Ibn Rushd on Miracles: Between Natural Law and Public Belief

Abstract

This article explores the philosophical foundations of religion in Ibn Rushd’s thought, with particular attention to his treatment of miracles. It argues that Ibn Rushd relocates the discussion of miracles from the domain of natural philosophy to that of practical philosophy, where religion fulfills a civic and ethical function by shaping public belief and encouraging virtuous action. The study begins by examining Ibn Rushd’s critical engagement with the Ashʿarī theologians, focusing on his deconstruction of their arguments on miracles and his rejection of al-Ghazālī’s occasionalism in the debate over causality and the proof of miracles. It then turns to Ibn Rushd’s constructive position, which rests on three central elements: first, belief in miracles is fundamental to religious faith and not open to philosophical dispute; second, the miracle that validates prophethood consists in the establishment of divine laws that regulate thought and conduct; and third, this conception is grounded in the Qurʾān, representing the most authentic understanding of revelation. While the primary aim of the article is to clarify Ibn Rushd’s philosophical account of miracles and his reorientation of the debate toward practical philosophy, it also highlights his broader concern with the role of Sharīʿa in guiding communal beliefs and moral practices. This study also brings to light Ibn Rushd’s reliance on tawātur as a form of self-evident knowledge that secures certainty without the need for rational proof.

1. Introduction

The question of miracles has long occupied a central place in Islamic intellectual history, situated at the intersection of theology, philosophy, and natural law theory. For Ashʿarī theologians, miracles represent extraordinary acts of God that suspend customary patterns of nature in order to confirm the truth of prophetic claims. Philosophers, by contrast, have often approached miracles with caution, seeking to reconcile them with broader accounts of natural causality and metaphysical order. Among these voices, Abū al-Walīd Ibn Rushd (d. 1198) stands out for the distinctive way he reconfigures the debate. Rather than treating miracles as violations of nature or as metaphysical puzzles, he relocates the discussion into the domain of practical philosophy, where religion plays a crucial civic and ethical role in shaping public belief and guiding moral conduct.

This study takes up Ibn Rushd’s account of miracles, situating it within his broader philosophical project and his critique of both theologians and philosophers. It examines how he dismantles the Ashʿarī conception of miracles, rejects Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s (d. 1111) doctrine of occasionalism, and offers instead a framework that ties the miraculous to prophecy, lawgiving, and the collective transmission of self-evident knowledge through tawātur. While the wider Islamic tradition also encompasses a rich Sufi discourse on (karāmāt al-awliyāʾ), this article focuses specifically on Ibn Rushd’s philosophical and legal–theoretical treatment of prophetic miracles, as that is where the implications of his reconfiguration of miracle discourse most clearly emerge. By doing so, the article highlights not only Ibn Rushd’s unique understanding of the miraculous but also his deep concern with the role of Sharīʿa in sustaining communal life, ensuring moral order, and preserving the certainty of religious truths.

The problem of miracles in Ibn Rushd’s thought is both stimulating and controversial. On the one hand, considering miracles as extraordinary events in nature seems to challenge the principle of causality, which underpins his Aristotelian natural philosophy. On the other hand, Ibn Rushd does not deny the occurrence of miracles in history. Rather, through the careful reading of his works, it becomes clear that he introduces a conceptual shift: moving away from viewing miracles primarily as disruptions of the natural order and instead framing them in legal–theoretical terms. For Ibn Rushd, prophetic miracles are not merely supernatural signs but, above all, acts that establish divine laws to regulate belief and conduct.

The examination of miracles in Averroes’ philosophy falls specifically within his responses to the theologians’ arguments concerning the use of miracles as proof of prophethood (fī baʿth wa-ithbāt al-rusul). Ibn Rushd articulates these responses chiefly in two major works: Tahāfut al-Tahāfut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), where he systematically critiques al-Ghazālī’s arguments, and Kitāb al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij al-Adilla (The Exposition of the Methods of Proof), where he challenges the theologians’ approach more broadly and clarifies his own principles concerning belief and divine action.

Ibn Rushd’s approach in these texts can be characterized by three steps: first, presenting the theologians’ arguments in their strongest form, including a full exposition of al-Ghazālī’s reasoning; second, deconstructing these arguments by exposing their logical weaknesses and conceptual inconsistencies; and third, constructing his own account, grounded in a rational reading of Qurʾānic verses and the purposes of Sharīʿa.

Various studies address Ibn Rushd’s views on miracles from different angles. Ben Ahmed (2025) examines Ibn Rushd’s treatment of prophecy and miracles, showing how he distinguishes between the theologians’ account of miraculous signs and his own reinterpretation grounded in Sharīʿa and rational reflection. Ben Ahmed highlights Ibn Rushd’s reliance on al-Ghazālī’s later, Sufi-oriented works rather than solely on the Tahāfut al-Falāsifa and explains how this allows Ibn Rushd to redefine miracles not merely as violations of natural law but as lawgiving acts that structure belief and practice.

Similarly, Yazicioglu (2013) situates Ibn Rushd within the broader discussion of Qurʾānic miracle stories, emphasizing his rationalist orientation and his effort to reconcile divine wisdom with a coherent natural order. Yazicioglu underscores the way Ibn Rushd reads miracles as signs that function both intellectually and socially, avoiding the tension between rational philosophy and religious faith.

Oktay (2010), by contrast, explores the methodological problem of proving miracles in Ibn Rushd’s thought. She highlights how his critique of theologians stems from their reliance on qiyās (analogy) and occasionalist premises, while his constructive position emphasizes the Qurʾān and the establishment of divine law as the true foundation of prophecy.

Taken together, these studies illustrate that Ibn Rushd’s conception of miracles cannot be reduced to a single framework. Instead, his views reflect a complex negotiation between philosophy, theology, and jurisprudence, with miracles understood less as disruptions of causality and more as instruments for grounding prophecy, communal belief, and moral order.

For Ibn Rushd, the miraculous is not a suspension of natural law but a lawgiving act that orders belief and practice. By situating miracles within the Sharīʿa, he interprets them as signs through which divine legislation is established, public faith is shaped, and moral conduct is guided. This move not only clarifies his critique of Ashʿarī’s argument and al-Ghazālī’s occasionalism but also reveals his broader concern with the civic and ethical role of religion. Thus, studying Ibn Rushd’s conception of miracles provides a window into his method of reconciling reason and revelation, his legal–theoretical approach to prophecy, and his vision of how religious truth underpins communal life.

2. Theologians on Miracles: Ibn Rushd’s Criticism

In Kitāb al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij al-Adilla, in the fifth section dealing with “Knowing the Actions of God,” Ibn Rushd critically examines the theologian argument concerning the divine sending of messengers, and the role of miracles as proof of their prophethood.

The aim of this section is to outline the theologians’ argument as presented and interpreted by Ibn Rushd, and to clarify the specific points at which he identifies problems with their reasoning. Generally speaking, Ibn Rushd’s central critique of the theologian’s argument relies on both the method they employ and the content of the argument itself.

According to Ibn Rushd, the theologians’ method depends chiefly on qiyās to demonstrate the existence of messengers. In that, the theologians argue for the existence of divine messenger by drawing an analogy between the known existence of messengers in al-shāhid (the observable world) and the possibility of their existence in al-ghāʾib (the unseen realm) (Ibn Rushd 2007, p. 173).

In the observable world, when someone stands before a group of people and declares, “I am a messenger of the king to you,” and a sign from the king appears, then and according to the theologians, it must be admitted that his claim is true. This sign is the appearance of a miracle at his hands. In other words, and according to the theologians’ view, prophetic miracles serve as a sign of divine mission. When an individual claims to be divinely sent, and a miracle appears at his hand, this miracle is taken as evidence of his prophethood. As a result, he is recognized by the people as a messenger of God (Ibn Rushd 2007, p. 174).

This argument, according to Ibn Rushd, is persuasive in a way that is suitable for the general public. However, upon closer examination, a flaw in its principles becomes apparent. Ibn Rushd formulates the way of establishing prophethood as a logical proposition, which rests on two premises and a conclusion. He formulates it as a syllogism: This person performs a miracle; anyone who performs a miracle is a prophet; therefore, this person is a prophet.

The first premise [this individual claiming prophethood has a miracle] is established through bi’l-ḥiss (sense perception). This is based on the recognition that this extraordinary act, manifested as a miracle, occurs without prior learning, or of a kind that cannot be attributed to the imagination (Ibn Rushd 2007, p. 175).

The difficulty arises in the second premise [that anyone who has a miracle is a prophet] which presupposes what it seeks to prove: it requires prior knowledge both of the reality of prophethood and of the nature of miracles (Ibn Rushd 2007, p. 175). This renders the argument circular for anyone who does not already accept the existence of prophets. For this reason, Ibn Rushd relocates the proof to what is self-evident by tawātur to the universally transmitted and publicly evident character of prophetic law, thereby grounding belief not in speculative reasoning but in tawātur itself. He elaborates:

One such matter is the knowledge of the existence of a class of people known as messengers and prophets; [their existence] is self-evident. These types of people establish laws for people through divine revelation rather than through human learning, in that no one denies their existence, except those who reject matters transmitted through tawātur, such as the existence of things that we have not seen ourselves, or of people renowned for their wisdom (Ibn Rushd 2007, p. 197).

Here, Ibn Rushd treats the existence of prophets and messengers as self-evident knowledge, established through tawātur. By doing so, he situates the knowledge of prophets within the category of universally accepted truth that acquired through the method of tawātur, akin to knowledge of historical figures or things have not seen or distant lands. For Ibn Rushd, tawātur produces epistemic certainty independently of formal syllogistic reasoning, functioning as a self-evident ground rather than a derived conclusion.

The third methodological question identified by Ibn Rushd is: even if we accept the existence of divine messages and the occurrence of miracles, how can we prove that anyone through whom a miracle occurs is truly a prophet? (Ibn Rushd 2007, p. 176).

This judgment cannot be established through al-samʿ as the theologians claim, nor by experience or habitual observation. The method of al-samʿ cannot establish this principle, because doing so would amount to affirming the thing by means of itself. Likewise, it cannot be established by experience or habit, since this would require directly witnessing the miracle as it happens at the hands of the prophet. Therefore, the theologians treated imkān (the principle of possibility) as equivalent to actual existence (Ibn Rushd 2007, p. 177).

In sum, Ibn Rushd challenges the theologian’s argument and their methodological approach. His critiques can be summarized as follows: first, their reliance on qiyās to establish the existence of messengers; second, their failure to establish of the necessary prior knowledge of the premises, and third, the inadequacy of their method of inference, particularly their attempt to establish prophethood through the occurrence of miracles without a valid demonstrative basis.

3. Natural Philosophy and Miracles: Between Al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd

The second framework for discussing the subject of miracles lies in the broader philosophical and theological debate concerning the subject of natural causality. Al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd, however, develop fundamentally different conceptions of this issue, reflecting deeper divergences in their views on the relationship between reason, causality, and divine intervention.

This debate between al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd is most prominently articulated in their respective works: al-Ghazālī’s Tahāfut al-Falāsifa and Ibn Rushd’s Tahāfut al-Tahāfut. The discussion on miracles and natural causality takes place in the chapter that deals with “The Natural Sciences” specifically in the first discussion concerning the relationship between causes and effects (Averroes 1954, pp. 420–43). It is important to note, however, that Ibn Rushd’s engagement with al-Ghazālī’s position on miracles is not drawn exclusively from Tahāfut al-Falāsifa. As Fouad Ben Ahmed observes in his article “Ibn Rushd: Reason and Unreason in Prophecy,” Ibn Rushd also relies on al-Ghazālī’s later, Sufi-oriented works al-Qisṭās al-mustaqīm (The Just Balance) and al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl (The Deliverance from Error), which depart from Ashʿarite kalām methodology and adopt a more introspective spiritual approach (Ben Ahmed 2025). This broader range of sources shapes Ibn Rushd’s understanding of al-Ghazālī’s views and nuances his subsequent critique.

In Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, Ibn Rushd approaches the subject by fully presenting Al-Ghazālī’s argument as it appears in the original text, without paraphrasing or alteration. He then proceeds to respond to the argument and to correct what he considers to be an inaccurate understanding or a generalization of the philosophers’ argument.

Generally speaking, al-Ghazālī’s main argument on causality is based on his rejection on the philosophers’ conception that the existence of a cause necessarily entails the existence of its effects. In other words, there is not a necessary relationship between cause and effect. Al-Ghazālī maintains that, under such a conception of causality, only God is the cause. He says: “According to us the connexion between what is usually believed to be a cause and what is believed to be an effect is not a necessary connexion” (Averroes 1954, p. 421). Al-Ghazālī argues that what appears to be a causal order in the world is not grounded in the nature of things themselves, but rather it depends on God’s will, either through wāsiṭa (an intermediary) or without one. In this context, al-Ghazālī offers his well-known example, namely the burning of cotton through contact with fire. Al-Ghazālī explains “for we regard it as possible that the contact might occur without the burning taking place, and also the cotton might be changed into ashes without any contact with fire, although the philosophers deny this possibility” (Averroes 1954, p. 422). In this example, al-Ghazālī indicates that fire does not inherently cause cotton to burn, rather, God creates the burning each time fire contacts cotton, through the intermediation of angels or without intermediation. This view is associated with the doctrine of occasionalism, which denies inherent causal power in created things. Based on this argument, al-Ghazālī claims that the philosophers deny the possibility of miracles, since they maintain the necessity of causal order. As a result, he accuses them of resorting to taʾwīl (interpretation) in their explaining of miracles.

This line of reasoning can be summarized as follows. Mehmet Fatih Birgül outlines al-Ghazālī’s reasoning into three main points: first, the cause and effect relationship as observed in nature is not necessary; second, things possess no inherent necessary nature; and third, the formal substance that gives each thing its distinctive nature is bestowed by an agent separate from matter, namely God, or through an intermediation of angels not by things of the same kind (Birgül 2010).

In his response, Ibn Rushd clearly distinguishes between two domains of inquiry: he places the discussion of miracles within the framework of Sharīʿa, a topic that is not subject to philosophical questioning and skepticism, while situating the discussion of causality within the domain of natural philosophy. In the latter, he defends the reality of natural causality as both rationally demonstrated and a necessary foundation for a coherent understanding of the natural world. Ibn Rushd does not deny that God can act as He wills; rather, he denies that metaphysical occasionalism is a necessary frame for understanding nature. He affirms that causality is indispensable to human reasoning and scientific inquiry, articulating three key principles: first, that each effect has a cause; second, that denying causality destroys science and knowledge; and third, that without causality, it becomes impossible to reason about the world (Averroes 1954, p. 424). Ibn Rushd marks that if what he perceives to be al-Ghazālī’s denial of causality is accepted, “there is no fixed knowledge of anything, because certain knowledge is the knowledge of the thing according to what it is in itself” (Averroes 1954).

This emphasis on causality is further clarified by Peter Adamson, who analyzes the Aristotelian foundations of Ibn Rushd’s position. Adamson highlights two key principles underpinning Ibn Rushd’s view: the first is what he calls epistemic optimism. Ibn Rushd assumes that humans are capable of attaining knowledge, and therefore, if a theory of causality is incompatible with our knowing things as they are, then this is itself a sufficient refutation of that theory. The second principle concerns the nature of knowledge itself, in that, the things are known demonstratively only through their causes. According to Adamson, these two principles together serve as foundational guidelines for Ibn Rushd in formulating a coherent and philosophically grounded theory of causality (Adamson 2008). Consequently, from Ibn Rushd’s perspective, miracles understood as events in which God intervenes and disrupts the natural order do not fall within the domain of causality, and thus the proper framework for understanding them is not that of natural philosophy.

Al-Ghazālī’s objection to the principle of causality is not an investigation of truth or an epistemological issue, but rather a defense of religious faith. In contrast, Ibn Rushd contends that denying natural causality is a sophistical claim. He upholds the necessity of the cause-effect relationship and accordingly excludes miracles from the domain of natural philosophy to that of the philosophy of religion.

4. Ibn Rushd on Miracles: Towards a Legal Theory Perspective

The discussion of miracles has been a central theme in Islamic theology, grounded in the belief that the occurrence of a miracle depends entirely on God’s will and creative power. In Ashʿarī theology, a miracle is not understood as a suspension or alteration of natural laws, but rather as a situation where God acts in unusual ways without distributing the universe’s order, as everything is contingent upon His will (Malik and Kocsenda 2025, pp. 184–85). Ibn Rushd from a philosophical perspective, however, responds differently, while he acknowledges that belief in miracles is fundamental to religious faith, he shifts the notion of the miraculous away from extraordinary natural events. For him, the miraculous nature of the Qurʾān lies in delivering divine laws that shape people beliefs, organizing social order, and guiding human actions. This framework is explained in detail in Ibn Rushd’s work Kitāb al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij al-Adilla, where he introduces a conceptual shift in understanding miracles in Islam.

In contrast to the Ashʿarī theologians such as Ibrāhīm al-Bājūrī, who offers a detailed typology of miracles by distinguishing between muʿjiza and other forms of extraordinary phenomena (Malik and Kocsenda 2025), Ibn Rushd does not provide a similar classification. Instead, he treats the miraculous in more general terms, employing the words khāriq (extraordinary act) and muʿjiz (miracle) interchangeably. He does not draw a rigid terminological distinction between them, nor does he attempt to develop a taxonomy of different types of miracles. This suggests that for Ibn Rushd, the precise classification of miracles is less important than their function as signs of prophecy, particularly when understood in relation to the Qurʾān as the ultimate proof of divine law.

In Kitāb al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij al-Adilla, and after deconstructing the theologians’ argument, Ibn Rushd proceeds to construct his own account of miracles. His argument is marked by three key characteristics. First, he grounds his argument based on the miracle of Prophet Muḥammad that is the Qurʾān, before extending this framework to encompass the miracles of Jesus and Mouses. Second, although his approach reflects a rational understanding of the miraculous, he nevertheless anchors his argument by numerous Qurʾānic verses, thereby integrating reason with revelation. Third, his treatment diverges significantly from both the Ashʿarī theologians, who attribute miracles solely to God’s will and power, and from the Muslim philosophers he critiques, who tend to subsume miracles under metaphysical and natural explanations.

4.1. The Two Types of Muʿjiz

Ibn Rushd distinguishes between two types of muʿjiz: al-muʿjiz al-barrānī (the external miracle) and al-muʿjiz al-’ahl ī or al-muʿjiz al-munasib (the appropriate or the corresponding miracle). The term al-barrānī (the external) in the first type seems to describe the miracle that occurs in the external, physical world, or those which are perceptible by the external senses, like the parting of the sea or the splitting of the moon. By contrast, the second type, al-muʿjiz al-’ahl ī or al-muʿjiz al-munasib, relates more directly to the cognitive and rational capacities of the audience. Importantly, Ibn Rushd considers the first type of muʿjiz, involving supernatural events such as the transformation of a staff into a serpent by Moses or the raising of the dead by Jesus, not as an essential indication of prophethood. As it has no independent evidentiary value apart from being attached to a claim and to an audience capable of recognizing its point, it only becomes compelling when coupled with al-muʿjiz al-munasib (Ibn Rushd 2007, pp. 184–85). In this framework, conviction achieved through al-muʿjiz al-barrānī is persuasive primarily for al-jumhūr (the general public), whereas conviction through al-muʿjiz al-munasib is effective for both al-ʿulamā’ (the learned elites) and al-jumhūr alike. Crucially, as Ibn Rushd affirms, a careful reading of Sharīʿa indicates the establishment of conviction based on al-muʿjiz al-munasib not the first one. Accordingly, Ibn Rushd underscores that the paradigmatic muʿjiz al-munāsib is the Qurʾān itself, for it embodies the prophet’s role of bringing divine laws to humanity and thus serves as the definitive sign of Muḥammad’s divine mission.

4.2. Qurʾān as Prophet Muḥammad’s Miracle

For Ibn Rushd, the miracle that serves as the definitive sign of Prophet Muḥammad’s divine mission is the Qurʾān. Crucially, he argues that its miraculous nature does not lie primarily in its eloquence, stylistic perfection, or linguistic beauty, as many have claimed, but rather in its function as a revealed law that organizes human thought and action (Ibn Rushd 2007, p. 179). These teachings, Ibn Rushd stresses, are not the product of human art or scientific learning but are directly bestowed by God. In this way, he redefines the essence of the miraculous, grounding it in the Qurʾān’s role as a source of divine legislation that guides belief and behavior.

4.2.1. The Two Principles of His Argument

In Ibn Rushd’s conception, the Qurʾān serves as authentic evidence of Prophet Muḥammad’s prophethood, and this claim rests on two fundamental principles, indicated in the Qurʾān as well:

The first principle is that there exists a category of people who receive revelation from God and whose role is to direct human beliefs and actions in order to lead people toward their ultimate happiness. To fulfill this purpose, they persuade their communities of sound beliefs and warn them against false ones, while likewise encouraging good deeds and discouraging harmful actions. In other words, the function of such individuals is both intellectual and practical: to shape convictions and to regulate conduct in accordance with divine wisdom.

The second principle follows from the first: anyone who performs this act, namely, the establishment of laws by a revelation from God is a prophet. This principle makes the existence of prophecy intelligible as a distinct category, grounded not in ordinary human reasoning or political convention, but in divine instruction. As Ibn Rushd makes clear in al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij al-Adilla, prophecy is thus defined by its legislative and guiding function, and the Qurʾān itself exemplifies this role by providing laws and teachings that order both belief and practice (Ibn Rushd 2007, pp. 179–80).

4.2.2. The Epistemology of the Argument

These two principles belong to the category of self-evident knowledge, which admits of no doubt or questioning. On the second principle, Ibn Rushd states:

This principle is beyond doubt in human nature. Just as it is self-evident that the act proper to medicine is healing and that whoever performs healing is a physician, so too it is self-evident that the act proper to prophets is the establishment of laws by revelation from God, and that whoever performs this act is a prophet (Ibn Rushd 2007, p. 180).

Here, Ibn Rushd places prophethood in the realm of self-evident knowledge, meaning it does not require external proof or rational demonstration to be accepted. Just as the definition of a physician is inseparable from the act of healing, the definition of a prophet is inseparable from the act of establishing divine laws. This makes prophethood not a matter of speculation, but a natural category grasped immediately by human reason.

This analogy with medicine underscores Ibn Rushd’s functional understanding of prophecy. Prophets are not identified merely by extraordinary abilities or rhetorical skill but by their distinctive function: establishing laws that regulate belief and practice through divine revelation. This legislative function is what sets prophets apart from philosophers, rulers, or sages, whose guidance may be rooted in human reason or convention but lacks the divine authority that revelation confers.

Moreover, by grounding prophecy in human nature, Ibn Rushd suggests that its reality is universally acknowledged, much like the acceptance of historical facts transmitted through tawātur. In this sense, prophecy belongs to the category of universally accepted truths, whose credibility is not subject to doubt.

4.2.3. Proving the Two Principles

To support his argument, Ibn Rushd does not rely only on his rational explanation but anchors his reasoning in the Qurʾān. He cites Qurʾānic verses to substantiate both the first and second principles, for the first principle:

“إِنَّا أَوْحَيْنَا إِلَيْكَ كَمَا أَوْحَيْنَا إِلَى نُوحٍ وَالنَّبِيِّينَ مِنْ بَعْدِهِ” إلى قوله “وَكَلَّمَ اللَّهُ مُوسَى تَكْلِيمًا”

(al-Nisāʾ 4:163–164)

Verily We have revealed unto thee, as We revealed unto Noah and the prophets after him (up to His saying) and unto Moses God spoke directly

(Nasr et al. 2015, 4:163–64)

“قُلْ مَا كُنتُ بِدْعًا مِّنَ ٱلرُّسُلِ”

(al-Aḥqāf 46:9)

Say, “I am no innovation among the messengers”

(Nasr et al. 2015, 46:9)

For the second principle, Ibn Rushd supports his argument with the following verses:

“يَٰٓأَيُّهَا ٱلنَّاسُ قَدْ جَآءَكُم بُرْهَٰنٌ مِّن رَّبِّكُمْ وَأَنزَلْنَآ إِلَيْكُمْ نُورًا مُّبِينًا”

(al-Nisāʾ 4:174)

O mankind! Verily there has come unto you a proof from your Lord. And We have sent down unto you a clear light

(Nasr et al. 2015, 4:174)

“يَا أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ قَدْ جَاءَكُمُ الرَّسُولُ بِالْحَقِّ مِن رَّبِّكُمْ فَآمِنُوا خَيْرًا لَّكُمْ”

(al-Nisāʾ 4:170)

O mankind! The Messenger has come to you with the truth from your Lord; so believe!

(Nasr et al. 2015, 4:170)

“لَّٰكِنِ الرَّاسِخُونَ فِي الْعِلْمِ مِنْهُمْ وَالْمُؤْمِنُونَ يُؤْمِنُونَ بِمَا أُنزِلَ إِلَيْكَ وَمَا أُنزِلَ مِن قَبْلِكَ”

(al-Nisāʾ 4:162)

But those among them who are firmly rooted in knowledge, and the believers, believing in that which was sent down unto thee and in that which was sent down before thee

(Nasr et al. 2015, 4: p. 162)

“لَكِنِ اللَّهُ يَشْهَدُ بِمَا أَنْزَلَ إِلَيْكَ أَنْزَلَهُ بِعِلْمِهِ وَالْمَلَائِكَةُ يَشْهَدُونَ وَكَفَى بِاللَّهِ شَهِيدًا”

(al-Nisāʾ 4:166)

But God Himself bears witness to that which He has sent down unto thee—He sent it down with His Knowledge—and the angels bear witness. And God suffices as a Witness

(Nasr et al. 2015, 4:166)

4.2.4. Proving the Authenticity of Prophets

Furthermore, Ibn Rushd substantiates his two principles by appealing to the very signs that attest to the authenticity of the prophets. Their truthfulness can be recognized in their reports about matters that had not yet existed but later came into being precisely as they had foretold, both in form and in timing. It is also reflected in the distinctive nature of the knowledge and actions they convey, which are fundamentally different from the knowledge and actions attainable through taʿallum (ordinary human learning) (Ibn Rushd 2007, pp. 179–80).

This extraordinary knowledge, manifested in the establishment of sharāʾiʿ (divine laws) indicates a source beyond human capacity, confirming its origin in divine revelation. It is in this sense, Ibn Rushd argues, that prophecy is to be understood.

4.2.5. Proving the Divine Legislation in the Qurʾān

The second basis concerns the inimitability of the Qurʾān in its legislative dimension. Here, too, Ibn Rushd points to several features. The knowledge and directives it contains are of a kind unlike anything produced by human learning, extending even to metaphysical realities such as God, the hereafter, the nature of human goodness and happiness, voluntary actions that lead to this happiness; the essence of the self; the reality of happiness in the hereafter; and the means of attaining it (Ibn Rushd 2007, p. 182). Likewise, the Sharīʿa provides precise guidance for human action—its proper measure and timing. Since this comprehensive and perfect knowledge is fully contained in the Qurʾān, Ibn Rushd argues, it must necessarily be divine in origin.

Additionally, the unique compositional structure of the Qurʾān cannot be attributed to fikr wa-ruʾya (deliberate reflection or rhetorical artifice) (Ibn Rushd 2007, p. 181). Taken together, these features establish the Qurʾān as a miraculous text; divinely revealed and beyond imitation, serving as the clearest sign of Muḥammad’s prophethood.

It is worth mentioning that Ibn Rushd does not ground iʿjāz in stylistic or rhetorical features such as sajʿ, but in its normative and transformative function, as reflected in the following verse:

“قُلْ لَئِنِ اجْتَمَعَتِ الْإِنْسُ وَالْجِنُّ عَلَى أَنْ يَأْتُوا بِمِثْلِ هَذَا الْقُرْآنِ لَا يَأْتُونَ بِمِثْلِهِ وَلَوْ كَانَ بَعْضُهُمْ لِبَعْضٍ ظَهِيرً”

(al-Isrāʾ 17:88)

Say, “Surely if mankind and jinn banded together to bring the like of this Quran, they would not bring the like thereof, even if they supported one another

(Nasr et al. 2015, 17:88)

Moreover, he stresses that the Prophet Muḥammad himself was ummī (unlettered), raised in a Bedouin society marked by widespread illiteracy. This nation neither cultivated the sciences nor engaged in the systematic examination of existence as the Greeks had done. Thus, the extraordinary knowledge and legislation that Muḥammad brought forth could not have come from acquired learning, but only through divine revelation (Ibn Rushd 2007, p. 182). Ibn Rushd reinforces this point with the verse:

“وَمَا كُنتَ تَتْلُو مِن قَبْلِهِ مِن كِتَابٍ وَلَا تَخُطُّهُ بِيَمِينِكَ ۖ إِذًا لَّارْتَابَ الْمُبْطِلُونَ”

(al-ʿAnkabūt 29:48)

And thou didst not recite before this any Book; nor didst thou write it with thy right hand, for then those who make false claims would have doubted

(Nasr et al. 2015, 29:48)

For this reason, God praises this distinctive trait of His Messenger in several passages:

“هُوَ الَّذِي بَعَثَ فِي الْأُمِّيِّينَ رَسُولًا مِّنْهُمْ يَتْلُو عَلَيْهِمْ آيَاتِهِ وَيُزَكِّيهِمْ وَيُعَلِّمُهُمُ الْكِتَابَ وَالْحِكْمَةَ وَإِن كَانُوا مِن قَبْلُ لَفِي ضَلَالٍ مُّبِينٍ”

(al-Jumuʿa 62:2)

He it is Who sent among the unlettered a Messenger from among themselves, reciting unto them His signs, purifying them, and teaching them the Book and Wisdom, though before they were in manifest error

(Nasr et al. 2015, 62:2)

4.2.6. Revealed Legislations in Judaism and Christianity

Ibn Rushd also notes that the establishment of revealed laws is not unique to Islam but can be observed in earlier revelations such as the Torah and the Gospel (Ibn Rushd 2007, p. 183). These traditions, too, contain forms of divine legislation, though their scope remains limited each tailored to particular peoples and times. In contrast, the Qurʾān, for Ibn Rushd, completes and universalizes what earlier revelations only partially achieved, standing as the supreme example of comprehensive and universal divine law. It is precisely for this reason that the al-muʿjiz al-munāsib reaches both the learned and the common audience alike, guiding them through a revelation proportioned to every level of understanding.

The Qurʾān, he explains, addresses with particular clarity and completeness the two most essential domains of human concern: knowledge of God and knowledge of the hereafter, together with everything that relates to these two. In contrast to previous revelations, the Qurʾān not only reiterates core truths but perfects and completes them, offering a legislative system that organizes both belief and action for all of humanity. For this reason, Islamic Sharīʿa is understood to represent the culmination of divine lawgiving, a comprehensive framework that both confirms and surpasses the earlier revealed laws.

5. Conclusions

Taken as a whole, this study demonstrates that Ibn Rushd’s conception of miracles reflects a deliberate shift from metaphysical speculation to a legal–theoretical framework. By situating miracles within Sharīʿa rather than natural philosophy, he underscores their role in shaping communal belief, guiding moral practice, and securing human happiness. His reliance on Qurʾānic authority, coupled with epistemic foundations such as tawātur and self-evident knowledge, reveals a distinctive philosophical approach that integrates rational reflection with religious law.

Ibn Rushd articulates a distinctly reformist orientation inasmuch as he maintains the necessity of affirming the truths, exemplified here by the Qurʾān’s depiction of miracles, that religion provides for the general public, without subjecting them to undue skepticism. Simultaneously, he advances an alternative account of iʿjāz to that offered by the Ashʿarite and Muʿtazilite traditions. For Ibn Rushd, the locus of the miraculous resides not in the suspension of natural order but in the prophet’s capacity to institute norms and laws that regulate communal life within a coherent ethical framework. It is this legislative capacity, and the moral order it engenders, that discloses the divine origin of the prophetic message.

The study further demonstrates that Ibn Rushd’s argument unfolds through a series of interconnected elements. He begins with his distinction between two types of muʿjiz; al-barrānī and al-munāsib and emphasizes that the paradigmatic muʿjiz al-munāsib is the Qurʾān itself. For Ibn Rushd, the Qurʾān embodies the prophet’s unique role as the bearer of divine legislation, and in this sense, it constitutes the definitive sign of Muḥammad’s divine mission. Building on this foundation, he articulates the two principles upon which his argument rests, clarifies the epistemological framework that supports them, and details his method of proving their validity. He then expands this reasoning to demonstrate the authenticity of prophets, to establish the Qurʾān as the supreme source of divine law, and to situate Islamic legislation within a comparative perspective that acknowledges earlier revelations such as the Torah and the Gospel while affirming the universality and perfection of the Qurʾānic Sharīʿa.

In this way, Ibn Rushd not only responds to the theologians’ claims but also offers a coherent theory of prophecy and miracles that highlights the centrality of divine legislation as the true sign of prophethood.