly determined universe. This opens up the possibility that not all events are fixed, allowing for a reinterpretation of causal structure.

Carneades suggested that Stoic determinism does not resolve the question of human freedom, and although his own proposal of spontaneous motions is also debatable, he successfully highlighted the limitations of the Stoic doctrine regarding causality and predestination. Additionally, Carneades postulated that voluntary human actions are caused by the will itself and do not need to be linked to an eternal natural sequence to have causality (Cicero 1942, De Fato 15, 34). In this sense, Carneades’ critique presents a challenge not only to Stoic determinism but also to the religious conception of a universe fully governed by divine fate.

Cicero, in recounting these critiques in De Fato, also recognizes the distinction between necessary causes and necessary conditions, a point that allows the Stoics to differentiate between what must inevitably happen and the conditions that merely facilitate an event (Frede 2011, p. 74). This differentiation is crucial for understanding the Stoic position and its attempt to balance fate with human autonomy. However, as Cicero notes, this reconciliation is unsatisfactory from a critical perspective, since even our own nature and character, which are considered primary causes of our actions, are themselves influenced by factors beyond our control.

Finally, Carneades attacked the Stoic doctrine of divination24. The Stoics argued that divination was possible thanks to divine providence, which provided humans with the necessary signs to predict the future. This divine providence was viewed as a direct link between the human world and the divine, a mechanism that allowed the gods to reveal their will through signs, omens, and other forms of divination. Carneades, however, challenged this idea, arguing that if there is no present basis for a future event, it cannot be predicted. Moreover, if everything is predetermined by fate, divination would have no practical value, as it would not alter the inevitable course of events (Hankinson 1998, pp. 223–28).

Carneades’ critique, as presented by Cicero, poses a significant challenge to Stoic determinism25. By suggesting that it is inappropriate to consider the remote factors of an event as true causes, Carneades undermines the global causal structure defended by the Stoics (Sedley 2006, pp. 145–47). His argument implies that while some events may be causally connected in a chain, not all necessarily are, and that there may be causes that are not part of a universal and immutable fate. This critique questions the role of religious practices, such as divination, in a world where fate is understood to be fixed and unchangeable. Carneades’ perspective offers room for the possibility that the divine might reveal itself through mutable signs, allowing for a more dynamic relationship between humans and the gods. This alternative perspective opens the door to a more flexible conception of causality and human freedom, which has remained a central topic of philosophical debate ever since. Carneades proposes a more flexible understanding of causality than the Stoics, suggesting that not all events are part of an unchanging causal chain. This alternative view allows for human freedom and provides a framework where events can be caused by a variety of factors, not all of which are determined by a universal, fixed fate. His challenge to Stoic determinism continues to influence modern discussions on the relationship between causality, fate, and freedom. Furthermore, his critique of Stoic divination reflects a broader questioning of how divine will operates in a world where human freedom is possible.

5. Cicero’s Appropriation and Critique: Structure and Method

The Latin term fatum26 carries philosophical connotations derived from its Greek equivalents, such as heimarmenē and anankē. In the religious and philosophical context of antiquity, the question of fate was not solely a metaphysical or ethical issue but also a deeply spiritual one, directly tied to beliefs about divine influence and the workings of the cosmos. In this way, fatum not only refers to an impersonal force or law of the universe but also has a strong connection to the divine will and the role of the gods in shaping human destiny. De Fato represents an important philosophical adaptation of Greek concepts into Roman thought. While the Greek word εἱμαρμένη (heimarmenē) refers to a “portion” assigned by fate, the Latin fatum, originating from the verb fari (to speak), evokes a sense of a pronounced, almost oracular destiny, a concept that deeply resonated with Roman religious practice, where omens and prophecies played a central role in guiding public and private decisions. This oracular nature of fatum aligns with the Roman understanding of the gods’ direct influence over the course of human affairs, suggesting that fate was not merely a deterministic force but also an expression of divine will. The Stoics reinterpreted heimarmenē not only as a portion of fate but as a chain of causality (White 2003, p. 138)27. Fatum, in turn, acquired a more emotional connotation, associated with inevitability, as suggested by its persistence in the Portuguese fado28, a musical expression of melancholy in the face of the inevitable (Vernon 1998).

In De Fato, the first Latin treatise equivalent to Peri tēs heimarmenēs (Περὶ τῆς εἱμαρμένης), Cicero explores the nature of fatum as an “everlasting series of causes” (causarum series sempiterna), a concept he adopts from Stoic philosophy29. However, Cicero does not merely adopt these ideas wholesale. In De Fato, he navigates among these philosophical currents, adopting and adapting concepts to construct his own vision. While he shows sympathy for Stoicism, particularly in the figure of Chrysippus, he also engages with the critiques of skeptics such as Carneades, who defended human freedom against Stoic determinism.

Cicero’s dialectical method in De Fato is similar to that used in his Tusculan Disputations, where a disciple proposes a thesis and the master refutes it30. In this treatise, the supposed dialog is held with his disciple Aulus Hirtius at Cicero’s villa in Pozzuoli; his brother Quintus does not appear. The style follows the Academic Skeptic tradition, where the master argues contra omnia (against everything), as propounded by Arcesilaus (Cicero 1998, p. XIII)31. In this regard, Cicero notes that the goal is to respond to everything (Cicero 1923, De Divinatione II, 4, 10)32. Likewise, at the beginning of De Fato, he states the following:

It is also necessary to expound the meaning and the theory of propositions, called in Greek axiomata; what validity these have when they make a statement about a future event and about something that may happen or may not is a difficult field of inquiry, entitled by philosophers Perì dynatôn; and the whole subject is Logikḗ, which I call “the theory of discourse” (Cicero 1942, De Fato 1, 1)33.

Moreover, a certain circumstance prevented Cicero from doing, in this discussion on fate, what he did in other books—those that deal with the nature of the gods and, similarly, those in which he addressed divination—where the discourse unfolded without interruption, with arguments for and against, so that each one could more easily prove what seemed most probable to them34. This approach highlights the religious importance of divination in understanding fate, as divination was often seen as a means of accessing divine will regarding future events. For Cicero, this method is the “Roman method” because “it advances with caution” (Cicero 1942, De Fato 2, 4).

Cicero, far from advocating for religious dogmatism, proposes a skeptical suspension of judgment as a legitimate and virtuous way of living religiously. For Cicero, accepting religious beliefs without clear evidence can lead to both superstition and impiety—two equally serious errors. Skeptical moderation thus becomes a rational alternative that avoids error, guided not by dogmatic certainties but by what appears “plausible” or “probable.” As Wynne notes, “Philosophical inquiry may impose two sorts of bound on Roman religion, that is, on Roman religious practice: that it be neither superstitious nor impious” (Wynne 2019, p. 72).

This position does not call for an external reform of religious worship, but rather an internal reorientation of its meaning: traditional practices are preserved, but false beliefs that might corrupt them are purged. Cicero’s philosophical interpretation of traditional Roman religion is part of a broader project, developed in dialog with authors such as Varro and Nigidius Figulus, aimed at recovering a rational and virtuous understanding of Roman civic religion. In contrast to Varro, who seeks to reconstruct religion from its historical origins, Cicero advocates for interpreting it from a skeptical philosophical standpoint—one that allows for its continued practice without falling into superstition.

It should also be noted that the reference to De Fato in De Divinatione is explicit; Cicero mentions that he plans to address superstition and the Stoic theory of fate in a future treatise, which is none other than De Fato. In fact, the central theme of De Fato can be closely linked to the discussions of Quintus, Cicero’s brother, in De Divinatione, who argues that “everything happens because of fate” (Cicero 1923, De Div. 9, 24).

6. Cicero’s Three Approaches to Fate

One of the most intriguing ideas derived from the fragmented De Fato is that Cicero approaches the problem of fate from three distinct perspectives. This allows him to merge and contrast various Hellenistic philosophical systems, creating a complex and nuanced dialog among them.

The first of these approaches is the physical (sections 5–11), in which Cicero investigates, on the one hand, the possibility that, as the Stoics maintained, there exists a natural interconnection among all parts of the world. This idea, known as sympátheia35 or “universal sympathy”, is one of the fundamental pillars for understanding Stoic cosmology and ethics and is deeply related to the doctrine of fate. This Stoic view of fate is not merely philosophical but also intersects with religious ideas about the cosmos being governed by a divine rationality, or logos, a principle closely associated with divine will and the gods’ involvement in the world. On the other hand, he also explores the existence of chance and human will36.

According to the Stoics, sympátheia or universal sympathy refers to the idea that everything in the cosmos is interconnected and that each element influences and is influenced by all others. In Stoic philosophy, the universe is a living organism, where every part, no matter how small, is linked to all the others through a rational and divine principle known as the logos37. The logos is often associated with divine providence and the will of the gods, shaping the cosmic order and, consequently, human fate. This logos not only orders and governs the cosmos but is also the source of its internal coherence and harmony (Long 2006)38.

To understand this phenomenon of cosmic contiguity, Cicero explains that Stoicism derives from inherited physical characteristics or external influences, such as environmental factors, which are considered crucial in understanding a person’s fate. These environmental influences are often interpreted through religious practices, such as oracles and divination, which seek to explain the influence of the cosmos on individual destinies. For example, in Athens, where the atmosphere is light, its inhabitants are thought to be more astute. In Thebes, where the atmosphere is denser, its inhabitants are considered “coarser and more vigorous” (Cicero 1942, De Fato, 5–11)39. However, to these examples, Cicero responds by emphasizing the diversity and plurality of natures, as well as the difficulty of defending this argument in absolute terms. Cicero challenges the Stoic view of fate by raising questions about human freedom. If everything is interconnected and every event is part of an unbreakable chain of causes, Cicero asks whether humans can truly exercise free will. Cicero’s skepticism also extends to the religious belief that divine will, manifested through oracles and prophecies, dictates the course of human life. If everything is fated, how can humans interpret divine signs as anything other than a confirmation of an already determined destiny? He argues that if all actions are predetermined by the causal chain, the concept of personal responsibility and moral agency becomes meaningless. This critique of determinism invites a more nuanced view of human action and the possibility of free will40.

This universal interconnection, which ties into the system of divination, means that events do not occur in isolation; rather, each event is determined by a complex network of causes ultimately linked to fate. For the Stoics, fate, or heimarmene, is the chain of causes extending from the beginning of time to the end, determining everything that happens in the universe. Consequently, everything that occurs in the world is the result of a rational and necessary order. Due to this interconnection, the Stoics argue that there can be no random events; each occurrence is predetermined by this network of interrelated causes. Moreover, fate is not merely a fixed sequence of future events but an expression of the cosmos’ intrinsic rationality, where every element plays its role in a preordained cosmic plan.

In his physical approach to fate in De Fato, Cicero critically examines this Stoic idea. Although universal sympathy is a compelling explanation of cosmic order, it has implications that challenge the notion of human freedom. If everything is so closely interconnected and every event is part of an unbreakable chain of causes, what room is left for free action? Can humans truly exercise their will independently, or are we all trapped in an immutable web of fate? Cicero questions whether this sympátheia implies absolute predestination, where every detail of our lives is already determined by the interconnection of causes41. In this framework, the idea of personal and moral responsibility dissolves, because if our actions are merely the inevitable result of a predetermined causal chain, freedom and the ability to choose become illusions. This challenge to determinism also casts doubt on religious practices like divination, which claim to reveal the future based on signs and omens, as Cicero questions whether such practices truly allow for human agency or merely reveal a predetermined fate.

For example, Cicero mentions a curious episode related to Socrates’ physiognomy according to Zopyrus’ interpretation42. The latter claimed that Socrates’ facial features revealed that he had the temperament of a “stupid and slow-witted person” because he “did not have sunken collarbone hollows” and also accused him of being a womanizer. This seemingly absurd interpretation provoked laughter from Alcibiades, who could not take seriously the idea that physical traits could determine Socrates’ character or fate43. Cicero uses this anecdote to illustrate a deeper critique: physical traits are not absolute determinants of a person’s character or fate.

From a contemporary perspective, we could extrapolate this critique to the belief in zodiac signs, which hold that a person’s character and temperament are predetermined by their birth month and day. Just as Cicero questions the idea that physical traits determine fate, we could argue that attributing personal qualities and specific destinies solely based on the position of the stars at birth limits our understanding of human complexity and underestimates the importance of free will, determination, and learning in shaping character and life (C. Brennan 2017). Similarly, Cicero critiques the ancient reliance on prophetic signs, arguing that such beliefs obscure the true agency of individuals in shaping their own future.

Cicero’s aim is to reconcile the idea of a cosmic order with the notion of human freedom. While he acknowledges that there may be universal principles governing the cosmos, he insists that these principles do not negate the possibility of human autonomy. For Cicero, individuals retain the capacity to make moral decisions and act responsibly, even within a universe governed by rational laws. This perspective affirms the importance of free will, moral responsibility, and personal agency in shaping one’s life.

For Cicero, what truly defines an individual’s fate is not inherited physical characteristics or immutable external influences but rather “will”, “effort”, and “learning” (Cicero 1942, De Fato, 5–11). These are the factors that allow humans to overcome the limitations imposed by nature or any deterministic interpretation of character. By emphasizing the importance of will and personal effort, Cicero rejects the notion of absolute dependence on nature in shaping human destiny. Cicero’s vision of fate is not one of rigid determinism but rather a flexible and humanistic conception that recognizes the interplay between cosmic order and human freedom. This view allows for personal effort, reason, and choice to shape one’s character and life. Cicero’s rejection of absolute determinism reflects his commitment to the idea that individuals are capable of making autonomous decisions and achieving excellence through their own efforts. This view also stands in contrast to religious fatalism, which often denies human agency and the ability to alter one’s fate through effort and moral action.

Ultimately, Cicero’s goal is to strike a balance between recognizing a certain cosmic order—a universal harmony that, according to some philosophical schools, could influence fate—and preserving free will and moral responsibility. These elements are essential to his ethical and political vision, as they allow individuals to be agents of their own destiny, capable of making moral decisions and acting responsibly in public life (Inwood 2005). Furthermore, Cicero argues that although the cosmos may be governed by certain laws and universal principles, this does not negate human capacity for autonomous decision-making and action. Thus, his stance distances itself from rigid determinism and moves toward a more flexible and humanistic conception of fate, in which personal effort and reason play a crucial role in shaping one’s character and life44. In contrast to religious practices that promote an unalterable fate, Cicero’s view offers hope for personal transformation and the power of individual agency in determining one’s future.

This Ciceronian perspective not only defends personal freedom against predestination but also underscores the importance of moral and educational development as tools for achieving excellence and virtue, which are central objectives in his philosophy. In a world where many believed that fate was inscribed in the stars or in physical traits, Cicero proposes a more optimistic and empowering vision of the human being, one capable of shaping their own future through reason and constant effort45.

7. The Influence of the Treatise De Fato

After Cicero’s death, De Fato continued to be an influential work in philosophical debates concerning fate and free will. Thinkers such as Gellius, Macrobius, Plutarch, and Alexander of Aphrodisias referenced his work, but it was Saint Augustine, in his De libero arbitrio, who revisited and expanded upon Cicero’s ideas, adapting them to the Christian context46. The debate on fate and freedom did not conclude with the Middle Ages. Cicero’s influence became particularly evident during the Renaissance. The revival of humanism in Italy was no accident; the prosperous and politically independent Italian city-states fostered an environment that highly valued individual freedoms and civic rights47. This climate facilitated the revival of ancient ideals, largely thanks to the deep connection to the traditions of ancient Rome (Oakeshott 1986).

In the context of the Renaissance, Cicero’s thoughts on freedom and human dignity had a significant impact. Lorenzo Valla (1407–1457), for example, addressed the issue in his De libero arbitrio (1437)48, and many later authors engaged in the theological dispute over predestination and the origin of evil, a theme that also reflected the Renaissance interest in fate. Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525) also wrote a treatise titled De Fato, Libero Arbitrio et Praedestinatione (1520), exploring these questions from a religious perspective, drawing on Aristotelian philosophy and Scholastic traditions. In this work, he critically examines whether human actions are determined by an unbreakable chain of causes or if there is room for genuine freedom, all within a theological framework influenced by divine will. In this work, he critically examines whether human actions are determined by an unbreakable chain of causes or if there is room for genuine freedom. Pomponazzi argues that, from a naturalistic and Aristotelian standpoint, events unfold according to necessary causal laws. This perspective leans toward a form of natural determinism, where human choices are deeply influenced—if not entirely dictated—by prior causes and the structure of the universe. However, he also engages with the theological perspective, acknowledging that divine providence introduces a degree of uncertainty into strict determinism. Additionally, the concept of “fortuna” in the European literature of the time, though sometimes stripped of its original philosophical content, remained a manifestation of Ciceronian influence (Akopyan 2021)49.

Cicero, with his defense of freedom and human activity, contributed to the formation of a mindset that valued dignity and individual freedom—core elements of Renaissance humanism (Grafton 2000). In his treatise De Fato, he argued that “not everything that happens comes from fate” (Cicero 1942, De Fato 34–38), defending the human capacity to act independently of it. Cicero’s argument against absolute fatalism aligned with his Academic Skepticism, which encouraged questioning rather than rigid adherence to deterministic views. This position, however, was not just a philosophical stance, but one that also held profound religious implications, challenging the conception of an omnipotent fate or divine will governing all human action.

Furthermore, in his work Pro Archia, Cicero not only defended an individual but also promoted the value of the humanities. The defense of the humanities in Pro Archia aligned with Cicero’s broader advocacy for a well-rounded education as being essential to civic and moral excellence. The philosopher argued that the study of Greco-Roman culture and the heroic deeds of the past ennoble human beings and bring them closer to virtuous ideals. Cicero’s engagement with human dignity and moral freedom, however, can also be seen as part of a broader conversation on divine will and human agency in religious contexts, where the search for moral virtue intersects with theological reflections on providence and grace. This approach was interpreted during the Renaissance as an early manifestation of humanism, a movement that believed the study of the ancients elevated and humanized individuals. Petrarch, one of the first humanists, rediscovered this text and saw it as fundamental to his own conception of humanism50.

Cicero opposes a rigid view of fate. For him, although some events may be predestined or influenced by prior causes, not everything in life is predetermined. There is space for human action, freedom, and decision-making that are not entirely subject to an inexorable fate51. This is particularly relevant in religious contexts, where the question of divine providence and the human capacity for free will have been central to theological discussions for millennia. This defense of individual freedom left a profound mark on Western thought, where the dignity and autonomy of the human being were established as central values.

Not only did he reject absolute determinism, but he also promoted an ideal of humanity based on education, virtue, and freedom—elements that became pillars of Renaissance humanism (Baker 2015). His legacy in philosophy and political thought remains relevant52, emphasizing the importance of freedom and dignity in human life, concepts that continue to be fundamental in our understanding of the modern world53. In conclusion, De Fato remains an essential work for understanding philosophical discussions on fate in antiquity, but also for recognizing the enduring religious and theological dimensions of these debates.

8. Conclusions

Cicero’s De Fato is a fundamental philosophical inquiry into the relationship between fate and free will. Through its three main approaches—physical, logical, and ethical—Cicero examines and critiques various Hellenistic doctrines, particularly Stoic determinism and the Epicurean theory of clinamen. His objective is not merely to refute these positions but to seek a balance between the existence of a cosmic order and the possibility of free and responsible action. This balance is crucial, as it reflects the theological tension between the divine will and human agency that has long been central to religious discussions.

In De Fato, Cicero critically engages with the debate between determinism and free will, interacting with Stoic and Epicurean perspectives while defending a position that preserves human autonomy. He challenges the Stoic notion of absolute fate, arguing that necessity does not govern all events, thus allowing for contingency and voluntary action. Additionally, his analysis addresses the implications of divine foreknowledge, questioning whether omniscience necessarily entails determinism. He refutes fatalistic interpretations by emphasizing the role of probability and human reasoning in decision-making. Through these arguments, he upholds the idea that moral responsibility requires a degree of freedom, which would be impossible under strict determinism. In this way, he acknowledges the theological concerns surrounding divine omniscience and free will, highlighting the philosophical and religious complexity of the topic.

From a physical perspective, Cicero explores the Stoic doctrine of sympátheia, which posits a universal interconnectedness governing the fate of all things. However, he challenges the notion that this interconnection necessitates absolute predestination, emphasizing the significance of effort, will, and learning in shaping individual destiny. His critique extends to the belief in the influence of celestial bodies and physical traits on human character, reaffirming the individual’s capacity to shape their own future. This critique is also relevant in religious thought, where the question of how divine providence interacts with human efforts remains a key theological issue.

In the realm of logic, Cicero engages with the determinism of Diodorus Cronus and the position of Chrysippus, confronting the idea that only what actually occurs is truly possible. He argues that the ability to foresee the future does not imply that it is immutably fixed. Furthermore, he rejects the Epicurean theory of clinamen as a valid solution to the problem of free will, maintaining that randomness is insufficient to account for human freedom. Cicero’s exploration of divine foreknowledge and free will offers a crucial perspective for theological discussions about the nature of God’s knowledge and human free will.

Cicero’s ethical approach reinforces individual autonomy in decision-making, opposing absolute fatalism. He underscores the importance of moral responsibility and the capacity for choice within a framework where causes and necessary conditions exist but do not entirely determine human action. In religious terms, this aligns with theological ideas that emphasize human moral responsibility in the face of divine providence, affirming that divine order does not negate free will.

The significance of De Fato extends beyond its historical context, influencing later philosophical and theological discussions on free will, fate, and moral responsibility. While Cicero’s reasoning is not systematized as a formal theory, it provides a crucial foundation for later debates in medieval and modern thought. Philosophers such as Saint Augustine reinterpreted Cicero’s ideas within a Christian framework, while Renaissance humanism found in his defense of dignity and individual freedom a foundation for the development of modern thought. His rejection of absolute fatalism and his advocacy for human agency contributed to a more flexible conception of fate, in which will and reason played a fundamental role in shaping both individual and collective futures. This theological legacy, shaped by Cicero’s exploration of fate, continues to influence contemporary religious thought, reminding us that while certain circumstances may be shaped by divine will, we remain the architects of our own destiny.

Ultimately, Cicero succeeds in reconciling the existence of a universal order with humanity’s capacity for choice and action. His optimistic and humanistic vision of fate and freedom remains relevant in contemporary philosophical debates, as well as in religious discussions that seek to understand the interplay between divine providence, free will, and moral responsibility. It serves as a reminder that, although our lives may be shaped by certain circumstances, we remain the architects of our own destiny.