Bhagavad Gītā as a Dialogical Space in Philosophical Counseling

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

 

This manuscript offers a fresh perspective on philosophical counseling by integrating dialogical self-theory with symbolic interpretations from the Bhagavad Gita. The blend of philosophical and psychological frameworks, particularly Hubert Hermans' dialogical self-theory applied to the ancient text, is both unique and innovative, providing a new angle to explore the development of agency in the context of counseling.

 

The introduction of concepts like "Informed Ignorance" and "Agentive Reason" adds significant theoretical value to the discourse. These ideas are not only philosophically significant but are also practical in nature, offering tools that could be highly useful in counseling. The author effectively illustrates how counselors can help clients navigate internal conflicts by fostering a "metaposition," drawing parallels with Arjuna’s crisis in the Bhagavad Gita. The focus on dialogical space and the counselor's role in broadening the internal landscape of the counselee is particularly worth noting.

 

Suggestions for Improvement:

 

1. Although "Informed Ignorance" and "Agentive Reason" are interesting and valuable ideas, they could benefit from further explanation, particularly in comparison to existing theories in philosophy and psychology. Providing concrete examples or case studies from actual counseling practice to illustrate their application would help bring these concepts to life.

 

2. The literature review could be more comprehensive, especially concerning dialogical self-theory and its prior use in counseling and therapy. Engaging more deeply with relevant works would better position the current study within the broader academic landscape and demonstrate how it builds upon or diverges from previous research.

 

3. While the manuscript introduces thought-provoking theoretical insights, its practical applications could be better articulated. How can counselors implement these concepts in their sessions? A more detailed discussion, possibly including a step-by-step framework or hypothetical scenarios, would enrich the manuscript and make it more relevant to practitioners.

 

4. The paper would benefit from smoother transitions between sections. At times, the shift from theoretical discussions to symbolic readings of the Bhagavad Gita feels somewhat abrupt. A more seamless integration of these two strands would greatly improve readability. Additionally, clearer subheadings or section divisions could provide better guidance for the reader as they navigate the paper.

 

5. The manuscript would be stronger if it addressed potential limitations or critiques of using the Bhagavad Gita as a framework for counseling. For instance, does the cultural or religious specificity of the text limit its applicability across different client populations? A thoughtful discussion of these aspects would add nuance to the paper.

 

6. The conclusion section could be more robust. It would be helpful to see a stronger synthesis of the key points raised in the paper, as well as a clearer statement of the manuscript’s contribution to philosophical counseling and dialogical self-theory. Additionally, outlining possible directions for future research or practical applications would strengthen the closing remarks.

 

Recommendation:

 

This manuscript presents novel and insightful contributions to the field of philosophical counseling, particularly through its application of dialogical self-theory and its exploration of agency using the Bhagavad Gita as a symbolic framework. However, the paper would benefit from revisions, particularly in terms of expanding on the practical implications of its key concepts, clarifying theoretical contributions, and improving the structure and flow.

 

I recommend considering this paper for publication after minor revisions. If the suggested improvements are made, the manuscript will offer a valuable contribution to the fields of philosophical counseling and interdisciplinary studies.

Comments on the Quality of English Language

The overall quality of the English language in the manuscript is satisfactory, but there are areas that could be improved to enhance clarity, readability, and the flow of ideas. Here are a few suggestions:

 

1. Some sentences are overly long and complex, which can hinder comprehension. For instance, the sentence beginning with "The dialogical extension of the self (of the counselee)..." (lines 41-42) could be broken down into shorter, more digestible sentences to improve readability.

 

There are occasional minor grammatical issues, such as missing articles or awkward phrasing. For example, the phrase "its practical teachings are unambiguously aimed at making people realise to the fullest, their individual responsibility as actors" could be rephrased for better clarity and flow.

 

2. There are inconsistencies in spelling. For example, both "counseling" (American English) and "counselling" (British English) are used throughout the text. It would be beneficial to standardize the spelling to maintain uniformity.

 

Similarly, the manuscript alternates between "Bhagavad Gita" and "Bhagavadgita." A consistent approach to the spelling of this key term would improve the overall coherence.

 

3. Some word choices seem unnecessarily complex. For example, the use of "exapts" (line 145) is uncommon and could be replaced with a more familiar term like "draws from" or "adapts from" for easier comprehension.

 

There are occasional redundancies that could be streamlined. For instance, terms such as "informed ignorance" and "agentive reason" are repeated multiple times in close proximity. Reducing repetition would help keep the reader's attention on the main argument.

 

4. Transitions between sections could be smoother. Currently, the manuscript sometimes shifts abruptly between theoretical discussions and symbolic interpretations, which may confuse the reader. Adding clearer transitional phrases would help guide the reader more effectively through the argument.

 

5. Some sentences are overly long and could benefit from additional punctuation. For example, using more commas or semicolons could help break up complex ideas and make the text easier to follow.

 

6. Certain sections are dense with complex ideas, which may make it difficult for the reader to follow the argument. For instance, the discussion of dialogical self-theory could benefit from more straightforward language and fewer nested clauses.

 

Technical terms such as "metaposition" and "I-positions" are used frequently, but they are not always clearly explained. It would be helpful to provide more accessible definitions early on for readers who may not be familiar with these concepts.

 

Overall, while the manuscript is generally well-written, there is room for improvement in terms of clarity, sentence structure, and consistency. Simplifying complex sentences, ensuring consistent terminology, and improving transitions between sections would enhance the manuscript's accessibility and overall readability.

Author Response

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

1. Although "Informed Ignorance" and "Agentive Reason" are interesting and valuable ideas, they could benefit from further explanation, particularly in comparison to existing theories in philosophy and psychology. Providing concrete examples or case studies from actual counseling practice to illustrate their application would help bring these concepts to life.

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

Thank you for this thoughtful suggestion. We agree that "Informed Ignorance" and "Agentive Reason" are critical theoretical concepts, and their detailed articulation is essential. In the revised manuscript, we have expanded the scope of both concepts in the introduction by situating them within broader philosophical and psychological frameworks. Additionally, while we acknowledge the value of case studies, we have noted that their development requires empirical validation through actual counseling sessions, which we aim to pursue in future research. In the current paper, we have sought to illustrate these ideas through the symbolic example of Arjuna’s dialogue with Krishna, providing a foundational framework for future empirical work.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

2. The literature review could be more comprehensive, especially concerning dialogical self-theory and its prior use in counseling and therapy. Engaging more deeply with relevant works would better position the current study within the broader academic landscape and demonstrate how it builds upon or diverges from previous research.

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

While the interdisciplinary nature of this essay inherently limits its ability to exhaustively cover all aspects of dialogical self-theory, we have ensured that its scope is clearly elaborated in the revised manuscript. Between lines 60 and 70, of the revised manuscript, we provide a detailed discussion of Hermans’ foundational contributions to dialogical self-theory and its relevance to counseling.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

3. While the manuscript introduces thought-provoking theoretical insights, its practical applications could be better articulated. How can counselors implement these concepts in their sessions? A more detailed discussion, possibly including a step-by-step framework or hypothetical scenarios, would enrich the manuscript and make it more relevant to practitioners.

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

We have now made the practical applications of the theoretical insights more explicit in the revised manuscript. Section 6 ("Dialogical Tension Leading to a Boundary Experience") has been enhanced to outline a step-by-step framework for implementing these concepts in counseling sessions. Additionally, we have drawn a clearer connection between the teachings of the Bhagavad Gita and counseling practices, illustrating how Krishna’s guidance to Arjuna serves as a model for facilitating meta-positions [see pages 8 and 9]. A step-by-step manual is what we intend to develop after pilot-testing this model, which will happen in future. That would be a separate work in itself. The use of this theoretical model has been indicated as a direction for future research.

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

4. The paper would benefit from smoother transitions between sections. At times, the shift from theoretical discussions to symbolic readings of the Bhagavad Gita feels somewhat abrupt. A more seamless integration of these two strands would greatly improve readability. Additionally, clearer subheadings or section divisions could provide better guidance for the reader as they navigate the paper.

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

Thank you for your valuable feedback regarding transitions and the organization of the paper. In response, we have revised the manuscript to improve the flow between theoretical discussions and symbolic interpretations. Specifically, we have added bridging sentences at the end of key sections to create seamless transitions. These revisions explicitly link the theoretical constructs of dialogical self-theory to their symbolic exemplifications in the Bhagavad Gita, ensuring that the narrative remains coherent and engaging.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

5. The manuscript would be stronger if it addressed potential limitations or critiques of using the Bhagavad Gita as a framework for counseling. For instance, does the cultural or religious specificity of the text limit its applicability across different client populations? A thoughtful discussion of these aspects would add nuance to the paper.

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

We have addressed this in the revised manuscript by explicitly discussing the cultural and religious context of the Bhagavad Gita. To ensure broader applicability, we have clarified that the study focuses on extracting universal philosophical insights from the text, rather than relying on its cultural or theological specificities. This distinction, outlined in lines 324–326 of the revised manuscript, emphasizes the adaptability of the framework for diverse counseling contexts while respecting its cultural origins.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

6. The conclusion section could be more robust. It would be helpful to see a stronger synthesis of the key points raised in the paper, as well as a clearer statement of the manuscript’s contribution to philosophical counseling and dialogical self-theory. Additionally, outlining possible directions for future research or practical applications would strengthen the closing remarks.

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

We have significantly revised the conclusion to address your feedback. The updated conclusion provides a stronger synthesis of the paper’s key contributions, including the introduction of "Informed Ignorance" and "Agentive Reason" as practical extensions of dialogical self-theory. It highlights the integration of Hermans’ theoretical framework with the symbolic teachings of the Bhagavad Gita, emphasizing the paper’s contribution to philosophical counseling. Additionally, the conclusion now outlines clear directions for future research, such as the development of empirical case studies, pilot-testing the framework in counseling sessions, and exploring cross-cultural adaptations. These enhancements aim to provide a more robust and forward-looking closing statement.

 

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

1. Some sentences are overly long and complex, which can hinder comprehension. For instance, the sentence beginning with "The dialogical extension of the self (of the counselee)..." (lines 41-42) could be broken down into shorter, more digestible sentences to improve readability.

There are occasional minor grammatical issues, such as missing articles or awkward phrasing. For example, the phrase "its practical teachings are unambiguously aimed at making people realise to the fullest, their individual responsibility as actors" could be rephrased for better clarity and flow.

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

We have revised the manuscript to address these concerns. Sentences flagged as overly long have been broken down into shorter, more comprehensible structures. The sentence on the dialogical extension of the self and the phrasing of "its practical teachings..." have been rephrased for better clarity and flow. Additional grammar and phrasing issues have also been corrected to enhance readability.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

2. There are inconsistencies in spelling. For example, both "counseling" (American English) and "counselling" (British English) are used throughout the text. It would be beneficial to standardize the spelling to maintain uniformity.

Similarly, the manuscript alternates between "Bhagavad Gita" and "Bhagavadgita." A consistent approach to the spelling of this key term would improve the overall coherence.

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

The manuscript has been standardized to ensure consistent spelling. "Counseling" (American English) has been used uniformly throughout the text for coherence. Regarding "Bhagavad Gita," the term has been consistently used except for the title in the reference to S. M. Srinivasa Chari's (2005) The Philosophy of the Bhagavadgita, where we have retained the spelling as it appears in the original title to maintain citation accuracy.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

3. Some word choices seem unnecessarily complex. For example, the use of "exapts" (line 145) is uncommon and could be replaced with a more familiar term like "draws from" or "adapts from" for easier comprehension.

There are occasional redundancies that could be streamlined. For instance, terms such as "informed ignorance" and "agentive reason" are repeated multiple times in close proximity. Reducing repetition would help keep the reader's attention on the main argument.

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

The term "exapts" has been replaced with "draws from" for better comprehension. Redundancies, particularly the repeated use of terms like "informed ignorance" and "agentive reason," have been reduced where appropriate to improve the readability and maintain the reader’s engagement with the main argument.

 

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

4. Transitions between sections could be smoother. Currently, the manuscript sometimes shifts abruptly between theoretical discussions and symbolic interpretations, which may confuse the reader. Adding clearer transitional phrases would help guide the reader more effectively through the argument.

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

As mentioned before, we have revised the manuscript to enhance the flow between theoretical discussions and symbolic interpretations. Bridging sentences have been added at the end of key sections to ensure smoother transitions. These changes explicitly connect the theoretical principles of dialogical self-theory with their symbolic representation in the Bhagavad Gita, maintaining a coherent and engaging narrative throughout.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

5. Some sentences are overly long and could benefit from additional punctuation. For example, using more commas or semicolons could help break up complex ideas and make the text easier to follow.

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

The manuscript has been revised to address these concerns. Long sentences have been restructured, and appropriate punctuation, such as commas and semicolons, has been added to clarify complex ideas and enhance readability.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

6. Certain sections are dense with complex ideas, which may make it difficult for the reader to follow the argument. For instance, the discussion of dialogical self-theory could benefit from more straightforward language and fewer nested clauses.

Technical terms such as "metaposition" and "I-positions" are used frequently, but they are not always clearly explained. It would be helpful to provide more accessible definitions early on for readers who may not be familiar with these concepts.

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

We have revised the discussion of dialogical self-theory to use more straightforward language and simplified nested clauses to improve clarity. Definitions of technical terms such as "metaposition" and "I-positions" have been added earlier in the manuscript to provide accessible explanations for readers unfamiliar with these concepts.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

“Developing Agentive Reason through Informed Ignorance” (hereafter, essay) is an interdisciplinary essay. After all, it is associable to at least three areas of inquiry. a) Traditional Philosophy in the sense of a discipline that handles disputes, such as that over the distinction between knowledge and ignorance. b) Clinical Psychology in the broad sense of a discipline that aims to deal with some sort of human suffering. And c) Religious Studies in the sense of a discipline that aims to interpret books that have been called “holy”, such as the Bhagavad Gita (hereafter, Gita).

I am very sympathetic to interdisciplinary essays; I think that original research can be done through them and even, arguably, only through them. However, an interdisciplinary essay, I would like to assume, needs to satisfy a strong or at least a weak condition. The strong condition is to add something relevant vis-à-vis all the disciplines that are part of the plurality of those that form the interdisciplinary realm at stake. The weak condition is to do that vis-à-vis at least one of these disciplines, some sort of subdiscipline of these disciplines or some sort of unique quite specific intersection of these subdisciplines.

This essay, I interpret, does not satisfy the strong condition due to the following reasons:

1. All sorts of particular uses of concepts, such as “knowledge” or “ignorance”, that have been adopted throughout the history of philosophy in all sorts of ways are merely assumed in a not particular precise fashion in the essay. Thus, it is hard to understand what this essay adds to Traditional Philosophy. To do that, the essay would have to show, to begin with, why it is philosophically pertinent to use these concepts in the essay’s fashion.

2. The essay does not compare “philosophical counselling” (line 29) to other kinds of therapies, such as psychoanalysis, that have been proposed to tackle human suffering. Thus, is it hard to understand what the essay adds to Clinical Psychology.

3. The essay discusses part of the literature on the Gita, even if it ignores some core readings such as Gandhi’s, Angelika Malinar’s etc. Nevertheless, the essay does not explicitly indicate what its interpretation adds to this literature. More exactly, the essay merely applies the concepts it connects to philosophical counselling to articulate a reading of the Gita, without showing why this would be relevant to those interested in the huge history of this book’s interpretations; a history that includes even Nazi readings. In the end, the essay’s proposed reading is a bit too broad. This is to state that it is not clear what the essay adds to Religious Studies.

One could yet argue that the strong condition is too demanding; that, hence, only the weak condition should suffice. More exactly, that is to read that the essay should only seek to add something to a quite specific area of inquiry; that of those who are interested in using the Gita to develop insights from works by Hubert Hermans. The essay, I interpret, likewise does not satisfy this weak condition. The reasons are the following:

4. Lines 67 to 79 do not justify the thesis of line of 80: that that “the ideas of Bhagavad Gita are as relevant and meaningful today as when they were written”. Lines 67 and 79 merely indicate that there have been all kinds of readings of this work. More broadly, Section 2, I believe, would have to be articulated in a more detailed way to back up the aim of using the Gita for a contemporary clinical purpose, as the essay seems to aim.

5. The presentation of Hermans’ views in Section 3 is a bit too quick; it is quite hard to understand why his views matter for Clinical Psychology at all. More specifically, a statement had to be explained in more detail: that “The others, it is to be noted, are not seen as purely outside by Hermans, but rather as simultaneously part of the self” (p.141). Are these others like paraconsistent objects that have contradictory properties, such as that of being part and not being part of the self at the same time? Questions, like this, would have to be tackled in a more interesting presentation of Hermans’ views.

6. A more interesting presentation of Hermans’ views would, moreover, explain the justification for introducing concepts, such that of a “minisociety” (line 159) within the self. To do that is to explain the difference between this minisociety and the mental lives of those who are usually called “schizophrenics”. That is not yet done in Section 4.

7. The essay makes analogies between: a philosophical counselor and Krishna; Arjuna and a counselee; and philosophical counseling and the Gita’s dialogue between Krishna and Arjuna. Krishna is yet some sort of deity with all sorts of supernatural powers. The essay does not tackle this particular “detail”. Thus it is not particularly explicit why one should accept these analogies in the first place.

8. As the essay’s footnote 2 indicates in line 584, “Kshatriya is one of the four traditional social classes (Varna) of ancient India and is associated with the warrior aristocracy”. A plausible reading is that the Gita seems to presuppose these classes as well as that its respective members have specific duties related to their respective classes. Given that, it is also hard to see the pertinence of the stated analogies. After all, these classes do not exist in Western societies. Actually, let us consider India; one could make a case for the claim that these classes still exist there. Yet one would have to acknowledge that these classes do not exist today in the exact same way that they did in the Gita’s time. A more interesting paper would tackle this kind of issue.

9. The essay does not discuss all sorts of empirical factors relevant to philosophical counseling. For instance, where this counseling is supposed to occur? Is it in any capitalist Western country? In Germany? In India? Somewhere else in the Global South? Should the counselee have some kind of philosophical background, say, a BA in philosophy? If not, why would philosophical counseling be pertinent vis-à-vis this counselee? What kind of human suffering should be handled through this kind of counseling? Etc.

10. In lines 361-361, the essay associates Arjuna’s duty to a sort of categorical imperative of the kind proposed by Kant. However, it is not obvious whether this association should be made. That is especially because, as indicated above, it is plausible to read that the Gita attaches specific duties to specific classes, instead of aiming to determine, along Kant’s lines, universal duties that all rational agents should adopt, regardless of their classes or other empirical factors. More broadly, the very practice of translating the Gita’s vocabulary into those of Western philosophy is quite problematic; it requires, therefore, a more careful exegetical work than the one provided by the essay.

It is possible to solve all the worries raised by 1 to 10. However, it seems to me that to do that, one would have to write a completely new essay.

 

 

 

Author Response

Response To the Comments and Suggestions of The Reviewer 2

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

“Developing Agentive Reason through Informed Ignorance” (hereafter, paper) is an interdisciplinary paper. After all, it is associable to at least three areas of inquiry. a) Traditional Philosophy in the sense of a discipline that handles disputes, such as that over the distinction between knowledge and ignorance. b) Clinical Psychology in the broad sense of a discipline that aims to deal with some sort of human suffering. And c) Religious Studies in the sense of a discipline that aims to interpret books that have been called “holy”, such as the Bhagavad Gita (hereafter, Gita).

I am very sympathetic to interdisciplinary papers; I think that original research can be done through them and even, arguably, only through them. However, an interdisciplinary paper, I would like to assume, needs to satisfy a strong or at least a weak condition. The strong condition is to add something relevant vis-à-vis all the disciplines that are part of the plurality of those that form the interdisciplinary realm at stake. The weak condition is to do that vis-à-vis at least one of these disciplines, some sort of subdiscipline of these disciplines or some sort of unique quite specific intersection of these subdisciplines.

This paper, I interpret, does not satisfy the strong condition due to the following reasons:

 

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

We appreciate the reviewer’s thoughtful engagement with the interdisciplinary nature of the paper. We agree that “Developing Agentive Reason through Informed Ignorance” is inherently interdisciplinary, as it engages with multiple domains of inquiry such as traditional Philosophy, particularly in addressing concepts like knowledge and ignorance. But we believe that both; (b) Clinical Psychology, in its indirect engagement with themes of human suffering, and (c) Religious Studies, as it draws from and interprets the Bhagavad Gita; might not be of direct relevance to our work. We respectfully differ with the reviewer’s assessment that the paper does not satisfy the strong condition for interdisciplinarity.

While the paper draws upon concepts such as the dialogical self (Lines 92–94 and 286–289), it does so strictly for their philosophical significance rather than their clinical application. For instance, the concept of the dialogical self, though stemming from psychology, is rooted in philosophical traditions that emphasize inner dialogue and self-reflection. The dilemma of Arjuna, which forms the core of this paper, is approached as a philosophical problem, not as a clinical one.

As stated in Lines 92–94:

“The application of the Bhagavad Gita’s teachings to contemporary philosophical practice not only highlights the enduring relevance of these ideas but also illustrates how ancient philosophical dialogues can be reinterpreted to address modern epistemological and psychological challenges.”

Similarly, in Lines 286–289:

“The concept of the dialogical self, although stemming from psychology, has its roots in the history of philosophy, and this is important to note here because the dilemma of Arjuna is philosophical, and the dialogical space in which it is dealt with does not lend itself to psychological treatment.”

We have, therefore, deliberately limited the paper’s scope to philosophical counselling rather than clinical psychology.

Speaking of engagement with religious studies, the paper explicitly disentangles the Bhagavad Gita’s philosophical teachings from its theological or religious connotations. Section 2 (Significance of Bhagavad Gita to Philosophical Counselling, Lines 67–79) focuses on the text’s practical implications for philosophical counselling, rather than its status as a holy book.

For example, in Lines 31–32, we state:

“This paper seeks to integrate the theoretical frameworks of dialogism and pragmatism with the practical imperatives of philosophical counselling.”

By addressing the Gita as a philosophical dialogue rather than a religious scripture, the paper engages with its symbolic and practical dimensions, which are central to its reinterpretation in contemporary philosophical counselling. The paper’s central contribution lies in its exploration of agency, a theme that connects Traditional Philosophy, dialogical self-theory, and the teachings of the Bhagavad Gita. This is addressed across multiple sections:

• Section 3 (Understanding Agency through I-positions) links the concept of agency with dialogical self-theory, grounding it in philosophical inquiry.
• Section 8 (Philosophical Practice Underlying the Bhagavad Gita) extends this discussion by exploring how agency is symbolically represented in the dialogue between Krishna and Arjuna.

These discussions underscore the paper’s primary objective: to demonstrate how the concepts of Agentive Reason and Informed Ignorance can enrich philosophical counselling practices by drawing upon interdisciplinary frameworks.

While the paper may not fully satisfy the strong condition of interdisciplinarity, it meets the weak condition by offering a substantial contribution to Traditional Philosophy and philosophical counselling. The paper’s interdisciplinary engagement is further enhanced by its reinterpretation of the Bhagavad Gita as a dialogical framework, bridging the domains of philosophical practice and symbolic thought.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

This paper, I interpret, does not satisfy the strong condition due to the following reasons:

#1

All sorts of particular uses of concepts, such as “knowledge” or “ignorance”, that have been adopted throughout the history of philosophy in all sorts of ways are merely assumed in a not particular precise fashion in the paper. Thus, it is hard to understand what this paper adds to Traditional Philosophy. To do that, the paper would have to show, to begin with, why it is philosophically pertinent to use these concepts in the paper’s fashion.

#3

The paper discusses part of the literature on the Gita, even if it ignores some core readings such as Gandhi’s, Angelika Malinar’s etc. Nevertheless, the paper does not explicitly indicate what its interpretation adds to this literature. More exactly, the paper merely applies the concepts it connects to philosophical counselling to articulate a reading of the Gita without showing why this would be relevant to those interested in the huge history of this book’s interpretations, a history that includes even Nazi readings. In the end, the paper’s proposed reading is a bit too broad. This is to state that it is not clear what the paper adds to Religious Studies.

 

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

We are glad to see this thoughtful observation and would like to clarify the paper’s philosophical approach to “knowledge” and “ignorance.” These concepts are adapted uniquely to the Bhagavad Gita’s philosophical framework, which presents them not merely as opposites but as dynamic categories contributing to reflective decision-making and agency. The paper does not aim to offer a definitive philosophical analysis of these terms in a universal sense, as might be expected in a purely theoretical philosophical work. Instead, it draws on the context of the Gita’s teachings to propose practical applications of “knowledge” (jnana) and “ignorance” (avidya) in philosophical counselling. This perspective is supported in Lines 50–53:

“Moreover, the study, while examining the theoretical visions of the Bhagavad Gita and its relevance to philosophical counselling, introduces the concepts of Informed Ignorance and Agentive Reason as practical consequences of its teachings, hinting at a broader work in future.”

Furthermore, the paper explores how these concepts are integrated into a lived philosophy that addresses existential dilemmas, drawing from the Gita’s boundary experience of Arjuna’s crisis. This aligns with the methodology of philosophical practice, which, as Achenbach argues, does not offer rigid theories but instead fosters a correspondence between philosophy and life. Thus, the paper contributes to Traditional Philosophy by offering a novel interpretive framework that links ancient philosophical insights with contemporary counselling practices, thereby emphasizing the practical value of philosophical engagement with these concepts.

Speaking of Bhagavad Gita, the paper does not attempt to provide an exhaustive review of the Gita’s interpretations, it situates itself within a tradition of practical readings that emphasize the text’s relevance to human action and agency. Section 2 (Lines 62–91) cites key commentators, including Aldous Huxley, Vivekananda, and Balaganapathi Devarakonda, who have examined the Gita’s practical dimensions. These references underline the paper’s focus on the Gita as a philosophical dialogue rather than a theological or historical text. For example:

“Through this, we may infer that the ideas of Bhagavad Gita are as relevant and meaningful today as when they were written because they illuminate universal truths about the nature of reality, humanity, ethics, and consciousness, which are the recurrent common themes of global concern.”

Moreover, the paper introduces a symbolic interpretation of the dialogue between Krishna and Arjuna to highlight its relevance to philosophical counselling. This approach offers a fresh perspective by focusing on the dialogical structure and its implications for the counselee’s journey toward agency. While we acknowledge that the paper does not engage extensively with Gandhi or Angelika Malinar, we view this as a limitation rather than an oversight, as the paper’s primary aim is to connect the Gita’s insights with philosophical counselling rather than to critique or expand the broader historical literature.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

#2

The paper does not compare “philosophical counselling” (line 29) to other kinds of therapies, such as psychoanalysis, that have been proposed to tackle human suffering. Thus, is it hard to understand what the paper adds to Clinical Psychology.

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

We appreciate this observation and agree that the paper does not engage with Clinical Psychology or other therapeutic paradigms, such as psychoanalysis. As stated in Lines 29–30 and further supported in Lines 92–94 and 286–289, the scope of the paper is limited to philosophical counselling. For example, in Lines 29–30:

“In recent discourses, dialogical space and its various forms have been construed to be significantly essential in philosophical counselling (Batory, Anna, Bąk, Wacław, Oleś, Piotr and Puchalska-Wasyl, Małgorzata 2010; Goutham A. V. 2024).”

While the paper draws from concepts such as the dialogical self, it does so to explore their philosophical rather than clinical implications. The paper’s focus is on philosophical counselling as a reflective practice that bridges philosophical inquiry and practical application. It neither aims to critique other therapeutic methodologies nor to contribute to Clinical Psychology. By maintaining this focus, the paper seeks to emphasize the distinctiveness of philosophical counselling, particularly its capacity to address existential and ethical dilemmas through reflective engagement with philosophical frameworks, as demonstrated through the symbolic and practical analysis of the Bhagavad Gita.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

One could yet argue that the strong condition is too demanding; that, hence, only the weak condition should suffice. More exactly, that is to read that the paper should only seek to add something to a quite specific area of inquiry; that of those who are interested in using the Gita to develop insights from works by Hubert Hermans. The paper, I interpret, likewise does not satisfy this weak condition. The reasons are the following:

#4

Lines 67 to 79 do not justify the thesis of line of 80: that that “the ideas of Bhagavad Gita are as relevant and meaningful today as when they were written”. Lines 67 and 79 merely indicate that there have been all kinds of readings of this work. More broadly, Section 2, I believe, would have to be articulated in a more detailed way to back up the aim of using the Gita for a contemporary clinical purpose, as the paper seems to aim.

 

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

The paper integrates recent sources to support its theoretical framework. For example, references to James W. Moore (2016) and Hermans (2014) provide a modern grounding for the concepts of agency and dialogical self, aligning them with recent psychological and philosophical studies on human agency, particularly the section Understanding Agency through I-positions. This adds contemporary relevance while maintaining the classical foundation of the argument drawn from the Bhagavad Gita.

Please refer to Line (69-82):

However, some non-traditionalist Perennialist philosophers like Aldous Huxley and Huston Smith who seem more concerned with Bhagavad Gita’s practical approach towards the paths of liberation rather than its metaphysical or theological teachings, have argued that Bhagavad Gita occupies an intermediate position between scripture and theology; for it combines the poetical qualities of the first with the clear-cut methodicalness of the second (Huxley 1945; Mohammad Syifa Amin Widigdo 2020). Swami Vivekananda, an advocate of humanism and universal religion considers Bhagavad Gita to be an objective exposition of the Vedanta philosophy (Vivekananda 1986, p. 232). Balaganapathi Devarakonda has discussed that the philosophical practice of the period of Bhagavad Gita is based on the normative framework of Dharma that is centered around the social and moral order of individual actions (Balaganapathi Devarakonda 2021, p. 2607). Through this, we may infer that the ideas of Bhagavad Gita are as relevant and meaningful today as when they were written because they illuminate universal truths about the nature of reality, humanity, ethics, and consciousness, which are the recurrent common themes of global concern.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

#5

The presentation of Hermans’ views in Section 3 is a bit too quick; it is quite hard to understand why his views matter for Clinical Psychology at all. More specifically, a statement had to be explained in more detail: that “The others, it is to be noted, are not seen as purely outside by Hermans, but rather as simultaneously part of the self” (p.141). Are these others like paraconsistent objects that have contradictory properties, such as that of being part and not being part of the self at the same time? Questions like this would have to be tackled in a more interesting presentation of Hermans’ views.

 

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

To address your point about the complexity of Hermans' concept, I would like to emphasize that Hermans' view of the ‘other’ is not intended to suggest a paradoxical or contradictory relationship. Rather, it reflects a dynamic and fluid understanding of the self as relational and polyphonic. The idea that others are “simultaneously part of the self” refers to the integration of external voices—such as family, friends, or societal influences—into the internal dialogue of the self. These voices are not simply external objects or separate entities but are internalized in such a way that they become active participants in the construction of the self. This allows for the formation of “I-positions,” where different internal voices representing various aspects of the self engage in dialogue with one another and with external others.

Please refer to Line (141):

“The others, it is to be noted, are not seen as purely outside by Hermans, but rather as simultaneously part of the self (Hermans, Hubert 2011).”

This is not to suggest a paraconsistent structure where contradictory properties coexist simultaneously in a logical sense. Instead, the ‘other’ in Hermans’ framework represents the multiple, often conflicting, perspectives that are part of the dialogical self. For instance, an individual’s internal voices may represent conflicting desires or values (e.g., Arjuna’s duty as a warrior vs. his attachment to his family in the Bhagavad Gita), but these voices are not contradictory in the same way that paraconsistent objects would be. Rather, they coexist and interact within the broader self-system, contributing to the dynamic nature of agency and identity. The goal is to highlight the richness of Hermans' dialogical self theory, where the internalized others create a space for dialogue that transcends the static self-object relationship. This allows for the self to be both a subject and a site of multiplicity, where agency is shaped through the interplay of internal and external voices. Additionally, we would like to clarify that while Hermans’ theory has significant implications for Clinical Psychology, our paper does not directly address this field. Instead, the focus is on exploring the philosophical dimensions of Hermans’ work, particularly in relation to agency, selfhood, and dialogical relationships. We hope this distinction helps to clarify the scope of our analysis.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

#6

A more interesting presentation of Hermans’ views would, moreover, explain the justification for introducing concepts such as that of a “minisociety” (line 159) within the self. To do that is to explain the difference between this minisociety and the mental lives of those who are usually called “schizophrenics”. That is not yet done in Section 4.

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

To clarify, Hermans introduces the idea of the self as a "minisociety" to emphasize the polyphonic nature of identity—where multiple “I-positions” (representing different internal voices, perspectives, or roles) coexist and interact. This conception contrasts with the more conventional view of the self as a singular, unified entity. By referring to the self as a minisociety, Hermans highlights the complexity and multiplicity of internal experiences, suggesting that the self is not just a passive receiver of external societal influence but an active, internally negotiated network of perspectives. Please refer to Line (159), where Hermans argues that rather than being directly influenced by the macrosociety, the self functions as a minisociety of I-positions. This view underscores the active role of the self in shaping its identity through the interaction of various internal voices.

Regarding your point about the distinction between this minisociety and the mental lives of individuals commonly diagnosed with schizophrenia, we would like to express that introducing such a comparison, while perhaps an attempt to further clarify the concept, may not be particularly relevant to the direction of our paper. The focus of the analysis is on Hermans’ framework for understanding the self, and we believe that drawing such a parallel risks detracting from the philosophical implications we are exploring, particularly when the focus is on the dialogical self and I-positions rather than any clinical diagnostic category. The concept of the minisociety is not intended to pathologize or reduce the dynamic structure of the self to a clinical condition, which, in this context, seems an unhelpful comparison. Rather, it serves as a framework for understanding the inherent multiplicity within the self, where various “I-positions” coexist and sometimes conflict, but in a manner that contributes to an integrated and evolving self-formation. This is distinct from the fragmented and disconnected experiences often associated with schizophrenia, where the lack of coherence between I-positions can lead to a breakdown in the sense of self. Instead, think of it as a dialectical process, where internal voices reflect, challenge, and negotiate with one another—creating a fluid, complex identity rather than a fractured one.

Please refer to Line (159):

Hermans argues that rather than being directly influenced by the macrosociety, the self functions as a minisociety (of I-positions).

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

#7

The paper makes analogies between a philosophical counsellor and Krishna, Arjuna and a counselee, and philosophical counselling and Gita’s dialogue between Krishna and Arjuna. Krishna is yet some sort of deity with all sorts of supernatural powers. The paper does not tackle this particular “detail”. Thus, it is not particularly explicit why one should accept these analogies in the first place.

 

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

As clarified in the abstract (Lines 17–18) and Lines 45–46, the paper does not claim that Krishna is a philosophical counsellor. Instead, it presents Krishna’s voice as a symbolic representation of a reflective, guiding presence within Arjuna’s dialogical self.

The analogy is intended to highlight the dialogical structure of philosophical counselling, where the counsellor facilitates the client’s ability to navigate internal conflicts and achieve an adaptive metaposition. By focusing on Krishna’s methodological role rather than his divine attributes, the paper aligns with its non-theological approach. Thus, Krishna’s intervention serves as a model for the role of the philosophical counsellor, who helps the client (counselee) organize conflicting internal I-positions, thereby guiding them toward an adaptive meta position.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

#8

As the paper’s footnote 2 indicates in line 584, “Kshatriya is one of the four traditional social classes (Varna) of ancient India and is associated with the warrior aristocracy”. A plausible reading is that the Gita seems to presuppose these classes as well as that its respective members have specific duties related to their respective classes. Given that, it is also hard to see the pertinence of the stated analogies. After all, these classes do not exist in Western societies. Actually, let us consider India; one could make a case for the claim that these classes still exist there. Yet one would have to acknowledge that these classes do not exist today in the exact same way that they did in the Gita’s time. A more interesting paper would tackle this kind of issue.

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

We thank the reviewer for this insightful observation and appreciate the opportunity to clarify the paper’s intent in referencing Arjuna’s varna (caste) within the Bhagavad Gita. The mention of Arjuna’s varna is not intended to endorse or promote the socio-political structures of varna as they existed in the Gita’s time nor to suggest their applicability in modern contexts. Rather, it serves as a contextual lens to understand Arjuna’s stationed duty (svadharma) as a warrior, which is central to his moral and existential disquiet in the dialogue. The concept of svadharma, or stationed duty, is critical to the narrative of the Gita. Arjuna’s inner conflict arises because he perceives a profound tension between his duty as a Kshatriya (to uphold justice and protect social order through warfare) and his ethical concerns regarding violence and familial destruction. Understanding Arjuna’s varna helps illuminate the stakes of his disquiet and the dialogical process through which Krishna guides him toward resolving this tension.

As noted in the paper, the focus is not on the historical or contemporary existence of varna systems but on the philosophical significance of duty as an ethical concept. This approach transcends cultural and temporal boundaries. The analogy drawn in the paper highlights how Gita’s exploration of stationed duty can be reinterpreted symbolically for contemporary philosophical counselling, emphasizing the universal dilemma of balancing societal roles and personal ethics. We acknowledge that a more detailed engagement with the historical evolution and modern interpretations of varna could make for an interesting and broader discussion. However, given the paper’s focus on philosophical counselling and the symbolic interpretation of the Gita, such an exploration lies outside the current scope. Instead, the paper uses Arjuna’s varna as a narrative tool to illustrate the philosophical challenges of duty and agency, which remain universally relevant.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

#9

The paper does not discuss all sorts of empirical factors relevant to philosophical counseling. For instance, where this counseling is supposed to occur? Is it in any capitalist Western country? In Germany? In India? Somewhere else in the Global South? Should the counselee have some kind of philosophical background, say, a BA in philosophy? If not, why would philosophical counseling be pertinent vis-à-vis this counselee? What kind of human suffering should be handled through this kind of counselling? Etc.

 

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

While we agree that empirical considerations such as geographical context, cultural background, and the philosophical training of the counselee can be relevant in specific cases, they are not the focus of this paper. The purpose of the paper is to explore the philosophical methodology underlying counselling practices, emphasizing its conceptual framework rather than its empirical implementation. Philosophical counselling, as distinct from therapeutic or clinical practices, operates beyond specific spatial, cultural, or temporal boundaries. It draws from a global repository of philosophical ideas to address universal human concerns, and its applicability is shaped more by the counsellor’s expertise and philosophical acumen than by the specificities of the counselee’s background. The paper does not presuppose that a counselee must have formal training in philosophy. Philosophical counselling does not aim to transform individuals into philosophers but to facilitate reflective engagement with their lived experiences and dilemmas through a philosophical lens. As Achenbach (1984) notes, philosophical practice is less about offering solutions rooted in predefined theoretical paradigms and more about fostering a dialogue that enables the counselee to navigate their challenges with greater clarity and agency.

Moreover, the paper focuses on the symbolic and practical value of the Bhagavad Gita as a framework for addressing existential and ethical dilemmas, which are not limited by geography or cultural context. The Gita’s dialogical structure, particularly Krishna’s engagement with Arjuna, illustrates how philosophical counselling can guide individuals in reconciling inner conflicts and fulfilling their roles responsibly, regardless of their sociocultural environment. While we acknowledge that empirical factors could enrich the discussion, we believe that such an exploration would require a separate paper dedicated to the practical dimensions of philosophical counselling in specific contexts. By focusing on the conceptual and symbolic underpinnings of counselling, this paper offers a universal framework that counsellors can adapt to their own settings, ensuring its relevance across diverse cultures and regions. We hope this clarification addresses the reviewer’s concerns and provides a clearer understanding of the paper’s scope and contributions.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

#10

In lines 361-361, the paper associates Arjuna’s duty to a sort of categorical imperative of the kind proposed by Kant. However, it is not obvious whether this association should be made. That is especially because, as indicated above, it is plausible to read that the Gita attaches specific duties to specific classes, instead of aiming to determine, along Kant’s lines, universal duties that all rational agents should adopt, regardless of their classes or other empirical factors. More broadly, the very practice of translating the Gita’s vocabulary into those of Western philosophy is quite problematic; it requires, therefore, a more careful exegetical work than the one provided by the paper.

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

Regarding the comparison between Arjuna’s duty and Kant’s categorical imperative, we agree that the association may not be sufficiently justified within the scope of this paper. The Bhagavad Gita’s framework for duty (svadharma) is contextually grounded in Arjuna’s specific role as a Kshatriya, which reflects a situated ethical responsibility rather than a universal principle applicable to all rational agents, as in Kant’s categorical imperative. While both frameworks engage deeply with the concept of moral duty, their foundations and implications are distinct. In light of the reviewer’s remarks, we have removed the comparison to Kant’s categorical imperative to avoid potential misinterpretations. Instead, we have chosen to focus on the Gita’s unique contribution to philosophical counselling by emphasizing its dialogical and situational approach to resolving ethical dilemmas.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

It is possible to solve all the worries raised by 1 to 10. However, it seems to me that to do that, one would have to write a completely new paper.

 

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

We thank the reviewer for his/her thoughtful feedback. We acknowledge that the concerns raised in points 1 to 10 can be resolved (except for 5 and 6). As stated in the introduction, this article is an interdisciplinary exploration, but it is not intended to delve into the specific concerns of clinical psychology or religious studies, which seem to interest the esteemed reviewer the most. Instead, the paper focuses on the central theme of agency, drawing from the Bhagavad Gita for its symbolic and dialogical value, particularly the dialogue between Arjuna and the internalized voice of Krishna. This dialogue serves as a lens to explore the concepts of Informed Ignorance and Agentive Reason, which are useful for philosophical counseling. Rather than suggesting a prescriptive theoretical model for counseling, this paper seeks to discuss the correspondence between philosophy and life, showing how philosophical dialogue can inform the personal agency and self-understanding.

While it is certainly possible to engage more rigorously with the theoretical aspects raised by the reviewer, doing so would risk transforming this paper into something that aligns more closely with a theoretical or clinical framework, which is not the intent. Of course, should the reviewer feel inclined, they are welcome to explore these aspects further in a separate paper, but such an approach would shift the focus of this work away from its primary aim of preserving the open-ended nature of philosophical practice. We emphasise that our concern is not about providing definitive solutions but about exploring concepts in a manner that invites reflection and dialogue. This aligns with the goals outlined in the special issue of the journal, which emphasizes the value of philosophical inquiry as an ongoing exploration rather than a closed, definitive theory. Therefore, while we appreciate the suggestion to address the concerns more thoroughly, we believe such an approach would deviate from the paper's fundamental purpose and its engagement with philosophical practice as an open-ended and dialogical process.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 3 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

This fascinating article should absolutely be published. While its stated goal is to use the Bhagavadgita as a lens through which to examine the role of dialogue in philosophical counseling, in doing so, this essay provides a novel interpretation of the Bhagavadgita that will be of great interest to scholars of Hinduism as well. The dialogue format of the Bhagavadgita is too often regarded as a mere literary framing device for its ideas, but as the authors of this article convincingly demonstrate, the creation of a dialogic space in the text that allows the conflicted central character of Arjuna to explore various ideas and positions under the guidance of Krishna before arriving at a course of action can also be read as a central point of the text itself. Drawing on Hermans’ notion of the dialogical self, the authors examine Arjuna’s internal conflict in the Bhagavadgita as shifting “I-positions”, which need to be examined in order to arrive at a clarity that allows for action.

The authors of the article introduce the concept of Informed Ignorance. Although an etic term foreign to the text itself, the notion of Informed Ignorance resonates with the Bhagavadgita’s own epistemological worldview, which suggests that knowledge must begin with a realization of one’s own ignorance and the inadequacy of one’s pre-existing frameworks of understanding. The related concept of Agentive Reason is also an interesting innovation in this article. Again, while this is not a term used in the scholarship on the Bhagavadgita, it is based on a close reading of the text itself. The authors make the case that Arjuna’s crisis of agency which results in an initial inability to act is overcome through the dialogic exploration of self, desire, and action that culminates in the idea of renunciation in action.

I think this article is ready for publication as is, but just to nit-pick: it would be more helpful for the reader to have all the bibliographic entries listed together in alphabetical order, rather than divided into articles, books and book chapters, and websites. Note that an article title and a journal title seem to be missing in line 656.

Author Response

Response To the Comments and Suggestions of The Reviewer 3

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

I think this article is ready for publication as is, but just to nit-pick: it would be more helpful for the reader to have all the bibliographic entries listed together in alphabetical order, rather than divided into articles, books and book chapters, and websites.

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

Thank you for this thoughtful suggestion. We have revised the bibliographic entries list in alphabetical order as per your suggestion.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

Note that an article title and a journal title seem to be missing in line 656.

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

We are glad to see this thoughtful observation. We have corrected this reference in the revised manuscript.

 

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 4 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

In general, the paper “Developing Agentive Reason through Informed Ignorance” is a necessary contribution to Hindu studies articulated with unusual perspectives for understanding their cultural dynamics, in this case philosophical per se. Actually, the paper proposes a welcome pedagogical approach to some speculative and rational issues that are, now and then, really hard to grasp, unless it is made clear what is at stake. It is exactly because of this outstanding, remarkable breakthrough concerning the propaedeutic nuance of this paper that I believe some adjustments could be made, even considering that “the study acknowledges its limitations” (page 13).

 

In general, the paper does not bring to its approaches some technical terms either from Sanskrit itself or from Hindu culture itself. Apparently, this runs the risk of falling into some orientalism – in the negative sense of the term – insofar as culturally originating expressions of European origin, such as “self”, “agentive reason”, “informed ignorance”, are mostly used when Indian terms such as “ātman”, “vidyā”, “avidyā” etc., in their respective polysemy and semantic dynamisms in the Sanskrit language and Hindu culture, could have been used as an explanation of the author's own argumentation and reasoning especially due to the fact that an originally Hindu source, Bhagavad-gītā, is the paper’s main reference. Thus, it is possible to avoid any risk of reducing cultural, philosophical, religious, original dynamics – or deliberately inventing the Other according to one’s own mental expectations – to a framework produced by another cultural, philosophical, religious paradigm, even within the horizon of the respective approach is exactly an initiative of unusual perception with the prospect of some qualitative step forward in the human intellectual framework as a whole...

 

It would be important for the author to insert the reference frame of human goals (puruṣārthas) into the text itself when discussing not only Hindu dharma, but also different modes of “thinking about actions” (page 10) related to these puruṣārthas, as in the case of the Hindu socio-occupational stratifications (varṇas) and modes of life (āśramas), in a more broadly and clearly exposed way throughout the text, especially to make clear the polysemy implicit in the adopted categories of saṃnyāsa, kṣatriya, dharma, etc...

 

 

 

It is pertinent to highlight here why Bhagavad-gītā is also titled Gītopaniṣad in the sense of a better understanding of its didactic structure, typical of the Upaniṣads themselves, in the regular uninterrupted and intergenerational transmission from master to disciple through Vedic doctrinal lineages (guruśiṣyaparaṃparās) according to their own methodological guidelines inserted into this cultural framework as a whole...

 

Another delicate issue in the text is the prominence placed on the individual through expressions such as “I, Me and Mine”, “I-positions”, “Agency”, “Ignorance” etc. which may sound strange to a culture that privileges dissolution or dampening of the ego as a sense of individuality and principle of identification in its soteriological horizons as it seeks to relativize, in several of its doctrinal developments, the prominence of ahaṁkāra – or, in some cases, of human effort tout court (puruṣakāra) as a means of sufficiency of self-realization – and their respective attachments and impulses etc... Bhagavad-gītā itself (VII,6.12; IX,4-5.19; X,8.42; XI,33; XVIII,20.23.51-53) points out to it in Kṛṣṇa himself as Supreme Personality of Godhead as a much more sovereign existential index over the relative human individual...

 

Still in the wake of the perspective of the human condition itself, it would be worth inserting the onto-epistemological notion of witness (sākṣī) into the larger frame of states of consciousness (viśva, taijasa, prajña, turīya) and, thus, comparing it with the sufficiency of “I, Me and Mine”, “I-positions”, “Agency”, “Ignorance” notions according to the epistemological objectives foreseen by the text... Needless to say, the reference of non-duality (advaita) further emphasizes the importance of considering these same notions, especially due to the way Kṛṣṇa is presented in the main source of the paper itself, the Bhagavad-gītā...

 

For the reasons aforementioned, it is recommended to RECONSIDER AFTER MAJOR REVISIONS the paper entitled “Developing Agentive Reason through Informed Ignorance”.

 

Some comments that I believe could be a useful contribution to the textual review of the paper:

 

a)    As an overall feature, there is not a uniform pattern throughout the text concerning the diacritics according to the International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration (IAST) standard, e.g. “Srikrishnārjuna” instead of “Śrīkṛṣṇārjuna”, “Bhagavad Gita” instead of “Bhagavad Gītā”, “Mahabharata” instead of “Mahābhārata”, “Kshatriya” instead of “Kṣatriya” and so on;

b)   in line 91 (page 2) do register “1357a) – illustrating” for “1357a)-illustrating”;

c)    it seems that in lines 120-127 (page 3) it is a whole citation from a source, requiring quotation marks in its beginning and in its end, or highlighting this part in a different way amid the text;

d)   in line 181 (page 4) do register “other people. The others” for “other persons. The others”;

e)    in line 186 (page 4) there is an unnecessary repetition of the word “from”;

f)    in lines 457-458 (page 9) do register “of pleasure and pain, creates a sense” for “of pleasure and pain creates a sense”.

 

In general, these are the considerations that I believe are relevant for any improvement of this paper...

Author Response

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

In general, the paper “Developing Agentive Reason through Informed Ignorance” is a necessary contribution to Hindu studies articulated with unusual perspectives for understanding their cultural dynamics, in this case, philosophical per se. Actually, the paper proposes a welcome pedagogical approach to some speculative and rational issues that are, now and then, really hard to grasp unless it is made clear what is at stake. It is exactly because of this outstanding, remarkable breakthrough concerning the propaedeutic nuance of this paper that I believe some adjustments could be made, even considering that “the study acknowledges its limitations” (page 13).

In general, the paper does not bring to its approaches some technical terms either from Sanskrit itself or from Hindu culture itself. Apparently, this runs the risk of falling into some orientalism – in the negative sense of the term – insofar as culturally originating expressions of European origin, such as “self”, “agentive reason”, “informed ignorance”, are mostly used when Indian terms such as “ātman”, “vidyā”, “avidyā” etc., in their respective polysemy and semantic dynamism in the Sanskrit language and Hindu culture, could have been used as an explanation of the author's own argumentation and reasoning especially due to the fact that an originally Hindu source, Bhagavad-gītā, is the paper’s main reference. Thus, it is possible to avoid any risk of reducing cultural, philosophical, religious, or original dynamics – or deliberately inventing the Other according to one’s own mental expectations – to a framework produced by another cultural, philosophical, or religious paradigm, even within the horizon of the respective approach is exactly an initiative of unusual perception with the prospect of some qualitative step forward in the human intellectual framework as a whole...

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

Thank you for your in-depth review of our paper, highlighting the complexities that we have tried to handle in our philosophical approach. Your kind words encourage us to consider your suggestions with an open mind, though we had knowingly maintained some of the loose ends that you have pointed out. The reason being that the paper is focussed on the field of Philosophical Practice rather than purely traditional philosophy. As a newly emerging area of study, this field is establishing fresh and ongoing connections with the philosophical and terminological traditions of the culture into which it develops. During recent decades, and partly owing to globalization, as Lou Marinoff observes, a conspicuous cross-pollination of Western and Asian philosophical traditions has unfolded. The paradigm shift is clearly evident from the debate over the various approaches to philosophical counselling. The explicit teaching of traditional philosophy viable only in a cultural context is no longer held to be the core of counselling. Rather, the movement is global, proceeding towards a wider, deeper and more general goal of praxis. Since the paper assumes this paradigm shift, it has taken some liberty to coin globally viable terms such as informed ignorance and agentive reason instead of meddling with traditional choices such as avidya and Jnanottara karma, etc. Concerning the propaedeutic nuance of this paper, as you have rightly pointed out, and for fear of falling into negative orientalism, we have tried, wherever possible, to connect the dots and redirect the attention of the reader. For instance, references to non-traditionalist Perennialist philosophers like Aldous Huxley (Line 151-156) made in section 2; and time and again stressing on Bhagavad Gita as a symbolic framework for exploring philosophical counselling in terms of the latest ideas of Dialogical Self Theory (Lines 14, 20, 95, 121, 181, 191, 311, 398, 401, 422, 436, 744). Specifically, the paper drawing from Gita’s boundary experience of Arjuna’s crisis explores the counselee’s lived philosophy in trying to address the existential dilemmas in a counselling set-up. The coining and treatment of concepts such as informed ignorance and agentive reason aligns with the methodology of philosophical practice – a method beyond method that fosters a correspondence between philosophy and life.

That said, wherever it is possible, we have incorporated the changes in an attempt to gain the suggested merits without deviating too far from the nature and scope of the paper.

We have added Lines 43-56 in section 1, “Introduction”, providing the Indian context of Agentive Reason.

We have added Lines 67-89 in section 1, “Introduction”, explaining that the concept of informed ignorance is explicit only when we try to propose practical applications of “knowledge” (jnana) and “ignorance” (avidya). We have explained that the study of philosophical counselling cannot be totally similar to traditional philosophy.

We have moved a large part of section 1 to a new section 2 (Line 90) titled “Inter-disciplinary Nature of the Study”

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

It would be important for the author to insert the reference frame of human goals (puruṣārthas) into the text itself when discussing not only Hindu dharma, but also different modes of “thinking about actions” (page 10) related to these puruṣārthas, as in the case of the Hindu socio-occupational stratifications (varṇas) and modes of life (āśramas), in a more broadly and clearly exposed way throughout the text, especially to make clear the polysemy implicit in the adopted categories of saṃnyāsa, kṣatriya, dharma, etc...

It is pertinent to highlight here why Bhagavad-gītā is also titled Gītopaniṣad in the sense of a better understanding of its didactic structure, typical of the Upaniṣads themselves, in the regular uninterrupted and intergenerational transmission from master to disciple through Vedic doctrinal lineages (guruśiṣyaparaṃparās) according to their own methodological guidelines inserted into this cultural framework as a whole...

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

Thank you for this thoughtful suggestion. We have added a detailed account incorporating your above suggestions from Lines 547 to 590, under section 13, “Arjuna’s judgement of Agency”.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

Another delicate issue in the text is the prominence placed on the individual through expressions such as “I, Me and Mine”, “I-positions”, “Agency”, and “Ignorance” etc. which may sound strange to a culture that privileges dissolution or dampening of the ego as a sense of individuality and principle of identification in its soteriological horizons as it seeks to relativize, in several of its doctrinal developments, the prominence of ahaṁkāra – or, in some cases, of human effort tout court (puruṣakāra) as a means of sufficiency of self-realization – and their respective attachments and impulses etc... Bhagavad-gītā itself (VII,6.12; IX,4-5.19; X,8.42; XI,33; XVIII,20.23.51-53) points out to it in Kṛṣṇa himself as Supreme Personality of Godhead as a much more sovereign existential index over the relative human individual...

Still, in the wake of the perspective of the human condition itself, it would be worth inserting the onto-epistemological notion of witness (sākṣī) into the larger frame of states of consciousness (viśva, taijasa, prajña, turīya) and, thus, comparing it with the sufficiency of “I, Me and Mine”, “I-positions”, “Agency”, “Ignorance” notions according to the epistemological objectives foreseen by the text... Needless to say, the reference of non-duality (advaita) further emphasizes the importance of considering these same notions, especially due to the way Kṛṣṇa is presented in the main source of the paper itself, the Bhagavad-gītā...

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

Thank you for your valuable feedback. The prominence placed on the individual through expressions such as “I, Me and Mine”, “I-positions”, “Agency”, “Ignorance”, etc., follow from our consideration of the Dialogical Self Theory and are in no way imposed on the Bhagavad Gita or Indian thought in general. Owing to the interdisciplinary nature of this essay, the paper’s primary objective is to demonstrate how the concepts of Agentive Reason and Informed Ignorance can enrich philosophical counselling practices by drawing upon interdisciplinary frameworks.

In philosophical counselling, epistemological values are not limited to theory but are actively translated into practice. This is reflected in how counselees take action – to navigate complex moral and existential dilemmas through a refined understanding of their agency. Further exploration into how these epistemological values can be practically implemented to enhance the efficacy of counselling practices, particularly in resolving intertwined moral and existential dilemmas.

Thus, while the paper draws from the concepts of dialogical self-theory, it does so to explore their practical value to counselling rather than spiritual implications. The paper’s focus is on philosophical counselling as a reflective practice that bridges philosophical inquiry and practical application. By maintaining this focus, the paper seeks to emphasize the distinctiveness of philosophical counselling, particularly its capacity to address existential and ethical dilemmas through reflective engagement with philosophical frameworks, as demonstrated through the symbolic and practical analysis of the Bhagavad Gita.

The application of the Bhagavad Gita’s teachings to contemporary philosophical practice not only highlights the enduring relevance of these ideas but also illustrates how ancient philosophical dialogues can be reinterpreted to address modern epistemological and psychological challenges.

Furthermore, Lines 477-489 show how Arjuna is confused between the denotative and connotative meanings of the term Sanātanaḥ. We have spoken about Ātman as the everlasting, all-pervading, unalterable and immutable and shown how Kṛṣṇa works on this awareness.

Lines 508-518 discuss the problem of ahaṁkāra in terms of the sense of doer-ship and enjoyer-ship and attributes non-agency to the Self.

Lines 603-606 take this further and show that without the ascertainment of truth, Arjuna cannot assume that he is the non-doer (Ātman)

Lines 638-646 assert the Bhagavad Gita’s unique treatment of Agency, clearly distinguishing it from several approaches of the West.

Lines, 668-681though make reference to Advaita philosophy, only try to offer a basic introduction to the concept of Agentive Reason, which is the aim of the paper. We have stated that further exploration will follow, focussing on theoretical development.

Inserting the onto-epistemological notion of witness (sākṣī) into the larger frame of states of consciousness (viśva, taijasa, prajña, turīya) and, thus, comparing it with the sufficiency of “I-positions”, etc. would stretch the paper too far from its current scope. However, the authors are very thankful for the suggestion and definitely look forward to incorporating this point in their broader work on Agentive Reason in the near future.

 

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

Some comments that I believe could be a useful contribution to the textual review of the paper:

1. a) As an overall feature, there is not a uniform pattern throughout the text concerning the diacritics according to the International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration (IAST) standard, e.g. “Srikrishnārjuna” instead of “Śrīkṛṣṇārjuna”, “Bhagavad Gita” instead of “Bhagavad Gītā”, “Mahabharata” instead of “Mahābhārata”, “Kshatriya” instead of “Kṣatriya” and so on;

 

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

Thank you for your mindful suggestion. We have brought uniformity to the Sanskrit terms according to IAST as per your recommendation.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

1. b) in line 91 (page 2), do register “1357a) – illustrating” for “1357a)-illustrating”;

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

Thank you for pointing this out. The suggested change has been implemented.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

1. c) it seems that in lines 120-127 (page 3), it is a whole citation from a source, requiring quotation marks at its beginning and in its end or highlighting this part in a different way amid the text;

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

Thank you for pointing this out. The suggested change has been implemented.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

1. d) in line 181 (page 4) do register “other people. The others” for “other persons. The others”;

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

Thank you for pointing this out. The suggested change has been implemented.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

1. e) in line 186 (page 4), there is an unnecessary repetition of the word “from”;

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

Thank you for pointing this out. The suggested change has been implemented.

 

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

1. f) in lines 457-458 (page 9) do register “of pleasure and pain, creates a sense” for “of pleasure and pain creates a sense”.

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

Thank you for pointing this out. The suggested change has been implemented.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Round 2

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

First, it is not clear to me if the authors’ reply is that their paper meets the strong condition  or does not do that; they point to both directions. Either way, nothing they stated in their replies or added to the paper made me change my reading that the essay does not meet the strong condition. In fact, two further reasons back up my reading that they do not meet this condition. Call it Reason #11 the one according to which what the authors mean by “philosophical counselling” seems to be just a new label for what  Socrates himself calls “philosophy”. Call it Reason #12 the one according to which the authors’ reply itself is that they do not even aim to address Clinical Psychology or Religious Studies. Thus, the authors suggests that my reasons #2 and #3 would not even be relevant vis-à-vis their essay’s aim. I disagree. I think the authors should aim to say something regarding these two areas; that, otherwise, it is hard to see the motivation for: adopting the expression “philosophical counselling” which seems to mean simply “philosophy”; addressing the Gita or suggesting that their paper is interdisciplinary. Also, I am not convinced by their response to my reason #1, for it is mainly a restatement of the points of the essay’s first version.

Second, nothing the authors replied or added to the paper made me change my view that the essay does not meet the weak condition. Their revisions of the paper are minor. Their replies to my reasons #4 to #10 revolve around: restatements of claims of the first version; clarifications that are not developed in the article; acknowledgements that they should cut some things; insinuations that I did not understand their points; or polite ways of suggesting that they will not do what I suggest them to do. That is okay. I understand. But I would like to emphasize that “clinical psychology or religious studies” do not “interest the esteemed reviewer the most”. As the authors acknowledge, “Hermans’ theory has significant implications for Clinical Psychology”. Thus, it is hard to grant that an essay that mainly deals with Hermans does not have to state anything about this area, especially because the essay is in a section entitled  “Religions and Health/Psychology/Social Sciences”. Moreover, the paper tackles the Gita. So, it is also hard to grant that the paper should not state anything about Religious Studies. One may make these two concessions. But then to recommend the paper’s publication, one would have to see all sorts of philosophical virtues in the essay. I do not yet see these virtues, as indicated by reasons #1 to #12.

Author Response

REVIEWER’S COMMENTS:

First, it is not clear to me if the authors’ reply is that their paper meets the strong condition or does not do that; they point to both directions. Either way, nothing they stated in their replies or added to the paper made me change my reading that the essay does not meet the strong condition. In fact, two further reasons back up my reading that they do not meet this condition. Call it Reason #11 the one according to which what the authors mean by “philosophical counselling” seems to be just a new label for what Socrates himself calls “philosophy”. Call it Reason #12 the one according to which the authors’ reply itself is that they do not even aim to address Clinical Psychology or Religious Studies. Thus, the authors suggests that my reasons #2 and #3 would not even be relevant vis-à-vis their essay’s aim. I disagree. I think the authors should aim to say something regarding these two areas; that, otherwise, it is hard to see the motivation for: adopting the expression “philosophical counselling” which seems to mean simply “philosophy”; addressing the Gita or suggesting that their paper is interdisciplinary. Also, I am not convinced by their response to my reason #1, for it is mainly a restatement of the points of the essay’s first version.

Second, nothing the authors replied or added to the paper made me change my view that the essay does not meet the weak condition. Their revisions of the paper are minor. Their replies to my reasons #4 to #10 revolve around: restatements of claims of the first version; clarifications that are not developed in the article; acknowledgements that they should cut some things; insinuations that I did not understand their points; or polite ways of suggesting that they will not do what I suggest them to do. That is okay. I understand. But I would like to emphasize that “clinical psychology or religious studies” do not “interest the esteemed reviewer the most”. As the authors acknowledge, “Hermans’ theory has significant implications for Clinical Psychology”. Thus, it is hard to grant that an essay that mainly deals with Hermans does not have to state anything about this area, especially because the essay is in a section entitled “Religions and Health/Psychology/Social Sciences”. Moreover, the paper tackles the Gita. So, it is also hard to grant that the paper should not state anything about Religious Studies. One may make these two concessions. But then to recommend the paper’s publication, one would have to see all sorts of philosophical virtues in the essay. I do not yet see these virtues, as indicated by reasons #1 to #12.

 

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE:

We appreciate the reviewer’s detailed engagement with our essay and the subsequent clarifications requested. We maintain that our essay satisfies the strong condition for interdisciplinary research, as it makes a substantive contribution to philosophical counseling by offering a novel framework that integrates dialogical self-theory with insights from the Bhagavad Gita. The essay’s focus on agency, through the concepts of Informed Ignorance and Agentive Reason, builds on philosophical traditions while enriching contemporary discourses in counseling theory. Contrary to the reviewer’s assertion that philosophical counseling is merely a new label for what Socrates called “philosophy,” we argue that it is a distinct practice addressing existential concerns through dialogical methods, bridging theoretical and applied dimensions. This approach not only demonstrates its relevance to modern philosophical practice but also highlights how ancient philosophical dialogues retain practical value today, thereby satisfying the strong condition through conceptual and methodological innovation.

 

Regarding the reviewer’s claim that our essay should explicitly contribute to Clinical Psychology and Religious Studies, we respectfully submit that such expectations misread the paper’s aims and scope. The essay is interdisciplinary, but its central focus is philosophical counseling—not Clinical Psychology or Religious Studies per se. While Hermans’ theory has applications in Clinical Psychology, we employ it here as a philosophical framework, distinct from its psychological origins. Similarly, the Bhagavad Gita is treated not as a religious text but as a philosophical dialogue relevant to counseling practices. We contend that interdisciplinary work need not make equal contributions to every field it draws upon but must demonstrate relevance to its primary focus, which our essay achieves through its treatment of philosophical counseling. Thus, to require explicit engagement with Clinical Psychology and Religious Studies as independent fields overlooks the essay’s stated purpose and conflates interdisciplinary breadth with disciplinary diffusion.

We acknowledge the reviewer’s broader concerns regarding revisions and reiterate that our clarifications were intended to consolidate the paper’s focus rather than expand its scope. While we respectfully disagree with the assertion that our revisions were minor or merely restatements, we recognize that interdisciplinary essays often provoke differing expectations. However, we believe that philosophical rigor should be assessed based on conceptual coherence and argumentative depth, rather than the breadth of disciplinary engagement. The essay achieves this by grounding its arguments in established philosophical traditions, extending their application to contemporary practices, and offering original insights into counseling methodologies. We trust that this response suffices to highlight the essay’s philosophical contributions and its alignment with the journal’s focus on interdisciplinary inquiry.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 4 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Considering this review report of the paper “Developing Agentive Reason through Informed Ignorance” as a second de facto review, I reiterate here the praise made at the beginning of the first review report regarding not only its pedagogical approach to some speculative and rational issues from Hindu culture, but also the unusual perspectives dealt with by the author. I would also like to thank you for the revisions made according to my previous comments.

 

Bearing in mind that Religions Journal is a publication of excellence, accessible to a wide global audience, I would like to highlight again two points from the first review report and add a third in order to humbly contribute to some improvement among the readership that may happen to come across this document:

 

a)    the need to consider, head-on, the notions of ahaṁkāra – or, in some cases, of human effort tout court (puruṣakāra) as an index of sufficiency of self-realization – and their respective attachments and impulses, etc. combined with the argument itself of authority through expressions such as “I, Me and Mine”, “I-positions”, “Agency”, “Ignorance” etc... the Bhagavad-gītā itself (VII,6.12; IX,4-5.19) points out to this in the figure of Kṛṣṇa as Supreme Personality of Godhead as a much more sovereign existential index over the relative human individual;

 

b)   I insist on the need to directly address the onto-epistemological notion of witness (sākṣī) in the larger picture of states of consciousness (viśva, taijasa, prajña, turīya) and, thus, compare with the notions of “I, Me and Mine”, “I-positions”, “Agency”, “Ignorance” according to the epistemological objectives foreseen by the text... needless to say, the framework of non-duality (advaita) further emphasizes the importance of considering these same notions, especially due to the way in which Kṛṣṇa is presented in the privileged source of the paper itself, the Bhagavad-gītā...;

 

c)    In line 76 (page 2) what is the source (page etc) of Lou Marinoff's quote...???? Furthermore, this perspective by Lou Marinoff should be further developed to convince the reader that there would not be a distortion or falsification – conscious or not – of the polysemy of Sanskrit terminologies applied... perhaps the paragraph between pages 2 and 3 would be better used in the Introduction, where the text discusses the methodological perspectives of authorship...

 

For the reasons aforementioned, it is recommended to ACCEPT AFTER MINOR REVISIONS the paper entitled “Developing Agentive Reason through Informed Ignorance”.

 

Some comments that I believe could be a useful contribution to the textual review of the paper:

 

a)    As an overall feature, there is not a uniform pattern throughout the text yet, concerning the diacritics according to the International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration (IAST) standard:

- in line 45 (page 1) do register “Kṣetra Kṣetrajña” for “Kṣhetra Kṣhetrajña”;

- in line 49 (page 2) do register “Stithaprajñā” for “Stithaprjñâ”;

- in line 52 (page 2) and in line 483 (page 10) do register “Niṣkāma” for “Nishkâma”;

- in line 475 (page 10) do register “hṛdaya-daurbalyaṁ” for “hrdaya-daurbalyam”;

- in lines 553-554 (page 11) do register “Varṇa” for “Varna”;

- in line 544 (page 11) do register “Śānti parva 167, Anuśāsana Parva 111” for “Shanti parva 167, Anusasana Parva 111”;

- in lines 740 (page 15) do register “Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad” for “Bṛihadaranyaka Upanishad”.

 

b)   I believe that it is advisable to register all Sanskrit words in italics, including “Bhagavad Gītā” itself;

c)     in line 81 (page 2) do register “Philosophical counseling” for “philosophical counseling”;

d)   in line 253 (page 5) do register “Complementing” for “Complimenting”;

e)    in line 454 (page 9) do register ““(Adharma³)” for ““( Adharma³)”;

f)    in line 463 (page 9) do register “(Sanātanaḥ⁴).” for “( Sanātanaḥ⁴).”;

g)   in line 558 (page 11) do register “Brahmacharya” for “Bramhacharya”;

h)   in line 567 (page 11) do register “focused” for “focussed”;

i)     in line 593 (page 12) do register “(Kṛpaṇa⁷),” for “( Kṛpaṇa⁷),”;

j)     in line 658 (page) do register “here because Agentive Reason” for “here because, Agentive Reason”;

 

In general, these are the considerations that I believe are relevant for any improvement of this paper...

Comments on the Quality of English Language

As an English teacher for nineteen years with a Cambridge CAE certificate, besides TKT certificates as well, I recognize the good level of English language used in this essay, in spite of some minor typing errors.

Author Response

Please see the attachment.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Round 3

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

I cannot continue to dialogue with the authors in a pertinent fashion; I have nothing else to add.

Author Response

Comment: I cannot continue to dialogue with the authors in a pertinent fashion; I have nothing else to add.

Response: We appreciate the time and efforts of the reviewer. We tried our best to address the concerns that the reviewer pointed out in terms of making changes wherever possible and substantiating the grounds of our perspective. 

We acknowledge the support of the reviewer in refining the paper