Defending the Gate of Inimitability: Abū Rashīd al-Naysābūrī (d. After 415/1024) and the Freethinker Critiques

Abstract

The intellectual legacy of the Baṣrān Muʿtazila has had a profound and lasting impact on the development of discussions on Qurʾānic inimitability. Numerous writings have been composed by Baṣrān Muʿtazila on the topic; among them is Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān by Abū Rashīd al-Naysābūrī, an unpublished manuscript preserved in the King Saud University Library under the number 7752. This paper focuses on the development of al-Naysābūrī’s understanding of Qurʾānic inimitability in the context of this manuscript, especially analysing his reception of early Muʿtazilī (specifically Bahshamī) thoughts on Qurʾānic inimitability. Moreover, it pays particular attention to al-Naysābūrī’s engagement with the critiques directed against the Bahshamī theory of Qurʾānic inimitability. This paper adopts a source-criticism approach to studying the manuscript and evaluating the historical development of its contents. It argues that the theoretical foundation underlying the theory of miraculous eloquence developed by ʿAbd al-Jabbār drew al-Naysābūrī’s attention towards a deep engagement with hypothetical dialogues inspired by the refutations of questions concerning Qurʾānic inimitability posed by the freethinkers’ movement. This engagement prompted al-Naysābūrī to adopt and assess numerous hypothetical frameworks and conditional views, including the ṣarfa theory, in his defence of Qurʾānic inimitability. This approach of addressing the freethinker critiques aligns greatly with the dynamic and responsive nature of Baṣrān Muʿtazila’s thoughts against freethinkers’ movement.

1. Introduction

Despite its focal role in contributing to shaping the identity of the new community (i.e., Muslims), the discussion on the nature of the Qurʾān has played a vital role in the formation of classical Islamic theology (al-Salimi and Madelung 2014, ch. 6, pp. 11–23; al-Ashʿarī 1980, pp. 582–611; al-Balkhī 2018, pp. 268–78). In addition, the late second (eighth) and early third (ninth) centuries saw rigorous debates between early Islamic scholars over the proofs of prophecy and the different ways in which prophets can be authenticated (al-Salimi and Madelung 2014, ch. 2, pp. 34–36; al-Balkhī 2018, pp. 285–91). Eventually, the attention of these scholars was directed toward the Qurʾān as primary evidence of Muḥammad’s prophethood (al-Balkhī 2018, pp. 284–85; al-Ashʿarī 1980, pp. 225–26). This view was labelled later as the inimitability of the Qurʾān and was upheld by almost all Islamic creeds (Martin 2018).

Now, there is little doubt that the early investigation on Qurʾānic inimitability emerged from the early Muʿtazila circles during the third century of Islam (Ibn al-Nadīm 1997, p. 58; Martin 1980, p. 185). With the emergence of new theological schools, the history of the written texts on Qurʾānic inimitability was primarily influenced by the theological allegiances of the authors themselves (Larkin 1988, pp. 31–47). Therefore, a detailed study on the concept would require considering these theological affiliations as a methodological point in approaching the topic. There are two key elements in the development of Qurʾānic inimitability in classical Muʿtazilī writings: (1) the concept of prophetic reports (akhbār), which refer to those about the miracles of Prophet Muḥammad and his claims to prophethood, and (2) the idea of what the reason for the inimitability of the Qurʾān did, whether eloquence or not, breaks custom (al-Rummānī 1956, pp. 109–10; ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 15, p. 317; vol. 16, pp. 191–235).1 These two aspects of Qurʾānic inimitability were affected by the freethinkers’ critiques,2 and the development of the Muʿtazila system was intimately linked to the refutations of these critiques.

Modern studies have approached the development of Muʿtazilī thought on Qurʾānic inimitability from various perspectives, particularly examining the influence of the theological underpinning of theories on Qurʾānic inimitability and the affiliation of medieval scholars. Several studies have proved that Bahshamīs, mainly ʿAbd al-Jabbār and Abū Rashīd, conscientiously applied their theological criteria concerning miracles to prove the miraculous nature of the Qurʾān, especially justifying the credibility of the linguistic miracle and its similarity to physical miracles (Martin 1980, pp. 183–86; Rahman 1996, pp. 413–18). Another trend in modern studies has focused on how ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s model of eloquence was influenced by the Muʿtazila theological stance on divine speech, which in turn led the Muʿtazila to see only the focus on the surface structure of speech (Larkin 1988, pp. 34–38). Hence, the models built by ʿAbd al-Jabbār were influenced primarily by his theological background concerning God’s speech. The development of Baṣrān Muʿtazilī thought—particularly concerning the proofs of prophecy—has also been examined through the lens of its distinctness from the Baghdādī Muʿtazila and the intellectual encounters with freethinkers, which shaped its theory on Qurʾānic inimitability (Martin 1980, pp. 175–89). While exploring the evolution of Qurʾānic inimitability among the Muʿtazila in the context of the freethinker movement is certainly valid, the flaw in Martin’s approach lies in his problematic understanding of the scholarly affiliations within the Baghdādī Muʿtazila. Several significant figures from the circle of Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī (d. 303/915–916), the head of the Baṣrān Muʿtazila, were misidentified as Baghdādīs, including Abū Bakr ibn al-Ikhshīd (326/938) and al-Rummānī (al-Jishumī et al. n.d., p. 343; Heemskerk 2000, p. 26).3 This misattribution resulted in a misleading conclusion regarding the historical development of Baṣrān Muʿtazilī thought on Qurʾānic inimitability.

Despite the focus on the theological underpinnings of Qurʾānic inimitability theory, the interest in how the Baṣrān Muʿtazila received ṣarfa is also discussed in the secondary literature. Toha Toriq recently examined Abū Rashīd’s reception of al-Murtaḍā’s theory and its influence on Ziyādāt al-Sharḥ, focusing on how Abū Rashīd refused al-Murtaḍā’s conception of ṣarfa based on his ultimate belief in the miraculous eloquence theory (Toriq 2022, pp. 131–34). In addition to the fact that this position regarding ṣarfa violates what Abū Rashīd stated in Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān (as we shall see in this paper), a significant problem with this approach lies in its misattribution of this Ziyādāt al-Sharḥ to Abū Rashīd, when it was most probably written by the Zaydī scholar Shāh Sarījān (d. 5th/11th) (Ansari and Schmidtke 2010, p. 287).

A close focus on the earlier studies reveals that they were primarily centred on ʿAbd al-Jabbār, especially focusing on the theological underpinnings of theories on Qurʾānic inimitability. However, very few studies have been conducted on the writings of the late Bahshamī scholars after the death of ʿAbd al-Jabbār. Although it is well-documented that ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s texts on Qurʾānic inimitability inspired his students, the Bahshamī’s model on Qurʾānic inimitability witnessed major critiques by the Imāmī scholar al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044) (cf. ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, pp. 199–206; al-Naysābūrī folios, 50–52, 54–55; Ibn Mattawayhi folios, 171–2; Madelung 2011, pp. 144–46). In addition to the fact that al-Murtaḍā challenged ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s ideas, al-Murtaḍā’s thoughts serve as a response to the freethinkers’ critiques (al-Murtaḍā 2010, pp. 197–274; Toriq 2022, pp. 99–100; Aladwani 2025, pp. 216–18). Furthermore, the attention paid to Abū Rashīd’s thoughts in the secondary literature was solely on Ziyādāt al-Sharḥ, which, besides the fact it might have been written by someone other than Abū Rashīd, shows that Abū Rashīd’s stance was, to some degree, different regarding ṣarfa. Therefore, Abū Rashīd’s position regarding ṣarfa and miraculous eloquence theory and the influence of freethinker critiques in his discourse need to be re-examined within the context of his unpublished manuscript, Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān. The gap this paper addresses, then, is the lack of consideration about how Abū Rashīd’s Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān theorised the nuance around Qurʾānic inimitability.

Accordingly, this paper examines the development of Qurʾānic inimitability through two of its key aspects—akhbār and eloquence—and explores the influence of the freethinkers’ critiques on said development, with special reference to Abū Rashīd as the primary figure in this study. I argue that Abū Rashīd al-Naysābūrī employed the theoretical foundations of Qurʾānic inimitability established by the Baṣrān’s tradition—and predominantly by his mentor, ʿAbd al-Jabbār—while also deeply engaging with the critiques of freethinkers. In other words, Abū Rashīd presents a clear position that balances adherence to the Baṣrān Muʿtazila tradition of Qurʾānic inimitability with the pressures of freethinking critiques on the two pillars of iʿjāz, namely akhbār and eloquence. This, in turn, prompted him to accept conditional and hypothetical theories, including the ṣarfa theory, in order to defend the doctrine of Qurʾānic inimitability. To establish this argument, I shall first focus on the internal development of the doctrine of Qurʾānic inimitability in the early Muʿtazila. I then turn to the freethinkers’ movement. Finally, I discuss Abū Rashīd al-Naysābūrī as a representative scholar of later Baṣrān teachings on Qurʾānic inimitability.

2. Methodology

This study focuses on an unpublished manuscript to identify historical traces of the development of the topic. In the course of the source-criticism approach, it engages in three activities. First, it identifies the early development preceding the composition of the text. This includes identifying how the Muʿtazilī scholarship on Qurʾānic inimitability began to develop and how the freethinkers’ critiques started to appear. Given that the early Muʿtazilī writings on the topic are lost, the study will examine the existent writings from the same period that seem to share general headlines with the Muʿtazila school. Furthermore, since all of the freethinkers’ books are lost, it will rely on the accounts found in their adversaries’ works—namely, the Islamic tradition—when discussing freethinkers’ thoughts. Second, it focuses on Abū Rashīd’s text as a main representative of the Bahshamī circle. Doing so includes discussing how Abū Rashīd received and examined the earlier Muʿtazilī scholarship on the two pillars of Qurʾānic inimitability and how he responded to the freethinker critiques. In other words, it pays special attention to how the Baṣrān Muʿtazilī teachings are employed in Abū Rashīd’s Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān. Third, it focuses on the context in which Abū Rashīd made his original contribution and built on the earlier teachings of ʿAbd al-Jabbār. The study does so by presenting how al-Murtaḍā criticised ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s thoughts and how Abū Rashīd approached al-Murtaḍā’s critiques. These three methodological points contribute to confirming the authenticity of a manuscript tradition vis-à-vis Abū Rashīd. It is true that the medieval biographical books and the broader classical writings on Qurʾānic inimitability make no mention of any writings of Abū Rashīd on the topic. However, it will be seen that the manuscript clearly apprehended the early Muʿtazilī scholarship, even including that of the Baghdādī Muʿtazilī scholars. The manuscript also relies entirely on the Bahshamī model of Qurʾānic inimitability and effectively engages with the critiques against the Bahshamī thoughts after ʿAbd al-Jabbār. These two points indicate that the appearance of Abū Rashīd’s name as an author of manuscript number 7752 mostly closes any doubts on attributing the manuscript to him.

3. Contextualising Early Muʿtazilī Endeavours on Reports and Proofs of Prophecy

3.1. The First Generation of Muʿtazila

Within the early Muʿtazila school of thought, a fundamental point appears to have shaped how its adherents approached the notion of proofs of prophecy. That is, any reports that spread without prior agreement (tarāsul and tawāṭuʾ) must be true. This perspective was proposed by Wāṣil ibn ʿAṭāʾ (d. 131/748), one of the main founders of the Muʿtazila, and reflects the early essence of tawātur (reports that are numerously transmitted) (al-Jishumī et al. n.d., p. 203; al-Shawāshī 1993, pp. 263–66). However, it is virtually impossible to draw a full image of the nature of the proofs of prophecy in Wāṣil’s thought, as all of his writings have been lost. In fact, the early theorisation of the proofs of prophecy can be seen in the arguments of the Ibāḍī scholar ʿĪsā ibn ʿUmayr, who lived during the second half of the eighth century and clearly shared certain theological principles—most importantly, God’s justice—with the early Muʿtazila.4 We can reconstruct Ibn ʿUmayr’s argumentation regarding proofs of prophecy from its presentations in his Ibāḍī rival, ʿAbd Allāh ibn Yazīd al-Fazārī’s epistle, in the following points:

• There can be no reason for the fallacy of transmitting the reports as long as the status of tawātur is reached. Ibn ʿUmayr upheld that the credibility of tawātur can be proven by determining no reason for a lack of a prior agreement (tawāṭuʾ). In other words, the credibility of tawātur can be demonstrated by the fact that humans have different factors and needs, which make their consensus on one matter virtually impossible. Hence, this would mean that the tawātur reports represent the utmost level of authenticity (al-Salimi and Madelung 2014, ch. 2, pp. 16–20).
• For Ibn ʿUmayr, the knowledge of cities and battles is an axiomatic type of knowledge (e.g., the knowledge of the existence of Kūfa and Baṣra) (al-Salimi and Madelung 2014, ch. 2, p. 23).
• Similarly, knowledge of prophetic miracles is also axiomatic due to its having been transmitted by many people (al-Salimi and Madelung 2014, ch. 2, p. 20).

Further to their development, it should be noted here that the role of logical reasoning in shaping the epistemology of how reports can be transmitted is evident. Moreover, the above discussion emanated from the theoretical foundation of God’s justice, which relies entirely on the proofs of prophecy as a reason for discerning between true and false prophets. In other words, Ibn ʿUmayr clearly argued that the reason through which we can verify the prophecy claimants is based solely on the signs that they carry with them, and that the role of these signs is to differentiate between true and false prophets (al-Salimi and Madelung 2014, ch. 2, pp. 5–6, 10, 20; Cf. Madelung 2018, pp. 10–11). Ibn ʿUmayr, however, employed the idea of tawātur of the transmission of the prophetic signs, which was used to justify the status of transmitting miracles and revelation. Thus far, we can clearly see that there are two key points in the discussion of proofs of prophecy within early Muʿtazilī thought: (1) the theological justification of the efficiency of these signs, based on divine justice; and (2) the criteria through which the reports can be authenticated. These intellectual discussions around these two key points are, as we shall see next, what gave birth to Qurʾānic inimitability as a concept for Muḥammad prophethood for the next generation of Muʿtazila.

3.2. The Second Generation of Muʿtazila

However, none of the texts on prophecy of the next generation of the Muʿtazila have survived. Still, three points need to be discussed in order to more comprehensively understand their role in the emergence of the two key aspects of Qurʾānic inimitability. First, it has been stated that the notion of the Qurʾānic challenge (taḥaddī)—as a criterion upon which the failure of the Arabs was subsequently proved—was initially posed by Abū al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf (d. 235/850?) (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, p. 387). As recently noted by Price (2024, pp. 156–58), the strong emphasis on the authenticity of Qurʾānic transmission, coupled with the problematic positions on the authenticity of Ḥadīth-based miracles, led the early Muʿtazila to focus on the Qurʾān as a primary sign of Muḥammad’s prophethood. These problems largely stemmed from conflicting views on the number and reliability of the reports’ transmitters (al-Balkhī 2018, pp. 285–88; Van Ess 1970, pp. 211–23). Notably, al-ʿAllāf employed the concept of immediate knowledge (ʿilm ḍarūrī) as a criterion for authenticating reports about miracles and the Ḥadīth (Van Ess 2016–2020, vol. 2, p. 308). In other words, we may assume that al-ʿAllāf used ʿilm ḍarūrī, based on his specific criteria regarding the quantity and quality of transmitters, as a means to establish the credibility of Muḥammad’s challenge to the Arabs.

Second, al-ʿAllāf upheld the idea of the consistency and coherence of Qurʾānic passages (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, p. 387). If we take the last two key aspects of Qurʾānic inimitability into consideration, we can assume that al-ʿAllāf’s thought constitutes the framework from which these aspects later evolved, even before the emergence of the technical terms (cf. Van Ess 2016–2020, vol. 2, p. 308).

Third, al-ʿAllāf’s view faced disagreement from some of his junior Muʿtazilī contemporaries, namely Hishām al-Fuwaṭī (d. 3rd/9th) and ʿAbbād ibn Salmān (d. 3rd/9th), due to their contrasting positions on the nature of the proofs of prophecy. The central problem concerned how to attribute a miraculous nature to speech (or to the Qurʾān), given that speech is accidental (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, p. 242; al-Murtaḍā 2010, pp. 72–73; Martin 1980, p. 180). Hence, it became a question of God’s speech and its relation to its outward manifestation. Now, since the miracle could not be situated within speech itself, it might be assumed that al-Fuwaṭī and Salmān rejected the theory of miraculous eloquence. During the period shaped by this theological position, the theory of ṣarfa emerged, advanced by Abū al-Hudhayl’s nephew, Ibrāhīm ibn Sayyār al-Naẓẓām (d. 230/845) (al-Balkhī 2018, pp. 284–85). The emergence of this theory, which locates the miracle in divine intervention to prevent any emulation, can be seen as a reflection of the very theological tensions from which the theory of miraculous eloquence had originally been formulated.

The next scholar to extensively contribute to the discussions about proofs of prophecy was Abū ʿUthmān ibn Baḥr al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/869). Al-Jāḥiẓ added several criteria through which reports can be labelled as valid. He discerned between the veracity of the reports and the occurrences of certain events. In other words, people can agree upon different reports, but this does not make them valid or right. A report’s validity is based on its subsequent logical sense. If it is deemed valid and subsequently transmitted correctly, the occurrences of the report cannot be denied.

Al-Jāḥiẓ offered two examples to clarify his ideas: (1) the agreement of the Christians on the divinity of Christ is considered false because God would not give his miracles to claimants who do not know His unity; and (2) the identity and existence of Muḥammad in Mecca is correct. In spite of the veracity of the Prophet Muḥammad’s claim of prophethood in the view of his opponents, his identity and existence in Mecca cannot be denied (al-Jāḥiẓ 1964, vol. 3, pp. 250–52). Hence, for al-Jāḥiẓ, it is both the report per se and its transmission that are important.

Moreover, al-Jāḥiẓ did not deny the veracity of the Christians’ transmission of the report of Christ but rather stated that, on the basis of his logic (i.e., concerning God’s unity), the claim’s origin should be considered to have been fabricated. While Muḥammad’s existence in Mecca cannot be denied, what can be refuted is his status as a true prophet or that his miracles occurred (al-Jāḥiẓ 1964, vol. 3, pp. 250–52). Therefore, to be accepted and authenticated, a report must not violate the logical precept, even if it is widely spread and corresponded. From the above, the development of the ideas of transmission seems evident. In other words, there are now external criteria that the tawātur must meet to be accepted.

After establishing the external criteria, al-Jāḥiẓ introduced several internal criteria to more precisely grasp how tawātur can occur. There are three further points related to the nature of reports’ transmissions. First, humans cannot agree to transmit reports without contacting each other—and, if such contact has occurred, it cannot be hidden (i.e., it must be stated). Second, al-Jāḥiẓ stressed the need to transmit certain reports about important events. According to al-Jāḥiẓ, what is customary here is for reports to be transmitted in the first place. In other words, any awe-inspiring reports must be spread among the people. Accordingly, reports regarding the miracles of prophets must be widely renowned and spread. Third, humans are invariably impacted by various inherent natures and causes (asbāb wa ṭabāʾiʿ), which lead to their different positions in life and the different means through which their reports are transmitted (al-Jāḥiẓ 1964, vol. 3, pp. 241–50).

In light of the above, we can now question how these criteria can be linked to discussions about miracles. According to al-Jāḥiẓ, the reports per se cannot be proof (ḥujja); rather, it is their transmission (or occurrences) that serves as proof. Moreover, it is the failure of humans to emulate it that proves its quality. Accordingly, the discussion has been moved to the miracles per se. Furthermore, al-Jāḥiẓ (1964, vol. 3, p. 260) stated that the Qurʾān is a miracle. Seemingly, al-Jāḥiẓ was able to reconcile affording the Qurʾān miracle status and adhering to the theory of ṣarfa. According to al-Jāḥiẓ, there are two different ideas that explain Qurʾānic inimitability. First, the formation of words and their linguistic construction (al-Jāḥiẓ 1964, vol. 3, p. 229). Second, God prevented the Arab pagans from emulating the Qurʾān and claiming their emulation was near to the level of eloquence in the Qurʾān (al-Jāḥiẓ 2003, vol. 4, p. 305). Subsequently, the stories about Muḥammad’s challenge to the Arabs and the latter’s alleged failure were then related to the idea of reports, while the reasoning behind this Qurʾānic inimitability was linked to the degree of eloquence and the idea of ṣarfa. Hence, we can state that by the time of al-Jāḥiẓ, the two elements of Qurʾānic inimitability had been firmly established. It is also apparent that logical reasoning played a role in the emergence of Qurʾānic inimitability as a concept. Having discussed the internal development of Muʿtazilī thought on proofs of prophecy, let us now consider its external development.

4. Contextualising the Early Muʿtazilī Endeavours with the Critiques of Freethinkers

4.1. Identifying the Identity of Freethinker Figures

Later Baṣrān Muʿtazilī resources reveal the amount of pressure posed by freethinker critiques and the various levels from which their ideas were developed. Al-Muʾayyad Bi-Allāh al-Hārūnī (d. 411/1020), who had access to the early Muʿtazilī and freethinkers’ legacies, highlighted three stages of the latter’s movements. These are: (1) the intellectual legacy of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (d. 142/759); (2) the religious movement of Dayṣāniyya and Mānawiyya; and (3) the intellectual legacy of Ibn al-Rāwandī (Lika 2018, p. 28). In Abū Rashīd al-Naysābūrī’s text, we can find more contemporaries of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ. These are ʿAbd al-Karīm Ibn Abī al-ʿAwjāʾ (d. 2nd/8th), Bashshār Ibn Burd (d. 167/784), Abū Shākir al-Dayṣānī (d. 2nd/8th), and Ibn Ṭālūt (d. unknown) (al-Naysābūrī folio, 18). It has also been reported that Ibn Abī al-ʿAwjāʾ emerged from the circles of al-Ḥassan al-Baṣrī. In other words, he was a fellow of Wāṣil ibn ʿAṭṭāʾ and ʿAmr ibn ʿUbayd (144/761?) (al-Aṣfahānī 2008, vol. 3, pp. 101–2; Van Ess 2016–2020, vol. 1, pp. 516–17). Ibn al-Nadīm (d. 388/998?) classified these figures as a part of the mānawī movement, under which the name of Abū ʿĪsā al-Warrāq, a mentor of Ibn al-Rāwandī, was presented (Ibn al-Nadīm 1997, p. 411). Furthermore, these figures were said to have initiated several attacks on the faculty of prophecy and to have denounced Qurʾānic passages (Ibn al-Nadīm 1997, p. 411; al-Rassī 1927, pp. 3–55). Unfortunately, none of these writings is extant. Notably, it was also reported that some of these (related) heretics were executed by the early Abbasid caliphs, especially al-Mahdī (d. 169/785), after the movement against freethinkers (Ibn al-Nadīm 1997, p. 411). In her recent study, Price (2024, pp. 149–207) identified a close link between Ibn al-Rāwandī’s reflections and those of the early freethinkers. This may suggest that a type of continuous trend arose from the early Muʿtazilī circle until al-Warrāq and Ibn al-Rāwandī came to attack their ideological background. This conclusion might alter our view, shifting it from seeing the freethinkers in the context of Qurʾānic inimitability as separate individuals with different intellectual backgrounds to understanding them as a unified structural movement directed toward attacking the Qurʾān.

4.2. Freethinkers’ Critiques on Transmitting Reports

The above prompts the following question: what impacts did these figures have on the issue of transmitting traditions, especially regarding the signs of Muḥammad’s prophethood? We can deduce several points from the previous discussions about the early Muʿtazilī thought on the signs of prophecy—all of which may link it to the freethinking movement. First, it seems that al-Jāḥiẓ refuted an opposing view, which denounced the validity of transmitting the reports. This was evident when he attacked the futility of radical scepticism of everything other than visual (observed) events (al-mushāhadāt) (al-Jāḥiẓ 1964, vol. 3, p. 247). This thesis was attributed, in later Islamic legal books, to the Barāhima movement (al-Shīrāzī 1980, p. 291). Second, al-Jāḥiẓ (1964, vol. 3, pp. 277–78) stated that Ibn Abī al-ʿAwjāʾ, Isḥāq ibn Ṭālūt (d. unknown), and al-Nuʿmān (d. 2nd/8th) fabricated incorrect reports. Let us compare the following two statements and observe the close parallels between al-Jāḥiẓ’s statement (the first) and what has been attributed to Ibn Abī al-ʿAwjāʾ (the second).

“You will not find in the Muslim community—with its diverse schools of thought and rich exchange of opinions—any intentional or unintentional alteration of fundamental practices. Never has Friday, the day of Jumuʿah, been replaced with Saturday. This Muslim community has never delivered the Jumuʿah sermon on a Thursday, nor has it ever confused December for January, or fasting for eating”.

(al-Jāḥiẓ 1964, vol. 3, p. 246)

“I have fabricated four thousand Ḥadīths, declaring the permissible to be forbidden and the forbidden to be permissible. I made you fast on days of eating, and eat on days of fasting”.

(Ibn al-Jawzī 1992, vol. 8, p. 185)

We can thus see the similarity between these two positions. If we also consider the close connection between the early freethinkers and the early Muʿtazila circles, we could infer the spread of these discussions within these circles. Therefore, the idea of a report’s credibility, insofar as it has been transmitted without prior agreement, can possibly and even probably flourish in response to the freethinkers’ claims—and especially to those of Ibn Abī al-ʿAwjāʾ. Hence, we can assume that there was a contact between these figures. If we can form a connection between those who deny the existence of only visible (perceptible) events, we can assume that the comparison between the knowledge of cities with the knowledge of transmitted reports emerged from the same intellectual atmosphere. In other words, the validity of reading early Muʿtazila scholarship on report transmission as a response to the freethinker critiques indicates the presence of intellectual encounters between the two sides (i.e., the Muʿtazila and freethinker figures) in early Islam.

4.3. Freethinkers’ Critiques Against Qurʾānic Passages

Later Islamic accounts also reveal that Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (traditionally categorised as a freethinker) emulated Qurʾānic passages (Lika 2018, pp. 33–43; Van Ess 1981, pp. 151–63). Similarly, the early Islamic accounts that approached the Qurʾānic languages have extensively refuted the notion that Qurʾānic passages contain contradictory statements (Ibn Ḥanbal 2005, pp. 175–93; Ibn Qutayba n.d., pp. 24–85). The interest in Qurʾānic passages was, therefore, highly crucial within these early freethinker movements. These arguments grew from the duality between muḥkam and mutashābih, which was fairly established within Wāṣil’s circle (al-Shawāshī 1993, pp. 261–62). Al-Jāḥiẓ and Abū Rashīd postulated various questions made by the last figures against mutashābih’s verses (al-Naysābūrī folio, 18; al-Jāḥiẓ 1964, vol. 3, p. 320). As stated earlier, al-ʿAllāf argued that the reason behind Qurʾānic inimitability is the consistency of its passages (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, p. 387). The argument for Qurʾānic consistency appears to have been taken and developed as one of the primary reasons for inimitability. Later, Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī, who was deeply committed to denouncing Ibn al-Rāwandī’s contemplations on Qurʾānic inimitability, upheld that the linguistic consistency and coherence of Qurʾānic passages is per se a miracle (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, p. 328). Hence, it could be assumed that the discussions about the coherence and consistency of the Qurʾān in the eyes of early Muʿtazilī circles emerged from denouncing the thoughts of the freethinkers.

4.4. Ibn al-Rāwandī’s Critiques in the Tradition of Baṣrān Muʿtazila

During the time of al-ʿAllāf and al-Jāḥiẓ, there was a scholar named Abū al-Ḥusayn Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā b. Isḥāq al-Rāwandī, who was affiliated with the school of Baghdādī Muʿtazila (al-Khayyāṭ 1925, pp. 96–97; Ibn al-Nadīm 1997, pp. 215–16; Price 2024, pp. 209–11). There is considerable ambiguity surrounding the personal, intellectual, and professional aspects of Ibn al-Rāwandī’s life. However, what is known is that he adopted a sharply contrasting stance towards his Muʿtazilī peers and composed several treatises denouncing their theological tenets (Ibn al-Nadīm 1997, p. 216). Unfortunately, none of Ibn al-Rāwandī’s texts have survived. Still, from reading the classical Baṣrān Muʿtazilī texts, we can identify four questions related to the discussions on proofs of prophecy and Qurʾānic inimitability and developed from the literary heritage of Ibn al-Rāwandī.

• First, the question of negating the alleged failure of the Arabs to emulate the Qurʾān. This question begins with the assumption that the Arabs considered the very notions of war with Muḥammad or disregarding his alleged miracles as more beneficial than emulating the Qurʾān. This idea was presented in many different forms in the books of later Baṣrān scholars, all of which are rooted in the same concept of conflict being more probable than emulation (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, p. 279; al-Naysābūrī folio, 23). Hence, there was another reason not to emulate the Qurʾān other than the failure.
• Second, there was also a question concerning the attribution of the Qurʾān as a sign of Muḥammad’s prophethood. There are multifaceted forms of the idea of this question, all of which relate to how the Qurʾān can be used as proof of prophecy. This question theorises that the Qurʾān can be revealed by jinns or even to the unknown authors from whom Muḥammad plagiarised verses (al-Naysābūrī folio, 64; al-Mātūrīdī 1970, p. 190). Although this question was explicitly attributed to Ibn al-Rāwandī, Price (2024, pp. 244–45) has perceived a clear link between this question and the legacy of al-Zumurrud.
• Third, the question of consensus, which denounces the validity of consensus regarding the miracles of Muḥammad. This question came in different forms related to the credibility of consensus. While Ibn al-Rāwandī’s reasoning is not fully clear, it has been claimed to be linked to questions regarding the prophetic miracles. The discussions developed from a specific understanding about how the transmission of prophetic miracles can be authenticated since very few people have transmitted them (Ibn Mattawayhi folio, 176). This question also touches upon the idea of the credibility of the existence of the verses relating to Muḥammad’s challenge.
• Fourth, the question of eloquence. This question starts with the assumption that the eloquence of the Qurʾān’s short passages is negligible when compared to the highest level of eloquent Arabic poetry. Hence, there is no sufficient reason to place this eloquence in the Qurʾān (al-Jurjānī folio, 12; Anonymous folio, 230).

These questions thus encompass the two aspects of Qurʾānic inimitability (the notion of reports and miraculous eloquence). These four questions, as will be explained in the following section, have largely affected the later Baṣrān writings on Qurʾānic inimitability, especially Abū Rashīd’s thoughts. Next, we will discuss the late Baṣrān Muʿtazila (i.e., the Bahshamī) and consider Abū Rashīd’s manuscript as a central work to our discussion.

5. The Canonisation of Qurʾānic Inimitability Within the Framework of Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī’s Circle

5.1. The Convergence and Divergence Within the Framework of al-Jubbāʾī’s Circle

The development of Qurʾānic inimitability as a fully technical term likely emerged from the circle of Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī (Martin 1980, pp. 183–85).5 It has been reported that Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī concomitantly discussed both miracles and Qurʾānic eloquence (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, pp. 397–98; Ibn al-Jawzī 1992, vol. 13, p. 109). In addition, Muḥammad ibn Yazīd al-Wāsiṭī (d. 306/918–919), as a student of Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī, composed the first treatise, titled Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān fī naẓmihi wa taʾlīfihi6 (Ibn al-Nadīm 1997, p. 58). However, this treatise is lost, and, to the best of my knowledge, there are no quotations attributed to the treatise in classical writings. Moreover, the writings of al-Jubbāʾī’s students, including most importantly his son Abū Hāshim ibn al-Jubbāʾī (d. 321/933) and Ibn al-Ikhshīd, concerning the two key aspects of Qurʾānic inimitability, have also been lost (Ibn al-Nadīm 1997, p. 58; ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, pp. 273, 310). Classical scholars from the two sub-schools inside the circles of the Baṣrān Muʿtazila, the Bahshamī and the Ikhshīdī, have both discussed Qurʾānic inimitability. However, the theorisation of the Bahshamī on iʿjāz differs from the theory presented by al-Rummānī, who was from the Ibn al-Ikhshīd circle (cf. ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, pp. 197–235; al-Rummānī 1956, pp. 75–113). It is not fully clear whether or not these two different theories of miraculous eloquence originate from the differences between the Ikhshīdī and Bahshamī, since al-Rummānī had a solid background in philology, which may have led to his distinct position on Qurʾānic inimitability. However, what is evident is that the later Bahshamī, including ʿAbd al-Jabbār, paid particular attention (which seems to have shaped their thoughts) to refuting the arguments denouncing the two aspects of inimitability (i.e., reports and eloquence) (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, pp. 236–315).

The following table should serve as an intellectual map for the positions held by the main figures in the Muʿtazila regarding Qurʾānic inimitability. While different explanations were offered for both the miraculous eloquence theory and ṣarfa theory by these scholars, the table still provides a clear picture of the relationship between theory of miraculous eloquence and the ṣarfa theory.

Scholar Name	Affiliation	Miraculous Eloquence Theory	Ṣarfa Theory	Source
al-Jāḥiẓ	Baṣrān Muʿtazila	Yes	Yes	(al-Jāḥiẓ 1964, vol. 3, p. 229; al-Jāḥiẓ 2003, vol. 4, p. 305).
Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī	Baṣrān Muʿtazila	Yes	-	(ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, p. 328).
Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī	Baṣrān-Bahshamī	Yes	-	(ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, pp. 197, 328, 401–2).
Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Khayyāṭ	Baghdādī Muʿtazila	Yes	-	(al-Naysābūrī folios, 22–24).
Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī	Baghdādī Muʿtazila	Yes	-	(al-Murtaḍā 2010, pp. 110–11).
al-Rummānī	Baṣrān-Ikhshīdī	Yes	Yes	(al-Rummānī 1956, pp. 75, 110).

We can thus see there was a form of reconciliation with ṣarfa and miraculous eloquence among some of the early Muʿtazila. In other words, the two theories are not always contradictory; rather, there is room to combine them.

5.2. ʿAbd al-Jabbār and the Development of Qurʾānic Inimitability

Now, within ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s thinking, the question of Qurʾānic inimitability begins to take a clearer form, as fully consolidated by the theological system of the Baṣrān Muʿtazila. The two key aspects of Qurʾānic inimitability were modelled after the theological background of Baṣrān Muʿtazila. First, the discussions of the prophetic reports encompassed two levels: (1) the authenticity of Muḥammad’s challenge was proven by the integrity of the Qurʾān upon which the challenge verses were transmitted and the high position claimed by Muḥammad because of the Qurʾān (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, pp. 236–45); and (2) the failure of Arabs can be understood based on the motive and incentive to defeat Muḥammad and the superficiality of any reasons for the absence of emulation other than their absolute failure (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, pp. 337–42). Second, the miraculous eloquence theory was used to specifically explain miraculous acts. That is, the specific structure of the words and sentences enhances their degree of eloquence (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, p. 199). We shall discuss this later when approaching Abū Rashīd’s understanding of the miraculous eloquence theory. In the following, we will examine the conceptualisation of the two aspects of Qurʾānic inimitability in the texts of Abū Rashīd. As we shall see, Abū Rashīd significantly shaped his views from the epistemological foundation of the earlier Muʿtazilī traditions on the notion of reports related to Qurʾānic inimitability. While Abū Rashīd approached the theory of miraculous eloquence on the basis of ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s novel ideas, he was deeply engaged with the forms of critique raised by freethinkers—most importantly, Ibn al-Rāwandī.

6. Freethinker Critiques and Later Baṣrān Thought: The Case of Abū Rashīd al-Naysābūrī

6.1. The Authenticity of Muḥammad’s Challenge

Before discussing how Abū Rashīd conceptualised the theory of miraculous eloquence, it would be pertinent to state the general points in which he structured his views on Qurʾānic inimitability—especially the concepts of challenge in the Qurʾān and the alleged failure of the Arabs to produce a likeness of the holy text. Abū Rashīd wrote several discussions with hypothetical interlocutors to defend these two concepts (see, for example, al-Naysābūrī folios, 31, 34, 35, 45–46). Abū Rashīd’s responses to these questions can be divided into two main parts, both of which are backed by the epistemological foundation of the Muʿtazila in the notion of reports: (1) appealing to transmitted reports to substantiate both the challenge and the Arabs’ failure to imitate the Qurʾān; and (2) rejecting various hypothetical objections on the basis of the Muʿtazilī epistemological foundation on transmitted reports.

The first point that Abū Rashīd sought to prove was the authenticity of the challenge. There are two methods with which to prove this. The first relates to the established facts about the Arabs and the Qurʾān, while the second proves the integrity of the Qurʾān—especially that of its challenge verses. Abū Rashīd began by asserting that the Arab pagans had ample motive and incentive to emulate the Qurʾān. This is supported by transmitted reports describing them as masters of satiric poetry to such a degree that they would initiate a satire without even having been ridiculed or insulted first. According to Abū Rashīd, the Arabs were being verbally insulted by the Qurʾān. Hence, the natural response would have been to produce a likeness of the Qurʾān that undermined its linguistic value (al-Naysābūrī folio, 3). Hence, this point satisfies the conditions of challenge. In other words, pagan Arabs had the motives and incentives to emulate the Qurʾān on the basis of their features and the Qurʾān’s sentiments against them.

Several questions and hypothetical situations surfaced in Abū Rashīd’s discussions of this idea. First, according to Abū Rashīd, one cannot consider the satirical poetry composed against Muḥammad as an emulation, since the Arabic literary tradition considered the style and level of eloquence in their literary emulations to each other (al-Naysābūrī folio, 3). Second, it could be said that these claims about the Qurʾān could also render the Bible inimitable. Abū Rashīd was tolerant of the inimitability of the biblical books, though it was not reported that the biblical prophets challenged the Bible (al-Naysābūrī folio, 3). Third, another question is, what if Arab pagans had asked Muḥammad about any signs other than the Qurʾān? Abū Rashīd’s answer can be traced back to one of the main criteria attributed to the transmission of reports. That is, if this were the case, then it must be spread and known to us. Abū Rashīd also refuted this question by stating that the well-accepted reports indicate that the Meccan leader, al-Naḍr ibn al-Ḥārith (d. 2/624), had collected the stories of Rustam and Isfandyār and tried to emulate the Qurʾān (al-Naysābūrī folio, 4).

Reviewing the above responses, one sees that Abū Rashīd used two tools to craft his refutations: (1) the well-accepted reports as a source for defending his arguments, and (2) the epistemological criteria for transmitting reports as a measure for defending his arguments. These two tools shaped how Abū Rashīd formulated his argument. Moreover, Abū Rashīd’s epistemological positions when authenticating the credibility of a challenge are similar to those of ʿAbd al-Jabbār, although he appeared to direct his response as his needs required. For example, the case regarding the issue of al-Naḍr ibn al-Ḥārith was used by ʿAbd al-Jabbār but in support of the credibility of the idea that Arab pagans failed to emulate the Qurʾān (i.e., not to prove the authenticity of the challenge) (Ibn Mattawayihi folio, 169; ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, p. 268). Hence, Abū Rashīd remains loyal to the epistemological foundation regarding transmitted reports developed by the Muʿtazila, mainly his mentor ʿAbd al-Jabbār.

6.2. The Integrity of the Qurʾān

Abū Rashīd’s next topic concerns the integrity of the Qurʾān. It seems that the heated discussion among Muslims about the integrity of the Qurʾān has inspired freethinkers to challenge the notion of taḥaddī, based on the debates regarding the Qurʾān’s integrity. Specifically, it might be said that the challenge verses were added after Muḥammad’s death. This question was posed by the Jewish scholar Yūsuf al-Baṣīr (d. 431/1040), who seems to be inspired by the legacy of al-Warrāq and Ibn al-Rāwandī, to refute the authenticity of the challenge (Sklare 1999, p. 157). Abū Rashīd stated that the debates on Qurʾānic integrity among Muslims do not, by any means, violate the miraculous nature of the Qurʾān and the existence of the Qurʾān’s challenge to the Arabs. For Abū Rashīd, the agreed-upon reports indicate that there were still Christians among Taghlib’s tribe who would have had ample motive to emulate the Qurʾān (al-Naysābūrī folio, 6).

Moreover, according to Abū Rashīd, the verses containing the challenge were transmitted via the numerous reports through which the entire Qurʾān was transmitted. For him, any doubts concerning the reliability of the transmission of individual verses are ultimately linked with doubts on the totality of the Qurʾān (the Qurʾān as a whole). In other words, the knowledge of the totality of the Qurʾān (ʿilm al-jumla) is inseparable from the knowledge of the individual verses (āḥād al-āyāt). This is because the incentives and the circumstances under which the entire Qurʾān was transmitted are the same as those under which the individual verses were transmitted (al-Naysābūrī folios, 6–8). Abū Rashīd’s position on the integrity of the Qurʾān among Muslims and the transmission of the Quran is similar to ʿAbd al-Jabbār and Ibn Mattawayihi (Ibn Mattawayihi folios, 160–1; ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, p. 155).

However, al-Murtaḍā contested this idea, claiming that the knowledge of the totality of the Qurʾān does not imply the same degree of certainty as knowledge of the individual verses. According to al-Murtaḍā, there is a specific type of knowledge related to these individual verses, namely that each verse has been widely transmitted (tawātur) (al-Murtaḍā 2010, p. 282). For Abū Rashīd, even if one would claim that the knowledge of the Qurʾānic verses is varied in the degree of their authenticity of transmission, the knowledge about the challenge verses specifically is more evident than the knowledge of the verses related to legal rulings. This is because they have played a predominant role in proving Muḥammad’s prophethood. Hence, they would be more important than legal verses. Abū Rashīd rooted the rest of his refutation in the well-accepted reports concerning the utmost level of strictness and proficiency made by Muḥammad’s companions in preserving the Qurʾānic passages (al-Naysābūrī folio, 8). What can also be seen here is a duality between what we already know from Arab history during the time of Muḥammad and the qualities and characteristics upon which reports can be transmitted.

Now, al-Murtaḍā and al-Naysābūrī seem to refute an argument based on the notion that the knowledge of individual verses can be subject to doubts since it might be received by very few people or possibly added later to strengthen the new religion. This reasoning is almost identical to what Ibn al-Rāwandī attributed to in his attacks on Ḥadīth-based miracles, claiming that they were received by very few people and thus do not reach the status of tawātur. Hence, there is valid space for scepticism over their authenticity (see Section 4.4). If we agree with the recent argument that al-Murtaḍā’s position on ṣarfa was a response to the freethinker critiques, we can assume that this type of argument of al-Naysābūrī about transmission could be read as a response to the freethinker critiques inspired by denouncing the reliability of Ḥadīth-based miracles (Toriq 2022, pp. 99–100; Aladwani 2025, pp. 216–18). In other words, it seems that the role Abū Rashīd played in adding to the earlier Muʿtazila scholarship was to defend their position against al-Murtaḍā critiques, which, to a lesser or greater degree, was a response to the freethinker critiques.

6.3. The Credibility of the Failure of the Arabs to Emulate the Qurʾān

After establishing the authenticity of taḥaddī, discussions progressed to the idea of emulation. Similarly to the notion of taḥaddī, many of the various questions shared the same background, in that emulation was either perceived as useless or it was intentionally not transmitted or hidden (al-Naysābūrī folios, 8–14). In replying to these forms of questions, Abū Rashīd consistently used two approaches. First, the established norms are rooted in logical reasoning. This logical reasoning flourishes and supports two precepts that served as the background for almost all of the topics around the proposed failure of Arabs: (1) the followers of Muḥammad would not have left their high-status lives to follow him without proof of his veracity, and (2) the enemies of Muḥammad would not have let his power rise without trying to emulate Qurʾānic passages. Even if he did not directly challenge them, the natural (normal) response to the status of Muḥammad among his Meccan rivals would undoubtedly urge them to produce a likeness of the Qurʾān. Second, the established principles concerning transmitted reports, including the specific circumstances in which the transmissions of the emulations would have been necessary. In other words, there are certain circumstances under which the transmissions of the emulations are necessary.

To begin with, for Abū Rashīd, the established norms require that if there were an emulation, then Muḥammad’s power would have remarkably diminished. According to Abū Rashīd, since Muḥammad gained his power on the basis of the Qurʾān’s supremacy, the transmission of the emulation, if it exists, is a must, and its non-transmission would be a break from custom. This is because if someone has claimed a prophecy for a certain act and people have emulated it but managed to prevent its transmission to such a degree that no one knows of it, this would break from established custom. For example, if one were to sharply condemn a king’s speech in front of the masses, such a controversial event as this would certainly have been transmitted (al-Naysābūrī folios, 8–9). Hence, a form of logical reasoning has been employed here to support Abū Rashīd’s (Muʿtazilī) stance concerning the failure of the pagan Arabs.

Furthermore, the point of convergence between the established norms and the agreed-upon reports is clearly presented in three more cases. (1) First, the reason that there is no emulation is that Arabs have transmitted very weak emulations (those of Musylima). Hence, if strong emulations had existed, they would have required transmission (al-Naysābūrī folio, 9).7 The ultimate reason for this statement is the existence of the incentives and motives for transmitting more powerful emulations, while its absence (with transmitting the weak ones) reveals that no superior emulations were ever made. (2) This same reasoning also applies to the possibility that the emulations were intentionally suppressed or hidden following the consolidation of Islam. Abū Rashīd refuted this by referring to the existence of the books of freethinkers, such as al-Warrāq and Ibn al-Rāwandī, even with the spread of Islam, and to the spread of reports about the virtues of ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661), even with the Umayyads’ suppression of his office (al-Naysābūrī folios, 10–11).8 He then grounded the rest of his argument in comparing the knowledge of cities with the absence of emulations. According to Abū Rashīd, it would be impossible for there to be a city between Baghdad and al-Rayy larger than the two since the established norms (i.e., motive and incentive) would require the transmission of such a settlement.9 The same method was used by Abū Rashīd in refuting the possibility of another prophet having existed during the time of Muḥammad, of other battles during this period, and so on (al-Naysābūrī folio, 11).10

(3) Third, the same reasoning also prevailed in the discussions of some of the hypothetical theories about whether Muḥammad could have formed a secret agreement with eloquent Arabs to prevent them from emulating the Qurʾān for their specific benefit. According to Abū Rashīd, if so, then it would be known, and it (i.e., the agreement) must spread. Abū Rashīd based his refutation on the superficiality of this idea by stating that it would lead to a lack of trust in reports in general. Additionally, Abū Rashīd also grounded his responses in several agreed-upon reports to denounce the last critiques. For example, we know that Muḥammad’s Meccan rivals were already very eloquent men. As such, how could they possibly come to an agreement when they could not have been more eager to defeat him (al-Naysābūrī folios, 13–14)?11 Accordingly, Abū Rashīd had two aims. First, to prove that what has been reported is correct. Second, to prove that what was not reported did not occur, since it would have shared the same background as the reported.

The course of discussion then shifts to five hypothetical theories that justify the absence of any emulation other than as a result of an absolute failure by the pagan Arabs.

• First, the possibility that Muḥammad’s rivals (the pagan Arabs) considered fighting him to be preferable to emulating him, especially since they were accustomed to wars and military confrontation (al-Naysābūrī folio, 16). This question appears to have been raised by Ibn al-Rāwandī (see Section 4.4).
• Second, might the Arabs have refrained from emulation because they feared it would spark a debate over who was superior—Muḥammad or themselves? Hence, taking up arms against Muḥammad would be a far more promising option (al-Naysābūrī folio, 19). This question also appears to have been raised by Ibn al-Rāwandī.12
• The third question considers the same possibilities as the first two, but from a different perspective. It starts with the assumption that eloquent people, with their proficiency in language, will know that the degree of eloquence in the Qurʾān is unexceptional. Therefore, any emulations of the Qurʾān made by them will be explained differently. That is, Muḥammad prompts in them a need to produce an emulation to prove the Qurʾān’s ordinary level of eloquence. Hence, the very act of emulation would perplex the non-expert in eloquence attempting to determine who is superior (i.e., Muḥammad or the pagan Arabs) (al-Naysābūrī folio, 29).
• The fourth question also emerged from the same system of thinking, claiming that the absence of emulation by the pagan Arabs was due to their fear of being likened to Jews and Christians in the eyes of Muḥammad. For example, the Qurʾān presented historical accounts that differ from those in Biblical traditions regarding the fate of Jesus and the identity of ʿUzayr. Hence, literary emulation would be regarded as the same as these historical accounts, on the basis of its being susceptible to dispute (al-Naysābūrī folio, 30). The importance of this question lies in Abū Rashīd’s attribution of it to Ibn al-Rāwandī (al-Naysābūrī folio, 31).
• The fifth and final question related to the emulation concerns asks what should be done about those who do not speak Arabic (al-Naysābūrī folios, 27, 49).

These five questions occupy Abū Rashīd’s writings to a significant extent. As can be seen, the first four questions are almost identical in their epistemological foundation. While the fifth question might lie in different intellectual territory, Abū Rashīd’s response to this question is, as we shall see, similar in terms of its mechanism to the rest of his responses. Moreover, three among these five questions are related to Ibn al-Rāwandī. Hence, it is clear that these forms of questions emanated from the type of theorisation of the freethinkers—and especially the critiques arising from Ibn al-Rāwandī’s intellectual legacy.

In replying to these questions, Abū Rashīd used several techniques based on logical reasoning and the transmitted reports about Arabs. First, Abū Rashīd turned to what the agreed-upon reports stated about the Arabs. He stated that the Arabs’ eagerness to defeat Muḥammad was well-known. As such, they would have chosen to emulate the Qurʾān as the agreed-upon reports indicate that Muḥammad challenged them to produce such an emulation. The absence of any emulation, along with their identified motivation and incentive, serves as compelling evidence for their failure to emulate it (al-Naysābūrī folio, 17).13

Second, Abū Rashīd considered that emulation would be an effective tactic through which to diminish Muḥammad’s power. This is because anyone with wisdom would choose the easiest, not the hardest, way to fight their enemy (al-Naysābūrī folio, 17).14 In other words, the Arabs chose to fight Muḥammad, which was riskier than first trying to emulate the Qurʾān and discovering the effect of this emulation, even if it were followed by a dispute (al-Naysābūrī folios, 19–20).15 According to Abū Rashīd, successful emulation would still have diminished Muḥammad’s power, even if this were followed by a dispute.

Now, these questions may be the first occasion on which the notion of eloquence was discussed, as Abū Rashīd linked them with the disputation over the classes of poets among literary critics. According to Abū Rashīd, scholars held sharply contrasting positions about which of the first-class poets in the pre-Islamic traditions was superior. Each scholar produced such arguments that one could not assume that (for example) Imruʾ al-Qays’s poetry was far superior to al-Nābigha’s in terms of eloquence due to their comparability. The same reasoning could be applied if there had been a dispute following the emulation of the pagan Arabs (al-Naysābūrī folio, 24). Hence, a successful emulation would have surely diminished Muḥammad’s power.

Moreover, Abū Rashīd responded to these questions by stating that the established norm for anyone challenging others in scientific or poetic competence is to emulate them in order to probe their superficial position. In this way, the very act of emulation would still diminish Muḥammad’s power. Abū Rashīd went further by claiming that the level of perplexity and confusion would be further enhanced if the Arabs neglected the challenge, especially if the challenge was to produce such a text as the Qurʾān (al-Naysābūrī folios, 29–30).

Finally, Abū Rashīd also insisted on the efficiency of the emulation for non-Arabic speakers. This is because Arabs would be able to transmit reports of the emulation to non-Arabs, which would be more beneficial for them than war with Muḥammad. Simply put, it would be much easier and beneficial for pagan Arabs to report their emulations to non-Arabs than it would be for them to instigate combat (al-Naysābūrī folios, 27–28). We can see that Abū Rashīd’s aim in all of his responses was to prove that the first and quickest response would have been to produce an emulation, the very act of which would have called the supremacy of the Qurʾān into question. It is clear that in replying to these critiques, Abū Rashīd has employed the earlier Muʿtazilī tradition, mainly as expressed by ʿAbd al-Jabbār, to defend his arguments. It is also clear that the epistemological foundations of the reports and the logical reasoning employed by Abū Rashīd (among others) have concomitantly played a fundamental role in the discussions regarding challenge and emulation. One can also say that the focus of Abū Rashīd was on the early Mu’tazila scholarship in order to explicitly refute freethinker critiques. In other words, it is not that Abū Rashīd revised early Muʿtazila endeavours but rather that he employed them against freethinker critiques.

7. The Miraculous Eloquence of the Qurʾān in the View of Abū Rashīd

Within the scheme of Abū Rashīd’s perspective are three points that constitute his theory for the miraculous eloquence of the Qurʾān, all of which can be traced back to his mentor, ʿAbd al-Jabbār. These three points play a fundamental role in shaping the later Bahshamī theory of Qurʾānic inimitability and clearly distinguish it from other Muʿtazilī models of Qurʾānic inimitability, particularly al-Rummānī’s theory. First, the merit was based on the construction of the words, rather than the words per se. Put simply, what makes specific utterances more eloquent than others is the specific methods of structuring the words (al-Naysābūrī folios, 50–51; cf. ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, p. 199). Abū Rashīd offered two interrelated questions linked to Ibn al-Rāwandī and the Jewish scholars who attacked the notion of eloquence. These two questions refer to the absence of any levels beyond the basic level of communication. In other words, utterances are made to communicate matters and needs, thus eschewing any space for eloquence. In response to this, Abū Rashīd stated that even if we were to accept this hypothesis, the absence of any emulation alone is a breach of custom, since it would violate the established norm if people were to adhere to prophecy without evidence of supremacy (al-Naysābūrī folios, 36–37, 50–51).

Abū Rashīd may have had in mind the type of argument used by Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī, to whose circle Abū Rashīd was affiliated in his youth, to refute the doctrine of ṣarfa. The argument starts with the assumption that if the reason for Qurʾānic inimitability is ṣarfa, the Qurʾān should be in the lowest level of eloquence in order for the miracle to be much more evident (al-Murtaḍā 2010, p. 111). It seems that Abū Rashīd slightly changed the sense of this argument and used it to defend Qurʾānic inimitability. In other words, Abū Rashīd did not first try to answer this question by referring to the theory of miraculous eloquence formulated by the Bahshamī. Instead, he began by hypothetically accepting this case and formulating his refutation to the absence of any emulation. This would suggest our last conclusion that Abū Rashīd’s main aim was to completely refute the critiques of the freethinkers. Moreover, what further supports this point is that he also hypothetically accepted the idea of ṣarfa in almost three more cases related to the attacks made by freethinkers’ critiques against the linguistic techniques in the Qurʾān, as well as claiming that the Arabs’ failure to emulate the Qurʾān alone serves as a ground for proving its inimitability (al-Naysābūrī folios, 47–48, 50, 54). Hence, it is clear that the sort of argumentation is made to refute the freethinker critiques.

Second, the knowledge of the Qurʾān’s supremacy in eloquence is intuitive. That is, an immediate type of knowledge is possessed after many experiences (al-Naysābūrī folio, 55; ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, pp. 210–13). In spite of the fact that this idea predominantly appears in the texts of the early Bahshamī, it also surfaces in the argumentations posed by the freethinkers. That is, it can be said that the Qurʾān was composed by Muḥammad following a period of profound learning (al-Naysābūrī folios, 51–53). This question has been attributed to Ibn al-Rāwandī and other Jewish scholars, including Abū Yaʿqūb al-Qirqisānī (d. 338/960) and al-Baṣīr (Sklare 1999, p. 158; al-Qirqisānī 1943, vol. 2, pp. 294–99). The last question, according to al-Murtaḍā, seems to have been widely discussed during Abū Rashīd’s time (al-Murtaḍā 2010, p. 304). In replying to the different forms of this question, Abū Rashīd completely based the core of his argument on the writings of ʿAbd al-Jabbār, arguing for the following point: the variation between humans in eloquence is negligible, even with deep-seated learning, on the basis of its intuitive nature and the divine well that makes the differences in human eloquence ordinary (al-Naysābūrī folio, 55; ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, pp. 307–10). However, as with the rest of the argument, he was able to accept many hypotheses, then stating that the absence of any emulation is inimitability (al-Naysābūrī folio, 51).

Third, the failure of the Arabs to produce a likeness of the Qurʾān was based on the lack of the requisite level of knowledge to produce one. This was based on the Bahshamī concept of miracles, which stated that there are two types: (1) the kind that humans fail to emulate (i.e., reviving the dead); and (2) what humans fail to emulate in its specific way of occurrences (i.e., the parting of the sea or an unprecedented degree of eloquence) (al-Naysābūrī folios, 55–57; Ibn Mattawayihi folio, 165; ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 15, pp. 204–9). Abū Rashīd refuted two forms of questions concerning this matter. First, the miraculous act breaks with what is customary or previously known (i.e., outside of contemplation or reasoning). As such, since the miraculous eloquence of the Qurʾān can be subject to dispute, it is not then qualified to be a miracle. Second, the miraculous act cannot be replicated either by initiation or by imitation. As the Qurʾān can be recited, it is ordinary. In responding to these two critiques, Abū Rashīd referred to the idea that what distinguishes the miraculous from ordinary is the failure of humans to produce its likeness. In other words, Abū Rashīd supported his position by referring back to the well-accepted reports about the failure of Arabs to produce a likeness, though he also opted to refute these questions through other means (al-Naysābūrī folios, 55–56). Despite the clear dependence on ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s thinking in replying to these questions, Abū Rashīd’s main target was to prove the futility of the freethinkers’ questions, even when accepting their hypothetical positions, which may have led to finding a solution in another theory for Qurʾānic inimitability, such as ṣarfa. His main precept in proving the futility of the freethinkers’ hypothetical scenarios was the failure of Arabs to produce an emulation of the Qurʾān. In other words, Abū Rashīd was not primarily interested in defending the theory of miraculous eloquence. His keen interest was rather to refute the freethinker critiques. This finding should also resituate the discussion on ṣarfa and miraculous eloquence theory. Rather than presenting a complete paradox, they might offer parallel explanations of Qurʾānic inimitability.

8. Abū Rashīd and the Challenge Against Baṣrān Muʿtazila

At least two questions faced sharp and major criticisms in the generation that followed ʿAbd al-Jabbār. These are the questions of the Qurʾān’s attribution to Muḥammad and the variances in eloquence between high-level utterances. The first question that seems to have undergone a major development within the post-ʿAbd al-Jabbār Bahshamī was: Could jinn have mocked or fabricated the Qurʾān at the time of its creation and its revelation to Muḥammad? This question has been extensively discussed in the writings of the Baṣrān Muʿtazila, and it has also been linked with the freethinkers. More recently, Price (2024 pp. 244–45; cf. al-Murtaḍā 2010, pp. 171–72) raised the possibility that this question may have arisen from al-Zumurrud. This question has also been extensively discussed by al-Murtaḍā, who was one of the main contributors to the field after ʿAbd al-Jabbār and sharply refuted ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s views (al-Murtaḍā 2010, pp. 137–83). Moreover, it seems that Abū Rashīd was aware of al-Murtaḍā’s argument (cf. al-Naysābūrī folios, 67–68; al-Murtaḍā 2010, pp. 169–78). The Bahshamī scholars, including Abū Rashīd, stated that there can be no more proof that the Qurʾān was created as sole evidence for Muḥammad’s prophethood than its occurrences after Muḥammad’s claim of prophecy. Abū Rashīd compared the occurrence of miracles after the claim of prophecy with attributing an act to its performer. Human acts occur after and in line with their purposes and intentions (al-qaṣd wa al-dawāʿī). Likewise, miracles occur directly after the claim of prophethood so as to support such a claim (al-Naysābūrī folios, 64–65; ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, pp. 167–71). Conversely, al-Murtaḍā distinguished between two types of miracles: (1) a miracle that only occurs in a specific time and place, and (2) a miracle that can be transferred and moved after its occurrence. For al-Murtaḍā (2010, pp. 201–6), the second type requires attribution by God so as to protect it from mockery or deception at the time of its transference. For al-Murtaḍā, this divine intervention was used to substantiate the authority of the miracle and its direct attribution to the prophet.

Now, for Abū Rashīd in Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān and in line with ʿAbd al-Jabbār, he proposed that any mockery that occurred during the descent of the Qurʾān would lead to the corruption of God’s intentions. This basic idea would violate the theological tenet of God’s justice and wisdom. Abū Rashīd also decried any distinction between the last two types of miracles in denoting the prophethood. This is because if a king wants to verify or support someone, he can either do so himself or appoint a servant to do so in his place. The last example led Abū Rashīd to state that miracles are solely based on breaking the established norms or physical laws rather than merely something made by God.16 Hence, God can perform a miracle Himself or appoint one of His angels to do so (al-Naysābūrī folios, 65–66; ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1968, vol. 16, 185–90). What is clear here is that the epistemological foundation of the theory of miracles takes precedence over the role of metaphysical agency. In other words, the primary focus was on God’s justice and miracle-related concepts, which in turn undermine any accounts involving jinn as mediators.

Abū Rashīd framed his argument in response to a hypothetical Jewish interlocutor who argued there to be a difference between certain physical miracles—which human beings are generally unable to perform, such as turning a staff into a snake and raising the dead—and the linguistic miracle of the Qurʾān, which falls under a type of act that humans are capable of performing, despite failing to have matched its level of eloquence. According to this interlocutor, linguistic miracles are open to mockery and fabrication, while physical miracles are safeguarded by virtue of their clear attribution to God’s power (al-Naysābūrī folios, 67–78). Al-Murtaḍā addressed this argument by distinguishing between physical and linguistic miracles, stating that the main difference lies in the nature of causality and divine intervention. When a jinn delivers an eloquent speech using its own abilities, there is no violation of the natural order. Assuming that the level of eloquence may surpass that of human speech, this would undermine the validity of miracles and open the door for mockery. For al-Murtaḍā, the theory of ṣarfa effectively addresses any doubts regarding the involvement of jinn in miracles—something that the theory of miraculous eloquence fails to accomplish. However, if a jinn were to assist a false prophet in reviving the dead by bringing him a special stone that could do so, the mere act of assistance would not itself cause the revival. In such a case, God would not imbue the stone with the power to raise the dead, as doing so would serve to validate a false prophet—something that would contradict God’s justice and wisdom (al-Murtaḍā 2010, pp. 169–74). In response, Abū Rashīd treated both types of miracles as the same on the basis of breaking with custom, arguing that God prevents any contact between humans and jinns that would lead to a transmission of such an eloquent verse as the Qurʾān. In other words, there must be a divine command to prevent any interaction between humans and jinn that results in the transmission of supernatural linguistic achievements. Therefore, once this custom is breached by the transmission of eloquent verses, it becomes, in itself, a violation of the custom. Hence, in both types of miracles, Abū Rashīd argued that God’s wisdom and power would ultimately prevent the jinn from deceiving people into following a false prophet (al-Naysābūrī folios, 67–68).

It would seem that this question stems from arguments found in al-Zummurud and in the thinking of Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 313/925), which are used to denounce the function of miracles on the basis of humans’ limited knowledge of the physical laws that govern the universe. In other words, since we do not have the knowledge about every physical substance in nature, there might be properties and qualities, similar to phenomena like tricks, sorcery, or magnets, upon which what we consider a miracle could occur (al-Mātūrīdī 1970, p. 186; cf. Martin 1975, pp. 32–33). The similarity between this question and what we have discussed with the case of Abū Rashīd and al-Murtaḍā is clear. It seems, then, that this question was developed and employed to assault the notion of miraculous eloquence.

The second critique emerged from the writings of al-Murtaḍā and was his reason for rejecting the theory of miraculous eloquence. Abū Rashīd, in Ziyādāt al-Sharḥ, explicitly attributes this question to al-Murtaḍā (Martin 1975, p. 38). The critique is as follows: the differences between the highest pre-Islamic poetry and Qurʾānic passages are comparable to the differences between the highest Arab poetry and modern (Abbasid) poetry. As such, an Abbasid poet can rival a pre-Islamic poet in very few verses. Although he would not be able to reach the same level of eloquence, he would be able to do so in relation to pre-Islamic poetry with only a small number of poetic verses. The same rationale was applied in the case of the differences in eloquence between Qurʾānic passages and pre-Islamic poetry, which was perceived as slim and negligible (al-Murtaḍā 2010, pp. 36–38; al-Naysābūrī folio, 46).

Although ʿAbd al-Jabbār (1960–1968, vol. 16, pp. 273–76) alluded to this line of thought, he did not explicitly address this critique. For Abū Rashīd, this idea was refuted in two ways: (1) several reports agree that the pagan Arabs highly appreciated the linguistic merit of the Qurʾān, and (2) if the range of differences between the Qurʾān and pre-Islamic poetry is negligible and slim, they would be able to emulate the Qurʾān. Despite the many motives for doing so, their failure can be attributed to the miraculous degree of eloquence presented by the Qurʾān (al-Naysābūrī folio, 47). What can be clearly seen here is that Abū Rashīd was willing to accept various hypothetical positions, which proves the failure of the Arabs. This willingness is more significant than proving the miraculous eloquence theory. The sole aim of Abū Rashīd was to prove their failure, which would ultimately lead to adherence to Qurʾānic inimitability. Thus far, we have seen that this pattern of accepting various conditional positions encompasses, in the mind of Abū Rashīd, even the debates after ʿAbd al-Jabbār. In addition, the willingness of Abū Rashīd to enter inner debates between Muslims was due to his desire to prove the miraculous eloquence theory. In other words, as a matter of defence, Abū Rashīd would adhere to different hypothetical scenarios, even those that denounce the miraculous eloquence theory, for the sake of proving the failure of Arabs to refute freethinker critiques. However, when it came to inner debates with Muslims, Abū Rashīd still adhered to the Bahshamī ideas on the occurrence of miracles, which support the miraculous eloquence theory.

We can now ask, what was the origin of the argument (or question) upon which al-Murtaḍā spurred this critique and refuted it? It would seem that this type of theorisation stemmed from Ibn al-Rāwandī’s al-Farīd. As stated earlier, Ibn al-Rāwandī proposed that the differences between the prose attributed to Aktham ibn Ṣayfī (or any other eloquent orator) and Qurʾānic passages are unremarkable. We can thus assume that the final forms of this question, which present a comparison between pre-Islamic poetry, Abbasid poetry, and the Qurʾān, were made by al-Murtaḍā from his engagement with the freethinkers’ critiques. Hence, the proof that Abū Rashīd was refuting the freethinkers is that al-Murtaḍā was himself engaging with forms of questions that arose from their movement.

What further evidences this question’s origin in al-Farīd is the case of the Sunnī-Ẓāhirī scholar Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064), an adherent of ṣarfa. Ibn Ḥazm presented a similar argument to al-Murtaḍā, claiming that the range of differences in eloquence between small Qurʾānic passages and the highest level of Arabic poetry is negligible (Ibn Ḥazm n.d., vol. 3, p. 12).17 Moreover, classical biographical books mention that Ibn Ḥazm composed a refutation to al-Farīd, entitled al-Tarshīd fī al-Radd ʿAlā Kitāb al-Farīd (al-Dhahabī 1985, vol. 18, p. 195). As shown by Stroumsa (1999, pp. 198–213), it is also possible that Ibn Ḥazm significantly developed his thoughts on the refutation of the claims about the contradictions of the Qurʾānic passages from the legacies of the Baṣrān Muʿtazila, namely Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī’s Naqḍ al-Dāmigh. What all of these points suggest is that a deep engagement with the legacy of Ibn al-Rāwandī, especially his book al-Farīd, may have followed the death of ʿAbd al-Jabbār.

9. Conclusions

The early history of Qurʾānic inimitability is primarily a history of Muʿtazilī thought on the topic and their intellectual encounters with opponents who challenged their belief in the Qurʾān’s inimitability. The Muʿtazila developed their own theory, based on the theological principle of God’s justice, which required proof for the validation of miracles. This position necessitated the construction of a framework for what would constitute an acceptable proof of prophecy and how the transmission of that proof could be properly evaluated. This framework became known as the theory of akhbār.

After grappling with various positions on where to locate the sign of Muḥammad’s prophethood, the main trend among the Muʿtazila found the proof of the miracle in the Qurʾān’s level of eloquence. Within this same intellectual context, the concept of Muḥammad’s challenge to the pagan Arabs was substantiated based on criteria for the transmission of reports. These concepts came to fruition under the Baṣrān Muʿtazila leader Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī, whose circle produced the first writings on the subject, under the title Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān.

The theory of miraculous eloquence became fully developed with the emergence of the Bahshamī branch of the Baṣrān Muʿtazila, within which ʿAbd al-Jabbār formulated the so-called ‘theory of naẓm’. Drawing on earlier Muʿtazilī scholarship, Abū Rashīd addressed and effectively refuted the critiques of the freethinkers. The two central aspects of Qurʾānic inimitability (i.e., reports and eloquence) are well-articulated in Abū Rashīd’s writings. First, the credibility of Muḥammad’s challenge and the failure of the pagan Arabs is understood through the lens of well-transmitted reports and the epistemological criteria for accepting such reports. In addressing these concepts related to akhbār, Abū Rashīd shows complete adherence to earlier Baṣrān Muʿtazilī teaching regarding the authenticity of challenge and failure of pagan Arabs to emulate the Qurʾān. Second, Abū Rashīd predominantly aligns with ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s views on eloquence in refuting freethinker critiques. Even so, for the purpose of countering these critiques, he was also largely inclined to accept the theory of ṣarfa, or even several hypothetical positions that considered the mere absence of any emulation as sufficient grounds for inimitability, regardless of the underlying reason.

This, however, does not diminish the importance of the miraculous eloquence theory in his defence of inimitability. Rather, it is an indication of his deep engagement with freethinker critiques. His loyalty to the miraculous eloquence theory is also evident in his responses to the question of Jinn and the question about the subjectivity of eloquence, both of which played a fundamental role in the post-ʿAbd al-Jabbār period. In other words, while his discussions with fellow Muslims primarily reinforced the miraculous eloquence theory, in addressing freethinker critiques, Abū Rashīd was willing to entertain hypothetical positions and invoke the ṣarfa theory to defend Qurʾānic inimitability. The criteria upon which the miraculous eloquence theory appeared in the writings of the early Bahsamī scholars were mostly sufficient to him. It was the need for direct responses to freethinker critiques that seems to have occupied Abū Rashīd’s attention.

Abū Rashīd’s manuscript shaped the missing link between ṣarfa and miraculous eloquence theory and played a role in opening a new area for the period after ʿAbd al-Jabbār. Given that this article focuses only on Abū Rashīd’s Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān, the extent to which this approach can be applied to the post-ʿAbd al-Jabbār period still requires further study—especially considering the existence of several treatises on Qurʾānic inimitability written by later Bahshamī after ʿAbd al-Jabbār, which could not be fully covered in this article. Separately, these discussions can also play a role in understanding whether or not the artificial intelligence violates the notion of miracle. In other words, to what extent can Muʿtazilī arguments and freethinker critiques contribute to our understanding of the possibility of AI emulating the Qurʾān?