Kant’s Idealized Imputation of the Propensity to Evil in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason

Response to Reviewer Comments

1. Summary

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the reviewer for the thorough reading of our manuscript and for providing such constructive feedback. I am truly encouraged that the reviewer found the argument novel and worthy of publication. I have given careful consideration to all the comments and have incorporated the suggested revisions into the manuscript. Below, please find my point-by-point responses to the comments, along with the corresponding revisions as highlighted in the resubmitted files.

2. Point-by-point response to Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Comments 1: Perhaps this is owing to the journal’s editorial policies and not to the author, but I find the manner of referring to Kant’s texts to be questionable. Usually, scholars refer to Kant’s texts, not with a date of publication, but rather with the volume number of the Akademieausgabe von Immanuel Kants Gesammelten Werken. This way is more transparent to scholars, because the volume number, unlike the date of publication, enables scholars to recognize the specific work being cited, even if the title isn’t mentioned in the text. This knowledge matters especially in this treatment of the subject matter, which emphasizes that different works of Kant have different aims and purposes.

Response 1: Agree. I would like to respectfully suggest that the journal accommodate the request made by both reviewers regarding the citation of Kant’s texts. Hence, I am submitting two versions of the manuscript for your consideration. Accordingly, one version implements the suggested Kant citation method, while the other remains unchanged. I respectfully defer to the reviewers' expertise and recommend Version 1.

Comments 2:

I found the author’s reference at the beginning of section 3 to “the issue of agnosticism and metaphysical speculation regarding Kant’s conception of radical evil” obscure.  In particular, it is not clear to me what the author means by the issue of agnosticism.  I kept waiting for the author to explain that, but, if s/he did, I missed it.

Response 2: Agree. Therefore, I have revised the paragraph about agnosticism in the Introduction:

“This formulation invites criticism for falling into agnosticism. According to Kant’s epistemology, all human knowledge is constrained by empirical conditions, namely time and space. However, such an intelligible deed of freedom transcends all of these conditions. Consequently, it remains epistemically inaccessible to human beings who are constrained by empirical conditions (Michalson 1990, p. 63). As a result, it generates a counterintuitive implication that moral agents can be held responsible for a deed they cannot consciously recognize (Horn 2011, p. 66).” (line 50-56)

Response to Reviewer’s Comments

1. Summary

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the reviewer for their thorough reading of our manuscript and for providing such constructive feedback. I am truly encouraged that the reviewer found the argument novel and worthy of publication. I have given careful consideration to all the comments and have incorporated the suggested revisions into the manuscript. Below, please find my point-by-point responses to the comments, along with the corresponding revisions as highlighted in the resubmitted files.

2. Point-by-point response to Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Comments 1: This paper's main problem is that the author never gives a clear and detailed account of what the paper's single most important term, "idealized imputation," means. One or two sentences here and there do provide brief hints as to what the author has in mind (e.g. lines 307-311, 381- 385). But this does not suffice to enable readers to understand what the author means by this key term. Lines 381 to 385 explain that idealized imputation is somewhat similar to "transcendental", although it "is not transcendental in the Kantian sense"; likewise, lines 608 to 610 use terms that Kant normally reserves for transcendental components of his theories, thus hinting that the author thinks there is at least something like a transcendental feature of Kant's arguments for evil. So, is idealized imputation "quasi-transcendental"? The author's list of References includes an article that has this term in its title (line 772), yet the paper never cites that article. The author should cite that article and explain how his or her approach is similar or different from other main approaches, especially any that identify themselves as "quasitranscendental" interpretations.

The author never quotes any texts where Kant himself uses the expression "idealized imputation," nor does he or she ever state whether this is Kant's term or whether it is an interpretive addition that the author is making to Kant's texts. In the preface to the second edition of the Religion, Kant responds to a critic of the first edition by explaining that he intentionally avoids using technical philosophical terms throughout the book, because the content he wishes to convey is as simple as children's stories and sermons. If we take Kant seriously about this methodology, it would seem quite odd if a technical expression such as "idealized imputation" were to be needed to make sense out of Kant's theory of evil. If the author believes he or she has drawn this expression from Kant himself, somewhere near the beginning of the paper she or he needs to provide quotations and references showing the texts where Kant talks about evil in this way. If, on the other hand, the author is imposing this expression onto Kant's text, this fact should be stated explicitly and the term should be

explained simply enough for a ten-year-old child in a Sunday School class or an 80-year-old churchgoer listening to a sermon to understand. If the author can successfully come up with such a simple explanation of its meaning, then he or she should consider using that simpler version of the expression both in the title and throughout the paper. Questions that the author should answer, if he or she decides to keep using this highly technical expression, include: Does idealized imputation apply to the entire human race or to each singular human being, treated individually? Is evil alone ideally imputed in Kant's theory of religion, or are both evil and good ideally imputed? Is freedom ideal or real for Kant? Is the atemporal nature of a choice ideal or reaL for Kant?

Response 1: Thank you for raising this point. I fully agree with your comment and have, therefore, added two paragraphs at the end of the Introduction and two paragraphs in Section 3 to address it. In these additions, the concept of “idealized imputation” is clarified through Kant’s own theory of particular ideas. While the explanation may not be “simple enough for a ten-year-old child in a Sunday School class,” it is sufficiently clear for high school students who have been introduced to the method of idealization in modern science since Galileo.

The two paragraphs at the end of the Introduction:

“Before we proceed, it is important to clarify the central term used in this paper. The concept of “idealized imputation” is drawn from Kant’s notion of particular ideas. These ideas are concepts of reason that are independent of experience and, therefore, free from the temporal constraints that govern empirical knowledge. As part of the method of idealization in modern natural science, they function as standards for empirical cognition. They enable us to “assess the defectiveness of our cognition and tell us what we ought to approximate” (Spagnesi p. 420). For instance, although “it is hard to find pure earth, pure water, pure air” in experience, such idealized constructs remain necessary for disciplines like chemistry (KrV A646/B674). It should be noted, however, that these ideas are not transcendental ideas, such as God, the world, or the soul (Frketich p. 2). Unlike transcendental ideas, which contain no empirical elements, particular ideas are abstracted from experience by the understanding and subsequently idealized by reason. Although independent of experience, they retain a reflective relationship to it (Frketich pp. 16–20).

Accordingly, the good or evil imputed in “idealized imputation” is also an idea of this kind. It is abstracted from observed virtue or evil in experience, yet idealized to the point of being independent of variations in time and space. By contrast, in empirical imputation, virtue or propensity to evil is graded and differs from one individual to another. It should be acknowledged that Kant does not explicitly apply this idea to evil in his Religion (a possible explanation is that Kant tries to avoid technical terms in this work to keep his presentation as accessible as a children’s story or a sermon. Rel. 6:14), however, he does refer elsewhere to the “only one virtue in the idea (objectively)”, as opposed to the “virtue in reality (subjectively)” encountered in experience, which are plural and varies in “completeness or deficiency” (MS 6:447). I would not classify this form of imputation as transcendental, since it involves neither transcendental ideas nor serves as an epistemological concept. Rather, it belongs strictly to the domain of ethics. This conceptual clarification provides the foundation for my interpretation of Kant’s account of the propensity to evil in the Religion. The ensuing discussion will analyze the objects, judgment, and criteria involved in this form of imputation and the empirical imputation, especially in Sections 3 and 4.” (line 93-120)

The two paragraphs in Section 3:

“Although no empirical sample of material fully conforms to the ideal of pure elements, chemistry requires us to consider them as such for analytical purposes. Analogously, even though empirical self-examination cannot reveal the total corruption of the heart, we are compelled to think the imputation of an idealized evil by a divine scrutineer who apprehends the supreme ground of all maxims.” (line 434-439).

Although no empirical sample of water can ever be fully adequate to the idea of pure water, it is necessary to regard it as if it were such an instantiation for the purposes of chemical analysis. Analogously, any empirically observed evil propensity (including those in the first two stages) assumes the status of radical evil when subjected to this idealized lens of “radical perversity”. Consequently, each stage of the propensity expresses or manifests itself as radical evil (Allison 1990, 159; Formosa 2007, p. 225; Forschner 2011, p. 79). (Line 509-515).

Comments 2: The second main point that Lacks clarity in this paper is the author's presentation of the distinction between Kant's key terms relating to evil in the Religion. The author claims "Kant defines radical evil as an innate propensity to evil" (Line 41), but this is incorrect. I know of no text where Kant defines the Latter in terms of the former. Kant uses "propensity to evil" to refer to an innate feature of human nature: we humans tend to prioritize self-interest over morality, even though morality requires us to prioritize others' interests. By contrast, "radical evil" denotes an empirical fact about the human condition: as moral agents we inevitably start our moral Life with a free choice to prioritize the evil propensity over our good predisposition, creating a situation where the root of our decision-making capacity is inevitably corrupted by the evil propensity (see e.g. 6:32). The author's conflation of these two terms creates confusion inaccuracies throughout the article. For example, Lines 316 to 318 quote a passage where Kant defines "propensity," but the author presents it as a definition of "radical evil". Likewise, Lines 435 to 436 quote from Kant's comments on perversity in 6:38 and claims that in the quoted words "Kant explicitly defines radical evil," yet the paragraph in question never mentions radical evil; instead, Kant explicitly identifies the quoted words as a description of a certain type of "disposition.''

Related to this conflation of Kant's two very distinct terms is the author's tendency also to conflate the propensity to evil with the disposition. Several times throughout the paper (e.g. Lines 128-129) the author claims that human beings have both a good and an evil "propensity". But this is totally false. Kant's argument is that we start out with a good predisposition—a completely different German term from the term "propensity", with a very different meaning. Kant's theory is not that we start out with an evil propensity and then, through a process of moral religious education, we ought to adopt a good propensity. Rather, he views human nature as always inevitably possessing both a good predisposition and an evil propensity, while our disposition is always free to choose between prioritizing one of these over the other. A goodhearted (or well-disposed) person prioritizes the good predisposition (i.e. morality), whereas an evil-hearted person prioritizes the evil propensity.

The author's discussion of the so-called "fourth Level" (Lines 127-128) of his or her interpretation should be changed to refer to the above instead of imputing to Kant a theory that he never holds, that free choice is a choice between a good propensity and an evil propensity. In contrast to the author's claim, Kant explicitly states that the human predisposition is always (by nature) good, while the human propensity is always (by nature) evil; the change that happens when we freely choose to change the way we prioritize these two is a change in our disposition, not in our propensity. This is obviously the case, otherwise Kant would not spend Parts Two through Four of the Religion discussing how good-hearted people (those who have made the timeless choice to change their disposition from evil to good) still have to struggle with their on-going evil propensity. When Kant first defines these terms, at 6:29, he clearly states that the human propensity is only evil, whereas the choice this creates for us human beings is the choice to have an evil or a good heart (a synonym for what he has earlier called the "disposition"). Thus, in the paragraph at Lines 271-280, the author needs to introduce the disposition (or"heart") as the aspect of our (idealized?) human nature that we can freely choose to convert from evil to good; currently, that paragraph incorrectly reads as if Kant thinks we can freely choose to change our propensity from evil to good.

If the author doubts that his or her use of phrases such as "the propensity to good versus that to evil" (e.g. Lines 128-129; see also Lines 195, 205-207) is unKantian, he or she should read any of the main commentaries recently published on Kant's Religion, as the writings of Firestone, Palmquist, Hare, Pasternack, and others are all in broad agreement on Kant's understanding of the relationship between these basic terms. If the author believes the standard reading of Kant's theory of evil is mistaken and that Kant really does claim that the propensity itself can be either good or evil, then the author must provide textual evidence to demonstrate that this is Kant's own position, not just something that the author wishes Kant had said.

Response 2: Partially agree. I appreciate this suggestion and acknowledge that further clarification was warranted. Accordingly, I have revised the text in the following three aspects:

(1)    I have removed all references to the concept of disposition (Gesinnung), except two specific locations: lines 622 and 665, where the revolution of disposition remains relevant to the argument about moral education.

(2)    I have refrained from the direct assertion that “Kant defines radical evil as an innate propensity to evil,” while maintaining my original interpretation that Kant (although implicitly) characterizes radical evil as an innate and natural propensity. This conclusion is supported by the following textual evidence, which I have now included in the Introduction (lines 57–65). I believe this adjustment enhances clarity without compromising the coherence of my thesis.

Text 1: “So we can call it a natural propensity to evil, and, since it must nevertheless always come about through one's own fault, we can even call it a radical innate evil in human nature (not any the less brought upon us by ourselves). “ (Rel. 6:32)

Text 2: “If there is such a propensity in human nature, then there is a natural propensity to evil in humans; and this propensity itself, because it must ultimately be sought in free will and can therefore be attributed to it, is morally evil. This evil is radical because it corrupts the basis of all maxims.” (Rel. 6:37)

(3)   I am grateful to the reviewer for raising the concern that a “propensity to good versus propensity to evil” model may be un-Kantian. While I have taken this observation seriously, I have chosen to retain the concept of a propensity to good due to supporting evidence found in Kant’s lectures. To address potential interpretive conflicts, I have included a new paragraph following the discussion of the “fourth level”. This addition clarifies that my proposal of a propensity to good is not intended to challenge the consensus found in mainstream commentaries, but rather to supplement them with further textual nuance.

The added paragraph:

“It is worth noting that the propensity to the good and that to evil, in this fourth distinction, cannot be understood as two opposite options available to free choice. Such a “propensity to good struggling with that to evil” model would risk misinterpreting Kant’s “Incorporation Thesis”—namely, that evil consists in the adoption into one’s maxim of an incentive contrary to the moral law (Rel. 6:24; cf. Allison, 1990, p. 51). Instead, the fourth distinction simply confirms the possibility of a propensity to good with the text in Kant’s lectures. Moreover, the existence of a propensity to good does not logically conflict with Kant’s thesis concerning evil’s universality. Rather, these two propensities operate in temporal succession: the activation of good propensity emerges as a consequence of virtue, while paradoxically presupposing the prior existence of universal evil propensity (see Section 4).” (lines 253–263)

At last, I would like to point out that Kant’s concept of freedom of choice (Willkür) does not refer to the freedom to choose between a predisposition to good and a propensity to evil. For Kant, freedom is always the freedom to obey the moral law. Evil arises from the inability to suppress the propensity to evil. However, this point touches upon a centuries-long debate—dating back to Reinhold and Sidgwick—over whether Kant recognized two kinds of freedom. I will not discuss this issue in detail here.

Comments 3: Expressing Kant's terms more accurately and consistently should make it easier, not harder, for the author to explain why the various criticisms that have been leveled against Kant's position are unfounded. In addition to the above two major problems, the paper has some minor mistakes, which should all be relatively easy to correct. At Line 102, the author cites Wood 1970 as an example of a "transcendental interpretation" of Kant's theory of evil. Quite a few publications over the past 15 to 25 years have distinguished between transcendental and other types of interpretations, but Wood 1970 is rarely if ever cited as one of these. In any case, Wood's Later work on Kantian evil explicitly rejects the transcendental (or a priori) interpretation, claiming that Kant's proof of evil is empirical. The author does List in the References the four main interlocutors in this debate--Allison 2002, M organ 2005, Palmquist 2008, and Wood 2014--but does not discuss or even mention any of their arguments. That is, the author does not provide readers with the interpretive context for evaluating the paper's claims.

Response 3: I agree with this observation and have therefore removed the reference to Wood (1970) from line 139. Furthermore, I have revised the label “transcendental interpretation” to “transcendental freedom interpretation” to prevent confusion with Allison’s use of the term “transcendental interpretation” in the context of arguing for the universality of the propensity to evil.

Comments 4: Another minor problem is that, starting at Lines 134 to 138 the author mentions a "fourfold" classification/framework and subsequently refers repeatedly to such a fourfold distinction, yet the four parts of this framework are never stated--or at Least, not clearly. If the author is going to refer to this fourfold distinction, then the four items being framed need to be concisely Listed, or else the reader will not know what the author is referring to. In addition, the author should either cite the place or places in Kant's writings where he explicitly refers to such a fourfold distinction or else tell the reader that this fourfold distinction is something that the author is imposing onto Kant's text as a handy hermeneutic device.

Response 4: Agree. In response to this comment, I have revised the paragraphs discussing the fourfold classification to clarify that this framework represents my own interpretation, grounded in a specific passage from Kant's work. The modified section, along with the supporting textual excerpt from Kant, now reads as follows:

“Furthermore, this interpretation conflicts with the classification implied in the following passage in Religion, which operates on a purely empirical-psychological level without transcendental grounding.

‘By propensity (propensio) I understand the subjective ground for the possibility of an inclination (habitual desire, concupiscentia), insofar as it is accidental to humanity in general. It differs from a predisposition in that it can indeed be considered innate, but need not be represented as such; it can rather be thought of (if it is good) as acquired, or (if evil) as brought by the human being upon himself. However, we are only talking here about a propensity to the genuine, i.e., to moral evil, which, since it is only possible as a determination of free will […]’ (Rel. 6:28-29).

I argue that a fourfold classification can be constructed from this passage. The phrase ‘the subjective ground for the possibility of an inclination’ refers to the foundational level, where propensity is distinguished from mere inclinations. ‘It differs from a predisposition’ marks the second level, which differentiates predispositions from propensities: while predispositions to good (such as the animal instinct for sexuality) function independently of experience with objects, propensities form the subjective ground for possible inclinations (i.e., habitual desires) and depend on object experience to develop. Kant illustrates this with the example of “savage peoples” who possess a physical propensity for intoxicants—a propensity that only solidifies into a concrete inclination after initial exposure. ‘To the genuine, i.e., to moral evil’ introduces a third level of distinction, separating physical propensities from moral ones. Finally, the fourth level entails an internal division within moral evil itself: the propensity to good and that to evil. As determinations of free choice, these propensities are expressed either as acquired goodness or as self-incurred evil.” (lines 154–177)

Comments 5: On Lines 414 and 425 (and elsewhere, e.g. Line 577) the author uses the term "prototypical" to modify "propensity". Does Kant himself ever use the former term to modify the Latter? If so, the author needs to cite the passage(s) where such usage occurs, because English translations of Kant typically use "prototype" to translate Urbild and/or Vorbild. If the author has found passages where Kant uses one of these terms to modify "propensity", then he or she should specify which German term is there translated as "prototype". If no such passages can be located, then the author should change this to some other English word, because scholars well versed in Kant's theory of religion are all Likely to read the word "prototype" as a reference to what Kant introduces in Part Two of the Religion as the divine gift of an idea that enables evil hearted human beings to change their disposition to good. In other words, a prototypical propensity makes no sense in Kantian terms.

Response 5: I agree with this comment and have therefore replaced all instances of "prototypical" with "original" throughout the text (specifically at lines 470, 481, and 618).

Comments 6: Another very minor, yet not insignificant point of ambiguity that should be cleared up comes on line 477, where the author quotes Michalson's reference to Kant's alleged "latent resentment to the body." The author neither questions this claim nor adds the word "alleged", thus giving readers the impression that he or she agrees that Kant is guilty of such resentment. This is, indeed, an allegation that is not uncommonly leveled against Kant. However, some recent interpreters have questioned it, sometimes at great length and with very persuasive textual evidence that seems to demonstrate that Kant harbors no such latent resentment. Unfortunately, a passing comment at lines 591 to 592 seems to assume that Michalson's criticism of Kant on this point is correct; yet the relevant passage in Kant's Anthropology does not say that sensuous obstacles to moral choices constitute the evil propensity, as the author claims. Rather, Kant's point in the cited passage (7:325) is that "the crudity of [human] nature" gives rise to the obstacles Kant refers to here; he goes on to explain that he is thinking mainly of our "sexual instinct," something that in the Religion Kant explicitly associates with the predisposition to good, not the propensity to evil! In any case, 7:325 never uses the term "propensity", so the author has misrepresented Kant in this passage. As this paper already offers detailed responses to quite a few common criticisms of Kant's theory of evil, l does not think the author needs to include a detailed response to this particular issue. However, if the allegation that Kant despises the body is mentioned, the author should at least add a sentence or phrase telling readers whether he or she thinks Michaelson is correct or mistaken on this point. If the author is unsure, then a statement to that effect would be helpful, to avoid giving the impression that Michaelson's criticism is being supported.

Response 6: I appreciate this suggestion and agree that further clarification was necessary. Accordingly, I have made revisions at line 550 to address my standpoint against the “latent resentment” accusation. Furthermore, I have removed the assertion that the propensity to evil consists in sensuous obstacles.

Comments 7: Later, the author declares that in his lectures "Kant defines the propensity to evil as a psychological experience (lines 499 to 500, my italics). Kant does there describe various psychological/ empirical effects of the propensity to evil, but I know of no passage in the lectures where he defines the propensity as psychological. If the author really knows of a

passage that treats the propensity not just as having psychological effects on human beings but as being defined by those effects, then at least one quotation (in which Kant himself uses definitional terminology) needs to be quoted. Similarly, at the end of the same paragraph the author dogmatically declares that references to the atemporality of radical evil (which Kant traces to the evil propensity) in the Religion indicate that it is "independent of the empirical rather than referring to a metaphysical-noumenal world" (lines 510 to 512, my italics). However, Kant is never this dogmatic. Perhaps we wish he had been, so that interpreters would not need to debate so many possible interpretations. But the fact is that Kant does leave open the possibility that something noumena metaphysical is involved. As such, the author should do this too. This merely requires a softening of "rather than" to something more openminded, such as "not necessarily." Moreover, here and later (e.g. lines 582 to 585) the author should not write as if Kant discusses the empirical side of this equation only in the lectures; in the Religion Kant also talks about both the original evil choice and the subsequent need for a change of heart in both empirical temporal and intelligible/timeless terms. True, the Religion emphasizes the intelligible while the lectures emphasize the psychological; but that does not mean the other component is completely absent in each case.

Response 7: I agree with this comment and have therefore deleted the adjective "psychological. Regarding the concept of a possible metaphysical evil of the noumenon, I have chosen to retain my original formulation, as revising it would weaken the central argument of the article.

Comments 8: I agree with the author's claim on line 550, but "the conceptualization of radical evil as a disposition" is superfluous because this conceptualization is a figment of this author's creative imagination. Again, "radical evil" is far from being a synonym of" disposition" for Kant; as stated above, one is a fact describing the human condition, while the other is a supreme principle of maxim-making that (at some Level) Kant believes we adopt through a free internal choice to prioritize good or evil. If the author corrects the network of terminological conflations that I have pointed out above as the "second problem", then this sentence at Line 550 will obviously need to be reworded, or perhaps even better, the entire paragraph from Lines 550 to 564 can be simply deleted, as it refers to a side-issue about Wolff, which is not essential to the author's argument.

Response8: Agree. Accordingly, I have removed the sentence regarding “the conceptualization of radical evil as a disposition” along with the subsequent paragraph on Wolff to streamline the argument.

Comments 9: At Lines 618 to 628 the author makes an excellent argument regarding the final section of Part One of the Religion, which Kant recast as the "General Comment" in the second (1794) edition. The author incorrectly states (or at Least implies) that Kant added the new heading when he converted the 1792 journal article into the first edition of the book, in 1793. But this is not the case. The first edition keeps the five-section format of the journal article; the new heading for section five is added only in the second edition. Correcting this factual error will only enhance the correctness and relevance of the main point the author is making in this paragraph, with one exception. The first sentence of the paragraph states that "moral progress" is "the central focus of 'Part One'". This claim, as it stands, is far-fetched in the extreme, as Kant says nothing at all about moral progress in the first four sections. lt is very true, however, that the central focus of section five (which became the General Comment in 1794) is moral progress. To remedy this error, the author can simply change the words "central focus" to something Like "ultimate goal," "final end," "target," etc. lt is undoubtedly correct (but often neglected) that Kant's reason for emphasizing evil in the first four sections of Part One is to show how crucial moral progress is.

Response9: Thank you for pointing this issue out. I fully agree with this comment, as it is a very helpful suggestion. I have added the relevant arguments based on the first edition of Religion at line 659.

Comments 10: The next minor point relates to the first major problem, regarding the Lack of a coherent account of what "idealized imputation" means. At Line 638 the author refers to conscience as "idealized" when Kant describes it as a "scrutinizer of the heart." But in what sense is such scrutiny idealized? At Least when this refers to us humans, using our conscience to scrutinize our own maxims (=internal deeds), this seems to be realistic in a more important sense than what a person ate for dinner yesterday. Some explanation needs to be given, if the author wishes to call this "idealized", because this reviewer, for one, can't guess its meaning. Portraying conscience as idealized makes more sense, in the next paragraph, as Long as we read that paragraph as being about God. However, the author seems evasive in that paragraph (lines 641-655). Only in the very Last sentence, as part of a secondary quotation from a commentator, does the author mention that at 6:99 Kant is talking about a divine Legislator directing the community through each person's conscience. The prior sentences could be read as saying that each person's conscience constitutes the "idealized conscience-based imputation" that Kant thinks makes the church the best context for moral education. The author needs to be more explicit that this is God, especially because then the term "idealized imputation" would finally make more sense.

Response 10: I agree with this comment and have therefore added an explanatory clause to clarify this point:

“Additionally, the principle referenced in this imputation is also, in this sense, idealized. Conscience is idealized in its operation. Thus, it not only examines the propensity to evil as it is manifested in the maxims of actions we discover in self-reflection but also judges this propensity as a single, intelligible deed. It is further personalized as God.” (line 444-448)

Additionally, a corresponding concluding statement has been included:

“Thus, each person’s idealized conscience-based imputation establishes the church as the optimal context for moral improvement.” (line 696).

Comments 11: On Lines 663 to 664 the author refers to a three-stage "historical progress." Is this something the author got from Kant? Or did the author make it up? Or does it come from some other source? In any case, do the three stages refer to a time before Kant, or to the period following Kant, or something else? This sudden reference to three stages seems to appear out of the blue. It should either be deleted, if it is not essential, or else the author's source should be revealed.

Response 11: I agree with this comment and have therefore removed the term “historical progress”. Although cultivation, civilization, and moralization is a recurring theme in Kant's philosophy of history, however, it is best avoided here to prevent unnecessary misunderstanding.

Comments 12: On the paragraph at Lines 670 to 675 seems too short to be sufficiently informative. Some recent interpreters have argued that moral education is actually the main focus of the Religion. If this is correct, we cannot claim that Kant changed his focus after writing the Religion, and only later began to focus on moral education. A more cogent explanation, and one that does not ignore the pedagogical focus that the Religion itself clearly has, would be to say that once Kant had established the transcendental (or "idealized" in some quasi-transcendental sense?) role of evil in human nature, in Part One of the Religion, he did not need to return to that theme ever again, from Part Five (the General Comment) of the Religion to the end of his life. If the author is not convinced of this, he or she should read the recent article by Dennis vanden Auweele that argues convincingly that the Religion itself has a pedagogical purpose.

Response 12: I partially agree with the reviewer’s observation that Kant never fully abandons his thought of moral education. However, I would emphasize that he significantly marginalizes its role in relation to historical progress. To incorporate this nuanced perspective, I have added a clarifying paragraph at the end of the article:

“Thus, although moral education remains one of Kant’s main concerns (as evident in the ‘Doctrine of Method’ in the Metaphysics of Morals), it does not serve as a means of collective moral advancement. Consequently, the doctrine of idealized imputation and the resulting conception of the ethical community are marginalized.” (line 735-738).

Furthermore, I added a paragraph to argues that the moral education is the focus of Religion:

“The second edition of Religion may also represent Kant’s intention to provide a moral education. He asserts that to understand the Religion’s essential content, “nothing more is required than common morality”. He further notes that this content is expressed in “the most popular instruction for children or in sermons, and is easily understood.” (Rel. 6:14. For a more detailed interpretation of the educational significance of Religion, see Auweele 2015, pp. 373-375)” (line 666-671)

Comments 13: Also, the author adopts a very odd method of referring to Kant's writings, citing them all by the publication year of the second edition of the Akademie Ausgabe. English works on Kant typically do not cite Kant's writings in this cryptic way. The standard method of citing Kant's works in English publications is indeed to refer to this German edition, but instead of citing "Kant year," one should always cite the Ak. volume and page number(s). Some scholars also choose to include an abbreviation of the work being cited, since most Ak. volumes contain multiple works. The author's odd referencing system must be corrected, unless the author is here following instructions that the journal requires her or him to follow. In that case, I would recommend that the journal make an exception when it comes to citing Kant's writings, because any Kant scholar who reads an article published with this author's existing method of citation is likely to assume that the author is not knowledgeable about English Kant studies. Also, the author should thoroughly check every Ak. page number cited in the article, because at least one page number is incorrect: at line 31 8 the author cites page 42 of the Religion, but the quoted passage actually occurs at 6:29.

Response 12: I fully agree with the reviewer on this point regarding citation style. In order to accommodate both the requirements of the journal and the reviewer’s suggestion, I will provide both the original version and an additional version that includes Akademie volume and page numbering.

4. Response to Comments on the Quality of English Language

Point 1: Finally, there are some very minor grammatical issues that should be corrected in the revised version. The use of the word "and" in the paper's title seems odd. The wording causes the reader immediately to ask "idealized imputation of what? If (as it seems to be) the answer is "radical evil," then the author should replace "and" with "of" --that is, if the non-Kantian expression "idealized imputation" makes it into the revised version at all. On line 587, "four should be "five, as the Religion was first published in 1793. Throughout the paragraph starting at line 618, the author uses the word "chapter• in a non-standard way; the correct term in all these occurrences should be "section. Also, there are minor typos/grammatical errors on lines 279- 280, 292, 300, 592, and 598.

Response 1: I agree with this comment and have therefore revised the paper’s title to “Kant’s Idealized Imputation of the Propensity to Evil in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason”. Additionally, I have replaced the term “chapter” with “section” throughout the manuscript and corrected all identified typographical and grammatical errors accordingly.

5. Additional clarifications

Response to Reviewer Comments

1. Summary

I would like to sincerely thank the reviewer once again for the generous engagement with my manuscript. I am especially grateful for the academic openness that allows room for disagreement while still encouraging further clarification and improvement. The detailed and thoughtful analysis shows that the paper has been taken seriously, which I deeply appreciate. Above all, the review process has provided me with a valuable opportunity for scholarly exchange, from which I have learned a great deal.

2. Point-by-point response to Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Comments 1:

A previously treated "radical evil" and "propensity to evil" as synonyms without providing evidence for this claim. I recommended that A inform the reader that Kant makes subtle distinctions between these two terms. Instead, A has added the word "implicitly" in several passages that declare the terms to be equal, then added a new paragraph quoting the passages where A thinks Kant implicitly identifies them. This is not a responsible way for a scholar to write. If a scholar knows that some (probably most) interpreters distinguish between two terms, then responsible scholarship requires that this fact be acknowledged. A is welcome to claim that Kant treats the terms as synonyms, but must inform the reader that some interpreters distinguish between them. For example, most, if not all, of the recent string of commentaries on the Religion could be cited in this regard, the massive Comprehensive Commentary being particularly explicit in this regard, where the propensity to evil is interpreted as having a necessity that is akin to a transcendental condition while radical evil is the empirical outcome of the human race implementing that condition. A does not need to agree with such alternative viewpoints but does need to inform readers that such an alternative exists.

Response 1: Thank you for pointing this out. I fully agree with your point and have accordingly included a citation of Professor Stephen Palmquist’s distinction between the propensity to evil and radical evil, as presented in his Comprehensive Commentary on Kant's Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. Furthermore, I have reinforced this differentiation by introducing the phrase “in some sense” in the Introduction. Below is the revised paragraph:

“To make matters worse, Kant implicitly designates the propensity to evil as radical evil. Scholars debate whether these two concepts can be equated. Some argue, for instance, that the propensity to evil serves only as a transcendental condition for human evil (Palmquist 2015, p. 75), while radical evil constitutes its empirical manifestation (Palmquist 2015, p. 103). Nevertheless, Kant himself suggests that the former is, in some sense, also the latter. He states: “we can call it [the supreme ground of unlawful maxims] a natural propensity to evil, and […] we can even call it a radical innate evil in human nature (not any the less brought upon us by ourselves).” (Rel. 6:32). He further asserts that “if there is such a propensity in human nature, then there is a natural propensity to evil in humans; and this propensity itself, because it must ultimately be sought in free choice and can therefore be attributed to it, is morally evil. This evil is radical because it corrupts the basis of all maxims” (Rel. 6:37). Thus, the tension between the innate and natural character of the propensity to evil and human freedom extends to the core concept of Religion, namely, radical evil.” (Line 57-69)

Additionally, in Section 4, I have further clarified this distinction by adding two sentences:

“While Kant describes the propensity to evil as ‘radical evil’, he refrains from explicitly clarifying the nuanced distinction between these concepts that arises from this idealization: radical evil may be understood as the propensity to evil precisely insofar as it represents the latter’s idealized form. Within empirical imputation, individuals are assessed according to empirical standards, a process that reveals gradations in the propensity to evil—ranging from unintentional guilt (such as weakness or impurity) to deliberate crime (i.e., depravity).” （Line 472-478）

I have revised the text to acknowledge that radical evil does not directly equate to the propensity to evil, while maintaining my original argument that the former serves as the idealized form of the latter. This approach offers a potential resolution to the dilemma that “some (probably most) interpreters distinguish between the two terms”, while also accommodating the passages where Kant appears to treat them as equivalent (Rel. 6:32, 6:37).

Admittedly, I was somewhat evasive in my previous revision and response regarding this issue, due to a fundamental disagreement with the reviewer. From his perspective, “the propensity to evil is interpreted as having a necessity that is akin to a transcendental condition, while radical evil is the empirical outcome of the human race implementing that condition.” In my view, however, the propensity to evil—in its idealized form as radical evil—serves as the condition of religious imputation. I truly appreciate the reviewer’s academic openness in allowing room for such disagreement.

Comments 2:

The two new paragraphs explaining the concept of "idealized imputation" are extremely helpful. They clarify that this process has features that are like transcendental conditions in some ways, but involve a form of idealized abstraction from empirical elements. This would have been an appropriate place to mention that, because Kant repeatedly refers to the propensity to evil as being necessary, some commentators claim it has transcendental, or at least a "quasi-transcendental" function. In response to my previous comments about this term, A opted to delete the uncited article on this topic from the first version's list of references. However, that article deals with some of the same topics as A’s article and adopts an approach that seems in some ways similar. Thus, instead of hiding that fact by deleting the reference altogether, A should insert a reference to it at some point, noting that some interpreters have called such concepts "quasi-transcendental" for reasons similar to those A has stated in these paragraphs (i.e., because Kant views the propensity to evil as necessary and universal, yet it does not meet the standards of other, fully transcendental

concepts). If A thinks idealized imputation is significantly different from what some other authors have called "quasi-transcendental," then A should state the distinction between these terms.

Response 2:

Agree. I have accordingly emphasized the similarity of my “idealized imputation” with the “Quasi-Transcendental Argument” with the following two sentences and the end of the Introduction:

“My argument is partly similar to the ‘quasi-transcendental argument’ (for the universality of the propensity to evil), which suggests that in Religion, Kant “seeks the fundamental boundary conditions that must be assumed in order to explain how religion is possible at all” (Palmquist 2008, p. 273). Like this approach, my research also attempts to establish a necessary condition of possibility—in this case, for religious imputation. However, I would not characterize the resulting concept as “transcendental”, since it does not appeal to transcendental ideas or epistemology.” (Line 119-126)

In my original manuscript, I also explored the tension between the universality of the propensity to evil and human freedom, and compared different interpretive approaches—such as Allison’s and Morgan’s transcendental arguments, Palmquist’s “quasi-transcendental argument,” as well as various anthropological arguments (e.g., those put forward by Wood, Grimm, and Sussman). However, since this discussion diverges from the main focus of the article (which, admittedly, already struggles with thematic concentration), I decided to remove the section on the “transcendental argument” and “quasi-transcendental argument.” As a result of this removal, the reference lists in the last two manuscripts encountered formatting errors. Nevertheless, the parallels between my “idealization interpretation” and the interpretations offered by Allison and Palmquist are worth emphasizing. I truly appreciate the reviewer’s observation regarding this parallel—thank you for highlighting that connection.

Comments 3:

The newly added long quotation on page 4 and the various other revisions to the next paragraph are helpful in clarifying the textual basis of A’s distinction between four "levels" on which the concept of a propensity can be understood. While the quoted passage indeed makes no explicit reference to a transcendental grounding, this does not mean that Kant does not identify transcendental (or transcendental-like) features of the propensity on the fourth level, elsewhere in Part One of the Religion. Two minor changes are needed to this paragraph to make it fully consistent with Kant's text. First, to clarify the fact that "propensity" can have both a psychological and a non-psychological meaning, A should add a qualifying word such as "explicit" after the word "without” in the sentence just before the new quotation. This will make room for the fact that, throughout the remainder of Part One, Kant repeatedly refers to the propensity to evil using words that indicate it has a necessary status for human beings (i.e., he repeatedly states that the human propensity.

"must" be evil).

Second, careful scrutiny of the quoted passage will confirm that Kant's reference to a possible distinction between a good and an evil propensity ("if it is good" vs "if evil") refers back to the third level, not to the fourth level, as A claims. A defines the third level as occurring where Kant distinguishes between "genuine, i.e., ... moral evil" and physical evil. Kant starts that sentence with "However", going on to indicate that what follows in his discussion of evil, throughout the rest of Part One, concerns only one side of that distinction, the moral (genuinely evil) side. He says this partly to clarify that physical "evil" (and the propensity to it) may carry with it something good, so that in the realm of physical goods and evils it would make sense to talk about a possible "propensity to good". Kant's final "However" sentence clearly suggests that the fourth Level consists only of what is genuinely moral, and on this Level Kant explicitly rules out the possibility of a good propensity. Having admitted that in some (third Level) contexts it can make sense to distinguish between a propensity to good and a propensity to evil, he now declares that in this book the

propensity will be treated only on the fourth ("genuine") Level, where it refers only "to moral evil". I don't see how the quoted passage could be read in any other way, as Kant never again refers to a propensity to good for the rest of the book. Why would he say a good propensity in the strictly moral sense is possible but then argue for the rest of the book that it is impossible?

In short, A needs to inform readers that Kant's reason for distinguishing between these four

Empirical levels of a propensity are to clarify why, from this point forward, he presents the imputable propensity in human nature as being only evil and as being such necessarily and universally, such that some interpreters have taken his words to imply that the propensity to evil has something like a transcendental grounding. In other words, the helpful quote and other changes A has made here do not justify, at Least, the claim that Kant's theory of the propensity in human nature at its highest (moral) Level can be either good or evil. The whole thrust of Kant's argument throughout Part One is that the human propensity, as such, is necessarily evil. This is not just nit-picking, because without a proper understanding of this part of his argument, Kant's explanation of why religion is needed in human Life (and is not just an optional extra that some people may wish to avail themselves of) would totally collapse. This is why Kant says in the quoted paragraph that the evil propensity is self-incurred and thus imputable, whereas a good propensity (if it turned out to be in some sense possible for human beings, perhaps at one of the Lower Levels) would have to be "acquired" and thus not part of what A is calling "idealized imputation". This "acquired good" option is what leads Kant, at the end of Part One, to talk about the possible need for divine assistance.

If A agrees that the good-evil distinction actually belongs at the third level, then the paragraph elaborating on that Level, on p.5, should have at Least one sentence added, giving an example of how a physical propensity might be good. For example, some studies have shown that moderate amounts of coffee or red wine can be good for one's health; as such, those with a propensity for such tastes end up having what could be called (psychologically) a "good propensity" when they develop that propensity in moderation.

When A introduces an elaboration on the fourth Level in the middle of p.6, by saying "The fourth distinction ...'' (a phrase A repeats in the text added to the next paragraph), the word "distinction" should be changed (in both places) to "Level", to match the wording of A's discussion of the previous three Levels. This is important because the fourth Level, as Kant explicitly states in the previously quoted passage, refers only to the moral ("genuine") side of the distinction between physical and moral. A’s sentence can then go on to say that, having distinguished a good from an evil propensity, Kant, on this Level, clarifies that he will be talking only about the “genuine" propensity, which for all human beings is evil. A already states this fact in the second sentence: “Kant presents the propensity to evil as a universal phenomenon inherent in all human beings." This (correct!) statement by A will be hopelessly self-contradictory if A leaves the first sentence as it now stands, as if the fourth (properly moral) Level were to contain the possibility of both a good and an evil propensity in a moral sense. Kant never says this, so neither should A. What A goes on to say in this paragraph, about the possibility of employing various psychological methods "to actively cultivate

morally good inclinations" is fine; but in the Religion Kant never does this and if he did, he would never call it a “good propensity”, because that use of the term "propensity" would be psychological, whereas he has declared that his use of "propensity" as a technical term in the Religion will be Limited to the fourth Level, where it is solely moral and thus solely evil. To avoid confusing readers, A should be as careful as Kant in this respect. Kant could not have made it more explicit throughout Part One of the Religion that the human "propensity" (in the sense used in this book) is evil at its very root. This causes us all to start out with an evil disposition, which gives rise to the need for a change of disposition. Human beings always have the freedom to change their disposition; such a change, however, does not suddenly change human nature and give us a “good" propensity! That is why even good-hearted people still struggle against evil inclinations.

The three sentences added in the middle of p.6 should be adjusted to take account of the fact that Kant does not allow for a good propensity (in the technical, fourth-level sense) in the Religion. The wording of the first two sentences seems to reflect A's struggle to come to terms with this fact. As I have indicated above, the notion that Kant introduces this option in the previously quoted passage is a pure invention of A; to present it as Kant's own position does not reflect responsible scholarship. I know of no other Kant scholar who claims this; an otherwise excellent paper would therefore risk losing its credibility if A insists on saying it. What A could consistently and correctly say is that, if we take "propensity" in the psychological way that Kant uses it in his Lectures, then it would make sense to talk about various psychological tools for strengthening our moral resolve, once a person has experienced a revolution in his or her Gesinnung. Using psychological tools to

strengthen a converted person's good disposition makes perfect sense, given Kant's use of terms in the Religion; but doing this for a person's allegedly good "propensity" conflicts with the entirety of Kant's argument in Part One and should not be stated in a published paper, as this could seriously confuse readers for whom this article is their first introduction to Kant's theory. To avoid this result, A would be well advised to acknowledge that Kant introduces a distinct term, "disposition," precisely in order to deal with the very issue A is dealing with in this paragraph: there is no problem at all to say that "the existence of a good disposition does not Logically contradict with Kant's thesis concerning evil's universality." By contrast, A’s sentence as it now stands introduces a flat Logical contradiction: earlier in Part One of Religion Kant argued for what he calls moral "rigorism" when it comes to identifying the human propensity, and this, he says, makes it impossible that the human propensity could be both good and evil; Kant could not be more explicit in his insistence that the propensity is necessarily only evil, interpreted on this fourth (transcendental-Like) Level.

Response 3:

I fully agree with your feedback and have therefore removed all references to “level four”, along with the paragraph discussing a “good propensity” and the three newly added sentences. While it would be possible to further defend the notion of a “good propensity” in response to the reviewer's comments, I have decided not to pursue this line of argument for the following reasons:

(1) The possibility and existence of a “good propensity” is a highly controversial topic closely tied to debates surrounding the universality of the propensity to evil. For instance, its rejection serves as a central premise in Allison’s transcendental argument—and at the same time, a key target of criticism from his opponents.

However, the assertion of the existence of a “good propensity” appears only in Kant’s lectures. As the reviewer rightly points out, in Religion, Kant consistently describes the propensity to evil in terms that suggest it possesses a necessary status for human beings. Therefore, arguing for a “good propensity” is not directly relevant to this article. Given that the paper already suffers from some lack of thematic focus, introducing another controversial topic could further distract readers and reviewers from the core argument.

(2) Although I do not believe the idea of a “good propensity” logically contradicts the universality of the propensity to evil, it does divert attention toward other significant controversies surrounding this concept. Furthermore, my argument in Section 3 does not address the concept of the good propensity. It raises the issue noted by the reviewer in Comment 5: Why is there no idealized imputation of a good propensity? Since a reconstruction should clarify rather than complicate, I believe it is best to omit this unnecessary fourth level.

(3) As I acknowledged in the previous revision, the four-level classification is my own reconstruction of Kant’s paragraph. During this process, I recognized the problem highlighted by the reviewer—namely, that Kant’s phrasing regarding a possible distinction between a good and an evil propensity (“if it is good” vs. “if it is evil”) refers back to the third level (addressing moral vs. physical evil), not to a fourth level. Once again, the concept of the “good propensity” poses more problems than it resolves.

Comments 4:

A very minor point is that on Line 334, A has inserted "the" in a place where that insertion makes no grammatical sense. A phrasing that would make sense would be to move "Kant's" to the position of "the" so that the sentence reads: " ... within Kant's aforementioned technical. ... "

Response 4:

Thank you for pointing this out. I’ve revised my paper several times, which unfortunately introduced some typos—such as the repeated use of “aforementioned” and “mentioned above.” I’ve now rephrased the sentence to appropriately reflect the removal of any reference to a “propensity to good”.

“Crucially, this very possibility constitutes the imputable nature itself, determined by whether an individual exercises freedom rightly or wrongly, thus either restraining or developing the propensity to evil. “(line 3166-3188).

Comments 5:

The two sentences added to the first paragraph on p. 1.0 seem okay, though they might raise more new questions than they answer, for novice readers. What is abundantly clear is that A’s correct claim here, that for Kant "we are compelled to think the imputation of an idealized evil," would flatly contradict several of A’s other claims, if A continues to resist my advice that all trace of a "good propensity" be eliminated from any discussion of the "fourth level" in this article. A will gain nothing and stand to lose a great deal (e.g., consistency, credibility, accuracy) by continuing to insist on imputing to Kant the view that a good propensity is possible on the fourth level, so I trust that the final revised version will not display such stubbornness.

Response 5:

Agree. I have therefore removed the argument regarding the “good propensity”. I believe it is better to omit this option altogether rather than add further explanation about the idealization of a good propensity, as it is not central to the focus of this article.

Comments 6:

An error appears on lines 491-492, which I neglected to mention in my first review: A should not misrepresent the quoted phrase as if Kant "explicitly" presented it as a definition of radical evil. In the passage A quotes, Kant is referring to something far more mundane. His "explicit" statement regarding the quoted words about "perversity" is that this label applies even to a person whose "attitude of mind" (possibly a synonym of "disposition" but surely not a synonym of "radical evil") assumes that mere absence of vice is equivalent to possession of a good "disposition". A should reread Kant's passage and revise the article's text so that it accurately reflects what Kant explicitly states. If A correctly conveys the point Kant is making there, then the point A is making about a possible "overlap" in Kant's use of the term "perversity" will be much clearer. Kant does indeed appear to view all three levels of radical evil as constituting "perversity" in the sense that each is equally a perversion of the good principle.