The Question of Heroism and Heroic Virtue in the Philosophy of Education of Josef Pieper

Abstract

The question of heroism and heroic virtue belongs among the most discussed topics in history. It emerges as a recurring theme, mainly in the context of an imminent military danger provoking horror and fear which an individual must resist. This is precisely why heroism was a subject of Nazi propaganda in the past, when it was associated with an irrational willingness to sacrifice one’s own life for any value. In the context of the current war turmoil and tenebrous scenarios regarding the future of the humanity, this article poses the following question: what exactly is heroic virtue? In particular, it focuses on the image of heroism presented by Josef Pieper, who followed the line of thinking of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. He wanted to demonstrate how the courage to face injustice, in spite of imminent danger, develops into heroism when the power of hope is mobilised within individuals. This refers not only to the natural hope associated with our common expectations, but also a mystical hope that helps a hero maintain justice even when face-to-face with the predominance of evil until the end. The article concludes by proposing several motives that might be considered in the process of education to heroic virtue.

1. Introduction

In the time of every war, the question of war heroism arises, and people think anew what such a hero looks like and how he acts. We find various descriptions regarding this topic in history: A hero is a “great man or leader” (Van Doren et al. 1973, p. 6), which, of course, means an allusion to his great courage and determination to resist any hardships. At first, courage was understood to be a certain kind of madness, a readiness to plunge into a sea of difficulties which a man had to face and the effort to change his destiny, even if the price was death or perdition (Van Doren et al. 1973, pp. 9–12).

In ancient history, we can identify a hero according to different characteristics—his retreat or isolation from the rest of human society, or perhaps even from any life context. Naturally, the question gradually arose about whether this isolation is good and whether a hero is obliged to remain detached, as we see in the heroes of The Iliad—e.g., in Ulysses, Perseus and others. They work on their individual reputation—they are half gods (hemitheoi), lonesome warriors who only gain success alone. However, allow us to admit that the individuality of Achilles, for which he sacrifices everything—friends, honour, and, finally, his life—is about something more than his mere ego (Kendrick 2010, pp. 17–20).

Change has been coming slowly since the era of Virgil. Virgil offers a not so extreme perception of heroic isolation and heroism in The Aeneid. His hero, Aeneas, a symbol of a new Ulysses and, for emerging Christianity, a symbol of virtue, focuses on a goal that is not based on his individual vision. For the sake of a higher purpose, he puts aside his own expectations and desires (Van Doren et al. 1973, pp. 12–15).

The study of heroism gained momentum around the turn of this century. Long ignored by scholars, the phenomenon of heroism is finally attracting the serious attention of scholars from multiple disciplines, especially psychology (Allison et al. 2017),1 but also in philosophy (Kendrick 2010; Annas 2015). In the following lines we would like to show how Josef Pieper understood heroic virtue, influenced by the long tradition of philosophical thinking under the guidance of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. The approach to heroism has changed from a qualitative point of view, and we will examine how its new interpretations have developed and how Aristotle’s rational and Thomas Aquinas’s theological approach merged into Pieper’s concept of heroic virtue. The latter thinks of heroic virtue within the context of the Second World War, bringing his interpretation as a counterweight to Nazi propaganda.2

First of all, let us look at virtue according to Aristotle (Section 2) and the concept of heroism described in The Nicomachean Ethics VII (Section 3). Subsequently, we will show how this heritage of Aristotle was integrated into Christian thinking by Thomas Aquinas (Section 4). We will indicate where he developed the topic and where he used a new interpretation. In the fifth section (Section 5), we will explain the way Josef Pieper followed on the ideas of Thomas and how he enriched his motives with contemporary topics. The main aim of this article is Pieper’s view of heroic virtue. He tries to unveil the original meaning of heroic virtue hidden under the sediments of its misuse. He believes that Nazism somehow repainted the original motive of this topic and reinterpreted its content (Pieper 2021, p. 20). We will take a closer look at the two virtues considered by Pieper to be indispensable conditions of heroic virtue—fortitude (including the connected virtues of prudence and justice) and hope. Finally, we will try to summarise all the motives and propose several inspirations for practical education to heroic virtue (Section 6).

2. Aristotelian Teaching on Virtue

Before we get to Aristotle’s understanding of heroic virtue, let us recall his view of virtue as such. As is known, Aristotle considers virtue to be a certain gained quality, a prowess, an ability, and a disposition or state. He believes that virtue is a habit that enables us to act in a good way, and an ability to decide more easily in situations which require rapid decision-making. When we make decisions repeatedly, the act of decision-making becomes easier. It becomes like a “second nature”. Moreover, such decision-making is led by reason, which knows what is good for man in the given situation. For example, “generosity” is hard at the beginning, because it requires man to renounce something to a certain extent to give it to someone else. Gradually, however, this activity and decision-making becomes habitual and, thus, a simple routine.

When it comes to the virtues, Aristotle also speaks about a “state that decides” (hexis proairetiké) (Aristotle 1999, II, 6, 1107a). He sees choice as a capacity of the practical judgement of reason that selects the most suitable means to reach a goal. In his opinion, the practical judgement of reason, together with prudence, plays an eminent role in the whole process, because it determines the prerequisites for the will regarding the definition of the focal point. Reason and prudence represent the main prerequisites of virtue for Aristotle, because without prudence no virtue can be a virtue. Only the right reasoning (orthos logos) before action guarantees the successful reaching of a goal, because virtue remains in the mean (en mesotés). The mean (the intermediate) in respect of the thing is the same: it is “that which is equidistant from each extremity; and this is one and the same for all” (II, 6, 1106a26-b7), while the mean in respect of us is different for each person: “relative to us the intermediate is what is neither superfluous or deficient; this is no tone, and is not the same for all…” (1106a 34). Thus, according to Aristotle, the mean is more like an “average” for me as the acting person, not for a person who observes me. In addition, this average does not always mean an exact arithmetically determined mean. Generosity can be seen by someone as giving one cent, while for someone else it can mean giving five hundred euros.

Of course, the teaching on the mean only deals with certain activities that can have a mean. Aristotle acknowledges that, e.g., some evil activities (by themselves) cannot have a mean: theft is theft, adultery or murder cannot have a mean, which means that the “perfection” of such acts is not possible, because they are evil by nature. Apart from this, morally indifferent acts (walking, eating, drinking, etc.) cannot become virtues, because by performing them man does not make decisions and they are not subject to the judgement of reason. Only acts that are moral and the aim of which is some sort of good can have a mean. The definition of this mean—en mesotés—is given by prudence, which takes into account the circumstances and thinks how to do things in the best possible way. Thus, for Aristotle, virtue represents a second nature, the development of our abilities to a higher form under the guidance of prudence determining the best way of acting in given circumstances.

3. Aristotle’s Teaching on Heroic Virtue in NE VII

We introduced very briefly the teaching of Aristotle on virtue. Let us have a look at the structure of his thoughts in The Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle presents the teaching on practical and intellectual virtues. While the first books (I.–IV.) touch upon the topic of practical virtues, the fifth (V.) book deals with the question of justice, which is both theoretical and practical at the same time. The sixth chapter looks into the topic of intellectual virtues, which also include the problem of right intellectual judgement regarding the question of choice and acting. Following this, Aristotle mentions (NE VII) the virtue described on the basis of tradition as “heroic” (Cooper 2009, p. 9).

In this seventh book Aristotle speaks about continence (1–11, Lat. continentia, Gr. enkrateia) and at the same time he mentions pleasure and delight, and if they are good, acceptable, or due to be rejected (12–15). However, even before these topics, Aristotle affirms the necessity to refrain from three things: vice (kakia), incontinence (akrasia), and brutality (theriótes), while determining that the opposite of the first is virtue and the opposite of the second is continence (enkrateia). But what is the opposite of brutality mentioned as the third thing? Aristotle does not tell us, and we can only think that he gives us an indirect answer in the form of heroic virtue described as divine virtue, which, unlike classic ethical/dianoetic virtue, is not within our power (he describes it as “beyond our power”—hyper hemás). According to him, this virtue belongs to the gods (heroika tina kai theia, VII, 1, 1145a19–20), but gods do not need any virtue; they cannot be virtuous. It is a superhuman virtue through which humans become gods—that is all Aristotle writes in the whole chapter.

Heroic virtue is a state which contradicts brutality. It is a virtue that reaches beyond our power, likening us to gods. It can be reached by humans who—thanks to this extraordinary virtue (d՚arétés hyperbolén)—become gods for many other people.

It seems that Aristotle describes heroic virtue in a totally different way than he described ordinary virtue in books I–VI. Heroic virtue simply cannot mean the improvement of our natural abilities that he wrote about before. It is beyond our power; it is not just about harmony with intellectual judgement; it is not in a mean between two extremes (described as medium rationis in the Middle Ages), and it is not hexis—habitual acting. Aristotle even says that not everyone is capable of reaching this virtue. This is why Aristotle՚s thoughts from NE VII provoked (mostly in the Middle Ages) a number of different interpretations.

There were actually two fundamental directions or approaches to the question of what heroic virtue is exactly (Saarinen 1996, pp. 450–51). These were associated with a discussion of whether Aristotle understood it as an ethical or an intellectual virtue.

The first group of authors interpreted this reference of Aristotle about heroic virtue as concerning an ethical virtue, using the general term “continence” (continentia) mentioned by Aristotle in this chapter. As Albert the Great later argued, it seems that all the cardinal virtues in their perfect form can be called heroic (Saarinen 1996, p. 451). The basis for argumentation in favour of this idea is a theory that reason and command stand above affections and desires within heroic virtue. Although this group of authors builds on Aristotle, Aristotle does not see continence as a virtue and radically opposes such spartanism in the whole chapter.

The second group interprets Aristotle’s texts in a different way. Its supporters see his heroic virtue as a certain type of religious virtue—heroism or a heroic way of life. This heroic virtue began to be associated with canonisation in the perspective of its theological interpretation. Martyrs and saints are seen as those who “excel in virtue”, living a heroic style of life. This group of authors builds on Thomas Aquinas. Paradoxically, this direction developed after the 17th century, culminating under the influence of the Reformation. Of interest is that it was the Reformation that brought the interpretation that says heroic virtue is an “intellectual” virtue (sapientia), by which its practical dimension seems to become unnecessary (Saarinen 1996, pp. 450–51; Saarinen 1990, pp. 98–100).

Pieper’s version of heroic virtue, however, will be different, a third type that we will attempt to clarify. To approach it, however, it is first necessary to outline Aquinas’s solution, which Pieper will modify even further.

4. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpretation of Heroic Virtue

Thomas’s opinion on heroic virtue illustrates very well his attitude regarding Aristotle’s philosophy and the way he recasts his views into theology. In his work Sententia libri Ethicorum (mainly part 7.1) he aims for a purely rational interpretation (this also applies in the case of virtus heroica), while in his Summa Theologiae he presents a kind of theological interpretation (Costa 2008, pp. 160–61).

In Thomas’s view, heroic virtue is a disposition located in the rational part of the soul. In Sententia libri Ethicorum 7.1, he says that it completes and perfects the rational nature in man: this is, in his view, the “rational part”, and it is “perfected” by heroic virtue in a unique way (ultra communem modum humanae perfectionis) (Aquinas 1969, p. 381). Man by nature is located in the middle—between the world of animals and the world of pure spiritual beings—angels—and it is with this rational part of the soul that he is able to achieve communion with these divine beings. Since it surpasses the properties and circumstances of common virtue, tradition calls it “virtus divina”—divine virtue.

Aquinas clearly differentiates heroic virtue from continence (continentia), as for him it has a higher status than continence or any other ethical virtue and even exceeds it. In the case of heroic virtue, a person—with the help of grace—elevates his nature and achieves a virtue that Aquinas calls excellent, because it stands out beyond the general possibilities of man (propter excellentiam virtutis supra communem modum hominum). Therefore, this is not a virtue like common virtues, with a middle between two extremes, but, with this virtue, nature is directed at something higher (attingit ad id quod est superius) (Aquinas 1969, p. 381).

Thomas does not say, however, that, as a consequence of this virtue, a person transforms his human nature into something more, into a superman. He claims that when Aristotle speaks about human nature changing into the divine, he only means that such virtue transcends and surpasses all human capabilities. This is why Aristotle calls it divine (Aquinas 1969, p. 381), because in his view it is an “excellent virtue” (sed propter excellentiam virtutis).

Thomas cannot explain, as it were, why Aristotle speaks of such a divine/human virtue in the context of the seventh chapter, almost at the end of his discussion on the ethical and intellectual virtues. It appears to him that heroic virtue cannot be incorporated into any of the categories of virtues. In Summa Theologiae he himself finds a place to mention heroic virtues in the context of the discussion on the supernatural action of God in man, which follows the general treatise on the virtues and precedes the explanation of sin. This incorporation suggests that Thomas relates the topic of heroic virtue to divine agency. In his interpretation, the heroic virtue that Aristotle speaks about belongs among the gifts of the Holy Spirit (quae secundum nos videtur pertinere ad dona spiritus sancti) (Aquinas 2012, II-II, 159, 2 ad 1). As he states, “gifts are perfections of man, whereby he becomes amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost” (instinctum spiritus sancti) (I-II, 68, 3).

A person who has received gifts still acts freely but is at the same time under the guidance of the Spirit (I-II, 68, 3 ad 2). He does not rely on the light of reason, as do acquired intellectual and moral virtues, nor on the light of reason perfected by faith, as with infused virtues, but on divine instinct (instinctus divinus). Thomas explains that to see and act on the basis of the gift of the Holy Spirit means overcoming the fallibility and imperfection that are linked with human knowledge and action. “Whether we consider human reason as perfected in its natural perfection, or as perfected by the theological virtues, it does not know all things, nor all possible things. (…) God, however, to Whose knowledge and power all things are subject, by His motion safeguards us from all folly, ignorance, dullness of mind and hardness of heart, and the rest”3 (I-II, 68, 2 ad 3).

By combining heroic virtue and the gifts of the Spirit, Thomas not only offered a theological interpretation of Aristotle’s concept, but if we follow his interpretation of the gifts of the Spirit, one of the consequences of this step is the presence of the infused virtue of love in the hero.4 He holds the view that as moral virtues are joined by prudence, so the gifts of the Spirit are joined by love (caritas) (I-II, 68, 5). Love is their root and source (I-II, 68, 4 ad 3). Therefore, “whoever has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, none of which can one possess without charity”5 (I-II, 68, 5). From the overflowing goodness of God in relation to man (I-II, 68, 2), which is not limited by any boundaries, a hero can take part in love and gifts that surpass the possibilities of his human nature and lead him on the path to his goal.

The gifts of the Holy Spirit at the same time reveal what Thomas’s idea of a hero is. Thomas takes their calculation from the prophet Isaiah (Is 11, 2–3), who described the anticipated Messiah with them. These are the gifts of wisdom (sapientia), understanding (intellectus), knowledge (scientia), and counsel (consilium), which perfect reason, and the gifts of piety (pietas), fortitude (fortitudo), and a fear of the Lord (timor Dei), which perfect the appetitive power. A hero, in Thomas’s view, performs great deeds because he has a sharp vision of the truth, which a person does not normally achieve, and his will faithfully follows this truth. He, therefore, performs “acts which are higher than acts of virtue” (ad altiores actus quam sint actus virtutum) (I-II, 68, 1), because he is endowed with “something over and above the virtues” (aliquid supereminens rationi communi virtutis) (I-II, 68, 1 ad 1).

Although all these gifts are interconnected and do not exist on their own, we will select one of them, which, in our view, was most reflected in the treatment of the topic of heroic virtue by Josef Pieper, and based on it, we will also illustrate the relationship between gift and virtue more specifically. This is the gift of fortitude.

Fortitude is the name Thomas gives to moral virtue and the gift of the Spirit. As a moral virtue, fortitude perfects a person such that he is firm and persistent both in doing good and in enduring evil and danger. He is at the same time driven by love for the good and the desire for justice. Indeed, “[…] the praise awarded to fortitude depends somewhat on justice” (laus fortitudinis dependet quodammodo ex iustitia) (II-II, 123, 12 ad 3). However, there are situations in which fortitude “does not go so far as to give confidence of overcoming all dangers” (non sufficit dare fiduciam evadendi quaecumque pericula) (II-II, 139, 1 ad 1). To escape from every danger and finish all work begun is beyond the possibilities of human nature and acquired virtue. Human actions are usually interrupted by illness or death. However, just then—in seemingly hopeless situations—according to Thomas, the gift of fortitude, through which the Holy Spirit instills confidence in a person’s heart such that he does not fear, sustains that person. He assures him that he will be triumphant over every danger and over every threat (Roszak 2022). The victory the person achieves, however, is not from this world. It is the good he hoped for during his life—the communion of love with God, eternal life, and eternal beatitude (II-II, 139, 1).

Thus, to sum up, Thomas proposes an understanding of heroic virtue as a gift that (a) perfects a person beyond what he can be perfected by his own efforts and acquired virtues, even though he does not acquire them without God’s help (I-II, 68, 2); (b) springs from the infused virtue of love and is given to a person together with it; (c) infuses man with confidence to persevere because he will achieve the fulfillment of his efforts, eternal life, and eternal bliss (I-II, 68, 1 ad 1). In this way Thomas fills in the “gaps” in the Aristotelian conception with a new “religious” impulse.

5. Signs of Heroism According to Josef Pieper

As we have seen, in both Aristotle and Thomas, heroic virtue is an exceptional form of virtue. Aquinas interpreted it as a gift of the Holy Spirit. The hero, gifted with help “from above”, overcomes the shackling to bodily life, which can sometimes stand in the path of achieving a higher good. Thus, it seems that heroism as such is something very special and reserved for the uniquely gifted individual. What is more, both of these authors see heroic virtue more in the abstract, without a connection to specific events. They pay heed to its differentiation on the scale of degrees of human virtues, or they posit the question of its divine origin.

Josef Pieper (1904–1997) also understood heroism as a virtue, and this allowed him to distinguish heroism from the various forms of pseudo-heroism that he observed in the specific contexts of his time. At the time when he lived and wrote, the original meaning of heroism was veiled by various forms of purposeful propaganda. It was common to connect it with the presentation of an exceptional performance—in sports, science, or research—or even with extraordinary success; thus, military generals, successful surgeons, or political leaders were considered heroes (Pieper 2008b, p. 279). Pieper endeavoured to return to heroism its depth and the lustre of an exceptional virtue. He again tried to rethink what traditional ideas tell us about heroism and how to understand it in the current situation. Furthermore, his contribution lies in the argument that the core of heroism can be achieved by anyone.

His contribution to this topic consists in recognising two prerequisites of heroic virtue, which we will attempt to describe in the following lines: its core is fortitude, and its motive is hope. Both these virtues are related to the human fear of losing life in the pursuit of the goals of human nature and final beatitude. Pieper, however, like Thomas, holds the view that the virtues are interconnected (Pieper 1965b, p. 37). Therefore, fortitude cannot exist without prudence and justice, whose influence on the formation of fortitude will also be mentioned.

In his essay Heroism and Fortitude (Orig. Ist Heldentum noch aktuell?) Pieper identified fortitude as the core of heroism and at the same time as a virtue “fundamentally required of everyone” (Pieper 2008b, p. 280; English translation Pieper 1973, p. 51). Fortitude is one of the cardinal virtues, through which a person rules over his emotions of fear and confidence such that they do not prevent him from achieving rational good. A courageous person is willing to expose himself to danger and, in an extreme case, to suffer death. The question, of course, is at what cost; that is, what is the good that balances the loss of bodily good? Without answering this question, it would be possible to consider blind courage, an act motivated by a disdain for life or one’s own ambition, as heroism. In Pieper’s view, to submit oneself to death for these reasons is not heroism; it is one of its false imitations. True courage and true heroism spring from justice.6

Justice is the virtue of the will. A just person voluntarily does what reason recognises as right and good. The will is not self-sufficient but expects from reason a judgement about what to do. This judgement is the work of the virtue of prudence. Reason perfected by prudence operates as a mediator of the exchange between reality and a just will. It is distinguished by the ability to penetrate into the depth of things (situations) and recognise what is the right thing to do at a given moment. Heroic virtue in the end thus depends on knowing reality and how things really are. A just person wants nothing more than to see what good he can and should do. An unjust person wants nothing more than to protect his own well-being, comfort, health, success, and self-realisation, whatever the cost, clinging to external and bodily goods and, thus, falsifying his vision of reality. He is blind to some parts of it and shuts his eyes to the forms of evil. In contrast, a just person is willing to lose everything that we associate with self-realisation just to gain what Pieper calls “deeper, more essential intactness” (Pieper 2006, pp. 98–99; English translation Pieper 1965b, p. 119). He knows what he is losing and what he is risking, but he also knows what he is gaining through personal commitment (Pieper 2006, p. 120).

But what is this good, this integrity and this gain? What can a person fix his gaze on in the face of death, and where can he draw the strength that would lead him through such a trial?

In Pieper’s view, the answer to this question is crucial for the topic of heroism. To confront something terrible and horrifying with no hope of victory would be something unnatural and inhuman. Pieper did not regard such an approach as heroism, but as nihilism (Pieper 2006, p. 136). Hope is the utmost motive and the key to heroism; however, hope can take many forms and have layers that intertwine and support one another in a person’s life.

The first form of hope is a natural vital force and optimism that is mainly related to the period of youth. A young person grabs hold with confidence and expectation to the “not yet” of fulfilment, whether natural or supernatural (Pieper 2006, p. 38). He has his life before him, or at least assumes so, and embarks on a steep journey, overcomes obstacles, and fights for his dreams. He has hope that he will achieve the good he desires. Natural hope alone, however, is not yet a virtue; as we have seen, vital courage, without an association with justice, can even cause havoc rather than good in history. At the same time, a young person does not have to only be threatened by unreasonableness and rashness, but, in Pieper’s view, can also be affected by pride and ambition. If he wants to stand as a human being and not merely succeed or triumph, this layer of hope must be transformed by the spirit of justice.

The involvement of a young person in the battle for justice is a demanding aim of education, but it must not be the only aim. Moments appear in every person’s life when every natural hope fades. The “not yet” of bodily existence is exposed to danger or extinguished. The battle for a just cause seems lost and hopes remain unfulfilled. The hero truly sees that he will not get out of the situation alive. What can prevent his succumbing to despair? Is there anything left in the future for him to look forward to?

The answer, according to Pieper, can only be found by a person who does not abandon his ability to reflect and contemplate invisible things and be in a relationship with them. Such a person lives not only spiritually, but, as Pieper sees it, mystically: in friendship with God and in complete submission to His power. What motivates him to remain good and not succumb to cowardice in the merciless trials is no longer some temporary good and victory, but the hope of eternal life with God (Pieper 2006, pp. 260, 270). Examples of mystical life, according to Pieper, are contemplative mystics, such as Teresa of Ávila, who passed the test of the “dark night” (Pieper 2012a, p. 215), and Christian martyrs, who in extreme danger completely separated themselves and surrendered to God (Pieper 1951, p. 81). Supernatural hope took in them the place of natural hopes and certainties, and through the power of the Spirit of fortitude, they overcame the darkness and achieved the final victory, which is God Himself (Pieper 2006, p. 40). Therefore, the true strength of a hero who persevered is ultimately grace and the flow of divine power within him. He draws from it an awareness of essential indestructibility, which cannot be threatened by any injury (Pieper 2006, p. 273).

Pieper, however, does not relate the category of heroism only to Christian saints. For him a hero can be “every unimposing or unknown individual who risks his life for the sake of truth and good” (Pieper 2008b, pp. 284–85; English translation Pieper 1973, p. 55). If someone is capable of taking this risk for the sake of truth and goodness, he values God more than himself, and, therefore, cannot but be God’s friend. Thus, Pieper suggests that the moment when supernatural grace is added to one’s nature may not always be as evident as it is for Christians, for example, when receiving the sacrament of baptism. As we have seen, fortitude is the essence of heroism, which every person can and should develop in himself. If, along with this, a person also develops (inevitably) prudence and justice, he then opens up to the whole of reality. Whether, when, and how grace will come is a question that Pieper considers unanswerable (Pieper 2006, pp. 360–61).

6. Education for Heroic Virtue

In the previous section, we revealed the two prerequisites of heroism—fortitude and hope. In the next chapter, we would like to ask the question of what education should remember, if it wants to raise a courageous and hopeful person. We think that this question is very topical today, given the general tendency of today’s education to prioritise worldly success and “false heroism”. Although Catholic educators (parents, Catholic schools, after-school educational institutions) can probably benefit the most from the interpretation, Pieper’s ideas can also appeal to a wider range of readers.

In what follows, we will first think over education as such and explain what education is according to Pieper and how it relates to virtue. We will then think about what it means to educate for justice, prudence, and for hope—the virtues that resonate most in Pieper’s interpretation of fortitude and heroism.

6.1. Education for Goodness and Virtue as Part of a Holistic Education

Pieper’s opinions on education are part of his philosophical views and reflect Aristotelian–Thomasian anthropology and ethics. He does not understand education mainly as a purposeful and planned activity, but as the realisation of a form. What is important to him is that the educational goal has a basis in a reality, that is, it brings the possibility of the soul to fruition (Pieper 2004, pp. 310–11). The possibility of the spiritual soul is its ability to know and to act. Knowledge includes a whole range of actions, from observation of reality and intuition, through discursive rationality, to practical knowledge focused on the future and creation. What is important for Pieper is that knowledge is not narrowed down to a sense-perceivable fact, but is also open to revelation, which is part of tradition and which a person grasps through faith.

Action, too, the principle of which is will, includes many actions: a simple will (simplex voluntas), choice (electio), but also divine love (caritas). The relationship between knowledge and action is reciprocal and highly complex, and Pieper compares it to the relationship between education and perfection (Pieper 2004, p. 311). In his view, a person recognises when reality and his mind touch one another. Our mind receives measure from this touch, which means that it is shaped according to reality. Reason shaped by reality then imprints the measure of the action of the will, and the will accepts this measure, because it loves and wants to do good (Pieper 2004, pp. 315–16). It also imprints it into the lower abilities of the sensual soul. This is, thus, how virtue is formed, as a permanent ability to recognise, choose, and realise good.

Education for virtue is, in Pieper’s understanding, the essence of education. Virtue is the supreme development of the possibilities of the spiritual soul (ultimum potentiae), their realisation. A holistic education not only includes knowledge (the virtues of theoretical reason) and the ability to use knowledge for action (the virtues of practical reason), but also the ability to follow fearlessly and selflessly what is good (the moral virtues). Pieper does not think that man is assured a better future when he advances in science and research, nor when he secures new, previously unimagined possibilities with technology. He thinks that the essence of human history lies in that it is based on the free decision of individuals. The future of man does not depend on science but on its use by people, and this means that the real possibility of misuse of technological achievements, even the possibility of the ultimate destruction of man, is also hidden within history (Pieper 2012b, pp. 390–92). Pieper thinks that this danger will not be averted by either science or evolution, but only by the turn of man to the good. In effect, he suggests that the way out of the crisis and the future of humanity lies in virtue—in the fortitude of those who avert evil and do good. Education, in other words, is either whole and includes education for virtue, or it is not education at all.

6.2. Education for Justice and Prudence as a Prerequisite of Heroic Virtue

For Pieper, three things are particularly important if we want to raise a courageous person. The first is strengthening their sense of justice, which in his view is a sense deeply embedded in the human soul, one that cannot be eradicated even by the existence of evil in the world. This is manifested as a desire for a just organisation of human matters and as a resistance to resignation and adaptation to an unjust order (Pieper 2006, p. 45). But this can decline with age and life experiences, and the opposite force—a convulsive will not to lose advantages and to defend only one’s own interests—can assert itself more and more in a person. This is an obstacle to justice and heroism.

Education is a means to prevent it. As we mentioned above, its task is to help a student touch reality and to accept this touch in his will as a measure of his actions. Only in this way will he learn to see reality without selfish (self-preservation) motives in the background. Justice, which is a prerequisite for heroism, “depends upon the perception and acknowledgement of reality” (Pieper 1949, p. 8). Here, the second matter that is pedagogically important appears. To perceive and see correctly is the task of prudence. We can illustrate this on the example of reconstructing a traffic accident, when both parties involved must see and acknowledge the events as they actually happened and not embellish the reality. Only then can the judgement be fair (Pieper 2008a, p. 298). Seeing reality is needed for every moral act. Therefore, some authors rightly claim that, according to Pieper, “moral education is found in the development and growth of prudence, which is learning to see reality. Through being prudent, one develops other virtues” (Warne 2018, p. 4). However, so that a person can know reality truthfully and, thus, learn to be prudent, the will must be freed and accepting. If it were in motion during cognition, we would expose it to the risk that cognition would be distorted, for example, by looking at reality from the perspective of its potential use. Such a perspective makes it impossible for us to know reality as it is; we will then only know what corresponds to our assumption: what we can get out of it for ourselves. Opposite this, a righteous person sees himself and his “interest” in the perspective of the whole, for which he is able to make sacrifices, if needed.

6.3. Education for the Hope as a Prerequisite of Heroism

The third key matter in education is to open up a person’s perspective of hope, which will stand even in the face of death. Here, the question arises for us about whether it is possible to educate for the virtue of hope if it is a supernatural gift. Catholic education states that although the educator cannot “infuse” faith, hope, and love, he can still turn the gaze of the educated towards the One who gives them. Pieper actually distinguishes two forms of heroism—one refers to an explicit, Christian motive, the other to an anonymous philosophical approach based on reason that assumes natural hope.

For a Christian education, this challenge means initiating a person into the mystery of salvation through Christ (Pieper 1951, p. 83), initiating him into the hope of eternal life in communion with Him, as well as into the events that preceded the resurrection. This means focusing attention on Christ, who in the seeming failure of his mission did not stop trusting the Father. Thus, the aim is to prepare a young person for the inevitability of the confusion caused by original sin and for the fact that he is asked to oppose all stupidity, laziness, blindness, and malevolence even at the cost of losing comfort (Pieper 2006, p. 127). By being faithful to this mission, he gains participation in the life of God and in heroic virtue. But neither natural nor moral forces are sufficient for this fight. A person must draw strength from the fact that he dares to trust God and put himself at His disposal.

The mystery of the death and the resurrection of Christ and the hope of communion with Him is traditionally the centre of Christian religious education. Pieper, however, is convinced that contact with a tradition built on revelation should not only be conveyed to a person through religious education. He feels that revelation is not exclusive to Christianity (cf. Schmitz 2009). Philosophy, too, talks about the “wisdom of the ancients”, who preserved what they received in the divine message for future generations. We can read the content of this ancient tradition from the works of Plato and Aristotle. This means, in Pieper’s view, that “God holds in his hands the beginning, the middle, and the end of all things [Plato, Laws, 715e], that the spirit has charge over the whole universe [Plato, Philebus, 30d], that after death something far better lies in wait for the good than for the bad [Plato, Phaedo, 63c], that the soul is immortal [Plato, Meno, 81b], […] that all of nature is encircled by the divine [Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1074b1]” (Pieper 1958, pp. 481–82). Thus, Pieper shows that the salvation of man and eternal life is a topic that does not relate only to religion but is also an element of philosophical wisdom.

Pieper also presents a more universal level of heroism based on the notion that the whole of reality around man was created—and man has a kind of “anonymous” religious participation in this creation. He thinks that philosophy itself, if practiced as a path, is an opening to hope. A philosophising person “passes beyond the barriers of this present life on earth” and it is revealed to him that “our own existence, as well as that of things, is founded upon the non-temporal, non-successive, and therefore still continuing act of creation”. He is shown the fact that “existence as we know it, therefore, does not just ‘adjoin’ the realm of Eternity; it is entirely permeated by it” (Pieper 1965a, p. 31). Therefore, Pieper’s understanding is not only a syllogistic science but is even more a loving contemplation of wisdom that completely seeks the Other (Schumacher 1999, p. 464; Narváez 2003, p. 109). A philosopher open to the whole of reality does not give up on the question of what it is actually about and what is the last horizon of life. He is ever on his way to receive the gift. For this purpose, Pieper, in the play The Death of Socrates (Pieper 2002), put into the mouth of Socrates—facing an unjust death—words about the immortal existence of the soul, judgement after death and participation in the life of God, which awaits those who love and do good. These words were Socrates’s testament for his followers. Hope lies in the truth that they proclaim: a person who refuses to commit an injustice in order to escape the unjust snares of others gains more than he loses—eternal life.

It may seem that such a vision of education is Christian or Catholic even when it refers to the sources and the way of thinking of philosophy. Pieper was undoubtedly a Christian thinker. His view of education, however, which develops the spiritual nature (reason and will) such that a person does not serve the things of this world but develops his own higher mission, also inspires the current followers of liberal education. Lee Trepanier explains that “The aim of liberal education is to transform the mind and character of the student so he or she will become a different type of individual who will be able to bring insight that draws from various disciplines to particular complex issues and exercise prudential judgement as a person and as a citizen” (Trepanier 2009, p. 129). The basis of such an education is access to reality: “Whether we study something for its own sake or for utilitarian ends, whether we begin from a place of wonder or from doubt, whether we end in hope or despair determines the character of the education we pursue” (Trepanier 2009, p. 129). Naturally, something other than liberal education is also needed at schools and universities. These other things include a family that celebrates holidays and, thus, experiences something extraordinary, a touch of eternity (Pieper 2012d, pp. 242–44), a culture that values the word (Pieper 2012c), churches and communities that preserve tradition without petrifying it (Pieper 1958), and many other actors taking part in education and passing on values to the new generation.

7. Conclusions

In the first part of the paper, we had the chance to see that Aristotle had already examined the question of heroism in the context of the topic of virtue. In his view, however, heroism is not a human, but more of a superhuman virtue, as it were. Its opposite is not wickedness and depravity, which is still something human, but brutality. For Aristotle, heroes are often compared to gods or described as descendants of the gods, because something divine is reflected in them.

Thomas Aquinas mentioned heroic virtue both in the context of his commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics and in the context of a treatise on the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the Summa Theologiae. In the first work, he maintained Aristotle’s explanation that if brutality detaches a person from the human community, then heroic virtue connects him to the world of spiritual beings. A hero does not become a god, but something superhuman is reflected in his virtue. In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas mentions heroic virtue rather peripherally and attempts to integrate it into a theological perspective. At the same time, he shifts the emphasis from the exceptionality of the hero to the grace and gift of God which operates in the hero. Although Thomas is convinced that no human virtue arises and lasts without God’s help, in the case of heroic virtue it is a gift that exceeds human possibilities and is an expression of God’s extraordinary favour. Heroic virtue is the sealing and completion of human virtue by God. Thus, in Thomas we can observe two perspectives from which he examines heroism. The first is natural rationality, thanks to which a person can discern a form of virtue that exceeds human possibilities. The second is the theological explanation of this observation, which is God’s grace operating in the hero.

Pieper’s interpretation of heroism joins natural rationality with faith. Namely, in his entire oeuvre, Pieper holds the view that true philosophy must not be closed to any form of divine message—whether it comes from God’s revelation, as we encounter it in sacred books, or from myth. He says that a Christian martyr and a fallen soldier, but also any individual who under no circumstances commits evil in order to gain personal advantage (such as Socrates) can be a hero. What unites them is not only courage and a willingness to expose themselves to danger, but—and this is a sine qua non condition for Pieper—also justice and prudence. A hero realises that cowardice leads to evil, and he himself would rather lose his life than give even passive consent to evil. Pieper, however, is not an advocate of heroism without any hope for “gain”. Therefore, it at the same time also reveals the hero’s hopes. Gain is not an early win—glory belongs to heroes. What the hero hopes for is eternal life—a glory that the world is unable to give.

In his interpretation Pieper described a heroic virtue as a virtue whose foundation is in human nature, or better said, in the acquisition of fortitude through prudence and justice. The highest form of fortitude is supernatural; therefore, perfect heroism is a matter of grace, but each act of courage in which an individual gives preference for truth and goodness over advantage and external success is an expression of what is essential to heroism. Pieper’s convictions grew in the context of crisis moments of human history, which do not permit anyone to be carried along by the current. However, in his opinion, a hero of the present is in no way like the apparent heroes who are our role models—successful managers, executives, or winning athletes. How Pieper depicts today’s hero relates to a person’s inner qualities—virtues. Therefore, he feels that an appropriate education, which includes religion, philosophy, and ethics, is also important.

In the last part of the contribution, we looked at education in the context of Pieper’s philosophical views and proposed several educational motifs that could be inspiring for contemporary pedagogy as well. We showed that although only a person who has developed the natural dispositions for good within himself can become a hero, what in the end approaches his act is undeserved grace and a gift. He can only prepare for it by nurturing the hope of eternal life in himself, through contact with tradition. This will teach him not to cling to short-term advantages and surrender the future, the certainty of which lies in faith. Such holistically conceived education is not only a task for schools, though a school, can contribute to it if it mediates for students contact with reality in its entire breadth, not excluding revelation and tradition. In Pieper’s view, school education should not serve exclusively utilitarian goals; it should create space for thus far unknown horizons of philosophy.