Bhagavad Gītā as a Dialogical Space in Philosophical Counseling

Abstract

The importance of dialogical space and its various forms, useful in philosophical counseling, has been emphasized in recent discourse. The discourse primarily focuses on various aspects of the exchange between the counselee and the counselor in the form of external dialogue. This paper, drawing insights from Hubert Hermans, broadens the discourse into the domain of Agentive Reason, which includes the internal dialogue of the counselee, comprising various I-positions. By engaging with the associated network of the counselee’s “I-positions,” the counselor expands the counselee’s internal domain, thereby facilitating the counseling process. This paper aims to show that this process is best served when the counselor is able to cultivate his/her dialogical relationship with the counselee towards forming a metaposition from where the organization of existing and new I-positions can be seen, questioned, restructured, and most importantly, acted upon. This paper seeks to demonstrate this prospect through a symbolic exploration of Bhagavad Gītā in the form of a dialogical space. It examines how Arjuna’s agentive crisis, echoed in his internal dialogical tension of many maladaptive I-positions, is addressed by extending his dialogical self to Kṛṣṇa’s positions and counter-positions, leading the interaction to a dialogical metaposition in Arjuna’s external domain. The goal is not to establish Kṛṣṇa as a philosophical counselor or to present his discourse with Arjuna as a treatise on philosophical counseling. Rather, the intent is to encourage exploration of the symbolic representation underlying the Gītā, which helps us decipher various dialogical metapositions in the external domain that may correspond with the positions, needs, and emotions in the counselee’s internal domain. This has a threefold purpose: first, to recognize the open boundaries of the dialogical self; second, to examine the instrumental role of the counselor in negotiating these boundaries when they are closed in self-defense; and third, to introduce the concepts of Informed Ignorance and Agentive Reason.

1. Introduction

In recent discourses, dialogical space and its various forms have been construed to be significantly essential in philosophical counseling (Batory et al. 2010; Goutham 2024). This paper seeks to integrate the theoretical frameworks of dialogism and pragmatism by introducing two practical imperatives of philosophical counseling, namely Informed Ignorance and Agentive Reason. Agentive Reason refers to the capacity for reconciling conflicting impulses through reflective alignment with higher-order principles. While notions such as practical reason given by Immanuel Kant (1785/1998) emphasize adherence to universal moral laws, Agentive Reason allows for greater flexibility and contextual sensitivity. It incorporates emotional and situational factors, aligning more closely with Aristotle’s Phronesis (1357a) where he discusses how deliberation often takes place in contexts where there is uncertainty about future outcomes, highlighting the need for practical wisdom. Similarly, within the traditional interpretations of Bhagavad Gītā, it represents “the golden mean between the two ideals of action (Pravṛtti) and contemplation (Nivṛtti), preserving the excellence of both” (Hiriyanna 1932). It also corresponds to intimately interrelated concepts such as (i) Kṣetra Kṣetrajña (Gītā 13.1), where the field of activities (Kṣhetra) or the physical agency is inked with the Self (Ātman) as the knower of the field (Kṣhetrajña); (ii) Vidheya-ātmā (Gītā 2.64) or the self-controlled man who is able to engage with the objects of the senses without being affected by attraction and repulsion (Rāga-Dveṣa); (iii) Stithaprajñā (Gītā 2.56–60) the composite term that distinguishes a person of wisdom from a person of steady wisdom; (iv) Svadharma (Gītā 3.35) explained as “one’s own duty though defective, is superior to another’s duty well-performed”, which tries to connect the agent’s intentional conduct with his/her voluntary conduct; and (v) Niṣkāma Karma or the way of selfless action ensuing from self-knowledge—that integrates most of the above, and offers a direct means to liberation to the agent from his/her bondage.

Informed Ignorance, on the other hand, embodies the intellectual/epistemic humility necessary for effective agency. Though there is a lack of popularly explicit references, instances in philosophical literature such as Socrates’ declaration—“I know that I know nothing”—serve as a precursor to Informed Ignorance. In Socrates’ case, while highlighting the virtue of recognizing one’s ignorance to foster intellectual humility, Informed Ignorance moves beyond this passivity by advocating for actionable wisdom despite uncertainty. In contemporary epistemology, Informed Ignorance aligns with the concept of bounded rationality (Simon 1957), which recognizes the cognitive limitations of agents in decision-making, and also resonates with the emphasis on epistemic humility in virtue epistemology, which promotes the value of recognizing gaps in knowledge for intellectual growth. Within the traditional interpretation of the Gītā, we do not find any utterances that directly translate to Informed Ignorance. Though subtly hinted at throughout the text, the concept presents itself explicitly when we try to propose practical applications of “knowledge” (Jñāna) and “ignorance” (Avidyā) in philosophical counseling. As we will be taking that up in the subsequent sections, we shall discuss some important prerequisites here concerning the nuances of this paper. The purpose of this paper is to explore the ideas in the newly emerging field of philosophical counseling. This area of study is distinct from therapeutic or clinical practices, and operates beyond specific spatial, cultural, or temporal boundaries. It is establishing fresh and ongoing connections with the philosophical and terminological traditions of the culture into which it develops. During recent decades, and partly owing to globalization, as Lou Marinoff observes, “a conspicuous cross-pollination of Western and Asian philosophical traditions has unfolded” (Marinoff 2021, p. 2600). The paradigm shift is clearly evident from the debate over the various approaches to philosophical counseling. The explicit teaching of traditional philosophy viable only in a cultural context is no longer held to be the core of counseling. Rather, the movement is global, proceeding towards a wider, deeper, and more general goal of praxis. Philosophical counseling draws from a global repository of philosophical ideas to address universal human concerns. Since this paper assumes this paradigm shift, it has employed globally viable terms such as Informed Ignorance and Agentive Reason that align with the philosophical practices rather than forcing the traditionally bounded terms to conform with practice. Specifically, this paper draws from the boundary experience of Arjuna’s crisis depicted in the Gītā and explores the counselee’s lived philosophy trying to address the existential dilemmas in a counseling setup.

2. Inter-Disciplinary Nature of the Study

Beginning with an exploration of the intricate relationship between knowledge and action, this study underscores the significance of epistemological values in shaping philosophical practice. These values, which include the recognition of the multiplicity of the self, the centrality of agency, and the importance of reflective equilibrium, are translated into practice through a dialogical process symbolically drawing from the Gītā. The concept of the dialogical self, as articulated by Hubert Hermans, is central to this discourse (Hermans 2001, 2014). His work highlights how Dialogical Self theory (DST) has been applied in psychological counseling to facilitate self-integration and resolve internal conflicts. Through dialogical metapositions—viewpoints that transcend specific I-positions—clients gain a broader perspective, enabling them to navigate complex emotional and moral dilemmas. This process empowers individuals to reconfigure their sense of agency and develop coherent self-narratives. Recent studies have extended DST into interdisciplinary domains. For example, Maarit Arvaja (2023) explores its application in teacher education, examining how dialogical engagement fosters identity formation and adaptation. Similarly, Vlad Glăveanu emphasizes the role of meta-positions in fostering creativity and self-reflection (Keenan-Lechel and Danah 2019), insights that are directly transferable to counseling practices. These applications underscore DST’s versatility in addressing challenges across personal, educational, and therapeutic settings.

This paper illustrates how the dialogical extension of the self—where the counselee’s internal voices interact with the external voice of the counselor—serves as a conceptual framework for understanding the interplay of internal and external I-positions. This framework is brought to life through the symbolic narrative of Arjuna’s existential crisis, where his fragmented dialogical self reflects a clash between conflicting I-positions, representing epistemological tensions among duty, personal desire, and moral responsibility. Kṛṣṇa’s voice, integrated into Arjuna’s dialogical space, provides a meta-perspective that synthesizes these conflicting positions. This metaposition enables Arjuna to transcend his inner turmoil and engage with a broader, more pragmatic sense of agency.

Moreover, this study, while examining the theoretical visions of the Gītā, and its relevance to philosophical counseling, introduces the concepts of Informed Ignorance and Agentive Reason as practical consequences of its teachings, hinting at a broader work in future. Informed Ignorance is presented as an epistemological stance that recognizes the limits of one’s knowledge while fostering a deeper engagement with action and agency. This concept is shown to be crucial in Arjuna’s journey from confusion to clarity, illustrating how Agentive Reason—grounded in a nuanced understanding of one’s epistemic limitations—can lead to the realization of one’s potential as an agent in the world. Kṛṣṇa’s counsel to Arjuna emphasizes the necessity of acting despite incomplete knowledge, a sentiment akin to Aristotle’s deliberative ignorance, where practical wisdom emerges in the face of uncertainty—illustrating how informed humility can catalyze decisive action by balancing the tension between knowing and unknowing. That said, we are not attempting to develop this idea into a theory through this paper. Rather, we are limiting our scope to the positive benefit it offers to impact the dialogical space of the counselee. In philosophical counseling, epistemological values are not limited to theory but are actively translated into practice. This reflects in how counselees take action, to navigate complex moral and existential dilemmas through a refined understanding of their agency. The role of the philosophical counselor is also examined, with a focus on how they can assist the counselees to integrate the challenges posed by adaptation and development into a cohesive whole, through an effective agency.

3. Significance of Bhagavad Gītā to Philosophical Counseling

Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Nasr 2007, p. 6) states that one cannot seriously read the Gītā in this day and age without becoming aware of the religious character of this text. However, some non-traditionalist Perennialist philosophers like Aldous Huxley and Huston Smith who seem more concerned with the Gītā’s practical approach towards the paths of liberation rather than its metaphysical or theological teachings, have argued that the Gītā occupies an intermediate position between scripture and theology, for it combines the poetical qualities of the first with the clear-cut methodicalness of the second (Huxley 1945; Widigdo 2020). Swami Vivekananda, an advocate of humanism and universal religion, considers the Gītā to be an objective exposition of the Vedanta philosophy (Vivekananda 1986, p. 232). Balaganapathi Devarakonda has discussed that “the philosophical practice of the period of the Gītā is based on the normative framework of Dharma1 that is centered around the social and moral order of individual actions” (Devarakonda 2021, p. 2607). It follows from such numerous and diverse interpretations that the Gītā is not easy to understand. The scripture deals essentially with the broad principles underlying the ethical aspirations of humanity. It does not present a treatise on the whole of moral philosophy. The setting of the song on the battlefield that triggered a dilemma about right action makes the aim of the teaching very clear. It seeks the subordination of individual aim to the greater goal of Dharma with an unrelenting devotion to action. Though the situation is very particular and the discourse that follows is highly contextualized, the Gītā does not fail to draw our attention to some of the recurrent common themes of global concern, especially the congruity between professed belief and concrete action. Further, the symbolic richness of the work, together with its practical mode of treatment extends its reach and creates an almost universal appeal. However, “to regard a consideration of ultimate philosophical questions as falling within the main aim of the Gītā, appears to us to misjudge its character” (Hiriyanna 1932).

The application of the Gītā’s teachings to contemporary philosophical practice not only highlights the enduring relevance of these ideas but also illustrates how ancient philosophical dialogues can be reinterpreted to address modern epistemological and psychological challenges. Specifically, the epistemological values of agency, reflective equilibrium, and the recognition of the limits of knowledge are effectively translated into philosophical practice through the concepts of Informed Ignorance and Agentive Reason. The dialogical space symbolized by the philosophical voices of the Gītā treated as a source of positions, counterpositions, and metapositions, can offer significant insights into the application of dialogical self-theory and the cultivation of Agentive Reason within the context of philosophical counseling. Further exploration into how these epistemological values can be practically implemented to enhance the efficacy of counseling practices, particularly in resolving intertwined moral and existential dilemmas. The integration of Informed Ignorance and Agentive Reason into the counseling process opens new avenues for understanding how individuals can develop a more nuanced and empowered sense of self, leading to a more coherent and fulfilling engagement with the world. Taking creative advantage of the broader scope of its teachings, we feature the Gītā as a symbolic framework for examining the dialogical self and developing agentive reasoning in counseling contexts. Let us now connect these ideas to the broader concept of agency through the lens of I-positions.

4. Understanding Agency Through I-Positions

Agency is the capacity of an entity to act within a given environment. For humans, our sense of agency refers to the perceived control over our actions and their outcomes (Moore 2016). This sense is a default, non-conceptual feeling of being the locus of control over actions. This inherent sense of agency is distinguished from a conceptual judgment of agency, where we explicitly reflect on our actions and attribute agency to ourselves or others (Synofzik et al. 2008). This ‘thinking about our actions’ occurs in various modes, including self-talk and inner dialogue. These modes influence one’s judgment of agency, which in turn affects the feeling of control over actions and their consequences. Consequently, this sense of control impacts the individual’s disposition to interact with their environment.

There are two key points to consider here: first, how ‘thinking about our actions’ attributes agency to the self; and second, how the self configures agency by ‘acting on our thoughts.’ In the context of philosophical counseling, the counselee’s ‘thinking about actions’ can be seen as comprising many internalized voices within the self, formed by knowledge, emotional experiences, cultural norms, social encounters, beliefs, values, and models of action. These automatic, monological voices, expressed through self-talk, correspond to the counselee’s “I, Me, and Mine” that constitute a representational space where the counselee’s internalized voices project a one-sided perspective of the world. The representational elements of “I, Me, and Mine” offer the symbolic resources needed for an internal dialogical process. William James describes ‘I’ as the self-as-knower, ‘Me’ as the self-as-known, and ‘Mine’ as the people and things in the environment that are felt as one’s own (Hermans 2014). The ‘I’ processes experiences through an affectively charged mechanism of selection and rejection, creating a sense of volition and transforms the representational space of internalized voices into a dialogical space.

However, for true dialogue to occur between these internalized voices, the I-Me/Mine must transcend the self-object relationship. Hubert Hermans achieves this by introducing the concept of the ‘other’ as an extended I (who has a voice and can respond), thereby establishing a self–subject relationship that makes dialogue possible (Hermans 2001, 2014). He further expands this idea by extending the self to include an independent other (actual people in the larger society). Through these theoretical advancements, he proposes a polyphonic self comprised of multiple inner voices, each representing relatively autonomous points of view within the self, known as “I-positions.” It is these I-positions, rather than the personal “I” alone, that engage in dialogical relationships with each other and with other people. The others are not to be seen here as purely outside, but rather as simultaneously part of the self (Hermans 2011). Therefore, I-positions that include mental representations of culture, family members, friends, and significant others in association with personal positions constitute the dialogical self through a self–society interconnection—creating a sense of agency. In the context of this paper, which draws from the Gītā, “I-positions” refer to the different internal voices that represent conflicting desires, such as Arjuna’s conflicting duties as a warrior and his personal attachment to his family. Building on this foundation, the dialogical self emerges as a site of internal and external interplay, where conflicting I-positions shape and reshape agency. We next explore how this dynamic is further enriched through dialogical space.

5. Dialogical Tension in the Dialogical Space

The ability to imagine the various voiced positions of others in an internal dialogue is not to be understood as a feature of sociality imposed on an aloof self. The subjectivity of the self and sociality of the dialogue are an integral part of the dialogical self. According to DST, the self is dialogical; intersubjectivity and sociality are intrinsic to its embodiment in space and time (Hermans 2011). The dialogical space of such a self is a shared space of possibilities that cuts across (a) personal or social positions (I-as-counselee, I-as-confused) that form the internal domain of self; (b) significant other individuals or groups that form the external domain of self, (my-counselor, my-company); and (c) the larger society, consisting of actual individuals and groups or the macrosociety. Whereas the internal and external domains constitute the minisociety of the self, Hubert Hermans argues that rather than being directly influenced by the macrosociety, the self functions as a minisociety (of I-positions). The I-positions in the minisociety of the self, rather than acting as isolated entities, are organized as coalitions that share experiences and exchange knowledge about their respective ‘I’, creating a complex, multi-voiced, and narratively structured “dialogical self” (Hermans 2014). The minisociety of the self interacts with its environment (macrosociety) by forming new I-positions in the external domain, which also allows these positions to impact the I-positions in the internal domain. Thus, the self has open boundaries. However, when the self perceives a threat to its judgment of the agency, it may close its boundaries in self-defence (ibid). Now, let us proceed towards how philosophical counseling can try and negotiate these boundaries through dialogue and empower the counselee to reconfigure his/her agency by ‘acting on thoughts. The dialogical self, as a dynamic minisociety, offers a rich framework for understanding counseling interactions. To deepen this perspective, we turn to the complementing movements within the self that facilitate balance and change.

One of the key components of the dialogue in philosophical counseling is self-narrative. The construction of one’s self-narrative need not always be a coherent process. It often has to deal with disruption and fragmentation. This is because multiplicity and diversification are important elements of self-exploration, and they are the decentering movements necessary for adaptation and development, but can disrupt the self’s contingent stability. The decentering movements coordinate with the centering movements that work to achieve a new balance in the self in a process of change. By laying equal emphasis on these two mutually complementing movements in the self-space, DST offers a dynamic view of multiplicity and unity in the self. In a counseling setting, the force of decentering movements can be directed at getting the self out of its comfort zone while the centering movements can be aimed at achieving healthy coalitions of I-positions and restoring continuity in the self, as well as the self-narratives (Hermans 2014). When a counselee is invited to negotiate his/her identity and reflect on his/her thinking, being, and acting, multiple fragmented and partly/plausibly contradictive/divergent selves correspond, differ, and ultimately engage with the other selves in dialogue. “The power of self-narrative can be harnessed to develop a multi-voiced and dialogical self that can actively explore the heterogeneous self-space of hidden treasure and peril, and emerge as an adventurous, rich and coherent whole” (Goutham 2024).

To understand the mutually complementing movements in the dialogical self, let us consider a counselee whose coalition of I-positions may have failed to adapt to a new, confusing, or challenging situation. This can trigger decentering movements, forcing the self to close its boundaries in self-defense. Let us understand step-by-step how this happened. The counselee had a perceived control over actions and their outcomes, without explicitly thinking about it. Then, he/she encountered an uncommon situation. The default feeling of being the locus of control was altered. The experience could involve positive and/or negative feelings. In trying to attribute agency to the self (or others), the counselee begins thinking about his/her actions. The automatic monological voices corresponding to his/her ‘I, Me and Mine’ started to dominate. In this case, let us assume that the counselee entered into an ‘insecure self-talk’. This offered the symbolic resource to form different I-positions and initiated a dialogue between them. The voiced positions of certain coalitions of I-positions dominated in unproductive ways and suppressed the other possible positions. The differences or conflicts between these coalitions led to a dialogical tension, and the counselee ended up with a feeling of an inability to cope. Thus, though the dominant pattern of I-positions seemed well-established and convincing to the counselee, they turned out to be maladaptive for the given situation (Hermans 2014). As discussed earlier, though it could be a challenging process, this is a constructive part of change dynamics. The counselee’s experience, whether positive or negative, demanded a reconfiguration within the dialogical self as he/she reached the limits of the existing self-concept—a boundary experience. This process forced the self to close its boundaries and inhibit its further development as a whole. This dynamic interplay between centering and decentering movements offers a foundation for understanding the counselor’s role in fostering metapositional thinking, which we now explore through a symbolic lens in the Gītā.

A philosophical counselor, as an external interlocutor, engages in dialogue with the counselee, progressively becoming integrated into the counselee’s associative network of I-positions. This process expands the internal domain of the counselee, enabling deeper interaction from the standpoint of “I-as-a-counselee.” Simultaneously, the counselor assumes a significant role in the counselee’s external domain (my-counselor), thereby facilitating collaboration with the counselee’s critical internal I-positions to form a more adaptive and coherent coalition. This integration paves the way for the emergence of a dialogical metaposition, which can be understood as a pragmatic choice for the counselee. In the case of philosophical counseling, the ‘dialogical metaposition’ can be understood as a counselor helping a client transcend individual I-positions, such as conflicting desires for duty and personal satisfaction, to arrive at a broader, integrated perspective, as Arjuna does when he resolves his internal conflict with Kṛṣṇa’s guidance in the Gītā. Such a metaposition allows the counselee to transcend the limitations of individual I-positions, fostering an openness to multiple perspectives and the “otherness” within. This resonates with William James’ exploration of the self as a multi-faceted entity, where the pragmatic value lies in the ability to synthesize diverse internal voices into a cohesive whole (James 1890).

Vlad Glăveanu articulates the meta-position as one that “goes beyond relating position/perspective one and two and their object–it actively makes us look for a third position/perspective which exists in the sphere of the possible… To occupy a meta-position means, in other words, engaging with the possible; it means… experiencing wonder” (Glăveanu 2019, pp. 173–74). This engagement is inherently pragmatic, as it encourages the counselee to explore alternative possibilities, thereby expanding the scope for self-reflection and analytical depth. The metaposition thus becomes a crucial tool in the pragmatic evaluation of the counselee’s I-positions, allowing for the development of more stable and integrated self-concepts. Hubert Hermans underscores that the development of a metaposition enables the counselee to gain critical distance from specific I-positions, facilitating their evaluation and integration with contextual challenges. This process strengthens the centering movements within the self, promoting coherence and unity, while simultaneously reopening previously closed boundaries by harnessing decentering forces effectively (Hermans 2014). In this way, the counselee’s process of ‘thinking about actions’ is pragmatically aligned with the attribution of agency to the self, and this agency is further refined through action, as we shall see in the light of the Gītā. The dialogical metaposition not only reconciles conflicting I-positions but also fosters actionable insights, as illustrated through Arjuna’s transformative engagement with Kṛṣṇa’s guidance. We could only speculate about the philosophical practices that follow from the Gītā and further illuminate this dynamic.

6. Philosophical Practices Based on Bhagavad Gītā

Turning to the boundary experience of Arjuna in the Gītā, we observe how Arjuna’s dialogical self, influenced by significant social and personal positions, is organized into a narrative structure characterized by well-established yet maladaptive patterns. Through the dialogical engagement with the internalized voice of Kṛṣṇa, Arjuna is offered a dialogical metaposition that facilitates the development of Agentive Reason, highlighting the pragmatic importance of agency at the intersection of knowledge and action.

The dialogically constructed self of a counselee reflects in the narrative structure of his/her identity, with its underlying epistemological and ontological beliefs. The Gītā, a philosophical part of the ancient Indian epic Mahābhārata, facilitates space for discussion on the dialogical self with varied I-positions of the counselee that lead to a metaposition with the intervention of the counselor. It is one of the earliest philosophical dialogues of humankind, known as Śrīkṛṣṇārjuna Saṃvāda (a dialogue between Śrī Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna), provides an interplay of the self and society shaped by the dynamics and tensions of its history, culture, and prevalent institutional structures (Goutham 2024). While culturally rooted, the Gītā’s dialogical framework transcends its religious origins by focusing on universal themes of agency and ethical deliberation. This emphasizes the importance of the theoretical visions of the context that naturally influence the actions of the individual that get reflected in the philosophical practices of the time (Sharpe 2022). Similarly, Balaganapathi Devarakonda has shown how the agent’s place keeps shifting with the meaning of life and how the method of inquiry is conceptualized in a given culture at a given point in time. The philosophical practices during the period of the Gītā are grounded in the normative framework of Dharma, emphasizing dutifulness and righteousness as central to the social and moral order governing individual actions (Devarakonda 2021). Its practical teachings are explicitly designed to help individuals fully recognize and embrace their personal responsibility as moral agents. Having contextualized the philosophical practices based on the Gītā, let us now examine the narrative structure of Arjuna’s dialogical self to understand how his internal conflicts reflect a broader dialogical framework.

7. Narrative Structure of Arjuna’s Dialogical Self

Let us now construct the narrative structure of Arjuna’s dialogical self, and examine his underlying beliefs. Subsequently, let us observe in what way these beliefs posed a problem for his judgement of agency and how, through a dialogical intervention, he was able to reorganize his views and arrive at the model of action that would be in line with his value system and personal I-position. The Gītā presents us with a specific situation involving a moral dilemma where the dialogical space of the subject involved (Arjuna), confronts the limits of his existing self-concept—a boundary experience. This corresponds to the condition where a counselee seeks an external dialogue with a counselor to reconfigure his/her dialogical self. The concept of dialogical self, although stemming from psychology, has its roots in the history of philosophy, and this is important to note here because the dilemma of Arjuna is philosophical, and the dialogical space in which it is dealt with does not lend itself to psychological treatment (Goutham 2024). Let us analyze the setting of the Gītā to understand how Arjuna’s confusing situation threatened his judgment of agency.

To begin with, we find Arjuna, stationed between the two armies consisting of near and dear ones on either side. This is symbolically a boundary experience as he finds his self divided like the armies—for “he himself is his friend, and he himself is his enemy (Gītā 6.5)”. Swami Adgadanand explains that the war of the Gītā is the clash of innate properties and inclinations, the symbolic representation. The battlefield of the Gītā is the place where the sphere of action is transformed into the sphere of righteous action (Adgadanand 1998). Arjuna’s self is divided (like the armies) as he is caught in a situation where he is actuated by a desire for sovereignty over his ancestral kingdom (which happens to be his right), by a desire to enjoy it with his friends and relatives (which is natural). Herein lies the problem—he either has to kill his corrupt friends and relatives to attain the kingdom (which is his prescribed duty) or give up his rights (and forsake his duty). He desires to secure his rights (kingdom) with a two-fold purpose: one, to uphold the ideal of Dharma, which is his social obligation as a warrior (Kṣatriya2); and two, to enjoy the kingdom. Now, enjoyment becomes complete only when it is shared with near and dear ones. If they are all killed, he reasons that, securing enjoyment becomes meaningless. But what about Dharma? This is answered by Arjuna’s default response when placed in this uncommon situation rather than what he would have believed in the passivity of his principles. He surrendered to the power of the moment, growing despondent, and disinclined to fight.

This can be visualized as the counselee’s condition where the automatic monological voices corresponding to “I, Me/Mine” started to dominate. For instance, voices such as, “I am not able to stand firmly, and my mind seems to be whirling…” (Gītā 1.30) and “What need do we have of a kingdom or of enjoyments (to be derived) from killing my own people in the battle?” (Gītā 1.32–34) contest each other in the case of Arjuna. These voices, as we discussed earlier, are comprised of representational elements (cultural norms, emotional experiences, etc.) that gradually turn into symbolic resources for the dialogical self as a web of attachments unfolds. As these voices create coalitions of I-positions, we can map them forming the internal domain of Arjuna’s self, with social and personal positions such as “I-as-Kṣatriya”, “I-as-disinclined-to-fight”; the external domain of the self, comprised of significant other individuals or groups such as “My-friends-standing-on-the-enemy-side”, “My-clan”, and so on; and the larger society of actual individuals and groups like Kṛṣṇa forming the macrosociety (until they are received into the external domain as “My-counselor”, “My-so-and-so”). Certain I-positions, as we can observe, seem well structured, and dominant but maladaptive, causing the fragmentation of the self. For instance, “I-as-Kṣatriya, and My-Kingdom” exchange stories from their specific points of view, which are in sharp contrast with the accounts coming from another coalition of I-positions, namely, “I-as-disinclined-to-fight” and “My-enemies-who-are-my-loved-ones”, and it only gets more complicated from here.

Arjuna naturally feels distressed, helpless, and unable to cope as a result of the dialogical tension between these various multi-voiced positions (Arvaja 2023). The tumultuous sound of the war conches we hear (Gītā 1.19) symbolizes the clash between a cacophony of voices in Arjuna’s dialogical space. Arjuna’s default responses no longer seem to be bringing positive meaning or direction. He has reached the boundary of his existing self-concept. The decentering movements have kicked in and he is becoming more and more different from himself, confusing his judgement of agency (Goutham 2024). We may also observe a few rumblings of the centering forces where he reaches out to Kṛṣṇa, for consolation, support, and clarity (Gītā 2.7). Kṛṣṇa, the actual other from the macrosociety is being invited to take the position of an alternative voice in Arjuna’s external domain. Here, we have a phenomenon which is typical of many counseling situations: “The counselee implicitly knows what his or her problem is, but is not able to explicitly articulate it. However, when it is fittingly formulated by another person, counselees recognize it immediately as right or true.” (Hermans 2014). The representation of Kṛṣṇa will be eventually incorporated into the vast associative network of I-positions and can serve as a voice in the extended self of Arjuna—in the form of “Kṛṣṇa-as-a-constant-friend-who-offers-support-and-consolation”, “Kṛṣṇa-as-a-loving-God-who-is-always-there-in-me”. By now, the mutually complementing movements of decentering and centering forces are at play in Arjuna’s self. Now let us try and understand how the alternative voice of Kṛṣṇa enables Arjuna to give a meaningful dialogical response to his crisis. This dialogical interplay offers a deeper understanding of Arjuna’s journey from internal conflict to clarity, paving the way for a more nuanced exploration of Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna’s relationship in the context of counseling.

8. Dialogical Relationship of Kṛṣṇa–Arjuna

In the case of counseling, an obvious question arises: does the counselor provide a new position necessarily, or simply enable the dialogue within the dialogical self to occur? Let us recall that the self functions as a society of I-positions, which means that the self, rather than being influenced by an outside society, works itself as a mini-society, analogous to the macrosociety (ibid). Therefore, the counselor doesn’t ‘provide’ a new position as such, but can find representation in the external domain of the counselee’s dialogical self.

As we discussed, Arjuna is in a situation where he has to fight and kill his corrupt friends and relatives to fulfil his stationed duty/Dharma as a warrior. Arjuna was well aware of this superior ideal and stood for it, as he was empowered by the best education and cultural values of his times; that is, he was well aware of his duty to wage war against the unrighteous (Adharma3), even if they were to be his own. He was perfectly endowed with the courage and self-sacrifice it demanded. As discussed in the previous sections, Arjuna stands in the pursuit of securing his rights (kingdom) with a two-fold purpose: one, to uphold the ideal of Dharma, which is his obligation as a warrior (Kṣatriya); and two, to enjoy the kingdom. Arjuna’s dilemma is produced by well-established but maladaptive patterns of I-positions that lead him to assert that when a dynasty is destroyed, ‘my-tradition-which-is-eternal’ is destroyed (Gītā 1.40). The internalized voices of misguided traditions and customary beliefs that prevailed at the time of Arjuna collated with his affectively charged personal positions to pronounce family rites and customs to be eternal (Sanātanaḥ4). So, he tearfully laments to Kṛṣṇa that the war will destroy the eternal Dharma as it will obliterate the members of the dynasty. It is not, therefore, his considered view of Dharma that he sought to uphold, as Kṛṣṇa subtly brings to surface through his knowing smile (Gītā 2.10–11) but some man-made customs bound by traditional values. Arjuna, at least in theory, is aware that the Self (Ātman) alone, which is everlasting, all-pervading, unalterable, and immutable, can be regarded as eternal (Gītā 2.24). Kṛṣṇa taps into this awareness through his counterpositions to establish that if we do not know the means by which we can realize our Self, then we have no inkling of (Sanātanāḥ) Dharma. This helps Arjuna to contrast his position of ‘family tradition (Kula Dharma) as eternal’ with ‘Self (Ātman) as eternal’, from a third position (metaposition) over and above the two. This dialogical metaposition creates a sense of possibility over imagining even more perspectives. For instance, it uncovers that his disinclination to fight could also be, in a subtle and unconscious sense, faint-heartedness (hṛdaya-daurbalyaṁ. Gītā 2.3) at its bottom, owing to the hidden fear that he might after all lose the battle. Through this process, we can infer that when the counselee is able to value the perspective of others, it creates interconnected platforms in the dialogical space (Arvaja 2023) and provides access to a broader associative and organized network of I-positions (Hermans 2014). Kṛṣṇa’s intervention serves as a model for the role of the philosophical counselor, who helps the client (counselee) organize conflicting internal I-positions, thereby guiding them toward an adaptive metaposition. This is particularly clear when Kṛṣṇa introduces the concept of disinterested action (Niṣkāma Karma5) to resolve Arjuna’s internal conflict between duty and personal attachment.

9. Limitations of Arjuna’s Self-Knowledge

So far, Arjuna’s notion of Dharma stands examined; at least, it no longer corresponds to the preservation of ‘my-dynasty-which-is-eternal’. But the question that needs to be asked is what is the ideal of Dharma he stood for, trying to uphold which, his existing self-concept encountered a boundary experience, and confounded his judgement of agency? Here, we have to discuss how the philosophy of the Gītā understands agency. The Gītā attributes whatever actions a man performs in thought, word, and deed, to five causes: the body, the sense organs, the sense of doer-ship, the efforts, and the divine providence (Gītā 18.14). The effect that follows, in the form of pleasure and pain, creates a sense of enjoyer-ship leading to attachment, bondage, and suffering. To free oneself from suffering, one must free oneself from the sense of enjoyer-ship. However, this requires action and hence a sense of doer-ship. It is important to note here that The Gītā does not ascribe direct agency to the Self (Ātman). Rather, it regards our notion of ‘Self as an agent’ as a result of our ignorance of its true nature, for the Self is beyond all the above causes of agency, and their effects (Gambhīrānanda 2018; Gītā 2.21). We all have an intuitive awareness of the presence of the Self in us, and some of us, like Arjuna, have a conceptual knowledge about its true nature.

This conceptual knowledge is comparable to the finger pointing at the moon; we cannot walk on the finger and reach the moon. Arjuna wanted to pursue his ideal of Dharma with a sense of enjoyer-ship. However, when he considered the true nature of the Self, he saw that this was incompatible with his dutiful sense of doer-ship. Therefore, he had to deal with a counterintuitive proposition that performing actions is the only means to freedom from action. There is no escape from action even in the path of knowledge (Gītā 3.4). This is because Arjuna is not ignorant in the sense that he has inadequate or half-knowledge about the truth. However, he is ignorant in the sense that he cannot ascertain the truth by seeking further knowledge about the truth. There is no such knowledge according to the Gītā. If there is, it can be styled as Informed Ignorance where our level of knowledge (no matter how much higher), is bound to our state of awareness. But the nature of higher knowledge is such that it will not allow itself to be subordinated to lower self-awareness. This can often torment the self to no end, unless one takes action to uplift the self, or slumps so low that the knowledge gets obscured. Hence, by claiming himself to be the Self (Ātman) who is beyond all actions, Arjuna can neither free himself from the fetters of action nor attain true self-realization. Arjuna’s knowledge of Self as free from all actions is bound to his awareness of himself as an agent. Therefore, he has to work with this awareness rather than fool himself with the promises of superior knowledge. The philosophy of the Gītā does not look at Arjuna’s ignorance as a negative state of half-knowledge (incomplete knowledge of truth); it neither looks at it as ordinary instance of ignorance (lack of any knowledge of truth) but sees it as a positive state of “Informed Ignorance”. No one can abjure activity altogether, as activity is natural for all. But for a person of Informed Ignorance, action is not only inescapable, but if properly directed, it can uplift the self to a higher order of integration. Now, continuing with the example of Arjuna, let us learn how a counselee can harness his/her awareness of Informed Ignorance to empower agency rather than denying it.

10. Arjuna’s Judgement of Agency

We discussed how different modes of ‘thinking about actions’ constituted the dialogical self of Arjuna. In thinking about actions, the concept of Puruṣārtha, or the goal of life, has played a very vital role in the history of Indian thought. Puruṣārtha is based on the idea that humans, like other living beings, act instinctually; but, they can also do so intentionally. That is, we can consciously set before ourselves ends, and seek after them. It is this conscious deliberation that transforms them into Puruṣārthas. This means that even the ends which humans share with other animals, for instance, food and sex, may become Puruṣārthas, provided they are sought knowingly. Puruṣārtha is thus the aim or goal of human life which is consciously sought to be accomplished either as an end in itself or as a means to the accomplish a further end. Following an axiological approach, the Indian tradition has recognized four Puruṣārthas: Dharma (duty), Artha (wealth), Kāma (pleasure), and Mokṣa (liberation). Of the four, Artha and Kāma are the lower values that we are naturally inclined to seek, while Dharma and Mokṣa are higher and highest values, respectively. Dharma is the necessary means of attaining the other three Puruṣārthas. The Mahābhārata regards Dharma as the source, the guiding principle, of both Kāma and Artha and suggests that one should secure all the three. The popular belief by this period was that the renunciation of this triad or Trivarga was the key to the Puruṣārtha par excellence or Mokṣa as the former were only instrumental values. It seems that there was a philosophical confusion surrounding this belief, as the Gītā, an integral part of Mahābhārata, takes a critical stance towards the renunciation of actions as a means for liberation (Mokṣa)—the highest end of life. The key themes that comprise the Gītā, with its philosophical underpinnings, and the ethical principles through which it tries to deal with the perennial problems of life, suggest its close alliance with the Upaniṣadic thought. For this reason, Bhagavad Gītā is also known as Gītopaniṣad. The concepts of Varṇa and Āśrama were two more concepts that closely corresponded with the Puruṣārthas. The Varṇa system or the social–occupational stratification of individuals into four classes consisted of Śūdras, who toiled at the bottom of the social ladder; Vaiśyas, the businessmen; Kṣatriyas, the warrior class, and Brāhmaṇas at the top, forming the scholarly order. The Āśrama system referred to the four stages of life viz, Brahmacharya or early student life, Gṛhastha or householder, Vānaprastha or the retired, and then Saṃnyāsa or the ascetic life of renunciation. It was possible to leap from Brahmacharya to Saṃnyāsa aiming straight for Mokṣa if it followed from a sense of true renunciation. Similarly, the transition between the four classes is not unheard of. This paper precludes a detailed treatment of the socio-political structures of Varṇa–Āśrama systems as they existed in the Gītā’s time nor considers their applicability in modern contexts. It suffices to note that Arjuna was a Kṣatriya and a Gṛhastha. This information serves as a contextual lens to understand Arjuna’s stationed duty (Svadharma) as a warrior, and householder, which is central to his moral and existential disquiet in the dialogue. We will be more focused on the concept of Svadharma, or stationed duty, as it is critical to the narrative of the Gītā. Arjuna’s inner conflict arises, as we shall see, because he perceives a profound tension between his duty as a Kṣatriya (to uphold justice and protect social order through warfare) and his ethical concerns regarding violence and familial destruction. Understanding Arjuna’s Varṇa–Āśrama helps illuminate the stakes of his disquiet and the dialogical process through which Kṛṣṇa guides him toward resolving this tension.

Now, let us examine how these modes of ‘thinking about actions’ influenced Arjuna’s judgement of agency, and see where his values clashed with his model of actions. Arjuna, after examining his notion of Dharma, came to an understanding that he primarily has two choices as an agent: one, to fulfil his stationed duty as a Kṣatriya by waging the war against his unscrupulous friends and relatives; and two, to defect from his duty and give up his rights—that is, opt out of the contest; though he seems inclined towards the latter, he is unable to get over the former. So, as an excuse for this inaction, and to be consistent with his ideal of upholding righteousness, he proposes to upgrade himself to the monastic ideal of Saṃnyāsa6 (renunciation of actions). This ideal is not only accommodated in the normative framework of Dharma of the period under consideration, but recognized as an even higher ideal than the performance of actions.

However, just as his notion of the eternality, his notion of the renunciation of actions was problematic. Arjuna had made a couple of assumptions about the renunciation of actions (Saṃnyāsa): one, that he could artificially dispense with his agency (sense of doer-ship); and two, that the consciousness of the monastic ideal is the ascertainment of non-agentive Self in reality. These assumptions are exposed through the counterpositions from the voices of the extended self (Kṛṣṇa) in his dialogical space, such as, “to restrain from external action while mentally continuing to dwell on the objects is hypocritical” (Gītā 3.6). As a dialogical response to this, he could be imagined to reproach himself for his clinging attitude as a miser (Kṛpaṇa7), who is unable to tolerate the least loss of his possessions which his duty naturally demands (Gītā 2.7). Through this emotional development, he receives the doctrine of disinterested action (Niṣkāma Karma), that the monastic ideal of Saṃnyāsa stands not for renunciation of action, but for renunciation in action, (Hiriyanna 1932). This offers a dialogical metaposition to view the multiple realities playing out in his value system. He is able to clearly acknowledge that his devotion should be to fulfil his social obligation (Dharma) to fight as a Kṣatriya. His desire for kingdom made him feel guilty only because he had to kill his near and dear ones for it. Even if they were not to be the dear ones, his desire for enjoyment (kingdom) would come in the way of his belief in the ideal of Dharma, which enjoins on him the performance of duty for duty’s sake. Therefore, it was not the prospect of waging the war against his friends and relatives that challenged his judgement of the agency, as he had initially assumed. It was his mastery over the self along the lines of his consciousness of a higher ideal (Dharma). He needed conviction in action and not recourse to inaction. The growing awareness of Arjuna can be seen as taking a new internal position in his dialogical space corresponding to, “I-as-a-person-of-Informed-Ignorance” which offers him a metapositional view to distinguish between the positions of “I-as-not-desiring-to-fight” and “I-as-not-desiring-to-fight-for-selfish-gain”.

11. Arjuna’s Development of Agentive Reason

Now, what remains to be worked out by Arjuna, can be stated in the form of a further position: “No voluntary activity, however, seems conceivable without some motive or other.” (Hiriyanna 1932). Nobody can abjure activity (Karma), not even for a moment. If freedom from action is impossible without freedom from desire, the converse is also true. When it comes to human agency, the capacity to act is believed to originate in will or volition. The volition further requires an object and a desire to pursue the object. No voluntary or intentional activity seems conceivable without some motive or other. Will without desire, appears to be a fiction. Further, our actions could be involuntary and unintentional; action could be done under duress or out of ignorance. At this point, we have to realize that the philosophy of the Gītā differs subtly from many prominent theories of action. For instance, it differs from Aristotle’s view that an act is voluntary if it is not due to ignorance and not due to compulsion (Campos 2013)—for it treats ignorance as an epistemic concept and compulsion as a causal concept. It also differs from Elizabeth Anscombe’s distinction between voluntary and intentional action (Anscombe 1957)—for it attaches no responsibility to mere actions, but makes us accountable for the act of will itself. Consequently, when an act is involuntary due to ignorance, the Gītā attaches no responsibility for that mere act, except in so far as we are accountable for that ignorance itself (Hiriyanna 1932). When our voluntary act is not intentional, it demands on us, intent. In any case, it does not allow us to undermine or overlook the value and importance of being an agent.

Arjuna’s possible choices (action and inaction) have the following implications: Arjuna is not ignorant—hence, his actions are voluntary; not half-knowledgeable—hence, he consents to uphold righteousness; however, if his dutifulness to do so is not his own choice but coerced upon him or at least not fully his own choice, then, this would negate voluntariness; but, it would offer him an incentive—heaven if killed in valor, or enjoyment in victory (Gītā 2.37); on the other hand, if his choices do not correspond to his ideals, then his actions would not be aligned with his intentions; and, Arjuna has not ascertained the true nature of Self (non-agency)—hence, he cannot escape actions (Karma). His metapositional perspectives seem to suggest quite a counterintuitive possibility that “he who finds inaction in action, and action in inaction, he is the wise one” (Gītā 4.18). This allows him to bring Agentive Reason into his judgement of agency. Now we shall see how this significant metapositional vision reshapes his views and offers him a model of action that would be in line with his own value system and personal I-position. That is, how he would be able to adhere to his higher ideal of “I-as-Self-who-is-non-agent” and “My-renunciation-in-action” by ‘thinking about his actions’ that attributes agency to the self; and how his self reconfigures agency by ‘acting on his thoughts and determines the agent’s positive disposition to interact with its environment. The Gītā, through its unique view of agency, aligns the voluntary and intentional conduct closely through the notion of Informed Ignorance.

Ādi Śaṅkara (Srinivasa Chari 2005) explains the contradictory statement, “he who finds inaction in action, and action in inaction”, by placing agency in the field of ignorance—not plain ignorance but Informed Ignorance. This would mean to Arjuna that “I-as-a-person-of-Informed-Ignorance” acts towards the realization of “I-as-Self-who-is-non-agent” through “My-renunciation-in-action”. Through these personal positions, the sense of doer-ship is kept intact and cultivated to free him from the sense of enjoyer-ship altogether. Arjuna’s problem of will without desire, or action without motive is also addressed here because Agentive Reason makes ‘thinking the action’ (I-as-a-person-of-Informed-Ignorance), ‘action the result’ (My-renunciation-in-action) and perfection of this attitude (I-as-Self-who-is-non-agent) the enjoyment. As we can observe, Agentive Reason derives the necessary will to act from the non-agent Self (Ātman) who, in turn, is free from any desire. It finds inaction of the non-agent in motivating action and action of the agent in realizing inaction. Hence, the fools, not the learned ones, speak of (the path of) action and renunciation as different (Gītā 5.4).

12. Limitations of This Paper

The term Informed Ignorance has been previously introduced as a position that evolves in an information-rich environment under conditions that do not allow the proper acquisition of knowledge (Cohen and Garasic 2024). The term has been employed to describe the widespread position of being exposed to an abundance of information yet lacking relevant knowledge, which is tied to the exponential growth in misinformation driven by technological developments and social media (ibid). Though the term Informed Ignorance used in this paper is an independent theoretical development and differs in its denotation from the above, we have neither attempted to distinguish nor relate the idea with the above reference. We have derived the term following the philosophy of the Gītā to depict the state of awareness in the Yoga of action. We believe that further exploration of Informed Ignorance will unravel a range of ideas before we can unify them under an umbrella term. Further, the idea has close alliances with the concept of weakness of will, which we have not covered under this study. Agentive Reason, though it builds upon the idea of Agentive Thinking (Goutham 2024), is still a relatively new concept. This paper offers only a basic introduction to the idea limiting itself to refining the judgement of Agency, based only on the philosophy of the Gītā. It does not give a detailed account of how it applies to various dimensions of agency and only touches upon its relation to non-agency. Moreover, while Informed Ignorance (though practical to a degree) highlights the limitations of epistemic certainty, it may be criticized for its somewhat abstract applications, especially in counseling contexts where an emphasis is predominantly laid on practical solutions. Furthermore, Agentive Reason is still a nascent concept that requires further empirical validation.

13. Conclusions

This study highlights the transformative potential of philosophical counseling by integrating dialogical self-theory and the symbolic insights of Bhagavad Gītā. Through the introduction of the concepts of “Informed Ignorance” and “Agentive Reason,” this paper bridges ancient philosophical wisdom with contemporary counseling frameworks, offering innovative tools to address complex moral and existential dilemmas. The dialogical self, enriched by the interplay of I-positions and metapositional thinking, emerges as a dynamic model for self-exploration and empowerment.

Arjuna’s internal conflict, as portrayed in the Gītā, serves as a compelling case study of dialogical tension and resolution. By navigating his fragmented self through Kṛṣṇa’s guidance, Arjuna exemplifies the process of cultivating informed ignorance—an epistemological stance that embraces the limits of knowledge to foster actionable wisdom. His journey toward agentive reason underscores the counselor’s role in facilitating transformative self-dialogue, enabling clients to reconcile conflicting impulses and align their actions with higher-order principles. This paper’s contributions extend beyond theoretical discourse. By situating the Gītā within dialogical self-theory, it demonstrates the text’s relevance as a symbolic framework for philosophical counseling. This approach emphasizes the importance of agency, reflective equilibrium, and epistemic humility in fostering meaningful change. It also bridges cultural and philosophical boundaries, illustrating how ancient traditions can inform modern practices without being constrained by their religious or cultural origins. However, the study acknowledges its limitations. While the theoretical model of informed ignorance and agentive reason offers significant promise, its practical application requires empirical validation. Future research should focus on developing case studies, pilot-testing these concepts in counseling sessions, and exploring their adaptability across diverse cultural and therapeutic contexts. Furthermore, the integration of related philosophical and psychological theories, such as virtue epistemology and pragmatism, could enrich the model’s interdisciplinary robustness. In conclusion, this paper invites a deeper engagement with the interplay of dialogical self-theory, philosophical texts, and counseling practices. By fostering an integrated approach that combines theoretical insights with practical applications, it paves the way for a more nuanced understanding of self-dialogue, agency, and the transformative potential of philosophical counseling. The concepts of informed ignorance and agentive reason not only offer innovative tools for counselors but also open new avenues for exploring the human capacity for growth and self-realization in an increasingly complex world.