Political Theology After the End of Metaphysics: A Revision via Jean-Luc Marion’s Critique of Onto-Theology

Abstract

This article explores the possibility of conceiving political theology beyond its traditional metaphysical foundations. Starting from Carl Schmitt’s formulation of political theology as a domain rooted in analogical and representational transfers between the theological and the political, and drawing on Jean-Luc Marion’s critique of metaphysical theology, or onto-theology, this paper interrogates the foundational assumptions of Schmitt’s political theology and assesses the viability of a non-metaphysical theo-political discourse. The article has three main aims: to elucidate the representational logic at the core of Schmitt’s political theology; to examine postmetaphysical theo-political discourses in light of Marion’s deconstruction of onto-theology; and to vindicate the legitimacy and coherence of postmodern theological-political approaches. Taking inspiration from Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite’s threefold theological method—affirmation, negation, and eminence—the article argues that contemporary political theology can be reframed accordingly: (1) the path of affirmation aligns with Vatter’s reading of Schmitt; (2) the path of negation resonates with Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive strategy; and (3) the path of eminence finds its expression in Marion’s phenomenology of givenness. Ultimately, this paper contends that Marion’s phenomenological approach opens a productive avenue for reconceiving theo-political discourse; it is argued that the phenomenology of givenness proposed by Marion to surpass the conceptual idols of metaphysics has significant implications for the theo-political field that remain unexplored.

1. Schmitt’s Political Theology and the Emergence of Cataphatic Political-Theologies

Schmitt’s consideration of secular concepts of the modern state as secularized theological concepts provides a descriptive analysis for understanding the political. In his seminal work, he proposes the political theology of the sovereign. In so doing, he draws in what is understood as a cataphatic or affirmative way and paves a path for alternative forms of cataphatic political theologies.1

Schmitt identifies behind a political figure an affirmative attribute that predicates God’s divinity and has a juridical character. It is important to note that the characterization of Schmitt’s political theology as affirmative does not refer to a specific mode of practicing political theology, but rather denotes the theological approach by which concepts are attributed to both divinity and politics. Accordingly, the concept of “affirmative” in this context diverges from Jürgen Moltmann’s interpretation of Schmitt’s project.2 Rather, it endeavors to capture a presupposed aspect, since in the Western tradition, theology is constructed in an affirmative manner when considering the intersection of theology and politics.

Specifically, Schmitt draws a parallel between the omnipotence of God, manifested in miracle-making, and the power of the sovereign to decide on the exception, which is a juridical-political figure (Schmitt 1985, pp. 36–37). Schmitt uses this argument to critique the legalisms of liberalism, demonstrating that behind the façade of the legal foundation of the liberal state, there is always someone deciding over the law. In other words, just as the miracle reveals the preeminence of the divinity, the exception, and not the norm, constitutes the paradigm of normativity. This analogy between God-sovereign and miracle-exception is a key aspect of his argument, and highlights the theological underpinnings of the political.

The political theology of the sovereign has generated both contentment and discontentment, as well as continuities and discontinuities. At its core, it is a theory of theological-political affirmative concepts that involves several underlying assumptions that are crucial to its understanding. In what follows, I briefly address several key concepts—analogy, representation, secularization and theistic affirmative theology—for political theology that may be dismantled or re-formulated in a post-secular epoch.

First and foremost, it is important to address the issue of analogies in Political Theology by Schmitt. He suggests that he borrows the practice of supporting a political discourse with analogies of theistic theology from conservative authors of the counter-revolution, namely Bonald, de Maistre, and Donoso Cortés. However, while these authors employ such analogies primarily as rhetorical or justificatory tools, Schmitt goes further by conceptualizing analogy as both systematic and methodological. That is, while the former exemplify a mode of practicing political theology, Schmitt provides both a practice and a theoretical framework. In doing so, he recognizes the theistic theology as the background of his theory, and emphasizes that analogies in political discourse come from theistic theology (Schmitt 1985, p. 37).

In addition to his utilization of analogies, Schmitt also incorporates Leibniz’s approach to analogy in order to address his methodological concerns. Leibniz’s conception of analogy is grounded in the notion of similarity, that is, proportionalitas, and he employs it not only for metaphysical purposes but also as a method to comprehend the juridical, as he does in Nova Methodus (Leibniz 2017, II, §4–5). However, Leibniz clearly states that this occurs because the theological is part of jurisprudence, that is, for him theology has a jurisprudential form and not in the other way. Conversely, Schmitt understands that the political has a theological form. Schmitt draws upon Leibniz’s work in Political Theology to further his own methodology. Therefore, it can be said that Schmitt’s understanding of analogy captures the epistemological and mathematical sense.3 The juridical and the theological share a same structure that enables the transfers of meanings, and Schmitt’s political theology proposal has primarily an heuristic-epistemological value. These similarities enable the uncovering of unexplored meanings of the political.

In this regard, the election of Leibniz in order to support his theory it is not naïve. Hans Blumenberg contends that Schmitt resuscitates a notion of secularization through the utilization of a structural analogy that can be traced back to Leibniz’s mathematical reasoning (Blumenberg 1985). According to Leibniz, geometry serves as a domain wherein God’s incommensurability is rendered commensurable (Cf. Arthur 2014). As a result, the divine attribute of infinity is transferred from the divine realm to the realm of natural space during the modern era, and Leibniz is credited with executing this transposition.4

Moreover, the concept of structural analogy denotes an abstraction of a particular form, a notion which Schmitt recognizes as encompassing diverse variations. Schmitt’s own works on the subject illustrate this plurality (Cf. Herrero 2017), while his methodology also invites further explorations of such analogies by other scholars. For instance, Vatter’s development of the concept of divine democracy demonstrates the potential of Schmitt’s method for exploring theological-political frameworks that do not necessarily lead to autocratic outcomes (Vatter 2021).

Simultaneously, Montserrat Herrero contends that the juridical-political origin of the sacrament in oaths implies that the analogies between theology and politics are not unidirectional, despite Schmitt’s emphasis on the transfer of concepts solely from theology to politics (Herrero 2018). Furthermore, the structural similarity makes analogies traceable. This means that each image has a correlative that shares the same form. Accordingly, political theology is only possible thanks to the existence of a res mixta where the transfers of meaning occur (Schmitt 2008a). This rex mixta also prevents a total identification of the theological-political and, at the same time, avoids the total separation between these two spheres.5

Secondly, once a transfer is made, it serves as a representation, making the political present in the theological and vice versa. Such analogical thinking prompts representations. As Herrero notes, there exists a political theology of representation in Schmitt’s early writings, particularly in Roman Catholicism and Political Form (1923) and The Visibility of the Church: A Scholastic Consideration (1917) (See: Herrero 2017; Schmitt 2008b; Schmitt 1996). Of particular significance is the fact that Roman Catholicism was written a year subsequent to Politische Theologie (1922). Thus, the political theology of representation can be regarded as a further elaboration of the analogy of the sovereign.

One significant aspect of Schmitt’s proposal is the notion of secularization. Although Schmitt does not view secularization as a programmatic objective, he regards it as an indication of the indelible theological origins of the political domain. In this sense, Schmitt’s political theology relies on the secularization thesis. While it is accurate that Schmitt’s political theology confirms the theological derivation of secular notions in state theory, his theological explanation ultimately hinges on this thesis (Cf. Norris 2000). The centrality of the idea of secularization poses a challenge when advocating for postmodern theo-political discourses, and raises the question of whether a political theology can survive in a post-secular era (Cf. Sigurdson 2010).

Furthermore, it is imperative to avoid hastily dismissing the theistic theological roots of political theology. The concepts that are introduced are rooted in a cataphatic theology, which confirms God’s attributes, such as omnipotence or miracle-making. While one may question the appropriateness of selecting certain concepts over others, such as miracle versus grace to describe divine action, the paradigm remains affirmatory. In addition, the cataphatic approach revolves around the notion of sovereignty, with God primarily viewed as supreme power. Although this emphasis on sovereignty is central to Schmitt’s proposal, the ways in which sovereignty is articulated may vary, allowing room for alternative political theologies to emerge within his own theo-political framework (Cf. Herrero 2017).

Thus, the Schmittian proposal and its alternatives are organized around three axes: sovereignty, law, and representation. While the emphasis and preeminence of each axis may differ, they operate within the same paradigm. From this perspective, three aspects can be deduced. First, Schmitt’s political theology comprises a theory of concepts that exhibit structural analogy in a mathematical sense of similarity and proportionality. Second, political theology falls within a representationalist paradigm, as it seeks to make present what is not present. Third, the Schmittian proposal and its variations are grounded in an onto-political theological framework, i.e., they constitute political theologies constructed upon a theistic metaphysical foundation that follows the way of affirmation, that is, a cataphatic approach.

In this respect, Jean-Luc Marion offers a critique of metaphysical theological thought, suggesting that natural theology falls short in apprehending God (Marion 2012). According to Marion, divine affirmative attributes derived from natural theology are projections—representations—of the theologian or philosopher’s gaze. When applied to political theology, the prominence given to the plenipotentiary character of God over other attributes does not reflect the divine entity, but rather the metaphysician’s gaze. Consequently, the representation in political theology is not of God or a “theological structure”, but of the thinker.

Given this critique of metaphysical theology, it is worthwhile to explore its implications for political theology. Can political theology survive in a non-metaphysical thought? If so, do crucial concepts in Schmitt’s theory, such as sovereign, analogy, or secularization, survive this critique? In the following, I argue that not only is a political theology possible in a non-metaphysical thought, but to do so, it is necessary to abandon some crucial concepts of the Schmittian proposal that set the discussion of the theo-political in completely different discourses. The debates are not about liberalism, sovereignty, or legitimation of democracy, but about the inescapable permeability of religion in a post-secular society, which entails the end of the secularist paradigm. Furthermore, what emerges from this demolishing critique is the impossibility of an affirmative, authentic political theology. To develop this argument further, I turn to Marion’s thinking of the end of metaphysics.

2. Jean-Luc Marion’s Critique to Onto-Theology

Marion’s thought is characterized primarily by his critique of metaphysics and theological discourse, which he regards as onto-theology. This critique was first introduced in his 1977 work, The Idol and Distance (Marion 2001), and has been a recurring theme in his subsequent work. Marion revisited this critique and proposed a phenomenology of givenness as an alternative to onto-theological thought in his books God without Being (2012) and Being Given (2013). According to Marion, God cannot be apprehended from the standpoint of being, which is necessarily limited and finite, but can be approached through the dynamics of givenness, which exceed the limits of ontological conceptualizations. Although Marion’s critique and proposal are highly complex and require extensive analysis, this paper intends to draw on the most relevant aspects that have an impact on the status of political theology as a method and area of study.

Marion’s theological thought is rooted in a theory that primarily refers to the religious imagery: icon and idol. The aesthetical reference is not an incidental occurrence. It is a way of scaping the limits of conceptualizations. However, Marion’s project goes beyond an aesthetic theory.6 The distinction between icon and idol is inspired by Nietzsche’s notion of the death of God and the twilight of the idols (Cf. Nietzsche 2022; Nietzsche 1990). In this sense, Marion formulates his ideas as a response to Nietzsche’s argument, as demonstrated in his work, The Idol and Distance. Conversely, in his work, God without Being, Marion draws on Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics,7 which leads him to declare the end of metaphysics as proclaimed by these two contemporary thinkers in different formulations.

Marion posits that the death of God specifically refers to the God of onto-theology, the idol constructed by metaphysics, rather than to the God that exceeds our conceptual and sensible idols. God, as an icon, can be approached as a reality that is distant and surpasses the concepts of onto-theology. This perspective is presented in The Idol and Distance, but it is in God without Being where Marion systematizes the difference between idol and icon. Specifically, the icon is an image that is given to the gaze, while the idol is the representation of the human gaze (Marion 2012, pp. 7–52).

According to Marion, metaphysical theology is the great conceptual idol that Nietzsche aimed to overthrow. Marion also contends that any attempt to demonstrate the existence of God is an act of blasphemy, as it diminishes the divine to something that can be apprehended through human reason alone (Marion 2012, pp. 35–37). In contradistinction to Schmitt’s use of Leibniz’s method of structural analogy to bolster political theology, Marion maintains that Leibniz’s most radical atheistic pronouncement lies within his metaphysical thought (Marion 2001, p. 12).

From Marion’s point of view, any theological thought that prioritizes the concept is idolatrous. Marion argues that the concept must undergo transformation by that which surpasses it. Therefore, he proposes thinking of God without being, removing the question of his existence. Consequently, theology is not conceived as a conceptual discourse but rather as images that serve as vehicles of excess (See: Marion 1999a, p. 39).

In his critique of metaphysics, Jean-Luc Marion presents a profound reflection on the role of analogy in onto-theology, which he identifies as its central element.8 While he does not reject analogy outright, he seems to be critical of some of its formulations. Specifically, Marion argues that analogy is best understood as a form of exposition of God’s excess, rather than as analogia entis.9 In this sense, John R. Betz claims that “just as Marion would have us transcend metaphysics and do theology “without being”, by implication he would also have us do without the analogia entis” (Betz 2014, p. 81).10

Marion’s redefinition of analogy draws on Thomas Aquinas’s thoughts, but he distinguishes his view from the prevailing interpretation of Aquinas’s theory of analogy (Aquinas 2021; 1981, I, q. 13).11 According to Marion, Aquinas’s approach to analogy is open to the incommensurable, which is achieved through the election of the proportio rather than proportionalitas (Marion 2012, p. 214). Proportionalitas refers to a mathematical understanding of analogy, which is precisely present in Leibniz’s account (Leibniz 1863, 3:56).12 In contrast, for Marion, Aquinas’s analogical thinking suggests that “the created thus does not support or claim any commensurable proportion (according to the common concept of entity) with God” (Marion 2012, p. 214).

In other words, this incommensurability between God and the created order prevents theology from making transfers of meaning between God and the esse commune. Marion argues that it is when God is made “commensurable” through an erroneous understanding of Aquinas’s theory of analogy and participation that conceptual idols arise. He contends that he is not arguing against Aquinas himself, but rather against his commentators, who, in his view, fail to understand him properly (Cf. Caputo 2000). Furthermore, Marion suggests that Aquinas’s idea of God’s incommensurability opens the path to a phenomenology of givenness, and that Aquinas could support his radical thesis of God without being, without contradiction (Cf. Marion 2012, p. 232).

Moreover, for Marion, this incommensurability prevents conceptual exchanges between the divine and the non-divine. Exchange would result in the possibility of commensurability. While, in Marion’s view, the analogy of proportionalitas turns God into an exchangeable currency, the incommensurability of God makes such an exchange impossible. Thus, for Marion, God as given exceeds the exchange (Marion 2012, p. 100).

One core aspect of Marion’s critique of metaphysics pertains to the affirmative theology or cataphatic theology as a means of approaching God. While Marion advocates for negative theology, he argues that negative theology alone is insufficient (Marion 1999a, p. 26). In his text “In the Name: How to Avoid Speaking of ‘Negative Theology,’” Marion contends that deconstruction is aligned with the very propose of negative theology: “to deconstruct God and nevertheless to reach him” (Ibid., p. 22, see also: Derrida 1992).

Drawing upon Pseudo-Dionysius’s Divine Names, Aquinas’ commentary on it, and Nicholas of Cuse’s use of theologia negativa, Marion proposes that God can be approached by the way of eminence (Marion 1999a, pp. 22–24. See also: Pseudo-Dionysius 1999; Aquinas 2021; Nicholas of Cusa 1981). Whereas, through the way of affirmation, theology attributes qualities to God, and through negation, it removes any name that might be attributed from a natural, non-divine standpoint, that is, from commensurability. The way of eminence is a recourse to transcend both affirmation and negation by surpassing them through excess (Boedder 1921, p. 236; Marion 1999b, p. 234). Nevertheless, as Gschwandtner points out, there is no attempt to reestablish predication or define the divine through the way of eminence. Instead, it emphasizes even more strongly the impossibility of defining or describing the divine through the use of discourse that involves praising or praying to the divine (Gschwandtner 2007, p. 139). By way of eminence, what is affirmed and negated in relation to God is understood within a hermeneutic of the mysterious. This has two immediate implications.

First, the analogical thinking of the divine has to do with proportionality rather than with eminence. This analogy brings to light the incommensurability of God, who is not subject to abstract and conceptual categories, and demonstrates the great distance between the divine and the human, a distance that also arises in the statement of the death of God. Second, this openness to the mystery changes the speculative grammar. Since God surpasses rationality, he cannot be reduced to rational concepts. Nonetheless, this does not mean that God cannot be reached. According to Marion, mystical approaches can reach God without bracketing this ineliminable incommensurability. Mystical approaches possess the ability to engage in a transformative encounter with the Divine due to God’s inherent nature of being transcendent and beyond human comprehension. Rather than being apprehended through conceptual means, God is revealed through mystical experiences that challenge and disrupt conventional conceptual frameworks (Cf. Marion 2012, p. xxvi).

In these lines, Marion understands eminence in a pragmatic way. In light of God’s incommensurability, the only possible response is prayer, “a decidedly non-predicative form of speech, namely the prayer” (Marion 1999a, p. 23). This movement to the pragmatic discourse of prayer is also part of Derrida and John D. Caputo’s thought (See: Caputo 2000; Caputo 1997; Derrida 1992). In the face of the incommensurable, one can only respond in a dialogical grammar.

The third way, as proposed by Marion, neither affirms nor denies God’s true values, but rather de-nominates God in a pragmatic way that surpasses the limitations of language (Marion 1999a, p. 26). Instead of attempting to conceptualize God, Marion’s project is to substitute the metaphysics of presence with a theology of absence, which he equates to a phenomenology of the givenness. As Panu-Matti Pöykkö rightly suggests, the third way, or eminence, is captured by the saturated phenomenon, a concept coined by Marion to describe the excessiveness of the event of givenness (Pöykkoö 2017).13 In Marion’s view, what is given, i.e., God as given to us, surpasses any conceptualization and prevents any kind of conceptual exchange.14

For Marion, God as given becomes a central figure for theology and substitutes notions of affirmative theology such as omnipotence or omniscience. The Eucharist, where God manifests himself in self-giving, becomes the site of theology for Marion. The names of God, rather than referring to his kingship or creation, refer to the kenosis or self-abasement in the givenness event (Marion 2012, p. 191).

Marion’s theological discourse represents a radical shift that displaces metaphysics to phenomenology. For Marion, analogy is only possible through proportio, which uncovers God’s incommensurability and avoids the idolatry of conceptual idols of metaphysics. While Marion does not reject Aquinas, he argues that Aquinas fails to formalize this incommensurability in a conceptual discourse (Marion 1999a, p. 31).15 However, scholastic thought in Pseudo-Dionysius, Aquinas, or Cusa seems to be open to God’s incommensurability, although they do not find the grammar to express it. It is the modern reading of scholastic thought that attempts to make God commensurable and ends up in idolatry, skepticism, or atheism. In this context, from different perspectives, scholars such as Caputo and Josef Pieper have cautioned against the potential peril of misinterpreting Aquinas as being rooted in rationalism (Caputo 2000; Pieper 1957, p. 69). They have emphasized that this misreading is more closely associated with a contemporary neo-scholastic approach rather than the original intended meaning of Aquinas’ works. In light of Marion’s dialogue with medieval thought, he does not simply return to it but rather draws upon it to generate a postmodern movement aimed at surpassing the modern reduction of God to commensurability. As a result, his critique of onto-theology and his proposal of phenomenology of givenness appears to have implications for the discourse of political theology that are worthy of further exploration.

3. The Theo-Political Implications of Marion’s Critique to Onto-Theology: A Reformulation of Political Theology

Marion’s critique of metaphysics holds significant implications for political theology as it undermines the longstanding metaphysical basis upon which it has relied. This critical perspective creates a destabilizing effect on political theology, calling into question its foundations and challenging the assumptions that have traditionally underpinned it. Arthur Bradley perspicaciously notes that Marion’s ideas have political implications that are not fully explored by Marion himself (Bradley 2004, p. 81–112). An examination of the potential implications of this critique, as well as a reformulation of the theological–political relationship seems to be imperative. In this context, it is important to examine how this critique may shed light on the intersections between theology and politics.

One consequence of Marion’s critique is that political theology, in a non-metaphysical paradigm, needs to move away from conceptual and abstract approaches to understanding God, as these can often result in creating conceptual idols. Instead, political theology should focus on using images and figures that surpass the limitations of concepts. For instance, Marion’s use of the figure of eucharist serves as an example of an image that can overcome conceptual reductionism (Marion 2012, pp. 139–60). This shift away from concepts towards images suggests a radical reformulation of Schmitt’s claim that “all significant concepts of the modern theory” are central to the theological–political discourse In the non-metaphysical milieu, it is more suitable to refer to “all significant imaginaries” rather than adhering to the confines of traditional metaphysical discourse. However, as previously stated, it is worth noting that Marion’s iconology and the shift towards the image extend beyond its aesthetic dimension, as it pertains to the idea of a present being that is given (Cf. Ibid., p. 175).

This non-conceptual approach to political theology means that theological figures can illuminate political questions without providing a fully-articulated conceptual answer. Marion’s critique prompts an inquiry into the suitability of employing the concept of sovereignty as a theological–political construct. According to Marion’s perspective, this construct may be perceived as a secularized theological idol, thereby raising concerns regarding its appropriateness within theological discourse.

The use of theological concepts within political theology risks generating idols, i.e., conceptual constructs that fail to mediate the divine and instead obscure its transcendence. In this sense, the transfer of meaning between the theological and the political may constitute not so much a genuine mediation, but rather a transference of the theologian’s idolatrous image of the divine into the political sphere. This underscores the need to move beyond conceptual discourse toward a non-conceptual, iconic function of theology, one that can revise our understanding of the political by safeguarding the excess of the divine.

Contrary to an idolatrous, metaphysical mode of thought, non-conceptual theology functions as an icon within the political realm. This iconic function resists the assumption of commensurability between the theological and the political, exposing the impossibility of a stable or symmetrical correlation between them16. Consequently, every idological political theology of representation is idolatrous. Additionally, it can be argued that an idol is to Marion what secularization is to Schmitt, and each secularized concept is a conceptual idol. However, while Schmitt regards political concepts as secular representations of theological concepts, Marion’s perspective diverges from this viewpoint, as he contends that conceptual idols preclude the possibility of an authentic representation of the divine. Marion’s perspective maintains that the divine cannot be aptly represented and, instead, constitutes a presence that is given to us. This presence rectifies the representationalist attempts of human gaze.

Consequently, if representation of the divine is not fully possible, and the divine cannot be reduced to human perception, then radical secularization is impossible.17 The divine will always surpass any attempt to reduce it to a human replication, and while idols may exist, the excessiveness of God transcends these conceptual idols. The iconic character of a non-metaphysical political theology corrects this secularizing gaze by acknowledging the impossibility of the secularization thesis. The excess of the saturated phenomena that is given to us resists secularization. Thus, a non-metaphysical political theology is necessarily post-secular, as it transcends the secularist paradigm.

Moreover, since analogy is a central concept in the formulation of political theology, and its critique delves into onto-theology, it is important to address its productivity after critique. On one hand, Schmitt’s Leibnizian argument posits a structural analogy between the religious and political realms, whereas Marion’s critique of onto-theology contests this perspective, maintaining that no structural similarity exists between these domains. Instead, there is an unsurmountable dissimilarity that is integral to the reformulation of political theology.18 This dissimilarity prevents authentic transfers of meaning between the political and the theological. For this reason, the political sphere is unable to capture the eschatological hope or to fulfill a messianic task, and the theological dimension is lost when the divine is used as a political strategy.19 Marion’s critique of onto-theology indirectly contradicts the analogous structure of the political and the theological as the basis for Schmitt’s project.

On the other hand, analogy does not disappear but rather demonstrates the incommensurability of the political and the theological, as they are fundamentally distinct. The finite and the infinite cannot be exchanged, but they collide in the theo-political discourse. Theology cannot be used as a currency to legitimize the political because it loses its authentic theological character, and therefore cannot function as a tool for legitimation. Thus, analogy for political theology in a non-metaphysical paradigm reveals the incommensurability of these two realms and rejects any kind of conceptual exchange. The theological figures correct the gaze of human political conceptualizations, but they do not have a distinguishable correlate. Analogy opens a path for the eminence of political theology, which is only possible after the way of negation, that is, the deconstruction of theo-political discourses.20

In that sense, one way to address the idolatrous gaze of the political is through deconstructing the discourses of political theologies. By uncovering new meanings within scripture, one can disrupt and dismantle theological–political conceptualizations (Cf. Ricoeur 2000, pp. 127–46). However, it is important to note that deconstruction alone is not sufficient, as it merely represents a negation of a reductive conceptualization of the theological. To achieve a more complete solution, the way of eminence must also be incorporated. Nevertheless, the way of eminence does not entail the superlative predication of the category of omnipotence to God. Rather, it requires accepting that the category of omnipotence might be insufficient, and turning to God as he is given to us. In this sense, God’s event of givenness entails a call and demands a response (Cf. Caputo 2015, p. 38).

Consequently, this deconstruction introduces a new, still-unexplored framework for theo-political discourses: phenomenology of givenness (See: Marion 2013). By critiquing onto-theology, which displaces metaphysical theology, this framework centers on a phenomenology of donation, with the event of givenness as the focal point for understanding the theological event and, therefore, its political implications. This phenomenology of givenness emerges as a result of the deconstructive task. In this regard, Caputo also adopts a non-metaphysical stance but emphasizes the event rather than the givenness. He develops a theology of the event by drawing on the event of the cross, which leads to a weak theology that disarticulates the omnipotence of God. As a result, theo-political concepts such as sovereignty or kingdom are redefined, and a sacred anarchy is proposed, surpassing the limits of the possible. The aim of this sacred anarchy is to explore the possibilities of the impossible (Caputo 2015, p. 21).

Thus, the analogical thinking of the theo-political can be viewed as the cataphatic approach, while deconstruction corresponds to an apophatic approach. The phenomenology of givenness, however, represents the way of eminence and opens up a new theo-political field, distinct from the structural analogies that occur between the political and the theological.

Accordingly, political theology can be divided in terms of the theological doctrine of a tradition that it is referencing, namely, Christianity, Judaism or Islam, or, considering the Pseudo-Dionysius’ triple via, the tradition can be divided according to the different approaches to de-nominate God. These three different approaches result in, on the one hand, different ways of considering the theo-political entity and the relation that theology and politics maintain, and, on the other hand, different theo-political discourses articulated with different theological grammars. In that respect, while the cataphatic via presents articulated discourses covering different nominations of the divine, and the apophatic their disarticulation, it is worth exploring the phenomenological approach as “the way of eminence.” The first one is the model that Schmitt proposes and that other authors such as Strauss or Peterson, in his negation of the possibility of a political theology, build on.21 Nevertheless, from the very beginning, the cataphatic approach suffers the proliferation of distinct names to refer the divinity. In this regard, referring to the cataphatic approach of theology, Marion points out that “the infinite proliferation of names does indeed suggest that they are still there, but it also flags as insufficient the concepts they put in play and thereby does justice to what constantly subverts them” (Marion 2004, p. 160). Applied to the theo-political realm, the proliferation of names and political theologies suggests that these theological–political concepts are still insufficient.

Regarding the second via, postmodern thinkers such as Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy, or Giorgio Agamben draw a theo-political thinking that consists in the disarticulation of different political theologies (Cf. Agamben 2011; Dufourmantelle and Derrida 2000; Nancy 2008). This approach is able to dismantle the illusory sufficiency of the theological–political names provided by the cataphatic approach. Nevertheless, negative political theology is also unable to provide a surpassing non-reductive denomination of God (Cf. Newheiser 2019). In this regard, Bradley has situated Marion’s potential contribution to political thought within the framework of negative theology (Bradley 2004, pp. 81–112). While it is indeed accurate that Marion employs negative theology to disarticulate onto-theology, I contend that his phenomenology of givenness represents an effort to forge a new way of eminence that has yet to be fully explored.

The third way appears to be an uncharted avenue for political theology. Marion’s phenomenology of givenness introduces the notion of gift and excess into political theology through his concept of the saturated phenomenon. Thus, the figures and names that invoke the divine are more closely related to the excess of the givenness event than to God’s omnipotence. In this regard, the splendor and incommensurability of God does not lie in his power but in his givenness.22 Thus, the phenomenology of givenness displaces the concept of sovereignty as the central concept of political theology. Instead, the eucharistic event as the paradigm of the saturated phenomenon seems to better reflect the excess of the givenness.

Thus, when Schmitt claims that the sovereign is who decides in exception and traces an analogy between miracles and exception, he confers to the sovereign a voluntaristic role in his decision-maker capacity. However, according to the phenomenology of givenness, the paradigm is not exception but saturation. Thereby, the paradigm of saturation, which surpasses and destabilizes the law of conceptualization—including political conceptualization—, is God as given. In this regard, the kenotic structure of the eucharist reflects this excess of the given. The majesty of God does not rely in his omnipotence but in his inapprehensible givenness.23 Thus, the eucharist as a theological event of the givenness has much to illuminate to the political sphere (Bradley 2004, p. 105). Marion’s proposal applied to political theology invites the substitution of the sovereign paradigm by a kenotic paradigm. Thus, power is subordinated to a dynamic of givenness. Furthermore, it can be argued that the concept of sovereignty is the great idol of modern political thought, since it attempts to capture a divine attribute without considering it from God’s given in excess, which is precisely what the figure of the eucharist condenses.

Nevertheless, in articulating a phenomenology of givenness as a way of eminence for political theology, we find two initial difficulties. On the one hand, while Marion’s argues that it is precisely the excess in the event of the givenness that allows us to de-nominate God without reducing him to a conceptual idol of metaphysics, it is relevant to address the contribution of this phenomenology of givenness for the political realm and how it can provide answers, or at least a path of thinking, to pertinent political questions. In short, can phenomenology of givenness act as the way of eminence for the theo-political thinking, and why it is necessary to recover the givenness in order to do so? The phenomenology of givenness, while illuminating for political theology due to its excess, encompasses the risk of totally surpassing the political realm, and therefore, losing meaning in terms of the questions and challenges that are raised by politics. Von Balthasar’s political thought presents a fruitful way of addressing this challenge: while emphasizing the excessive and transcendent nature of the figure of God, he argues that theology can shed light on and correct reductive tendencies within political thinking. By doing so, he reorients such frameworks toward a more profound understanding of human and social reality. This approach, therefore, opens up the possibility for a more concrete and meaningful development of political thought (Cf. Molina 2023b).

On the other hand, Marion emphasizes the importance of prayer as the new grammar of this third way within theology. However, the second challenge lies in providing an adequate account of the articulation of the phenomenology of givenness in a grammar of praise and prayer, as this is merely a suggestion in Marion’s thought without further development. As such, Marion himself advises caution when it comes to the grammar of mystical theology (Marion 2004, p. 145).

Likewise, it is necessary to explore how this grammar applies to the theo-political thought. This grammar of prayer is exemplified in Caputo’s The Weakness of God, where the monograph is not structured in syllogisms but in a dialogical-prayer mode. This certainly poses difficulties for the clarity of the argument, but it captures the intended non-metaphysical, prayer approach to theo-political discourse.

Furthermore, in In Excess, Marion suggests that this grammar of prayer is the grammar of dialogue and vocation. While we cannot name the theological, the theological call and reconfigure the political. In that sense, referring to God, he claims that “the Name is not said by us; it is the Name that calls us” (Ibid., p. 162). Paradoxically, in that sense, this grammar is similar to Weber’s theory of charisma as a gift and politics as a vocation (Weber 2004, pp. 32–94), even though that theory arises from a very different tradition. In a certain sense, the call of the given disarticulates the modern concept of vocation and provides a new horizon for it: the excess. This vocative character of the event of givenness is precisely articulated by Marion through his use of political references, demonstrating that his phenomenological proposal is not totally disconnected from the political realm (Marion 2013, p. 298).

4. Conclusions: A Phenomenological Shift in Political Theology?

Marion’s critique of onto-theology is highly relevant for political theology. It introduces the theo-political within an unexplored paradigm by shifting it from its theistic foundation to a phenomenological articulation. However, this approach to the theo-political is not entirely new and has been developed previously, such as in Derrida’s exploration of hospitality and Caputo’s idea of sacred anarchy (Dufourmantelle and Derrida 2000; Caputo 2015, p. 21).

Marion’s critique, when applied to the theo-political discourse, reveals the idolatrous nature of the political theology of sovereignty and offers an understanding of the theo-political through the three classical viewpoints: the cataphatic, the apophatic, and the way of eminence. This distinction is useful in establishing a taxonomy of theological–political discourses and expands the discourse beyond its initial cataphatic formulation. Therefore, in response to the initial question of whether a political theology is possible in a non-metaphysical paradigm, the answer is yes. It is possible to have a political theology without a sovereign, structural analogy, or secularization.

Moreover, it worth noting that Marion’s critique of onto-theology, being profoundly postmodern, is built on medieval thought, namely, Pseudo-Dionysius, Aquinas, and Cuse. As pointed, Marion seems to suggest that the problem of onto-theology is the modern reception of medieval thought. In that sense, it could be argued that Schmitt’s proposal of political theology is highly modern and Marion’s critique has an impact not in political theology per se, but in its modern formulation: his concept of analogy is taken from Leibniz, and his focus on miracles could involve a veiled reference to Hume’s concern rather than to a conception of God’s givenness event in excess (Cf. Hume 2007, pp. 79–95).24

Recovering the unexplored medieval proposal of the way of eminence opens the path for new discourses of the political. The given in excess appears in political virtues such as hospitality, tolerance or responsibility. The given in excess disarticulates the self-founding power and the legalisms as an ultimate foundation of the state. The given in excess shows the disruptive character of the political, which has always needed to correct the gaze to overcome the proliferation of new political idols. This aligns with Caputo’s concept of sacred anarchy; the event of givenness renders any hierarchical order impossible and introduces a state of disruption (Cf. Caputo 2015, p. 21). Moreover, the given in excess, presented in a grammar of prayer and praise, demands an engagement and dialogue with the event of the givenness rather than a mere conceptualization of the political. Furthermore, the given in excess, in its incommensurability, prevents the theological from being used as a currency exchange for the political.

The phenomenology of givenness abandons idea of the commensurability between the political and the theological and impossibilities tracing direct correlations between these two spheres. This impossibility of correlation disestablishes the thesis of secularization and sovereign paradigms. The divine, in its incommensurability, surpasses any secularization attempt and any earthly reduplications. For this reason, it can be said that the political theology of the gift is profoundly post-secular and is still not explored.