Religious Dimensions of Confucius’ Teachings on Ren and Li in the Analects

Abstract

This essay examines whether Confucius aligns more with humanism or religious thought, asserting that his philosophy defies simple classification. It highlights his use of religious motifs, especially the concept of li 禮, which he broadened beyond mere rituals to include societal behaviors, infusing them with a sacred essence. Additionally, this essay delves into Confucius’s notion of de 德, perceived as having an almost magical influence without coercion, closely tied to his ideas on li and governance. This reflects a belief in a universal moral order, challenging the view of Confucius as purely a humanist. The text also explores his nuanced understanding of tian 天, a central yet complex aspect of his philosophy, suggesting a spiritual dimension. Ultimately, this essay advocates for recognizing Confucius not only as a moral guide but as a thinker embodying significant religious or spiritual insights.

1. Introduction

Confucius stands as a pivotal figure in Eastern philosophy, sparking ongoing scholarly discussions and varied interpretations. Often hailed as a quintessential “humanist”, this essay contends that Confucius should not be confined to the role of a moral instructor. Instead, he should be acknowledged for the religious or spiritual depth that permeates his philosophical teachings. This essay aims to showcase that the essence of Confucius’s ethical and political thought is deeply intertwined with his spiritual perspective on humanity and society. This perspective is primarily conveyed through his philosophy or spiritual understanding of li 禮. The subsequent analysis will delve into Confucius’s notions of ren 仁 and li, as presented in his Analects, to illustrate how they embody his approach to moral development and social harmony. Further examination of Confucius’s views on de 德 and tian 天 will unravel the Master’s comprehensive worldview, where ethical considerations and metaphysical concepts interlace, thereby challenging reductive humanistic or religious classifications.1

2. Li as Culture

Confucius saw himself as the preserver and restorer of a declining culture. The Master said that “I transmit but do not innovate; I am truthful in what I say and devoted to antiquity” (Confucius 1979, 7.1).2 Confucius was a vocal advocate of preserving the culture of the Zhou3: “The Chou is resplendent in culture, having before it the example of the two previous dynasties. I am for the Zhou” (Confucius 1979, 3.14).

This aspect of Confucius as a transmitter rather than an innovator is reflected on his strong emphasis on “learning”. There are some passages in the Analects in which the Master appears to put more stress on “learning” (學 xue) rather than on “thinking” (思 si):

I once spent all day thinking without taking food and all night thinking without going to bed, but I found that I gained nothing from it. It would have been better for me to have spent the time in learning.

(Confucius 1979, 15.31)4

As a “transmitter” Confucius was profoundly concerned with the transmission and appropriation of the cultural tradition (文 wen) through “learning”. He, however, was not merely a transmitter. Even as a transmitter, he was an innovator. Benjamin Schwartz notes that the Master’s disciples voluntarily adhered to him because they were “attracted by the reflectivity and fresh insight that he brings to bear on that which is transmitted” (Schwartz 1985, p. 67). It is generally observed that Confucius as “innovator” can be best appreciated in his thoughts and teachings on ren 仁 and li 禮. The two central concepts in the Analects, however, are never easy to comprehend in all their complexities and subtleties. For the Western interpreters, the challenge is to be careful not to read their Western worldview or frameworks into the Analects. For the Asian interpreters from Confucian culture, the challenge is to be careful not to presume that they already know what Confucius means in the text.

2.1. Li 禮

The Master’s emphasis on learning is to be understood in the context of his central belief on the importance of cultural tradition in the formation of the moral self. Confucius firmly believed that “the learning of traditional culture is a necessary condition for the effective development of the moral person” (Hall and Ames 1987, p. 47). To be more precise, Confucius regards li as the center of the cultural tradition that one should appropriate and embody in order to become a moral self. In the Analects, Confucius says “Unless a man has the spirit of the rites…in having courage he will become unruly, and in being forthright he will become intolerant” (Confucius 1979, 8.2). Later, the Master says, “To love forthrightness without loving learning is liable to lead to intolerance” (Confucius 1979, 17.8). Observing that the two sayings are practically identical except that in one we have li and while in the other we have xue 學, Lau claims that for the Master li formed a major part of what one has to “learn” (Lau 1979, p. 45).

Originally li 禮 was a term concerning a code of rites and ceremonies governing specific religious observances. However, as Hall and Ames observe, the focus of the term progressively “shifted from man’s relationship with the supernatural to the relationship obtaining among members of human society”. Li came to “embody the total spectrum of social norms, customs, and mores, covering increasingly complicated relationships and institutions” (Hall and Ames 1987, p. 86). Many scholars notice the critical role Confucius played in this extension of the meaning of li. Notably the Master uses the term metaphorically “embracing all rites, custom, manners, conventions, from the sacrifices to ancestors down to the detail of social etiquette” (Graham 1989, p. 11). In a word, the Master used the word li not only for proper religious rituals but also all proper behaviors toward others in society.5

2.2. Ren 仁

There is a passage in the Analects that definitely shows that Confucius regarded li as essential for the formation of the moral self. In one of the most noted sayings in the Analects, the Master says:

To return to the observance of the rites through overcoming the self constitutes benevolence [ke ji fu li wei ren克己復禮爲仁].

(Confucius 1979, 12.1)

It is to be noted that the Master gave this saying when asked about ren 仁. It is generally agreed that for the Master ren is a central, if not the central, concept in Confucius’ philosophy. The important thing is that Confucius was the first to conceive of ren as general virtue. According to David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames,

[P]rior to Confucius, Chinese tradition did not have a general, universal virtue under which all particular virtues could be subsumed. Confucius, in developing ren as this comprehensive virtue, established a ground that provided classical Chinese ethical theory with unity, consistency, and coherence.

(Hall and Ames 1987, p. 111)6

In the Analects, ren occurs 105 times, which is very remarkable considering that the term “does not occur in the earliest portions of the ancient classics, and only three times in the later parts” (Ames and Rosemont 1999, p. 50). That is, before Confucius ren was not so important a term in the Chinese philosophy. The Analects presents Confucius so often asked by his disciples what he means by ren. That is understandable because Confucius reinvented the term for his own purposes. People had difficulty in understanding the new meaning the Master invested in the hereto insignificant term.7

2.3. Relationship between Ren and Li

It is obvious that li is essentially connected with ren in Confucius. However, there have been differing, even contradictory, understandings of the connection between the two central concepts in the Analects. In the “instrumentalist” interpretation, the observance of li is regarded as a means to cultivate or express ren. For example, one’s ren (“love”) toward the deceased parent can be not only expressed but also cultivated by the li of the three-year period of mourning. Participation in li practices provides a mean of cultivating the appropriate emotional dispositions and attitudes. However, some commentators find the instrumentalist interpretation problematic for several reasons. Most of all, in such interpretation ren exists independently of the existence of li and is intelligible independent of li. In the example above, we understand that love as a reality is basically independent of the ceremonial expression.

Kwong-Loi Shun observes that in Confucius’ teachings, however, the relationship between ren and li appears to be much closer than is suggested by the instrumentalist model. Especially the passage “ke ji fu li wei ren克己復禮爲仁” strongly suggests that in the Master’s mind, ren is somehow constituted by li (Shun 1993, p. 461). Shun contends that li constitutes ren similar to the way that a wedding ritual in a community constitutes getting married.8 In this interpretation, it is obvious that ren cannot exist and be understood apart from li. Further, the observance of li is almost identical with ren.9 To generally follow the rules of li is to be a ren person.

Chenyang Li appreciates Shun’s concern that ren is not to be regarded existing independently of the existence of li, and totally agrees with Shun that li is a necessary condition for the attainment of ren. However, Li thinks that Shun, in his attempt to correct the instrumentalist interpretation, went too far. According to Li’s analysis, Shun’s position can be taken further to imply that li is also a sufficient condition for the attainment of ren. In Shun’s example, the wedding ceremony is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition for getting married. Li believes that this interpretation poses too close a relationship between ren and li. Li directs our attention to the fact that several times in the Analects the Master admits the possibility that one who follows the rules of li may not be ren (Li 2007, p. 314).10 Li agrees with Shun that ren is not attainable independently of li. However, Li believes that it fails to do justice to Confucius’ more nuanced and complicated teachings to regard the observances of li as a sufficient condition for the attainment of ren. The observance of li, Li observes, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the attainment of ren.

Li contends that the word wei 爲, while usually translated as “constitute”, is best understood to mean ze 則 or shi 使. What the passage says is that ke ji fu li can result in, cause, or enable a person to be ren in a similar way that physical exercise can cause or lead to good health. In order words, “one must practice li in order to become ren, but merely following the rules of li does not guarantee the attainment of ren” (Li 2007, p. 315).

While I agree with Li that Confucius appears to leave some distance between li and ren, I think that Li’s “instrumentalist”11 interpretation of ke ji fu li wei ren somewhat trivializes the profundity of the Masters’ teachings on li and ren. The passage certainly appears to pose a much closer relationship between the two central concepts than Li’s analogy—physical exercise and good health—suggests.

Given Li’s understanding of fu li as meaning “following the rules of li”, it is understandable for him to find problematic the translation of wei as “constitute”—it is very hard to think that Confucius regarded the mere formal observance of the li rules as sufficient for the attainment of ren. However, the phrase fu li can be interpreted in other ways. A.C. Graham suggests that we may interpret it as meaning “the recovery of the meaning of ceremony” (emphasis added). In other words, fu li does not merely refer to the observances of li behaviors but has a much more profound meaning—the recovery of the spirit of li. When such recovery is performed, then “the achievement of ren results immediately from” it (Graham 1989, p. 22).

It is obvious that Graham sees a much closer relationship between li and ren than Li does. According to his translation, the achievement of ren “results immediately from” the recovery of the meaning of li (Graham 1989, p. 22, emphasis added). The recovery of the meaning of li is virtually simultaneous with the attainment of ren. Graham observes that it is a striking feature of Confucius’ treatment of ren that he does not see it as a matter of degree: “Either you have it or you don’t; and even in most of the best of us it is only intermittent” (Graham 1989, p. 22).12 It seems to me that for Confucius, ren—at least sometimes—refers to the state in which one is performing li in the right “spirit”. In other words, the moment you are embodying the spirit of li, you are ren.

3. Li as Cult

Jing 敬, the Spirit of Li

Then, what is the meaning or spirit of li? Here I find very helpful Fingarette’s discussion of Confucius’ concept of li. In his seminal treatise, Fingarette directs our attention to the fact that the Master was the first who used the term li not only for religious rituals but also all proper behaviors toward others in society. That is to say, what Confucius did was to invite us to see propriety or social “conventions” in terms of “holy rite”, or “sacred ceremony”. This is, according to Fingarette, “the novel and creative insight” of the Master:

Characteristic of Confucius’ teaching is the use of the language and imagery of li as a medium within which to talk about the entire body of the mores, or more precisely, of the authentic tradition and reasonable conventions of society…. Confucius thus does two things here: he calls our attention to the entire body of tradition and convention, and he calls upon us to see all this by means of a metaphor, through the imagery of sacred ceremony, holy rite.

(Fingarette 1972, pp. 6–7)

That is, Confucius wanted to teach us that the proper behaviors toward others in society are not merely “social conventions” but have a sacred dimension. They are not bare patterns of behavior but “sacred ceremony” or “holy rite”. According to Fingarette, what the Master is doing with his original use of the term li is to bring foremost to our attention “the dimension of the holy in man’s existence”. Fingarette goes on to say:

Rite brings out forcefully not only the harmony and beauty of social forms, the inherent and ultimate dignity of human intercourse; it brings out also the moral perfection implicit in achieving one’s ends by dealing with others as beings of equal dignity, as free coparticipants in li. Furthermore, to act by ceremony is to be completely open to the other; for ceremony is public, shared, transparent; to act otherwise is to be secret, obscure and devious, or merely tyrannically coercive. It is in this beautiful and dignified, shared and open participation with others who are ultimately like oneself that man realizes himself. Thus perfect community of men…becomes an inextricably part, the chief aspect, of Divine worship….

(Fingarette 1972, p. 16)

I suggest, thus, that fu li in ke ji fu li wei ren involves, among others, appreciating or realizing the sacred dimension of human existence. In other words, it is when you treat others in society in the same spirit as you do the co-participants in the sacred rite that you are ren—that is, authentically human. It is to be noted that for Confucius ren is not simply to become a nice person, but, we might say, a much more serious thing. To become a person of ren 仁 is nothing less than to become ren 人—“human being”—in its most authentic sense, which is indeed a very rare accomplishment. For Confucius, this project of become human is essentially connected to grasping the sacred dimension of human existence, which li embodies. In their “philosophical” translation of the Analects, Ames and Rosemont render ren as “authoritative conduct”, “to act authoritatively”, or “authoritative person”. Their rationale for the somewhat novel translation includes recognizing the close connection between ren and li:

“Authoritative” entails the “authority” that a person comes to represent in community by becoming ren embodying in oneself the values and customs of one’s tradition through the observance of ritual propriety (li).

(Ames and Rosemont 1999, p. 50)

Ames and Rosemont, of course, differentiate “authoritative” from “authoritarian”. The former is almost opposite to the latter. The person of ren is “a model that others, recognizing the achievement, gladly and without coercion, defer to and appropriate in the construction of their own personhood” (Ames and Rosemont 1999, p. 51). While “authoritative person” appears a little bizarre as a translation of ren, the rendering, I think, succeeds in conveying a very important connotation that the term ren zhe 仁者 (“person of ren”) has in Asian—at least Korean—culture. To Koreans’ ears, ren zhe means not simply a nice or kind person but a very noble person. They are a weighty person, so to speak. Ren zhe commands deep respect or even reverence from people who have eyes to recognize them.

It is to be noted, however, that ren zhe is a person of “authority” because they are a person under authority. It is because they embody deep reverence for “Heaven” that they evokes reverence from people. That is, “authoritative person” is a person who embodies the “spirit” of li by showing proper reverence in all human transactions.

This, I believe, should awaken us to see the importance of jing 敬 (“reverence”) in the Master’s teachings on ren and li. I think that when Confucius said of fu li, the Master had in mind, among others, jing. If Confucius, as we saw, made a religious concept—“sacred rite”—as central to his moral and political philosophy, it is certainly not improbable that one of his main concerns in doing so was to put into focus the religious virtue associated with the sacred rite. Jing is a religious virtue essentially related to the sacred rite.

Often translated as “respect” or “reverence”, jing is an ancient concept dating back to the pre-Confucian era. According to Lau, in early Zhou literature, jing was a word describing the frame of mind of a ruler when they conduct sacrificial ceremonies to Heaven and their ancestors. The ruler who has jing is keenly aware of the immensity of their responsibility to promote the welfare of the common people. Jing is a “combination of the fear of failing in the responsibility one is charged with and the solemn single-mindedness directed towards the satisfactory discharging of that responsibility” (Lau 1979, p. 26).

As all words do, jing underwent a change or expansion in meaning. According to Sin Yee Chan’s analysis, in the early Confucian literature jing had basically two interrelated meanings: “seriousness” and “respect”. By “seriousness” Chan means “a frame of mind that includes single-mindedness, concentration, seriousness, caution, and a strong sense of responsibility” (Chan 2006, p. 230). Jing also had the meaning of “respect”, which is “recognizing/appreciating the worth of the objects of jing” (Chan 2006, p. 233). Chan observes that jing as “seriousness” and jing as “respect” can be seen as two modes of the same psychological state: the “seriousness” concerns the subject-regarding the aspect of the response, and the “respect” is the object regarding the aspect of the response (Chan 2006, p. 236). In other words, the one who has jing recognizes the worth of the others and so “respects” them in a “serious” manner.

Drawing mainly on the texts of Mencius and Xunzi, Chan argues that in Confucianism jing was regarded as a basis of li. In one of the important passages Mencius clearly associates jing with li: “The man who has ren loves others, and the man who has li jing others” (Mencius 4B:28).13

While the Analects does not say explicitly that jing is a basis of li, I believe that we have good reasons to think that jing was central to Confucius’ philosophy of li. According to Chan, in the Analects there are twenty-one occurrences of jing. In one of them, Confucius says “What can I find worthy of note in a man who is lacking…in reverence when performing rites…?” (Confucius 1979, 3.26). Indeed, for the Master, jing was one of the central virtues:

Tzu-yu asked about being filial. The Master said, ‘Nowadays for a man to be filial means no more than that he is able to provide his parents with food. Even hounds and horses are, in some way, provided with food. If a man shows no reverence, where is the difference?

(Confucius 1979, 2.7)

However, the relationship between jing and li can be more deeply appreciated when we engage the text, not merely on the textual level, but more imaginatively—in its best sense. As is said, both jing and li concern the “sacred rite”. Jing was the virtue required of the performers of the sacred rite—the original referent of li. If Fingarette is right in his claim that Confucius, with his innovative usage of the term li, aimed to draw attention to the sacred dimension of human existence, then jing, I think, does make perfect sense as the central thing the Master had in mind as the “meaning” of li, for virtue was most of all the human response to the sacred.

Thus, I think that for Confucius, the meaning of li is, among others, to recognize, take “seriously” and “respect” the sacred dimension of human existence. While the Master does not say that the humans are created in the image of God, his philosophy of li, I think, can be thought to imply such recognition of the religious grounding of morality. With his creative usage of the religious term li, Confucius appears to be calling us to treat others in society as if they are co-participants in the sacred rite. They are not to be exploited or degraded. They are to be treated not as objects but as co-subjects. As in the sacred rite, each participant has his or her own place—their wei 位—in society, which should be respected in a serious way.14 The Master challenges us to envision our societal life as participating in a holy rite. As Fingarette says, for Confucius “perfect community of men…becomes an inextricable part, the chief aspect, of Divine worship” (Fingarette 1972, p.16).

4. Confucius: Humanistic or Religious?

From what we have seen, I hope it is obvious that we cannot call Confucius a mere humanist.15 The usual characterization of the Master as a great “humanist” must be reconsidered or qualified to a great extent. While we may not call him a “religious” thinker without reservation, it is certainly wrong to regard him as a “humanist”—at least in its “Western” or “Modern” sense.

Of course, much depends on what we mean by “humanist” or “religious”. In today’s secular society, humanists are generally perceived as either secularists or, at the very least, religious agnostics. Tu Weiming, one of the most prominent proponents of “Confucian humanism”, however, observes that Confucian humanism is “unlike the secular, anthropocentric, rational humanism of the Enlightenment”. Tu Weiming describes Confucian humanism as “Spiritual Humanism”, distinguishing it from modern secular versions: “Humanism, as Confucians would have it, is neither de-spirited nor de-natured. It is, in theory and practice, rooted in the spiritual realm and grounded in the natural world” (Weiming 2024, p. 10). Regarding Confucianism as a tradition imbued with significant religious elements, Julia Ching also characterizes Confucianism as “religious humanism” (Ching 1993, pp. 51–67).16 In what follows, my aim is not to categorize the Master as either a “humanistic” or a “religious” thinker. In fact, the greatness of Confucius may lie precisely in his resistance to such narrow compartmentalizing. What is required is an attempt to reach a well-rounded understanding of his thoughts in their complexity and profundity.

4.1. Enchanted Worldview

As we saw, Confucius was an “innovator” in his imaginative usage of a religious imagery—“sacred rite”—to refer to the proper behavior between humans. In pre-Confucian times, li was a deeply religious term connected with sacrifices to spirits. The compound character 禮 is an ideograph connoting the presentation of sacrifices to the spirits at an altar. Hall and Ames explicate the etymology of li:

The character li 禮 has the radical shi 示 as a component element, meaning, “show”, “sign”, “indicate”. Because these ritual displays were originally enacted in a religious context to make human intentions known to the spirits, shi as a constituent radical in a character is usually indicative of religious affairs. The “ritual vase” (li 豊) component of ritual action(li) further associates ritual with the sacred and sacrificial.

(Hall and Ames 1987, p. 86)

What, then, was Confucius’ attitude toward the “spirits” or sacrifices? As A.S. Cua observes, the Master does appear to “have an insouciant attitude toward the existence of spirits and the relevance of belief in an afterlife”. Cua goes on to say,

Confucius approved of the li of mourning and sacrifices largely because of his adoption of the Zhou tradition as an ethical guide to communal intercourse, not because of the specific associated religious beliefs about the existence of ghosts and spirits…. Notably, Confucius seems to have an “as if” attitude toward the existence of the dead as objects of sacrifice (Analects 3:12)….

(Cua 2003, p. 273)

Thus, the assertion that Confucius was an “ethical humanist” is not groundless, though it needs careful qualification. Cua acknowledges that in Confucius, li has a religious dimension. Quoting J.L. Austin’s remark that “a word never—well, hardly ever—shakes off from its etymology and its formation”, the Confucian scholar affirms that in Confucius, li retains the sacred character (Cua 2003, p. 273). However, Cua concludes that the religious dimension of li is “an extension of its primary ethical dimension, and may properly be considered a constitutive feature of the Confucian ethical life” (Cua 2003, p. 273, emphasis added).

There appears to be a sense in which we can call Confucius’ thought “humanistic pragmatism” (Schwartz 1985, p. 119). Apparently, the Master has no interest in religious or metaphysical speculations. He is silent not only about supernatural beings like spirits or ghosts, but also about the dao 道 of Heaven and even the philosophical question of human nature. Instead, his “ultimate concern” lies in the practical ethical question of “how to live a moral life”, or self-cultivation. In other words, even as a humanist, Confucius was a thinker and activist deeply devoted to the ethical dimension of human life.

Schwartz, however, rightly reminds us that “there really is no such thing as ‘humanistic pragmatism’ in a vacuum”. “[A]ll pragmatisms”, he emphasizes, “tacitly presupposes certain images of the larger frame of things in terms of which pragmatic goals are set and pursued”. Schwarz goes on to elucidate his point:

The pragmatic teacher is constantly expounding what he considers to be truths about the correctness or incorrectness of modes of behavior in terms of the assumed ends of behavior. The ends themselves presuppose a certain vision of the world in which they are pursued.

(Schwartz 1985, p. 119)

Schwartz’s point, I think, should function as a corrective for much simplistic characterizations of Confucius’ ethical pragmatism. The profundity and relevance of the Master’s ethical thoughts will be more fully appreciated as we endeavor not simply to grasp his moral precepts, but to understand the underlying worldview—“images of the larger frame of things”.

As Fingarette shows in his well-argued book, Confucius’ “vision of the world” cannot be fully understood in humanistic or ethical terms. The Master envisioned human society as a sacred rite. True, some may take this to mean no more than that the Master wanted us to treat others as humanely or respectfully as any civilized person is required to do. In that way, some may think that in Confucius all “sacred” references or connotations are merely figurative speeches. However, anyone who takes such a perspective must be perplexed by the sayings from the Analects such as:

The Master said, ‘If a man is able to govern a state by observing the rites and showing deference, what difficulties will he have in public life? If he is unable to govern a state by observing the rites and showing deference, what good are the rites to him?’

(Confucius 1979, 4.13)

The Master said, ‘If there was a ruler who achieved order without taking any action, it was, perhaps, Shun. There was nothing for him to do but to hold himself in a respectful posture and to face due south.’.

(Confucius 1979, 15.5)

Such sayings make clear that for Confucius, li concerns not merely personal relationships between individuals, but also modes of “governing” people. More importantly, the Master so firmly believed in the power of li as to teach that the state can be ruled by the practice of li alone, without coercion. This conviction that “all government can be reduced to ceremony” is, according to Graham, “an extremely remarkable feature of Confucius’ thought” (Graham 1989, p. 13). Some might dismiss Confucius’ political philosophy as helplessly naïve, but what is important for our purposes is to recognize that the Master seriously believed in the power of li, even for the serious field of politics.

As Graham says, central to understanding Confucius’ confidence in the power of li is his concept of de 德. Although usually translated as “virtue”, de is not to be understood in its modern, ethical sense. According to Arthur Waley, de means (as the Latin virtus often also does) “the specific quality or ‘virtue’ latent in anything”. In early Chinese, Waley goes on to say, the term never had “the meaning of virtue as opposed to vice, but rather the meaning of ‘virtue’ in such expressions as ‘in virtue of’ or ‘the virtue of this drug’” (Waley 1989, p. 33).

Graham describes de as a “magical” power to “move others without exerting physical force” (Graham 1989, p. 13) It can be rendered as “potency”, and is opposed to physical force or coercion, rather than to “vice”. As said above, Confucius even thought that the state could be governed by de, but not coercion. Confucius even compares one who governs people by de to the Pole Star, which “commends the homage of the multitude of stars without leaving its place” (Confucius 1979, 2.1). That is, the magical power of de allows one to win a following without recourse to physical force. The ruler who has de maintains good order in his state without troubling himself by resorting to physical forces. Confucius says, “The virtue of the gentleman is like wind; the virtue of the small man is like grass. Let the wind blow over the grass and it is sure to bend” (Confucius 1999, 12.19).

Lau observes that de, originally a deeply religious—or pre-religious17—term, by the time of Confucius, must have already become a moral term. It is not that de came to mean what “virtue” means to us today. What Lau means is that de came to be understood as something to be “cultivated”, not simply to be “endowed by Heaven” (Lau 1979, p. 11).

While it requires more knowledge than I have to judge how “moral” Confucius’ concept of de was, my impression is that the Master’s “vision of the world” was very near to the magical worldview contained in the term de in its religious or pre-religious sense. It is commonly held that Confucius saw the practice of li as the way to cultivate de. However, the Master appears to have viewed li not so much a means to cultivate de within an individual as an activity possessing the “magical” power itself. In other words, Confucius appears to have envisioned society and individuals as morally formed by the virtue of li. That is, it seems that for the Master, the very act of performing li (in the right spirit) has almost a magical efficacy (ex opere operato) for (trans)forming society and individuals.

While Confucius’ teachings on de may indicate that he moralized de to some degree, I think that the Master’s teachings on li show that he still adhered, to a considerable degree, to the “magical” worldview, according to which de as a “magical” power was at large in the world, not simply residing within the individual as moral virtue. In other words, Confucius’ world is an “enchanted” one. The Master did not live in a disenchanted, moralized universe—a point which I think is very important to note in order to understand his teachings. His was a world in which some “mysterious forces” still moved people and things.18 If we will, we may still call Confucius a great humanist, but what should be noted is that the Master was never a humanist who believed that the universe was ultimately indifferent to morality. For Confucius, the universe was not simply an arena in which human moral drama is played out. Rather, the universe itself is, in some sense, moral. Schwartz appears to imply this:

A highly problematic aspect of the world “humanism” is, of course, its strong association with the whole trend of what has been called humanism in the post-Cartesian West. The notion of a radical breach and even antagonism between a human world centered on the human subject as the sole source of meaning and an indifferent, “valueless” or even hostile universe does not seem to be suggested anywhere in the Analects.

(Schwartz 1985, p. 150)

4.2. Heaven

Ching characterizes Confucianism as a “Ritual Religion” and notes that the traditional Chinese “cult of Heaven” is endorsed by the Confucian tradition. Ching suggests that the cult of Heaven bears similarities to the Jewish Temple sacrifices and even to the Christian Eucharist, highlighting its ritualistic and sacrificial elements within the Confucian framework (Ching 1993, pp. 59–62). Admittedly, one of the most important questions in investigating Confucius’ religiousness is whether “Heaven” (天 tian) was a “personal” god or an “impersonal order” for the Master. There is a saying in which Heaven is indeed associated with the impersonal processes of nature:

The Master said, ‘I am thinking of giving up speech.’ Tzu-kung said, ‘If you did not speak, what would there be for us, your disciples, to transmit?’ The Master said, ‘What does Heaven ever say? Yet there are the four seasons going round and there are the hundred things coming into being. What does Heaven ever say?’.

(Confucius 1979, 17.19)

But there are other sayings that imply that the Master saw tian 天 as a (almost) personal being. For instance, we find the following:

The Master said, ‘There is no one who understands me.’ Tzu-kung said, ‘How is it that there is no one who understands you?’ The Master said, ‘I do not complain against Heaven, nor do I blame Man. In my studies, I start from below and get through to what is up above. If I am understood at all, it is, perhaps, by Heaven.’

(Confucius 1999, 14.35)

Confucius even confesses “Heaven is author of the virtue that is in me” (Confucius 1999, 7.23). Yet we should be careful not to read into such expressions the Christian concept of a personal deity. Confucius mentions tian very discreetly, and his words, as Ching admits, “do not vibrate with a passionate longing for union with Heaven, or God, as do the words of many Western mystics” (Ching 2003, p. 83). Certainly, the Master was not a “theist” in the Western or Christian sense. In his book The Confucian Creation of Heaven: Philosophy and the Defense of Ritual Mastery, Robert Eno examines Confucius’ views on tian within the context of early Confucianism’s ritual practices. Eno observes that tian is not a “defining interest” for the Confucians, and that “early Confucian philosophy seems directed away from metaphysics and religion” (Eno 1990, p. 5). Eno claims that Confucius’ thought on Heaven was fundamentally about the practical implementation of ethical and social principles through ritual practices, rather than abstract theological speculation.

Nevertheless, the assertion that Confucius’ religiousness was not theistic should also be carefully nuanced. At any rate, the most important thing is to avoid being trapped in the theistic/non-theistic distinction, which is regarded as a heuristic frame, at best, especially in studying non-Western religions. While acknowledging that for Confucius, Heaven has a character of impersonal order, Schwartz nonetheless says that “there is no reason whatsoever to believe, in the case of Confucius”, that Heaven “may not also possess attributes of consciousness and spirit” (Schwartz 1985, p. 125). He goes on to say that:

…it is entirely possible to believe that the same Heaven which silently manifests itself in the course of the four seasons also knows Confucius and endows him with a historic mission. When one glances briefly ahead over the long history of Confucian thought, one finds that while the specifically “theistic” component of this view of Heaven often recedes, the rigid antithesis between Heaven as “order of nature” and Heaven as cosmic consciousness never does become firmly established.

(Schwartz 1985, pp. 125–26)

While it is not easy to determine what Heaven meant for Confucius, I believe that every reader of the Analects may come to be deeply impressed by the way the Master resorts to Heaven as his ultimate authority or empowerment.19 According to P.J. Ivanhoe, Confucius believed Heaven had a specific plan for humanity, and that Confucius himself was chosen to play a crucial role in realizing this plan to create a peaceful, just, and harmonious society (Ivanhoe 2007, pp. 211–20). Whatever philosophical or theological meaning it had for him, it is certain that Heaven was central to his “experience of conscious involvement in the project of life-integration through self-transcendence toward the horizon of ultimate value one perceives”.20 That is, tian is central to Confucius’ spirituality. He was a man deeply devoted to Heaven, although the characteristics of “devotion” are different from the ones found in Christian spirituality. Holding that Confucius’ philosophy is “clearly grounded in religion—the inherited religion of the Lord on High or Heaven, the supreme and personal deity” Ching emphasizes that Confucius was not merely a philosopher but also “a great spiritual personality” (Ching 2003, p. 82). Whether we may agree with Ching with her description of Confucius’ Heaven as “personal”, I believe that all readers of the Sayings will heartily agree that in the book they meet not simply a moral teacher, but a deeply religious or spiritual man.

5. Conclusions

I would conclude this paper with a reflective observation. Studying Confucius’ philosophy and spirituality of li greatly helped me see with more clarity the central role of religious imagination in person-making and community-building. For me, Confucius showed himself as a great spiritual Master, not merely a moral teacher or a political thinker. The Master appears to have had an intuitive conviction that “culture” grows from “cult”. Humanity cannot flourish without an authentically human culture, which has its life-giving foundation in the capacity to experience the Holy, in the secular as well as in the sacred. Without the recognition and celebration of the sacred dimension of human existence, society can persist only by resorting to violence. Religious imagination helps us envision our societal life not merely as “everyman against everyman”, but as a participation in the cosmic liturgy where everyone has her own dignified place. True, Confucianism can be—and has been—exploited for the interests of the dominant class in society. However, it should be also noted that Confucius has been the inspiration behind many humanitarian thoughts and politics in Confucian cultures. The spiritual Master appears to have dreamed of a society ruled by the virtue of reverent performances, not by means of force. In his “enchanted”—religious—worldview, virtue is not a moral quality but rather a spiritual power that affects the transformation of the society and its individuals. Confucius seems to have believed that the embodied spirituality of reverence—li—has spiritual power to transform individuals, and is thus a condition for a nonviolent society. Surely, the Master has much to teach us about the role of religious imagination in building a more peaceful society.