In the Beginning Was Madness: Divine Folly in Shakespeare’s King Lear and Tarkovsky’s Nostalghia

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The article’s greatest strength lies in its attention to the fool as a truth-technology, a figure through which societies authorize forbidden knowledge. The reading of King Lear is especially strong in this respect, showing how Shakespeare’s clown mediates between prophetic speech and courtly immunity. The discussion of Nostalghia identifies similar dynamics of revelation through failure and duration, though here the analysis would gain from closer attention to film form—the long take, sound design, and the aesthetics of repetition as epistemological procedures rather than expressions of faith. The treatment of Plato’s Phaedrus and the later humanist and theological materials is erudite but expository; these sections rehearse doctrine rather than test it against the literary and cinematic examples.

The essay’s ambition is admirable, yet it sometimes mistakes accumulation for synthesis. What is needed is a methodological clarification: these are not genealogically continuous instances of divine folly but analogical recurrences of a function—the performance of madness as a means of truth. Recognizing that distinction would transform the essay’s overreach into coherence. Likewise, key terms such as madness, folly, and inspiration should be stabilized early, perhaps in a brief theoretical preamble defining their sources and operations within each tradition. The reader moves through an impressive catalogue of instances where “madness speaks truth,” yet the argument’s center of gravity remains elusive: the essay needs to articulate more sharply what happens when the multiple traditions it engages all at once are brought into dialogue. 

In its current form the essay also lacks a sense of argumentative friction with existing scholarship. The author cites a wide range of authorities but rarely indicates where this study extends or corrects them. The discussion of Foucault, for example, uses the “Great Confinement” as a narrative bridge but leaves aside Foucault’s deeper claim that madness is produced by the very regimes that exclude it. Engaging that tension directly—arguing that fool-speech occupies the boundary of discursive power rather than existing outside it—would lend the piece philosophical authority.  

Stylistically, the writing is clear, literate, and sometimes elegant, but its unbroken rhythm and comprehensive exposition contribute to the impression of coursework. Many paragraphs open by introducing a text, summarizing its plot or scene, and closing with a general reflection. More analytical modulation—moments of compression, reversal, and argumentative surprise—would give the prose a mature scholarly cadence. The essay could profitably be shortened by a quarter without loss of substance, its concluding reflections drawn forward to highlight what is at stake: the claim that modernity’s medicalization of unreason entails a loss of epistemic and ethical depth.

The author’s intellectual seriousness is unmistakable. The manuscript asks an important question—what happens to truth when its only legitimate voice is silenced—and it asks it through works that continue to test the limits of reason. With revision, it could make a notable contribution. At present, however, the argument’s shape remains diffuse. I therefore recommend revise and resubmit: a substantial condensation and reconceptualization rather than cosmetic editing. The revised version should foreground the paper’s central claim about the fool as epistemic instrument, distinguish recurrence from genealogy, and engage its theoretical interlocutors more critically.

Author Response

Dear Reviewer 1,

Thank you for your thoughtful and substantive critique, which has significantly strengthened this manuscript. Following your guidance, I have restructured the essay around methodological clarification, explicitly distinguishing between genealogical continuity and analogical recurrence in the opening section. This reframing, as you suggested, transforms what appeared as "overreach into coherence."

I have engaged more critically with Foucault's deeper claim about madness being produced by regimes that exclude it, arguing that the fool occupies the productive boundary of discursive power rather than existing outside it. The Tarkovsky analysis now emphasizes cinematic form—duration, sound design, and repetition—as epistemological procedures rather than mere expressions of faith. I have also condensed the manuscript by approximately 15% and provided clearer definitions of key terms (madness, folly, divine inspiration) in a theoretical preamble.

Your observation about the need for "argumentative friction" has led me to engage more directly with existing scholarship throughout. I appreciate your recognition of the essay's "intellectual seriousness" and hope these revisions demonstrate the "mature scholarly cadence" you encouraged.

Sincerely,

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The article presents a cogent argument for the perennial need for folly in society by analyzing Shakespeare’s King Lear, Tarkovsky’s Nostalghia, and Plato’s Phaedrus. The article is clearly structured and offers a good analysis of the three works. The author shows how all three works concede that reason has its limitations, which madness can overcome. In addition, the author provides three supplementary discussions on Erasmus’s praise of folly in his Moriae Encomium, on Foucault’s history of madness, and finally on Russian Orthodox holy fools. The article closes with a brief discussion of how fools are relevant to contemporary society and highlights the lack of protection from which modern fools suffer (pp.8, 22-24). The article closes elegantly with the conclusion that “[t]he fool’s immunity measures a culture’s tolerance for truth.” (p.23)

The article is well written and makes many astute observations. In particular, the scholarly prose is, on the whole, quite elegant and borders artistic expression. At the same time, the engagement with scholarly literature is very broad and does not offer any new arguments (e.g., with regard to the discussion of Plato on p.15). Moreover, various bibliographical references are incorrect. Moreover, there are specific issues that the author should address before publishing the article. First, there are a couple statements that are imprecise and should be corrected.

On p. 8 the author says “His equation recalls Orthodox theology’s essence-energies distinction, where God remains one while manifesting as three.” There seems to be a misunderstanding, as the first part of the sentence talks about the essence-energies distinction, while the second part seems to refer to trinitology (i.e., one ousia in three hypostaseis). These are two different issues. Also, the reference (note 58) to Lossky seems wrong.

On p. 17 the author repeats the platitude that “Socrates knew that he knew nothing”. This is self-contradictory statement and simply wrong. In the Apology, Socrates is shown to have known the limits of his own wisdom. He is quoted to have said that “what I do not know I do not think I know” (ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι).

On p. 5, the author refers to Mikhail Bakhtrin’s The Dialogic Imagination, but the bibliographical reference is wrong and the quoted term “dialogical truth” does not appear in Bakhtrin’s work. The author should rather focus on Bakhtrin’s discussion of the fool/clown/rogue and its function in the ancient and medieval novels (see pp.159ff of Bakhtrin’s work).

A more generally question: could it be that the role of the fool has been (or is being) replaced by another liminal figure in contemporary society, such as the rogue, prostitute, or clown? Could it be that the fool’s role has not been lost but is simply replaced by another figure?

On a different note, I strongly recommend that a native speaker proofreads the article. While author’s diction is elevated and the style is generally lucid, there are many grammatical mistakes. Most notably, the use of the (in/definite) articles is often incorrect. This greatly diminishes the value of the article. Just a few examples of grammatically wrong sentences:

The scene layers performed and real madness until they become inseparable. (p.6)

The house becomes cranium opened to cosmic forces. (p.10)

Long takes build psychological weight. (p.10)

Gorchakov seems student, yet […] (p.12)

Communities protect fools not from kindness but from self-interest. (p.22)

Author Response

Dear Reviewer 2,

Thank you for your careful reading and specific corrections, which have improved the manuscript's accuracy and clarity. I have corrected all the factual errors you identified: the essence-energies/Trinity confusion has been clarified, the Socrates reference now includes the accurate Greek quotation from the Apology, and the Bakhtin citation has been revised to focus on his discussion of the fool/clown/rogue.

Your provocative question about whether contemporary figures (rogues, hackers, provocateurs) have replaced the fool has enriched my conclusion, where I now argue that these represent not replacement but transformation of the fool function in new cultural contexts.

I acknowledge and apologize for the grammatical errors, particularly with article usage. I am having the manuscript professionally proofread by a native English speaker to address these issues comprehensively before resubmission. Thank you for your patience with these language matters and for your generous assessment of the essay's scholarly contributions.

Sincerely,

Round 2

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Thank you