Worshipping with the U.S. Flag

Abstract

For generations, a silent symbol of politics in U.S. religious congregations has been the presence of the national flag in worship spaces. Despite debates over the flag, there is limited empirical research on its contemporary prevalence or influence in congregations. Building upon research on social sorting, we hypothesize that people with conservative religion and conservative politics sort into congregations displaying the flag. Additionally, we hypothesize a priming effect whereby worshipping with the U.S. flag elevates support for Christian nationalism. Findings from the 2021 Baylor Religion Survey reveal that nearly half of religiously affiliated U.S. adults worship with the flag, most notably members of white Protestant religious traditions (more so than Catholics) and older adults. Regardless of religious tradition or political ideology, worshipping with the flag is associated with support for Christian nationalist beliefs. These finding highlight a sorting process into American congregations and hint at political socialization occurring within them.

1. Introduction

An intriguing addition to Christmas light displays in recent years is the U.S. flag. On a suburban street in Central Texas, one of the many decorated houses has a silhouette of white lights portraying a nativity scene with Mary, Joseph, and Baby Jesus in a stable. Hanging above the stable, topped by the Christmas star, is the red, white, and blue flag of the United States of America. A spotlight from the yard illuminates the flag. It is not the only house on the street with the flag now included in the Christmas décor.

The appearance of the national flag in Christmas yards reflects a trend with a much longer history. For generations, the U.S. flag has stood as a silent symbol of politics in U.S. religious congregations. Noting that the U.S. flag has appeared in congregations for over 150 years, Ishio et al. (2019) found that 60.4% of U.S. congregations in 2006–2007 displayed the flag in their main worship space, resulting in 61.5% of U.S. congregants worshipping with the flag. The variables predicting display of the flag in congregations were religious tradition, race, education, age, founding date, congregation size, and region. No denomination that we know of requires display of the flag, nor do they prohibit it. The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (2025) gives discretion for display of the flag to diocesan bishops, who often defer to parish priests. Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod (2025) makes flag display a decision for local congregations. For congregations that adopt the flag, federal regulations outlined in the U.S. Flag Code specify how and where a flag should be displayed, including: “When displayed from a staff in a church or public auditorium, the flag of the United States of America should hold the position of superior prominence, in advance of the audience, and in the position of honor at the clergyman’s or speaker’s right as he faces the audience” (United States Code 2023).

We consider the stars and stripes of the U.S. national flag as a beacon in congregations for people who desire a public role for religion and a national identity shaped by religion. Ishio et al. (2019) recognized the presence of the flag in congregations as having consequences. In the conclusion of their article, they asked, “does exposure to the flag in worship services heighten nationalism?” (p. 449). Without direct empirical evidence, Whitehead (2023) made a similar claim, suggesting the flag in congregations is a marker of Christian nationalism. There is theoretical and empirical support for this assumption outside of congregations. Psychological studies of the national flag and personal attitudes indicate that the flag may prime people toward nationalist sentiments (Billig 1995; Carter et al. 2011; Kemmelmeier and Winter 2008).

The aims of this study are to provide an updated analysis of who worships with the U.S. flag and to consider the contemporary consequence of worshipping with the flag. Drawing on sociology and political science, we hypothesize that people sort into congregations displaying the flag based on their religion and their politics. Drawing on psychology, we test the priming effect of worshipping with the flag, hypothesizing that encountering the flag in a place of worship elevates support for Christian nationalism. We test our hypotheses with national data from the 2021 Baylor Religion Survey.

2. Social Sorting and the Flag

In 2008, journalist Bill Bishop published his monograph The Big Sort, asserting that Americans are increasingly sorting into ideological camps, even within religious organizations. While primarily discussed within the context of political partisanship (Bishop 2008; Campbell 2009; Harteveld 2021; Mason 2016, 2018; Margolis 2018, 2020), this “Big Sort” also impacted American religion. Bishop (2008) pointed out that since the 1970s, there has been a move within American Protestantism to create homogenous units that attract people back to church. We examine religion and politics as sorting mechanisms into congregations where the flag is displayed.

2.1. Religion

Ideology is a source of religious sorting in the United States (Margolis 2018; Mason 2016). Evangelical Protestantism has been shown to be frequently affiliated with ideological conservativism, such as voting Republican (Bishop 2008; Margolis 2020; Mason 2018). Similarly, religious fundamentalism has long been associated with the “Religious Right,” which puts pride in national symbols like the flag (Bishop 2008). Conservative religion is related to a desire for religion to have a prominent place in public life, including prayer in school (Elifson and Hadaway 1985) and government support for religious values and symbols (Froese and Mencken 2009). In 2006–2007, 72% of Evangelical Protestant churches displayed the flag, but even higher percentages of Mainline Protestant churches (77%) and Jewish synagogues (90%) displayed the flag (Ishio et al. 2019). In the ensuing years, we suspect political polarization has altered these percentages. Controversies surrounding the flag have escalated, with professional athletes refusing to stand for the national anthem. In response, the flag has taken on increased significance for conservative religious people. They mark their faith and their politics with visual images of the flag paired with the nativity, the cross, and the Bible. We use affiliation with an Evangelical Protestant congregation and a literal view of the Bible as markers of conservative religion. We hypothesize that Evangelical Protestants and biblical literalists will attend churches where the national flag is displayed.

H1. 

Evangelical Protestants will be more likely than persons in other Christian and non-Christian religious traditions to worship with the flag.

H2. 

Americans who take the Bible literally will be more likely than those with other views of the Bible to worship with the flag.

2.2. Politics

The marriage of conservative politics and conservative religion is widely recognized. In the 1970s, political conservatives advocated for prayer in public schools (Elifson and Hadaway 1985). In the 2000s, Republicans and political conservatives sought other forms of political support for religion (Baker and Smith 2009; Froese and Mencken 2009). Conservative political ideology is likewise associated with symbolic patriotism (pride in American identity, flag, and anthem) (Foertsch and Pieper 2023; Huddy and Khatib 2007). Political parties have further polarized since Bishop published The Big Sort in 2008 (Harteveld 2021; Mason 2016). Today, conservative political affiliation has become a more defining identity than religious affiliation. Margolis (2018) argues through a life course framework that an affiliative sequence occurs among conservatives—first politically and then religiously. Thus, we hypothesize:

H3. 

Politically conservative Americans will be more likely than political moderates or liberals to worship with the flag.

3. The Flag and Christian Nationalism

A contemporary manifestation of this merger of conservative politics and conservative religion is Christian nationalism. Christian nationalism is a hot topic in academic research and popular culture. Whitehead and Perry (2020) introduced the concept, which they define as a reactionary “cultural framework” of symbols, values, and norms rooted in the conception that the United States has a distinctive Christian identity that must be preserved. Christian nationalism combines religious symbols with national symbols, such as the flag, to enforce an abstract sense of “White American Christian Civilization” (Gorski and Perry 2022, p. 110). The presence of the American flag in congregations implies an integration of the nation with religion. When displayed in a religious worship space, this political symbol becomes sacralized with religious meaning. As such, religion lends legitimacy to the nation and inspires stronger personal identification with nationalism.

Congregations with the U.S. flag may achieve more than attracting people who support nationalistic sentiments. Psychological studies of the national flag and personal attitudes indicate that the flag may prime people to nationalist thinking. For example, exposure to the American flag, even without a person’s conscious awareness of the flag, reinforces feelings of national identity and loyalty (Billig 1995). In two experimental studies, undergraduate students exposed to the flag scored higher on nationalism and beliefs of American superiority than undergraduates not exposed to the flag (Kemmelmeier and Winter 2008). Other research using surveys and experiments suggests the flag is more closely associated with patriotism and egalitarianism than nationalism (Butz et al. 2007; Skitka 2005).

Though past findings are mixed, there is reason to believe that when the American flag is displayed in religious congregations, nationalistic sentiments may be strengthened within worshippers, coalescing into a religious legitimation/sacralization process. Exposure to the American flag shifts support toward more conservative political beliefs, attitudes, and voting (Carter et al. 2011). Flag display by individuals increased after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 (Skitka 2005). American Christianity is now designated by conservative groups as a signal of national identity, creating in/out group distinctions between Christian nationalists and others, especially Muslims (Baker et al. 2020; Foertsch et al. 2024; Foertsch and Pieper 2023; Shortle and Gaddie 2015). It is important to note that flag display, in this case, would be a reifying process; congregations inclined towards Christian nationalist beliefs are more likely to display the flag, thus priming Christian nationalist beliefs, which then strengthens and reproduces the tendency to display the flag. As noted, others have suggested that the display of the flag in worship spaces is related to Christian nationalism (e.g., Whitehead 2023). We test this assumption.

H4. 

People who belong to a congregation where the U.S. flag is displayed will express stronger agreement with Christian nationalist beliefs than people in congregations without the U.S. flag.

4. Data and Methods

We test our hypotheses with data from the 2021 Baylor Religion Survey. The Baylor Religion Survey is a national survey of beliefs and values in the United States. The Gallup Organization administered the survey from January to March 2021 to 11,000 U.S. households randomly selected using address-based sampling. Respondents could participate by mail or web in English or Spanish. A total of 1336 people participated for a 12% response rate.

Our first dependent variable is display of the flag in a place of worship. For respondents who reported attending religious services ever in a year, they proceeded to answer a series of questions about their place of worship. One of these items was: “Does your place of worship display an American flag in the main worship space?” Response options were “yes” (coded 1) or “no” (coded 0). Of the 1336 survey respondents, 692 identified with a religion and answered the question about the flag. Due to the skip pattern in the survey, most of the non-respondents to the flag question were people who never or rarely (less than twice a year) attended religious services (n = 485). For the relatively small number of others who attended services but did not answer the flag question (n = 159), item non-response may indicate a lack of awareness or uncertainty about the presence of the flag in their place of worship. Rather than attempt to impute a value on the flag variable for these respondents, we rely on the subsample of respondents who felt knowledgeable enough to answer the question. Our multivariate analysis is restricted to this subsample of religiously affiliated adults.

Christian nationalism is our second dependent variable. We use a six-item summative scale employed by Whitehead and Perry (2020). Sample items are “The federal government should advocate Christian values” and “The success of the United States is part of God’s plan”. Response options for each item ranged from 0 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree. The scale has a range of 0 to 24 and good internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85). There are criticisms of the scale, questioning its conceptualization and measurement (Davis 2023; Li and Froese 2023; Smith and Adler 2022; Smidt 2024a, 2024b). We use the six-item scale in keeping with the majority of prior research.

Our independent variables are religious tradition, view of the Bible, and political ideology. Survey questions about religious preference, denomination, and congregation permit a careful coding of religious tradition with Baylor Religion Survey data (Dougherty et al. 2007). We analyze Evangelical Protestant, Mainline Protestant, Black Protestant, Catholic, and Other. In the reduced sample, the small number of Jewish respondents (n = 19) led us to include Jewish in the category of Other religions. Beliefs about the Bible are from the question: “Which one statement comes closest to your personal beliefs about the Bible?” Response options were (1) “The Bible means exactly what it says. It should be taken literally, word-for-word, on all subjects.” (2) “The Bible is perfectly true, but it should not be taken literally, word-for-word. We must interpret its meaning.” (3) “The Bible contains some human error.” (4) “The Bible is an ancient book of history and legends.” (5) “I don’t know”. We created dummy variables for the five response categories. We retained “I don’t know” as a response category to avoid losing cases for analysis. To measure political ideology, we use the survey item: “How would you describe yourself politically?” We collapsed seven categories ranging from “Extremely conservative” to “Extremely liberal” into dummy variables of conservative, moderate, and liberal. To test Hypothesis 4, we also use the flag in congregations as an independent variable.

We control for demographic characteristics and personal religiosity, using variables that appear in previous research on flag display in congregations (Ishio et al. 2019) and Christian nationalism (e.g., Whitehead and Perry 2020). Demographic variables are gender (1 = women, 0 = other), age (in years), race/ethnicity (White non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, Hispanic, Asian non-Hispanic, and other/multiracial), education (high school diploma or less, some college, and bachelor’s degree or higher), and region (South, Northeast, Midwest, and West). We control for religious practice using a mean scale combining religious service attendance (“How often do you attend religious services at a place of worship?” 0 = never to 7 = several times a week), prayer (“How often outside of religious services do you… Pray alone for 5 min or longer at a time”. 0 = never to 5 = several times a day), and reading sacred texts (“Outside of attending religious services, about how often do you spend time reading the Bible, Koran, Torah, or other sacred book?” 0 = never to 8 = daily). The scale is standardized to account for the different range of values in the three component variables. Cronbach’s alpha for the scale is 0.82. Descriptive statistics for all variables in our study are reported in Appendix A.

The analysis proceeds in three stages. First, we present descriptive and bivariate statistics regarding who worships with the U.S. flag. Second, we test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 in a set of multivariate logistic regression models. Because our religion and politics variables are not independent of one another, we estimate models using stepwise regression. Third, we employ ordinary least squares regression (OLS) to analyze if worshipping with the flag is associated with Christian nationalism (Hypothesis 4).

5. Results

As shown in Appendix A, nearly half of religiously affiliated U.S. adults (48.2%) belong to a place of worship where the national flag is displayed in the main worship space. This is lower than the 61.5% estimated by Ishio et al. (2019) from 2006–2007 congregational data. Of course, the unit of analysis and data collection strategies were different in the two surveys. The National Congregations Study is a congregational survey administered to a key informant knowledgeable of the organization. The Baylor Religion Survey is an individual-level survey that includes a few organizational items. As noted in regard to missing responses on the flag question, some congregants may simply be unaware of the flag in their place of worship. Nevertheless, if we take the percentages at face value, perhaps display of the flag is becoming less common in congregations. Alternatively, it may be that congregations with the flag are not attracting as many participants as they did in the past. Whatever the explanation, still nearly half of U.S. congregants attend religious services in the presence of the national flag.

Table 1. Worshipping with the U.S. Flag by Religious Tradition, View of the Bible, and Political Ideology.

Variable	% Worshipping with U.S. Flag
Religious Tradition ***
Evangelical Protestant	52.4
Mainline Protestant	64.9
Black Protestant	42.7
Catholic	40.7
Other Religion	35.4
Belief about Bible
Bible should be taken literally	51.1
Bible is perfectly true, but it should not be taken literally	51.3
Bible contains some human error	40.7
Bible is an ancient book of history and legends	38.1
Don’t know	46.2
Political Ideology **
Conservative	53.5
Moderate	49.3
Liberal	36.5

** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (Chi-square tests).

presents bivariate findings showing display of the flag by religious tradition, view of the Bible, and political ideology. Mainline Protestants (64.9%) are most likely to worship with the flag, followed by Evangelicals (52.4%). Less than half of Black Protestants (42.7%) or Catholics (40.7%) worship with the flag. About a third of religious adults in other religious traditions (35.4%) encounter the flag inside their place of worship. The relationship between religious tradition and worshipping with the flag is statistically significant (χ² = 23.91, df = 4, p < 0.001). In contrast to Hypothesis 1, it seems to be Mainline Protestants foremost and then Evangelicals that worship with the flag.

We hypothesized that people with a literal view of the Bible would be most likely to seek out a congregation where the flag is displayed. Biblical literalists, as well as those who view the Bible as true but not to be taken literally, appear equally likely to worship with the flag. Just over half of both groups (51.1% and 51.3% respectively) are in a congregation with the flag compared to 40.7% of those who believe the Bible contains some human error and 38.1% who believe the Bible is a book of fables. For people reporting “I don’t know” regarding their belief about the Bible, 46.1% are in a congregation with the flag. These percentage differences are not large enough to be statistically significant. Hypothesis 2 is not supported.

The last three rows of Table 1 report worshipping with the flag by political ideology. The relationship between political ideology and worshipping with the flag is statistically significant (χ² = 12.57, df = 2, p < 0.01). In partial support of Hypothesis 3, 53.5% of political conservatives report a flag in their worship space. This is the highest percentage of any political ideology category, but political moderates are nearly as likely to worship with the flag at 49.3%. The biggest difference is political liberals, of whom only 36.5% are in a congregation displaying the flag. The same pattern appears if we use political party instead of political ideology. Republicans and independents worship with the flag at higher percentages than Democrats.

Next, we estimate three logistic regression models to assess who worships with the U.S. flag.

Table 2. U.S. Flag Displayed in Congregation (Logistic Regression Results with Odd Ratios in Parentheses).

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Religious Tradition (Evangelical Protestant)
Mainline Protestant	0.363	0.392	0.502
Black Protestant	−0.073	−0.062	−0.023
Catholic	−0.565 * (.568)	−0.545 * (0.580)	−0.540 * (0.583)
Other Religion	−0.666 * (0.514)	−0.633	−0.513
Belief about Bible (the Bible should be taken literally)
Bible is perfectly true, but it should not be taken literally	----	0.237	0.311
Bible contains some human error	----	−0.217	−0.009
Bible is an ancient book of history and legends	----	−0.234	−0.011
Don’t know	----	0.277	0.276
Political Ideology (Conservative)
Moderate	----	----	−0.031
Liberal	----	----	−0.439
Women	−0.230	−0.271	−0.249
Age	0.021 *** (1.021)	0.024 *** (1.024)	0.024 *** (1.024)
Race (White Non-Hispanic)
Black Non-Hispanic	−0.427	−0.451	−0.365
Hispanic	0.007	0.006	−0.018
Asian Non-Hispanic	0.406	0.349	0.420
Other/Multiracial	0.404	0.462	0.483
Education (High school diploma or less)
Some college	−0.029	0.006	0.006
Bachelor’s degree or higher	0.075	0.187	0.195
Region (South)
Northeast	0.497	0.504	0.487
Midwest	0.350	0.332	0.341
West	−0.101	−0.178	−0.145
Religious Practice	0.149	0.066	0.069
Constant	−1.187 **	−1.440 **	−1.471 **
Pseudo-R2	0.057	0.068	0.074
n	642	605	594

Reference groups in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).

reports logit coefficients as well as odds ratios for statistically significant relationships. Religious tradition is significant, but not in the way predicted in Hypothesis 1. Persons in other religions appear less likely to worship with the U.S. flag than Evangelical Protestants, but this relationship is no longer significant when view of the Bible is added to the model. Across all three models, Evangelical Protestants are more likely to encounter the flag at church than Catholics. In Model 3, the odds of worshipping with the flag are reduced by 42% for Catholics as compared to Evangelicals. If we change the omitted comparison group to Mainline Protestants, Catholics remain significantly less likely to worship with the flag. Failing to support Hypothesis 2, beliefs about the Bible are unrelated to attending a congregation where the flag is displayed. Unlike our bivariate findings, political conservatives are no different from moderates or liberals in the likelihood of worshipping with the U.S. flag, controlling for religion and demographic characteristics. This fails to support Hypothesis 3. In alternative models, we replaced political ideology variables with political party variables of Republican, Independent, and Democrat. Neither political ideology nor political party was significantly associated with display of the flag. Age is the only other statistically significant variable in Table 1. With every one-year increase in age, the odds of a person worshipping with the U.S. flag increase by 2%.

The final stage of analysis examines the consequence of belonging to a congregation where the national flag is displayed, taking into consideration religion, politics, and control variables.

Table 3. Support for Christian Nationalism (OLS Regression Results).

Variable	b	SE	β
U.S. Flag in Congregation	0.775 *	0.360	0.065
Religious Tradition (Evangelical Protestant)
Mainline Protestant	−0.601	0.574
Black Protestant	1.207	1.106
Catholic	−0.946	0.486
Other Religion	−1.673 *	0.702	−0.083
Belief about Bible (the Bible should be taken literally)
Bible is perfectly true, but it should not be taken literally	−1.076 *	0.501	−0.090
Bible contains some human error	−2.832 ***	−2.832	−0.166
Bible is an ancient book of history and legends	−4.010 ***	0.773	−0.232
Don’t know	−2.447 **	0.843	−0.107
Political Ideology (Conservative)
Moderate	−2.788 ***	0.431	−0.213
Liberal	−5.986 ***	0.477	−0.440
Women	0.257	0.358
Age	0.027 *	0.012	0.074
Race (White Non-Hispanic)
Black Non-Hispanic	−0.211	1.003
Hispanic	0.453	0.568
Asian Non-Hispanic	1.991	1.132
Other/Multiracial	−0.153	1.104
Education (High school diploma or less)
Some college	−0.419	0.561
Bachelor’s degree or higher	−1.732 **	0.5501	−0.145
Region (South)
Northeast	−0.848	0.549
Midwest	0.335	0.464
West	−0.543	0.468
Religious Practice	1.535 ***	0.290	0.193
Constant	15.543 ***	0.982
R2	0.547
n	573

Reference groups in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).

shows OLS unstandardized coefficients (b), standard errors (SE), and standardized coefficients (β) for statistically significant relationships. Supporting Hypothesis 4, worshipping with the flag is associated with Christian nationalist beliefs. The relationship between the flag in congregations and Christian nationalism (β = 0.065, p < 0.05) stands out from other known influences on Christian nationalism, including religious tradition, belief about the Bible, political ideology, gender, age, race, education, region, and religious practice. However, exposure to the flag in a congregation is not a primary driver of Christian nationalism. The standardized coefficient for the flag, although statistically significant, is much lower than the standardized coefficients for many other variables in the model. The strongest predictors of Christian nationalism in Table 3 are political ideology, beliefs about the Bible, and religious practice. These findings parallel the order of significant effects reported by Whitehead and Perry (2020, pp. 179–80) from 2007 Baylor Religion Survey data. Nevertheless, the findings in Table 3 support our hypothesis and hint at a possible priming effect occurring in congregations. It is not political conservatives in conservative churches that encounter the flag and express more support for Christian nationalism. The flag in congregations is associated with Christian nationalist beliefs regardless of politics or personal religiosity. Model 3 accounts for more than 50% of the variance in Christian nationalism (R² = 0.547).

6. Discussion and Conclusions

In the past two decades, much of the scholarship on social sorting has focused on the increasing nature of political polarization (Bishop 2008; Campbell 2009; Harteveld 2021; Mason 2016, 2018). A goal of this study was to examine sorting mechanisms that lead people to congregations where the U.S. flag is displayed. Analyzing national data from the 2021 Baylor Religion Survey, we found that nearly half of religiously affiliated U.S. adults belong to a congregation where the flag is displayed. People worshipping with the flag tend to be members of white Protestant religious traditions (Mainline Protestant or Evangelical Protestant) and older in age. Worshipping with the flag is not limited to theologically conservative or politically conservative Americans.

A second goal of this study was to consider the consequences of worshipping with the U.S. flag. We hypothesized that people in congregations where the national flag is displayed will express stronger agreement with Christian nationalist beliefs than people in congregations where the national flag is not displayed. Our findings support this hypothesis. Organizational flag display is statistically related to personal Christian nationalist beliefs, which highlights the strong likelihood of a symbolic cooptation between religious ideology and political identity in United States civil society (Foertsch et al. 2024). Moreover, this subtle but consistent cooptation is not limited to theologically conservative congregants in theological conservative religious traditions. The flag is present in a wide array of congregations, and the relationship between the flag in congregations and Christian nationalist beliefs persists when controlling for a person’s religion, politics, and demographic characteristics.

Previous research has mainly focused on micro- or individual-level characteristics associated with Christian nationalism (Whitehead et al. 2018; Whitehead and Perry 2020). We bring attention to an underexamined meso-level of organizations related to this ideology. Certain types of congregations may serve as organizational incubators for Christian nationalism. Our focus has been on the flag as a symbol in congregations stirring Christian nationalism. Sermons and songs are other ways that Christian nationalism is sown in congregations. Religious leaders may declare from the pulpit that God wants Christian warriors to restore the United States as a Christian nation. Around July 4 and other national holidays, congregants may sing “God Bless America”, “Battle Hymn of the Republic”, or even “The Star-Spangled Banner”. Like the flag, these national songs do more than celebrate a benign patriotism; they can connote a triumphal nationalism (Billig 1995). Perhaps soon, another symbol—the God Bless The USA Bible, a King James Version of the Bible published in 2024 with the U.S. Constitution, Bill of Rights, Declaration of Independence, Pledge of Allegiance, and lyrics to Lee Greenwood’s song “God Bless the USA”—will appear in the back of some congregation’s pews. Such sermons, songs, and symbols can rightfully be understood as seeds of Christian nationalism.

A major limitation of our study is the inability to test causation. With cross-sectional survey data, we cannot definitively determine if people with Christian nationalist beliefs self-select into congregations where the flag is displayed or if the display of the flag primes or socializes parishioners to embrace Christian nationalism. Another possibility is that people supportive of Christian nationalism are more aware of the U.S. flag in their place of worship, whereas less politically oriented worshippers may be less attentive to the flag’s presence in their worship space. To address such concerns, longitudinal data with measures of Christian nationalism before and after someone begins attending a church with the flag would be a valuable complement to existing research. Likewise, we advocate repeating the experimental studies of Butz et al. (2007) and Kemmelmeier and Winter (2008) in a congregational context. These findings also should be extended to analyses of other (particularly non-religious) organizations. By studying places such as schools, government buildings, and sports venues, social scientists can discern whether organizational influences on Christian nationalism happen primarily in religious environments or if it has a wider range.

In closing, we turn to implications. The core beliefs of Christian nationalism carry risks for the health of society. Christian nationalists tout inclinations towards authoritarianism, militancy, white supremacy, patriarchy, and heteronormativity (Davis and Perry 2021; Perry et al. 2022b; Whitehead and Perry 2020). They favor limitations on voting rights (Perry et al. 2022a). These tendencies challenge the foundation of American civic life. Therefore, the causes and consequences of Christian nationalism deserve scrutiny. Congregations where the national flag flies may bolster these beliefs. Social scientists have a responsibility to point out these sorting mechanisms and organizational trends for the continued health of democracy and the social institutions that uphold it.