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Article

Religious Aberrant: A Case Study on Religious Fundamentalism, Nationalism, and Racism in Sri Lankan Buddhism

Department of Indigenous Health Sciences, Faculty of Indigenous Health Sciences and Technology, Gampaha Wickramarachchi University of Indigenous Medicine, Yakkala 11870, Sri Lanka
Religions 2025, 16(12), 1526; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16121526
Submission received: 23 July 2024 / Revised: 15 August 2025 / Accepted: 29 November 2025 / Published: 4 December 2025
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Race, Religion, and Nationalism in the 21st Century)

Abstract

Religion is often regarded as a divine concept resistant to change or transformation, yet history reveals that religion can evolve and transform into new cults or religious movements. This reformation or alternative state of religion is often considered an aberrant version of the original. In Sri Lanka, an aberrant form of religion emerged during the modernization and colonization periods, particularly influenced by Protestant groups and urban Buddhists. The significance of this aberrant form of Buddhism is that it lacks the depth of true religious thought and is instead reflected in the mainstream of politics and nationalism rooted in race. Due to the demand to protect Buddhism, which was echoed by this aberrant version, the recognition of Sri Lanka’s diverse ethnic and religious identities gave rise to separatism and a fragmented form of nationalism. One of the key features of aberrant religion is its tendency toward fundamentalism and extremism, as it becomes distorted in the name of safeguarding religion. The consequence of aberrant religion was the fabrication of nationalism tied to ethno-religious identities, particularly among the Sinhalese majority, turning non-violent Buddhist thought into violent racism that cultivated discrimination in cultural values and even escalated into civil war to defend Buddhism and promote Buddhist nationalism. However, in time, the post-nationalist protest movement known as the “Aragalaya” rejected the pathological nationalism generated by aberrant Buddhism and brought about a systematic shift towards a unified nationalism. Thus, this study reflects on the formation of aberrant versions of religion in Sri Lankan history, their extension into nationalism and race, and the continued presence of aberrant religion in the contemporary context.

1. Introduction

The term aberrant refers to something unacceptable, unusual, abnormal, or deviating from what is considered right, normal, or standard (Merriam-Webster n.d.; Cambridge University Press n.d.). Applying this concept to religious faith may seem unusual, as religious teachings and practices are typically believed to be divinely ordained, with followers expected to adhere strictly to these doctrines rather than deviate or transform them. However, when examining religious traditions in Asia, alternative forms of religion have emerged due to the impacts of colonization and modernization (Ullah 2025). In efforts to protect and mobilize religion, several altered forms have been promoted by religious authorities. For instance, the Hindu Renaissance in India and the Vipassana Movement in Burma are examples of developments that occurred outside the mainstream of religion. Additionally, alternative religious traditions such as Navayāna by B. R. Ambedkar emerged from within specific communities (Devanandan 1955; Chung 2003; Jerryson 2017). These religious mobilizations reflect the characteristics of aberrant versions of religion, as various factors influenced religious communities or individual authorities to transform religious ideologies and practices. These transformed or altered religious forms were often developed in response to perceived threats to the security of the religion. Especially during the periods of modernization, colonization, and post-colonial transitions, these new religious cults evolved (Jodhka and Fazal 2021). The features of such alternative or aberrant forms of religion include the emergence of new religious cults as political responses aimed at restructuring religious orientation, establishing strong connections between religion and society, promoting social control, resisting anti-cult movements, engaging in brainwashing practices, and fostering identity formation within popular culture (Douglas 1982; Woodhead et al. 2003; Cowan and Bromley 2015).
This altered or aberrant formation of religion is prominently represented in the Sri Lankan Buddhist cult as well. It primarily arises within the ideologies or identities of nationalism and race, both of which are rooted in fundamentalist religion and ethnocentric racism. When examining Sri Lankan nationalism and racism, one must recognize it as a reflection of a pluralistic society with diverse ethnic identities, including Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim, Catholic, and other minorities. Statistically, the population consists of Sinhalese (74.9%), Tamils (15.2%), Muslims (9.3%), and Catholics and other minorities (0.6%). These ethnic groups correspond to religious identities such as Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Catholicism, Christianity, and other minority faiths (Department of Census and Statistics 2023). In general, the principles of nationalism are autonomy, unity, and identity (A. D. Smith 2013). However, when examining the history of Sri Lanka, it becomes evident that nationalism has often been characterized and formulated based on race and ethnicity, due to the deeply rooted historical and cultural connections of each group to the land. According to the historical chronicle Mahāvaṃsa, the Sinhalese are considered the inherent or pure community of Sri Lanka. With the arrival of Mahinda Thera in the 3rd century BCE, the Sinhalese identity and culture became deeply intertwined with Buddhism (K. M. De Silva 2005). After the decline of Buddhism in India, Sri Lanka became the central stronghold of the Buddhist faith and was regarded as a “place of sanctity for the Buddhist religion.” In this context, Buddhist monks (sangha) emerged as forerunners and authoritative figures not only in the religious sphere but also in social and political leadership (Blaze 2004; Holt 2011).
Moving towards other communities of Tamils, Muslims, and Christians, they also had their separate identity in the history of Sri Lanka in comparison to the Sinhalese. The Tamil community of Sri Lanka, established in the 3rd century, migrated from south India, known as “Dravidian”, and evolved with their own identity in the language, culture, and religion of Hinduism as an independent kingdom (Silva 2002). Similarly, the Muslim community has maintained an inherent identity in Sri Lanka from the 7th century onwards, arriving as migrants and traders. Due to the religious tolerance of Sinhala kings and the acceptance of the Sri Lankan community, Muslims established themselves in Sri Lanka, becoming further rooted in intermarriages between Arab settlers and local women. By the 16th century, Muslims were well-settled in Sri Lanka (Mohan 1987). The Catholic community’s roots in Sri Lanka date back to the 5th century. Before the Portuguese arrived in 1505, Catholics already lived in Sri Lanka. The spread of Christianity commenced with Portuguese missionary activities, leading to significant conversions. In 1544, Cankilli massacred 640 converts to Christianity in Mannar. By 1560, 70,000 people from the west coast of Sri Lanka had embraced Christianity. The Dutch arrival further evolved this, reforming Catholic literature in Sri Lanka. Over time, the Sri Lankan Catholic community evolved into various denominations, including the St. Thomas Christians, Nestorian Christians, Roman Catholics, Calvinists, and Anglicans (Pinto 2015).
Before the British Empire established control over Sri Lanka, political power was governed by the monarchy, with significant involvement from the Buddhist monastic community. For example, the Sinhala king was regarded as the defender of Buddhism, and Buddhist monks even held administrative positions. However, the centralization of administration by British rulers created a need for the formation of a national identity among the diverse communities (Schrikker 2007). This nationalistic ideology was largely shaped by political orientalism, which operated through two main perspectives: the colonial use of culture and perceived superiority as tools of domination, and the ethnic communities’ efforts to form political identities and resist colonial rule. This stereotyped nationalism was constructed around caste, race, ethnicity, and religion, particularly influenced by British colonial censuses conducted in 1814, 1824, 1871, and 1881 and by the gradual opening of opportunities for political representation in the 19th century based on race and ethnicity. As a result of these transformations, while the nationalist ideology ideally should have promoted unity under a collective Sri Lankan identity, modern nationalism instead developed in a fragmented manner, dividing people as Sinhalese, Ceylon Tamils, Ceylon Muslims, and other minorities, both culturally and politically (Wickramasinghe 2006; J. L. Fernando 2013).
This separated nationalism based on race and ethnicity was timely directed towards racism in the colonial period due to the crisis of identity. As revealed in history, Tamils were dislodged from their traditional homelands through state-aided colonization and government service opportunities for Tamils were reduced, leading to the high rise in unemployment among Sinhalese due to the Tamil interlopers (Sepencer 1990). Furthermore, each community made disassociation or separateness among ethnic communities to represent their identities, such as forming ethnic-oriented political parties, separate school systems, representation for the religious faith, and promoting separatism for the representation of their racial, social, political, cultural, and religious interests (Mohan 1987; Wilson and Wilson 2000; Mohamed-Saleem 2020). This separate identity of the minority of the Tamils and Muslims has challenged the identity of the majority of the Sinhalese. Because in the land of Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese had a long historical and prestigious identity among all other races and posed a challenge to the existence of the Sinhalese and the existence of Buddhism from several aspects (Dharmadasa 1992).
The identity of the Sinhalese has been centered around Buddhism, and Buddhism served as the primary instrument in the formation of nationalism within the Sinhala community. However, the ideology of Sinhalese nationalism was shaped by a fundamentalist interpretation of Buddhism, rooted in Sri Lanka’s long Buddhist history and marked by directed discrimination against minority groups (Nubin 2002). The Buddhist principle of non-violence was transformed into violent expressions, manifesting in racism towards minorities. For instance, the 1915 Mohammedan riots between Sinhalese and Muslims illustrate this transformation. Similarly, the thirty-year civil war in Sri Lanka, which began as a domestic conflict between Sinhalese and Tamils, escalated into the 1983 riots that resulted in the deaths of over 2000 Tamils and the destruction of approximately 18,000 properties. In response, a faction of the Tamil population militarized, demanding rights and seeking the establishment of a separate Tamil state in the northern and eastern regions, known as Eelam (Herring 2001). Following the end of the civil war, racism and discrimination shifted focus toward the Muslim community. The Sinhala majority, often through militarized religious groups, targeted Muslims with violence and exclusion, undermining their religious and cultural identities. Sri Lanka’s history also reflects inter-minority discrimination and violence, as seen in the Easter Sunday attacks, which further highlighted the vulnerability of minority communities (Gunaratna 2023).
All of the above explanations indicate that the nationalism propagated during the modernization and colonial periods in Sri Lanka was a form of prejudiced nationalism. This form of nationalism was characterized by racial preferences, the supremacy of the majority, a tendency toward discrimination targeting minorities, ethnocentric identity, intolerance, militant patriotism, and the use of stereotypical myths as foundational elements with particular emphasis on race and religion, continuing even into the present (Rutland 2022). The foundation of this prejudiced nationalism in Sri Lanka evolved largely due to the emergence of a neo-traditional or aberrant version of Buddhism, which came to be commonly identified by the term “Sinhala Buddhism.” This form was marked by features such as fundamentalism, pathological nationalism, extremism, and racism (DeVotta 2007). In conclusion, the evidence demonstrates that the orientation of nationalism during the modernization and colonial periods directed the Sri Lankan community toward a form of pathological nationalism intertwined with racism. The primary force behind this phenomenon was the aberrant version of Sri Lankan Buddhism. Given the deep interconnection between religion, race, and nationalism, this study seeks to explore whether the foundation of Buddhist thought inherently promotes violence or non-violence. Historical facts and theoretical perspectives reveal that the formation of this aberrant version of Buddhism, shaped by Protestant and urban Buddhist influences during the colonial and modernization periods, extended into racism and violence as a means of preserving the sovereignty of Buddhism (Gombrich 2006b; B. L. Smith 2022). Furthermore, this study examines the contemporary manifestations of this aberrant Buddhism, particularly about the Aragalaya protest movement, which challenged racist nationalism in the post-nationalist era. Overall, the study highlights the role of religion in the formation of nationalism and the promotion of racism in society through the emergence of an altered or aberrant version of religion, marked by fundamentalism and extremism, while also pointing toward the genuine potential for a unified nationalism in contemporary Sri Lanka.

2. Literature Review

The historical evolution of religion shows that it has undergone various modifications over time. One significant change has been the emergence of religious aberrations. These aberrations involve the misuse or alteration of religious values and teachings by a particular group, leading to the creation of new religious cults. Such movements often display characteristics of dependence, powerlessness, altered expressions of values, and the development of new religious ideologies. This form of religious abuse can replace the original values of the religion, creating a new spectrum within it (Knapp 2021). Additionally, this type of religious movement is often recognized as a form of self-religiousness, where religious values are altered according to the desires of individuals or groups. This “selfism” lacks the pure virtues of the original religion (Hennell 1873). Furthermore, the existence of authentic religion has been challenged by the evolution of mankind. To safeguard religion from these challenges, significant changes to authentic religious practices have become necessary. As a result, traditional values have been neglected, and religious faith has been altered to meet contemporary demands. This manipulation has transformed current religious faith into what is now referred to as religious aberration (Paton 2014).
One of the most antagonistic aspects of religion is religious fundamentalism. The term fundamentalism is vast and consists of the meaning of a form of reaction toward modern development, modern in itself and arising based on grand historical narratives (Peels 2023). Once this becomes a form of religion, it is characterized by a distinct pattern of militancy, where true believers strive to prevent the erosion of their religious identity by outsiders. They aim to reinforce the boundaries of their religious community and create viable alternatives to secular systems, often incorporating violence into their movement. All major religious movements worldwide exhibit traits of fundamentalism (Haar and Busuttil 2003). The root causes of religious fundamentalism are closely linked to religious aberrations. According to scholars, religious manipulation often arises from the influence of social, cultural, and political changes within a society (Lenshie and Johnson 2012). This interplay can transform religious aberrations into fundamentalist movements. Major world religions generally promote humanistic teachings and advocate for a moral lifestyle for their followers. However, the impact of religious aberrations can distort religious faith, leading to sanctimoniousness, hypocrisy, and prejudice (Paton 2014). Ultimately, religious aberrations give rise to new religious movements that reflect the cultural, social, and ethnic identities of their respective communities, often involving a degree of mental manipulation (Lucas and Thomas 2004).
Another significant feature of religion is its substantial contribution to the development of nationalist ideologies. The religious faith of any community shapes its nationalistic ideology, often emphasizing race and ethnicity. This intertwining of nationalism and religion is a contemporary phenomenon seen in many societies (Brubaker 2012). Scholars assert that religion and nationalism are inseparably linked in fostering the spirit of community and the aspiration for political self-determination, a concept known as religious nationalism (Rieffer 2003). Unlike secular nationalism, religious nationalism is often associated with racism, discrimination, extremism, and violence. This is evident in the nationalist movements within Hinduism, known as Hindu Tattva (Leidig 2020), and in the concept of a pure Islamic state (Simons 2016). These examples illustrate how religious nationalism can contribute to racism and ethnic conflicts, stemming from distorted forms of religion. Sri Lanka is another example where religious fundamentalism and extremism are intertwined with nationalist ideology, particularly among the Sinhala Buddhist majority, influenced by an aberrant version of Buddhism (Sangasumana 2014). In response to such religious nationalism, new national aspirations emerged in the mid-20th century, reflecting modern religious national states (Juergensmeyer 2019). These new forms of nationalism, which counteract the rise in religious nationalism and its distorted religious influences, have gained acceptance and support within the Sri Lankan community (Juergensmeyer 2023).

3. Methodology

This was conducted according to the explanatory case study methodology, which focused on how Buddhism has been transformed into an aberrant form in Sri Lanka and leading to racism and violence within nationalism. The theoretical framework or research design of the study has been developed according to the above literature review. According to the literature review, due to the change in the social, cultural, and political factors, the formulated neo-traditions developed the aberrant religion, and this expansion to nationalism formulated several pathological movements. In the contemporary era, the concept of post-nationalism is changing the outlook of nationalism in various forms compared to traditional religious nationalism. Based upon this framework in the Sri Lankan spectrum, the following relationship questions are derived:
  • Question 01: Do Buddhist teachings consist of any teachings related to violence and discrimination?
  • Question 02: How did Sri Lankan Buddhism transform into an aberrant religion and evolve into a fundamentalist and extremism religion?
  • Question 03: How fundamentalistic and extremist ideology of Sri Lankan Buddhism shapes the national identity and its contribution to racism and violence?
  • Question 04: What is the contemporary Sri Lankan perspective against ethno-religious nationalism in the post-nationalistic movement?
Through answering these questions, the results and discussion of the study are presented. The data related to these questions has been collected from both primary and secondary sources. Sources that illustrate the Sri Lankan ethnic and religious conflicts have been chosen, and the data relevant to the above four questions are presented. Then, analysis is performed with methods of descriptive analysis and direct interpretation focused on bringing an empirical analysis on the relation between nationalism and race within the scope of the religious aberrant. The discussion is presented in five phases parallel to above-mentioned four research questions. Those are 01. Buddhism as a non-violent and humanistic religion, 02. The Development of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, 03. Fundamentalism and Extremism in the Sri Lankan Buddhist Movement, 04. Buddhist Nationalism and Racism in Sri Lanka, and 05. Sri Lanka Towards Anti-Racism and Secular Nationalism.

3.1. Phase 01: Buddhism as a Non-Violent and Humanistic Religion

Buddhism evolved as an atheistic tradition focused on alleviating suffering and achieving freedom in both secular and spiritual contexts, as described in the Dhammacakkappavattanasutta (SN 56.11) (Bodhi 2005a). At its core, Buddhism promotes non-violence, harmony, tolerance, and freedom among individuals (Kraft 1992). Because the text of the Visudhimagga expresses the pathway for the awakening state of Buddhism, the essentiality of developing four key virtues is highlighted, such as loving-kindness (mettā), compassion (karunā), empathetic joy (muditā), and equanimity (upekkhā). These virtues guide individuals towards inner and outer peace, fostering unconditional love and empathy for all beings and enhancing joy and compassion (Nanamoli 1991; Rahula 2007). Among the many Buddhist traditions, Mahayana Buddhism stands out for emphasizing compassion as the highest virtue. Followers of Mahayana Buddhism are encouraged to cultivate compassion and extend this virtue to all living and non-living entities as a form of service, references to the Bodhisattva ideal described in the Sadarmapundarika Sutra and Prajnaparamita Sutra (Pine 2005; Trungpa 2013; Kern 2022).
Buddhist teachings also empower individuals with free will and self-determination, as pointed out in Dhammapada verse, the complete being directed by own force of the mind (Manopubbaṅgama dhamma manoseṭṭa manomaya) (Carter and Mahinda 1998; Keown 2005). People are seen as having the ability to control their thoughts and actions, directing them toward a humanistic path through their own volition (Das and Sahu 2018). Buddhism underscores that individuals can achieve desired outcomes through their efforts, free from external or internal constraints, according to the right effort (samma vayamo) described in the noble eightfold path (Jayatilleke 2010). The teachings advocate for sharing goodness in social and secular contexts without discrimination based on race, social status, or cultural background, as emphasized in the Vasalasutta (Snp 1.7). According to this sutta, superiority or inferiority is determined by one’s actions and their consequences, not by birth, race, or caste (Narada 2006; Bodhi 2017). Buddhist teachings focus on moral and spiritual growth rather than limiting human potential by race, caste, or ethnicity (Malalasekera and Jayatilleke 1974).
Furthermore, the path to Buddhist salvation known as the Noble Eightfold Path, as described in the Mahacattarisakasutta (MN 117) (Bodhi 2005b), is humanistic and non-violent, promoting the enhancement of individual potential rather than mystical or harmful practices (Gentry 2016). This aspect of Buddhist teachings demonstrates that Buddhism is fundamentally a non-violent and humanistic religion. Buddha’s teachings encourage independence, self-determination, and the sharing of empathy, compassion, and loving-kindness. Socially, individuals are encouraged to contribute positively to society, promoting tolerance and harmony. As a result, Buddhism’s core values do not subject its followers to discrimination or harm. For example, after the enlightenment, the first word shared by Buddha for his disciples was, Buddhist teachings and practices should be shared for the happiness and welfare of many (Bahujana sukhya bahujana hitaya cha).

3.2. Phase 02: The Development of Buddhism in Sri Lanka

The aberrant version of religion transforms with the features of fundamentalism and racism and may receive contributions from the historical roots of the specific religion, because of the emotional state of the superiority, sensation of threat, identity formation, arisen hierarchical system, bias and motivation for the violence, and discrimination shaped by the position of religion in race of the majority (Hill and Williamson 2005). Examine the development of Buddhism in Sri Lanka decision made by King Ashoka in the Third Buddhist Council; Buddhism was introduced to Sri Lanka during 250 BCE, introduced to ancient Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) through the mission of Mahinda Thera, the son of Emperor Ashoka. The early form of Buddhism that took root in Sri Lanka was Theravada Buddhism, which embodies the fundamental teachings of the Buddha (Gombrich 2006b). At the time of Mahinda Thera’s arrival, Sri Lanka was ruled by King Devanampiya Tissa. Following a diplomatic mission with King Ashoka, Mahinda Thera was sent to establish Buddhism in Sri Lanka. King Devanampiya Tissa converted to Buddhism after hearing the teachings of the Dhamma. Consequently, with the support of the monarchy, the Buddhist monastic community (Sangha) was established, and later, the tradition of female Buddhist disciples began with the arrival of Sanghamitta Thera, Mahinda Thera’s sister (Codrington 1995).
Toward the establishment of Buddhism and the spread of the social cognition of the individual in society, the evolution of the Buddhist monastic community may have been directly affected. During the Anuradhapura Kingdom, the monastic order was established as the Mahavihara and Abhayagiri. The consequence of this formation was that the complete identity and existence of Sri Lankans were fabricated by the Buddhists, because according to Buddhist teachings, the ultimate sovereignty of the Sri Lankan community was pursued as the highest attainment of the Buddhist soteriological state of Nibbāna, with the guidance of the monastic community. In popular culture, this is highlighted as the three jewels of Buddhism known as Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha. Reflecting the philosophy of King Ashoka, the Buddhist community in Sri Lanka also provided opportunities for other religions, such as Hinduism, to thrive. Evidence of this includes the incorporation of Hindu deities into Buddhist cosmology (Sekhara 1998; B. L. Smith 2022). However, it may show the clear demarcation among the race of the Sri Lankan community from history, considering Buddhism as the supreme community, as even the kingship of the country centered towards the Buddhist faith. For example, Sri Lankan kingship was symbolically linked to the relic of the Buddha’s tooth, and the arrival of Princess Sanghamitta, who brought a branch of the Bodhi tree (under which the Buddha attained enlightenment), marked a ritualistic tradition of Buddhism beyond the philosophical thought of Buddhism and the monastic order, which was the highest authority even beyond the king (Howard 2014).
Historically, Sri Lanka’s culture and civilization were shaped by Buddhism, due to the position of Buddhism as the majority religion, and dedicated to preserving Buddhism. As mentioned by Buddha, Sri Lanka is the only land where Buddhism is secure. To reflect this ideology, a number of incidents may be presented in the history, for example, under King Vattagamani, Sri Lankan monks compiled all Buddhist teachings into the Pali Canon, a collection of texts preserved through oral tradition in the 4th Buddhist council held in Sri Lanka and Chols King Elara has ruled Sri Lanka for the forty years and challenged the position of the Buddhism. Later, King Dutugamunu restored the Buddhist state of Sri Lanka. The Buddhist monastic community has historically advised the state, guiding kings to govern according to the principles of the Dasavidha-rājadhamma (the ten duties of a king) and to strive to become a Bodhisattva as prescribed in the Buddhist texts. This guidance has influenced Sinhala literature, art, architecture, politics, economics, and lifestyle. The significance of Buddhism in Sri Lanka is articulated in the Pujavaliya, which describes the island as belonging to Buddhism and one that should be directed towards protecting the Triple Gem: Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha. Despite occasional rule by non-Buddhist kings, Buddhism has remained deeply rooted in Sri Lankan society (Rahula 2003; Bullis 1999). Thus, Buddhism has been the central faith and belief system for the Sinhala community for over 2500 years, evolving into what is now known as modern Sinhala Buddhism (Wijeyeratne 2013).

3.3. Phase 03: Fundamentalism and Extremism in the Sri Lankan Buddhist Movement

As mentioned in the previous phase, the identity of the majority of the Sinhalese has been shaped by the Buddhist faith that has evolved over the centuries. However, this identity among the Sri Lankan Buddhist community was challenged during the colonial period in the 19th century. Due to the modernization, the administration is largely driven by colonialism, the consequence of this process of restructuring social and political order from the 16th century to the mid-20th century (Scott 1996). This period saw the imposition of a centralized governance system, replacing traditional kingship with parliamentary democracy, which threatened state support for Buddhism. Economically, the shift from a village-centered, non-caste economy to estate agriculture disrupted traditional caste systems and created new social and economic identities (Jiggins 1979). Additionally, the colonial education system, which replaced the traditional Buddhist monastic education, starting with the protestant missionary schools, challenged the Buddhist foundation of the traditional Sinhala society (Bond 1992).
Once the position of the religion is challenged, the need for a new identity is formed, and the religion begins its formation into fundamentalism (Bruce 2008). Considering this cause, due to the challenge arising in the colonial period towards the foundation of Buddhism, to sustain the majority identity, Buddhism reformed the social order, as Buddhism should be protected, considering the rich heritage that evolved from the centuries (Berkwitz 2012). This resistance was social, political, and ideological, with the two resistance groups being the urban and protestant Buddhists. The ideological form of fundamentalism was brought by the protestant monastic community, which sought to defend Buddhism against missionary criticism. The medium of resistance was scholarly works and public debates. In the 19th century, debates in Baddegama, Varagoda, and Panadura highlighted these tensions, with Buddhist monk Mohottivatte Gunananda defending Buddhism against missionary critiques (D. De Silva 2006). Missionaries criticized Buddhism’s scientific foundations, exemplified by the publication of “The Sacred Books of the Buddhists Compared with History and Modern Science” (Hardy 1863). In response, the Buddhist Theosophical Society formed two branches: clerical and lay, promoting a rationalistic and scientific approach to Buddhism, separate traditions of teachings. Texts such as “Buddhist Catechism” argued that the Buddhist path was scientific rather than merely religious, appealing to the lay community (Olcott 1881). Despite these efforts, missionaries continued to challenge Buddhism’s scientific credibility, as seen in texts like “Kristiyani Prajnapti” (The Evidences and Doctrine of the Christian Religion), which attracted some Buddhists to Christianity. The result was a reinterpretation of Theravada Buddhism in Sri Lanka, shifting away from authentic textual teachings, and Buddhism reforms as a religion based on race, with the identities taken from the history and culture of Sinhalese Buddhism (E. Harris 2006).
The newly formed educated group of urban middle-class society represents the group of urban Buddhists. Literature that has been promoted by protestant Buddhists, such as “Kristiyai Vada”, “Mardanaya, Samyak Darsanaya”, “Baudha Vaksaraya”, “Bauddha Vakya Khandanaya”, and the magazines “lakminipahana”, “Sarasavi Sandarsa”, “The Buddhist”, “Rivisara”, “Baudha Prashnaya”, especially address the criticism directed toward Buddhist cosmology and promote newly formulated scientific Buddhism. Due to these notions, the layman’s knowledge about Buddhism took a radical aspect, and the political representation during the colonization period was made by urban Buddhists. The inspiration taken by urban Buddhists through the above literature has led to the formulation of a new form of Buddhism, which gives recognition to the Buddhist identity among races, securing the Buddhist foundation and superiority of Buddhism as the theme of political representation (Malalgoda 1976). The formation of this new form of radical Buddhism with a combination of both ideological and political force among the middle class of Colombo’s cognition was highlighted by the Anglican Bishop of Colombo in the 19th century, as “there were two schools of Buddhism, one is old Buddhism and other one is self-consciousness, artificial, which aims revival of Buddhism” (Copleston 1892).
As mentioned in the previous sections, the monastic community had the authority on matters related to the religious teachings (dhamma), but due to the force that came from modernity and colonization, lay persons made a form of movement with newly interpreted religious teachings. Referring to modern Buddhism, Anagarika Dhammapala is a key person who has formed a separate Buddhist doctrine according to the lay person’s lifestyle or specific Buddhist ethical lifestyle, away from the monastic order, and promoted a new notion of Buddhism among the Sinhala community. The major text he introduced was Gihi Vinaya (Disciplinary Code for the Laity); some of the salient features of this rationalistic Buddhist tradition are that individuals can only achieve salvation through the guidance of a monk or sangha, individual responsibility for scrutiny, religion is privatized, and the need to fight for Buddhism in the social and political arena (De Silva Wijeyeratne 2013). Furthermore, in comparison to the monastic community, urban Buddhists have been the force of the religion because the financial support and sustainability of the religion were provided by the urban Buddhists during the colonial period (Gombrich and Obeyesekere 1990). This complete formation of the new form of Buddhism or neo-traditions of Buddhism has evolved as an alternative or aberrant form of Buddhism, with the features of individualization and self-interpretation as a revival form of Buddhism after colonization with the ethno-religious identity of the Sinhala Buddhists with the feature of the fundamentalism and extremism movement (Berkwitz 2003; Gombrich 2006a).
The features of fundamentalism are securing threats towards identity, pathological textual analysis and interpretation, political identity formation, historical superiority, anti-modernism, cultural revivalism, ethnonationalism, militancy, and violence (Antoun 2001; Saha 2004). Such a feature may exist within an aberrant version of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. The richness of the Buddhist history of Sri Lanka may be utilized to present the ethno-religious nationalism; the formulated ideology was that Sri Lanka was known as Dhammadipa or the island of Dhamma, which means that Sri Lanka’s need to be a Buddhist-dominated nation ruled by Buddhist rulers and securing Buddhism is one of the major dutiy of all Buddhists in Sri Lanka (Schalk 2006). The texts, symbols, and ancient historical books are considered the symbols of ethno-religious identity and the prestige of ethnicity in cultural revivalism. Referring to the ancient historical stories, the violence has been justified and promoted. One example in the Mahāvaṃsa is that King Dutugamunu secured Buddhism from the Tamil king of Elara. These historical events illustrated the right of the king to secure Buddhism, even with violence and the justified use of violence and racism in order to protect ethnic and religious identity. Another example is based on the teachings of historical texts such as Mahāvaṃsa, violence brought to the consciousness of individual, as scholars highlight, according to this text, “Sinhalas do die and do kill because of and for their history”; due to this, the majority of Sinhalese took harmful action towards securing Buddhism in Sri Lanka (Obeyesekere 1995; Bartholomeusz and De Silva 1998). Historically, this has first been directed towards the Tamils and has led to contemporary victimization of the Muslim minority (BBC 2014). This has transformed the other minorities towards fundamentalism and extremism to cope with the pressure given by the majority. One example is intolerance towards Buddhist fundamentalism and how the minority of Tamils have propagated their soteriology as the Tamil Eelam and militarized extremism. (Roberts 2014). In comparison to the Tamils, other communities also present an outlook of fundamentalism and extremism in their activities, for example, the Easter Sunday attack in Sri Lanka (Imtiyaz and Saleem 2023). All these facts may show that the formation of the alternative form of Buddhism or the formation of an aberrant religion may direct its faith into fundamentalism and extremism, even though it is a non-violent religion, due to the formation of the aberrant version of religion (Haynes 2008).

3.4. Phase 04: Buddhist Nationalism and Racism in Sri Lanka

The aberrant version of religion or fundamentalist ideology associated with religion is within a limited population, but it needs to come to the mainstream through nationalism. In Sri Lanka, the individual identity has been formulated within the religion-oriented political representation (Imtiyaz 2014; Rutland 2022). This can be recognized through the historical evolution of Sri Lankan democracy. In 1931, Sri Lankan citizens gained the right to vote for their representatives to the state council, marking a significant step towards democracy. This development brought a shift towards ethno-religious political representation, reflecting the modernized political structure of Sri Lanka. Consequently, ethnic tensions between the majority and minority communities increased, fueled by political parties based on ethnicity and religion. For instance, the Great Council of Sinhalese, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), and the All Ceylon Tamil Congress emerged in the post-colonial period. A notable development was the formation of the United Front of Buddhist Monks, which advocated for equality and opportunities for Sinhala Buddhists. This shift turned secular elite politics into religious mass politics. Authentic Buddhist teachings had generally discouraged monks from engaging in politics. However, the book “The Heritage of the Bhikku” justified the involvement of Sri Lankan Buddhist monks in political affairs (Caldarola 2011).
This ethnic and religion-oriented nationalism among the Sinhalese was grounded in previously developed fundamentalism and extremism. However, in the political arena, this has been extended towards racism. A feature of racism is making discrimination and prejudice, regarding the superior and inferior, based on race and ethnicity (Berg and Wendt 2011). Such a condition of racism has continued in Sri Lanka based on the politically oriented religion during post-colonialization from the 1956 election onwards, representing the position of the fundamentalist ideology generated in the modernization and colonial period, bringing about the theme of protecting Buddhism; Sri Lankan constitutional law has since defined Sri Lanka as a Buddhist nation, prioritizing Buddhism and enacting measures to safeguard it (DeVotta 2007; Schonthal 2016). This fundamentalistic ideology resulted in discrimination against other ethnic communities and promoted racism. For example, the Sinhala language was made the official language, and the Buddhist evolution of Sri Lanka was incorporated into the national curriculum (Keyes 2016). These policies contributed to the marginalization of minorities, exacerbating economic inequalities, local identities, and regional politics. For example, making Sinhala the official language limited Tamil employment opportunities in the public sector, restricted access to higher education for Tamils, led to land colonization by Sinhalese in Tamil areas, and reduced public investment in Tamil regions (Stokke and Ryntveit 2000). The most critical expression of this fundamentalist movement was the sporadic and systematic anti-Tamil violence during the 1950s, 1970s, and early 1980s. The peak of this violence occurred during the anti-Tamil riots of 1983, known as Black July, which resulted in the deaths of over a thousand people and significant property damage. The riots were triggered by the killing of 13 Sri Lankan soldiers by Tamil radicals who were demanding a separate homeland for Tamils to ensure their identity and right to self-determination (Uyangoda 2010).
Consequently, the concept of Elam, or the Tamil homeland, emerged as a form of resistance against the discrimination, intolerance, and tensions created by the majority’s push for identity preservation (Herring 2001). The racism directed towards the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka led to the emergence of “Tamil Terrorism.” This conflict resulted in ethnic violence, including military attacks on Buddhist religious sites and the killing of thousands of civilians, to present the resistance towards the aberrant version of religion. Notable incidents include attacks by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on the Sri Dalada Maligawa (Temple of the Sacred Tooth Relic), the Jaya Sri Maha Bodhiya (Sacred Bo Tree), and the Aranthalawa massacre, which resulted in the deaths of over thirty Buddhist monks. Examination of the aberrant Buddhist view was related to whether the war was justified, the involvement in the war, and the fight against terrorists, while highlighting that they are severe and directed towards the protection of the country (rata), race (jathiya), and religion (agama). Changing the notion of the Buddhist teachings, the fundamentalistic Buddhist community justified the engagement of war and motivation for battlefields, mentioning that the engagement of war does not violate the Buddhist teachings or values (Jerryson and Juergensmeyer 2010).
Later, during the third wave of the Elam, the racism intensified with “War for Peace”; the propagation of various nationalist group movements such as Sinhala Veera Vidhana (SVV, Sinhala Heroism), the National Movement Against Terrorism (NMAT), Sinhala Urumaya (Sinhala Heritage), and Sinhala Arakshaka Sanvidhanaya (Sinhala Organization for Self-Defense) advocated for Sri Lanka to be a Sinhala Buddhist country as a way to promote racism as the wish of the majority. In contrast, opposing groups sought national unity (E. J. Harris 2001). Furthermore, one nationalist group evolved as a political group to present the racist nationalism in the mainstream in 2004—the rise of the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) or National Heritage Party, composed primarily of Buddhist monks. The JHU won nine seats in the legislature with a political agenda that rejected political settlement for Tamils in the Northern and Eastern provinces, advocating instead for a united Sri Lanka and the establishment of a “Dharmarajya” “Sinhaladipa” or Sinhala Buddhist state as the achievement of the highest racism (DeVotta and Stone 2008; Deegalle 2004). This aberrant version of Theravada Buddhism in Sri Lanka began to accept Buddhist violence as doctrinally justified. The JHU spokesperson argued that “Buddha did not prohibit his followers from defending themselves,” transforming Buddhist monks into war monks and empowering the Sinhala community to engage in war to protect the Buddhist state. This perspective was closely associated with the ideology of Jathinka Chintnaya (National Thinking), which fabricated the nationalism of the majority with militarism under the guise of Buddhist principles (Lehr 2018; Brekke and Tikhnov 2012).
The radical path of the “War for Peace” secured victory for Sinhala Buddhists after 25 years of civil conflict, reinforcing the ideology of Buddhist nationalism and marginalizing Tamil communities. This victory ushered in a new era of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism, characterized by increased discrimination against minority values and practices. One example of this discrimination is the criticism of Hindu animal sacrifices at Munneswaram Kovil, which are seen as contrary to the Buddhist values of ahimsa (non-violence). Additionally, the halal certification process for Muslim dietary practices was challenged, reflecting a broader resistance against minority cultures. This resistance reached a dramatic point when a Buddhist monk engaged in self-immolation to protest against animal sacrifices in minority religions (Mahadev 2019; BBC 2013). This new wave of racism led to increased islamophobia and perceived threats to the sovereignty of the Buddhist state. Advocacy groups such as the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS), Sinhala Ravaya (SR), and Ravana Balaya (RB), active from 2012 onwards, have been at the forefront of this campaign. They have criticized various aspects of Muslim culture, including the wearing of hijabs, cattle slaughtering, and Islamic banking, and have targeted Muslim businesses and plural marriages. A particularly severe incident occurred in 2012 with the attack on the Dambulla Muslim mosque and in 2014 with the violence in Aluthgama. These attacks caused significant damage to property and loss of life. Despite the severity of these incidents, they were carried out by a relatively small segment of the majority population (Nuhman 2016; BBC 2012). The campaign by the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) gained considerable traction through the effective use of mass media and social media platforms, drawing national attention to their cause (Stewart 2014).
The campaign was further bolstered by financial support from Sinhala businessmen, entrepreneurs, and the Sri Lankan diaspora. It also received backing from well-educated professionals and political parties, enhancing its reach and influence. Despite the significant publicity and support, interventions by civil law authorities against the violence perpetrated by these extreme Buddhist groups were minimal. Reports indicate that between 2011 and 2015, there were over 240 documented incidents of violence against Muslims. However, following the 2015 presidential election, the activities of these extreme Buddhist communities diminished as the election brought a new president to power. During the 2015 presidential election, the BBS supported the outgoing government, which aligned with their interests. The BBS believed that they were defending Buddhist values against perceived threats posed by the Muslim community in terms of demographics, culture, politics, and economics. However, the public has accepted the movement of this community, during the 2020 parliamentary election, due to the Easter Sunday attack; BSS was able to win one parliament seat with 67,758 votes and continued the nationalistic, racist, fundamentalist views up to the contemporary period by accepting the majority and directing discrimination towards minorities after post-colonialization of Sri Lanka. Another example was during the presidential election in 2019; majority of the Sinhala community voted for the political group who represented ethnonationalism as a result of the impact of racist political ideology made by the Easter Sunday attack (Imtiyaz and Saleem 2015; Holt 2016; Ranawana 2020; DeVotta 2021b).

3.5. Phase 05: Sri Lanka Toward an Anti-Racism and Secular Nationalism

The fundamentalistic ethnic and religious nationalism in Sri Lanka is largely represented by a specific segment of the population, while a broader segment yearns for a society based on anti-racism and secular nationalism. However, this vision of reconciliation remains elusive due to a complex mix of political, religious, educational, social, cultural, and economic restrictions (Laksiri 1997). History shows that there have been multiple attempts to foster peace and harmony among Sri Lanka’s diverse ethnicities. The initial efforts were focused on providing fair political opportunities and enacting equitable laws (Herath 2002). Subsequent initiatives were aimed at promoting peace and education to enhance inter-ethnic harmony (Millawithanachchi 2020). Despite these efforts, the challenges posed by ethnonationalism, racism, and fundamentalism rooted in the aberrant form of Sinhala Buddhism have proven difficult to address. These issues manifest in both individualized and institutional forms, complicating reconciliation efforts (J. Fernando 2015). The recent Easter Sunday attacks have intensified the urgency for Sri Lanka to embrace secularism and safeguard the rights of all ethnic groups (Jayasuriya 2020).
In the 2019 Sri Lankan presidential election, the central theme was to create a nation free from terrorist attacks, ensure the protection of Buddhism while respecting other religions, and implement a uniform legal framework for all citizens. The political party that campaigned on these themes won the election, garnering significant support from the Sinhalese majority, Tamils in the north, and Muslims. The newly elected president emphasized in his inauguration speech that his victory was largely due to the support from Sinhala Buddhist votes and pledged to govern according to Buddhist philosophy (Wettimuny 2021). However, the period following the election saw several controversial developments. Notably, the national anthem was barred from being played in Tamil during the 2020 Independence Day celebrations, collaboration on reconciliation initiatives was halted, and the proposed “One Country, One Law” constitutional reform faced significant delays, leading to concerns among Tamils and Muslims (DeVotta 2021a). Additionally, the appointment of an extremist religious leader to head the presidential task force on legal reform raised further alarm (Keenan 2021). The economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, combined with unmet expectations from the Sinhala Buddhist majority, led to widespread dissatisfaction with the ethnopolitical landscape.
After over 75 years, the persistent ethnic and religious nationalism and the resistance to religious and post-nationalist reforms have culminated in the rise of the nationalistic movement known as “Aragalaya”. This movement reflects a broader discontent with the prevailing political and social dynamics in Sri Lanka. The rise of the nationalist movement known as Aragalaya emerged as a response to the extreme ethno-religious nationalism that characterized the Sri Lankan government following the 2019 presidential election. This era marked a peak in ethno-religious nationalism, prompting both majority and minority groups to unite in opposition. The underlying message of the Aragalaya protests was not just a demand for the resignation of the president but also a broader rejection of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism and a call for a shift towards secular nationalism (J. Fernando 2023). Initially, the protests began as street demonstrations aimed at toppling the president. However, they soon evolved into a nationwide movement with widespread participation from individuals across both majority and minority communities. This collective action underscored the desire to transcend Sinhala Buddhist nationalism and foster a more inclusive national identity (Al Jazeera English 2022).
The protest utilized various forms of expression, visual, vocal, and social media, to communicate its resistance against the dominant ethno-religious narrative (Hasangani 2024; Fedricks et al. 2022). The immediate outcome of the Aragalaya protests was the resignation of the president, which symbolized the erosion of the previously dominant ethno-religious majority’s control (Abenante 2023). Despite this significant political shift, the protests did not result in structural changes to address the underlying issues of ethnocentric nationalism. Instead, they highlighted the public’s desire for unity and a shift in national consciousness towards anti-racism and secular nationalism in Sri Lanka’s future (Modin-Lundin 2022). Later, during the 2024 presidential election, secular and unified nationalism in Sri Lanka emerged victorious in the mainstream political arena. By defeating parties rooted in ethno-religious political identities, a coalition of political parties that did not promote ethno-religious nationalism succeeded in winning both the presidential and parliamentary elections. This victory marked a significant step toward establishing a unified nationalism within Sri Lanka’s post-nationalist ideology systematically (DeVotta 2025). However, concerns remain regarding whether the newly elected political leadership is truly free from ethno-religious nationalism. This skepticism arises from the deeply embedded nature of fundamentalist Buddhism and its long-standing influence on the political establishment. As such, the persistence of ethno-religious nationalism remains a lingering dilemma and a cause for concern in the ongoing development of a genuinely inclusive national identity in Sri Lanka (Siriwardena 2025; Waduge 2025).

4. Conclusions

This study explores the intricate relationship between nationalism, religion, and race within the context of Sri Lanka, focusing on how religious aberrations or neo-tradition of religion influence nationalistic ideologies and contribute to racism and violence, even within the textually non-violent and humanistic framework of Buddhist thought. In Sri Lanka, Buddhism has been an integral part of the civilization for centuries, sustained under the guardianship of the monarchy. However, the processes of modernization and colonial political mobilization necessitated a transformation in the practice of Buddhism. This ideological transformation was facilitated by Protestant-influenced Buddhist thought, rooted in the long-standing belief that protecting Buddhism was the duty of the Sinhalese majority. This responsibility extended beyond the traditional authority of the monastic order to include lay communities. The political force behind this ideological shift was driven by urban Buddhists, who also brought monks into the mainstream political sphere. This reinterpretation gave rise to a neo-traditional or aberrant form of Buddhism, often referred to as “Sinhala Buddhism,” a modernized Buddhist tradition marked by fundamentalism and extremism.
The separatism of ethno-religious identity entered the social consciousness of Sri Lanka’s pluralistic society through nationalism. Historically, Sri Lankan nationalism has been perceived through the lens of religion and ethnicity, resulting in a disunified national identity. As nationalism became fabricated with elements of fundamentalism and extremism through modern Buddhism, individuals directed prejudice, discrimination, and violence toward minorities. Initially expressed as riots, this hostility evolved into civil war, cultural marginalization, and political exclusion, all carried out to secure Buddhist identity and preserve the sovereignty of Buddhist values. This historical trajectory persists in the present, as evidenced by the 2019 presidential election in which the candidate promoting Buddhist nationalism was elected, reaffirming the dominance of racist nationalism in Sri Lanka. However, this form of nationalism later triggered social unrest across ethnic and religious lines, most notably in the 2022 national protest movement known as “Aragalaya.” This movement represented a collective resistance to aberrant Buddhism and ethnonationalism, and it articulated the people’s desire for a post-nationalist Sri Lanka grounded in unity, anti-racism, and secular nationalism. Although the Aragalaya was initially insufficient to bring about structural change, its influence was evident in the 2024 presidential election. After the 2019 election, the Sri Lankan electorate eventually endorsed a political party free from ethno-religious nationalism, thereby establishing the foundations of a unified national identity and marking the beginning of a new era of post-nationalism in Sri Lanka.
This case study demonstrates that religion plays a pivotal role in shaping nationalist identities. However, in the contemporary context, these identities have often been constructed around neo-traditional or aberrant forms of religion. Due to a range of social, cultural, and political factors, religious positions are often challenged, and in response, an aberrant version of religion may be propagated to secure religious identities. Typically, this altered form of religion reflects the sovereignty of the majority group. Based on textual traditions, this aberrant form of religion is often characterized by fundamentalism and extremism. Furthermore, the extension of such an aberrant form of religion can lead to discrimination and violence based on race, religion, and ethnic identities. This study provides compelling evidence that these altered forms of religion contribute to a pathological nationalism rooted in race and ethnicity. Rather than fostering a unified nationalism, the aberrant form of religion has historically generated divisive, discriminatory nationalism, as seen in Sri Lanka from the past to the present. However, religion plays a key role in shaping societal identities, raising the question of whether this aberrant form of religion will persist. In Sri Lanka, the community’s response to this challenge has been shaped by globalization and intellectual transformation, which have catalyzed a rejection of ethno-religious nationalism. This shift has led to the emergence of a unified, anti-racist nationalism, even resulting in systemic change. Thus, while the aberrant version of religion has historically contributed to pathological nationalism, societies, including Sri Lanka, can abolish it and move toward non-violent and humanistic nationalism.

Limitations and Future Directions of Study

This study adopts a case study approach, primarily focusing on elaborating the manifestation of aberrant forms of religion and their extension into fundamentalism, extremism, and racism within the framework of nationalist ideology, with particular reference to the Sri Lankan context. Consequently, the explanations regarding the interconnections between the concepts explored in this study have been presented from a limited perspective, emphasizing the instrumental use of aberrant religion rather than engaging in a broader theoretical discourse. Furthermore, to justify the discussion, more extensive content would have been necessary, which constitutes one of the limitations of this research. For future studies, this newly conceptualized notion of religious aberration could be further examined with the aim of developing a theoretical framework through a quantitative research approach.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Data Availability Statement

No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

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Perera, R. Religious Aberrant: A Case Study on Religious Fundamentalism, Nationalism, and Racism in Sri Lankan Buddhism. Religions 2025, 16, 1526. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16121526

AMA Style

Perera R. Religious Aberrant: A Case Study on Religious Fundamentalism, Nationalism, and Racism in Sri Lankan Buddhism. Religions. 2025; 16(12):1526. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16121526

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Perera, Randika. 2025. "Religious Aberrant: A Case Study on Religious Fundamentalism, Nationalism, and Racism in Sri Lankan Buddhism" Religions 16, no. 12: 1526. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16121526

APA Style

Perera, R. (2025). Religious Aberrant: A Case Study on Religious Fundamentalism, Nationalism, and Racism in Sri Lankan Buddhism. Religions, 16(12), 1526. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16121526

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