The Registration of Ginling College and the Role of Wu Yi-fang, 1925–1930

Abstract

This paper examines the role of Wu Yi-fang in the registration process at Ginling College. It explores the initial resistance exhibited by the missionary faculty and the Ginling College Committee toward registration, contrasting it with their subsequent change in attitude following the 1927 Nanking Incident. This incident forced Ginling to adhere to government regulations, appointing Wu Yi-fang as the Chinese president of the college. Through her exceptional negotiation strategies, Wu not only ensured Ginling’s smooth registration and prosperity after the political upheaval but also successfully claimed decision-making authority for herself. This paper argues that Wu’s contributions to Ginling’s registration demonstrate how Christian schools and liberal education played a significant role in nurturing the development of Chinese female leaders and preparing them for leadership roles. Simultaneously, these institutions benefited from the achievements of their graduates.

1. Introduction

In November 1925, the Peking Ministry of Education issued a set of “Regulations Governing the Recognition of Educational Institutions Established by Funds Contributed by Foreigners” (“Regulations of Registration”) and demanded that all mission schools register with the local educational authorities. Ginling College (Jinling nüzi daxue 金陵女子大學)1 was founded by five American Women’s Mission Boards in Nanking in 1913, with a mission statement to “Christianize China” and “enlighten womankind” through the alumnae’s devoted work and lives (Widmer 2009, pp. 85, 89; Feng 2009, pp. 2, 9). During the Restore Educational Rights Movement of the 1920s, Ginling’s foreign and Christian connections diminished its popularity among many nationalist citizens (Thurston and Chester 1955, p. 71). Being one of the thirteen Protestant Christian colleges, Ginling College encountered the challenge of school registration, shedding light on the power dynamics between missionary benefactors and indigenous leaders.

Scholarly research on Ginling College and its registration, however, is scarce. In 2009, Feng Jin dedicated a lengthy book to discussing its foundation and development, with a particular focus on the family discourse within the college (Feng 2009, pp. 4–17). Helen M. Schneider’s more recent work explores the college’s involvement in social service during the 1930s and 1940s (Schneider 2014, pp. 113–42). This paper aims to explore the role of Wu Yi-fang (吳貽芳), an alumna of Ginling and its first Chinese president, in the process of its registration. This paper begins with an overview of the Anti-Christian Movement and the Restore Educational Rights Movement in the 1920s, establishing them as the backdrop for Christian school registration. After discussing the American faculty’s responses toward registration before and changes in attitudes after the Nanking Incident in 1927, it analyzes Wu’s strategies for negotiation in convincing the Ginling College Council (GCC) to comply with the government’s instructions. This paper contends that Wu’s remarkable negotiation skills were instrumental in ensuring Ginling’s smooth registration, guaranteeing the institution’s survival and prosperity amid political upheavals, and securing decision-making authority for herself. The registration of Ginling serves as a case study that unveils the governmental and public attitudes toward Christian Higher Education in the 1920s, showcasing the struggle of Christian colleges to survive and thrive amidst the Anti-Christian sentiment.

2. The Background of Christian School Registration

Since the early 1920s, Chinese nationalists have openly questioned the role of Christianity in building modern China, some criticizing it for spreading superstition and others from the perspective of anti-imperialism. As Jessie Lutz suggests, while the Chinese intellectuals’ hostile sentiments towards Christianity were diverse, they agreed that China would be better without Christianity (Lutz 1976, p. 403). Their resentments found concrete expression in denouncing mission schools, which became a target of attack in the Anti-Christian Movement (1922–1927) due to their intimate association with Christianity.2 For instance, the mood of anti-Christians escalated when the World Student Christian Federation (WSCF) planned to hold a conference at Tsinghua University (Qinghua Daxue 清華大學), Beijing. In March 1922, students in Shanghai protested against the conference as an imperialist encroachment and declared the founding of the Anti-Christian Student League (非基督教学生同盟). They denounced Christianity through Marxist language, criticizing the churches as upholding the status quo and aiding the upper class in exploiting and oppressing the lower class. In Peking, many students, educators, and members of KMT, CCP, and the Socialist Youth League took over the campaign against Christianity and extended its scope to denounce all religions, adopting the new name “Great Federation of Anti-Religionists (非宗教大同盟)”. Following the Marxian-Leninist ideology, the Peking intelligentsia criticized religions for teaching obedience, which was an antisocial morality of slaves, and for spreading superstitions, which were a hindrance for both individual and national developments (Lutz 1976, pp. 399–401). The WSCF finally carried out the meeting in the midst of the anti-Christian storm from April 4 to 9, with the student activists issuing an open letter of protest on the first day and holding a mass demonstration on the last day.

The protests over educational rights were initially launched against Japanese education in Manchuria in the spring of 1924, when some activist organizations persuaded students to withdraw from Japanese schools where Japanese language and history were promoted at the expense of Chinese culture. Nevertheless, the protest target was quickly shifted to Christian schools, as they were more numerous and common. During the second wave of the “Restore Educational Rights Movement”, the National Student Union criticized Christian education for “denationalizing” Chinese youth, as the missionaries restrained their students from participating in political activities (Lutz 1976, pp. 400, 403, 408–9). Their primary focus was on reclaiming educational autonomy for the nation (Lutz 1976, pp. 407–9). Meanwhile, the National Association for the Advancement of Education called upon the coalition government, which included the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), to oversee Christian schools and remove religious courses from the curriculum (Lutz 1976, p. 408). The Chinese educators and students’ sentiments of anti-imperialism and patriotism intensified when the “May Thirtieth Incident” occurred in Shanghai in 1925, in which thirteen Chinese students were shot to death by members of the Shanghai Municipal Police force, composed of British, Sikh, and Chinese police officers (Wang 2019, pp. 582–83). In response, Chinese educators designed new civics textbooks to promote the spirit of national and cultural self-consciousness, with illustrations showing how the Chinese people suffered indignities at the hands of foreigners (Rigdon 2009, p. 202). Meanwhile, many mission school students became active in political campaigns and protests so that they could demonstrate their patriotism by opposing the imperial agents, that is, their own schools (Lutz 1976, p. 409; Wang 2019, p. 583).

As can be seen, a portion of the Restore Educational Rights Movement developed in response to growing discontent with Christianity and missionary schools within society. Nationalists in the 1920s viewed educational rights as integral to national unity and sovereignty, advocating for Chinese authorities to oversee and manage Christian education. It was within this societal and political context that the Peking Ministry of Education issued the “Regulations of Registration” on 16 November 1925, and Ginling encountered the challenge of school registration with the educational authorities.

3. Ginling College during the Period of Registration

3.1. A Brief History of Ginling College

Ginling College was established through the collaborative efforts of five American mission boards, comprising Baptists (North and South), Disciples, Episcopalians, Methodists (North and South), and Presbyterians (North and South). Each of the five boards designated three individuals to sit on the Board of Control, tasked with the oversight of Ginling’s administration. The distribution of funds and the appointments of missionaries were determined by the Ginling College Committee (GCC), based in New York, which held ultimate authority in all matters pertaining to Ginling College. The founders held a vision of nurturing intellectually and spiritually empowered Chinese female leaders who would contribute to the transformation of the nation. To realize this vision, the American missionary faculty at Ginling College employed a dual approach. They imparted rigorous knowledge with high standards and instilled the spirit of Western culture in their students by adopting a liberal arts curriculum and drawing inspiration from the American collegiate model in their educational methods. Smith College, as Ginling’s sister institution, offered annual financial support to the college. Ginling reflects its influence in various ways, such as the observance of U.S. Founders’ Day, in alignment with Smith’s tradition, and the cultivation of a similar welcoming atmosphere reminiscent of Smith (Feng 2009, pp. 2, 9–10, 34). Additionally, Ginling embraced Christian ideals, evident even in the architectural design of its campus buildings, which were configured in the shape of a cross. Matilda Thurston, the founding president of Ginling, worked tirelessly alongside her missionary colleagues to secure funding for the construction of the Ginling campus and define its architectural features. As Ellen Widmer notices, the development of Ginling’s campus revealed how missionary educators implicitly expanded the influence of their religion. Through the incorporation of religious symbols, Christianity played a significant role in shaping Ginling’s culture and character (Widmer 2009, pp. 85, 88–89, 94).

As Ginling College embraced both Christianity and American collegiate culture, it faced criticism from nationalist detractors who labeled it “a foreign enclave on Chinese soil” in the late 1920s (Widmer 2009, p. 89). According to Ginling’s then president, Thurston, many male students and some Chinese educators denounced Ginling for being excessively “foreignized” and questioned its ability to educate women to become good wives. As noted by Ryan Dunch, one way missionaries employed to rationalize offering education to Chinese women was to highlight its role in preparing them for marriage and child-rearing, with a specific focus on their potential as “assistants” to their husbands and “educated Christian mothers” for their children (Dunch 2010, pp. 336–37). Consequently, the accusation that Ginling failed to cultivate good wives would have carried considerable weight. Furthermore, they criticized Ginling students for being excessively “scholarly”, prioritizing their studies, exams, and college requirements over patriotic holidays (Thurston and Chester 1955, p. 71). Ginling’s foreign and Christian affiliations subjected it to heightened pressure from nationalists during the Restore Educational Rights Movement. This context led Ginling to consider conforming to Chinese authorities, specifically seeking government registration.

3.2. The Responses of Ginling to Educational Registration in 1925

Ginling’s stance on school registration was, in general, split between the group of missionaries and the Chinese faculty and students. In the 1925/1926 school year, as reported by Thurston to the GCC, faculty members dedicated substantial time to deliberating the registration issue in different meetings. They also sought the opinions of senior students through informal discussions. Most American faculty at Ginling resisted registration as they found certain regulations unacceptable (Thurston and Chester 1955, p. 57; Feng 2009, pp. 123–24). Regarding the second article of “Regulations of Registration”, which mandated that “such an institution [established by funds contributed from foreigners] prefix to its official name the term ‘Szu lih’ (privately established)”, there was no opposition within the school. Yet, the following four regulations encountered significant resistance.

The third one required that “the President or Principal of such an institution should be a Chinese”. The article offered a concession in its note, suggesting the institution appoint “a Chinese Vice President, who shall represent the institution in applying for recognition”. As indicated below, Ginling was hesitant to comply and delayed the nomination of a Chinese president until 1927. Ginling was not the only Christian college displaying reluctance to cooperate. As an example, Yenching University appointed Wu Lei-chuan (吳雷川), a member of the Hanlin Academy (翰林院) and a prominent Chinese intellectual, as the vice president and chancellor in 1926. However, Yenching afforded Wu Lei-chuan very limited authority within the institution, and he submitted his resignation just two years after his appointment (West 1974, pp. 227, 240).

Article Four stipulated that educational institutions must have “a Board of Managers [of which] more than half of the Board must be Chinese”. Thurston argued that in practice, fulfilling this requirement could hardly be satisfied while maintaining “the basis of Mission presentation” within the committee (Feng 2009, p. 34), given that each of the five boards had had three representatives on the Board of Control since the college’s inception. However, as shown below, Wu Yi-fang proposed a solution that effectively addressed this issue.

Furthermore, Article Five, which stated that “the institution shall not have as its purpose religious proselytization”, posed more significant challenges for the missionaries. According to Thurston’s 1925–1926 annual report, most missionaries were satisfied with the original version of the college’s mission statement, which explicitly articulated the objective of Christianizing China in unequivocal Christian terminology. They resisted any amendments aimed at removing Christian elements from the college’s mission statement (Thurston 1925–1926, p. 5). Additionally, they were hesitant to eliminate the existing requirements for religious activities, such as mandatory attendance at weekday morning prayer, Thursday evening prayer, and Sunday service (Feng 2009, p. 159).

Article Six prohibits mission schools from “including religious courses among the required subjects”. In his letter to the China Christian Educational Association in December 1925, Timothy Tingfang Lew (Liu Tingfang 劉廷芳), a prominent Christian educator trained at Columbia University and Yale Divinity School, explained that the Ministry of Education, the general public, and Chinese educational leaders had reached a consensus, which dictated that educational institutions should focus solely on education, free from the influence of any religion, whether it be Confucianism or Christianity. The practical realization of this objective involved the exclusion of “all religions and required religious courses” from schools. According to Lew, the situation became critical due to Japan’s establishment of schools in Manchuria under the Twenty-one Demands, where Japanese religions and the worship of Japanese Emperors were promoted (Lew 1925, pp. 3–4). Acknowledging this, the request to remove religious courses from the curriculum continued to pose an equally significant challenge for the missionary faculty at Ginling. Dating back to the college’s inception in 1915, the curriculum mandated the completion of ten credits in Religion for graduation (Feng 2009, p. 159). Hence, the majority of missionary faculty resisted compliance with the regulations due to their unwavering commitment to the free promotion of Christianity and the inclusion of mandatory religious courses.

In contrast, the attitude of most Chinese faculty and students toward registration was much more enthusiastic. The majority were willing to comply with these regulations and integrate Ginling into the broader fabric of Chinese society. For instance, during the autumn of 1926, when the Restore Educational Rights Movement spread throughout the country, Ginling students voiced their “demands” for registration to the faculty, although most of the requests were denied as expected.3 Additionally, some students actively engaged in political activities, such as the National Women’s Association led by the Nationalist Party, and organized book clubs according to the “three principles of the people”. They received support from at least one Chinese faculty member who contended that Ginling could not be sustained without permitting students to participate in the movement (Feng 2009, pp. 123–24).

The discord among Ginling faculty prompted the college to postpone its registration until the Nationalist Army captured Nanking in 1927. At this juncture, school registration became a pressing necessity, and Ginling had to appease Chinese nationalistic educators to ensure its survival.

4. The Nanking Incident in 1927 and the Nomination of Wu Yi-fang

The Nationalist Army launched its Northern Expedition from Guangdong Province towards the Yangzi River in July 1926, with the aim of liberating the country from warlords and securing “its rightful place of equality among the nations” (Feng 2009, pp. 113–14). As this campaign inherently opposed foreign privileges in China, party propaganda accused missionary institutions of acting as the mouthpieces and tools of imperialism. During their advance, some soldiers destroyed missionary properties. On 24 March 1927, when the Southern Army entered Nanking, some foreigners were robbed, their residences looted and set ablaze, and tragically, several were killed. Within hours of the troops’ arrival in Nanking, Ginling’s foreign faculty were safely escorted to the University of Nanking, where they waited for the tumultuous situation to subside. However, the following day, persuaded by their Chinese colleagues and students, most of them decided to relocate to Shanghai to escape the turbulent events unfolding in Nanking (Report of Ginling College to the Ginling College Committee 1927, p. 1).

After cross-referencing primary sources such as Ginling’s report to the GCC and Thurston’s monograph, along with secondary sources, I reconstruct the development of events during this tumultuous period as follows: Following the departure of the missionaries to Shanghai, some Chinese faculty and alumnae came together to establish an Administrative Committee, taking charge of the campus’s operations. They employed more Chinese instructors to ensure that classes continued, preventing Ginling from being occupied by the army (Feng 2009, p. 124). The occupation of Nanking by the KMT and the increasing influence of the Chinese faculty within Ginling made it imperative to appoint a Chinese president. On May 11, the Executive Committee of the Board of Control held a meeting in Shanghai. At this meeting, six missionaries, including Thurston, tendered their resignations, motivated by their desire to align with the prevailing spirit of the era and facilitate Ginling’s registration with the government. The committee recognized their dedication but chose not to accept the resignations for the time being. Ginling alumna Zee Yuh-tsung (Xu Yizhen 徐亦蓁),4 a lifelong friend and classmate of Wu Yi-fang who played a significant role in Wu’s conversion to Christianity (He 2016, p. 108), was elected as the chairwoman of the Executive Committee, and they nominated Wu Yi-fang as the new president of Ginling to the Board of Control (Report of Ginling College to the Ginling College Committee 1927, p. 3; Feng 2009, pp. 124, 129).

Wu Yi-fang was a member of Ginling’s first class in 1919. During her studies at the college, she distinguished herself with “excellent academic performance” and “leadership skills”. During the May Fourth Movement of 1919, Wu organized political gatherings, fundraising activities, and demonstrations with her schoolmates (Feng 2009, p. 124). After graduating from Ginling, Wu taught at the Government Higher Normal for Women in Peking for three years and later served as the Head of the English Department. In 1922, she embarked on her studies in Entomology at the University of Michigan, where she was elected as the President of the Chinese Students Association of North America and the Vice President of the Chinese Students and Scholars Association in the USA (He 2016, p. 108). When nominated as Ginling’s new president in 1927, Wu was completing her Ph.D. dissertation in America (Report of Ginling College to the Ginling College Committee 1927, p. 4; Rufus 1942, vol. XLIX; Feng 2009, p. 130). According to Thurston’s testimony, Ginling had anticipated Wu’s return to work in the Department of Biology for some time. However, the pressing necessity of having a Chinese Administrative officer made her appointment as president “urgent”. Thurston suggested that Wu’s training and connections in the USA qualified her for this role (Report of Ginling College to the Ginling College Committee 1927, p. 4).

The members of the Board of Control, voting by correspondence, endorsed the recommendation and forwarded it to the GCC for confirmation. Out of the nineteen voters, sixteen approved the nomination. Among them, Miss Bradshaw recognized that it was time for Ginling to have a Chinese President and acknowledged Wu Yi-fang’s qualifications for the role, including her strong Christian faith, outstanding academic record, and the advantage of having studied abroad. Similarly, Dr. Bowen observed that, given the current circumstances, this step appeared to be both inevitable and essential and also highlighted Wu’s distinguished academic background as contributing to her success. Mrs. L. C. Hylbert also concurred that the ongoing crisis had expedited the need to substitute foreigners with competent Chinese individuals in key executive roles. Among the three members having reservations, Dr. Crawford acknowledged that appointing a Chinese president was inevitable in the current circumstances but proposed subjecting Wu to thorough evaluation and imposing specific restrictions on her trial term of service. It is worth noting that a Chinese member, Dr. Djang Fang, had qualms about nominating a Chinese as president simply “for the sake of being Chinese”. Djang suggested that it might be misunderstood [as] being taking advantage of this present circumstance. It may not measure up to the standard of the past…. Gradual evolution is better than [a] sudden change. May it be possible to invite Miss Wu as vice president for a period of two years in order to readjust herself to this present perplexing condition in China and train her up to take [the] bigger responsibility in the future (Report of Ginling College to the Ginling College Committee 1927, Appendix, 1)?

One Mr. Roberts forthrightly expressed his disapproval of the appointment, arguing that until the finances could be sustained by the Chinese, Ginling should not have a Chinese President nor a Chinese majority on the Board of Control (Report of Ginling College to the Ginling College Committee 1927, Appendix, 2). The correspondence among the members revealed that despite varying viewpoints, there was largely a consensus regarding the pressing necessity to adhere to school registration following the capture of Nanking by the National Revolutionary Army, which had rendered the appointment of a Chinese president indispensable. Following that, the GCC approved the nomination from the Board of Control and appointed Wu on 13 January 1928.

5. The Registration of Ginling College: Pragmatism and Concession

Wu Yi-fang returned to China on 1 June 1928, and one month later, she assumed the presidency of Ginling (Thurston and Chester 1955, p. 66), marking the beginning of a new era for the institution under Chinese leadership. As demonstrated below, Wu successfully alleviated the suspicions of both the GCC and the missionary faculty regarding the registration. In her inauguration speech on 3 November 1928, Wu first expressed her hesitation in accepting the position due to “inadequate training and experience” and gave her pledge to try her utmost to serve Ginling. She expressed her understanding of Ginling’s mission as “educating female leaders to meet the needs of Chinese society and to prepare professions for building modern China” (Wu 1929a, p. 59). Wu suggested that Ginling should carry out its vision through cultivating students’ noble and holistic personalities, which would enable them to be responsible leaders after graduation (Wu 1929a, pp. 58–60). It is noteworthy that in her recollection of Wu’s speech, Thurston said that Wu pledged to serve “the cause of Christian higher education for Chinese women” (Thurston and Chester 1955, p. 67). Interestingly, Thurston added the word “Christian”, which Wu had deliberately omitted in her speech. This omission hinted at Wu’s future work amending Ginling’s statement of purpose, as we will soon see.

Before delving into a discussion of Wu Yi-fang’s contributions to Ginling’s registration, it is valuable to examine the persistent hesitancy of Ginling’s American sponsors regarding the registration process. This viewpoint was evident in the GCC’s inquiry about registration in January 1929, when they questioned whether registration was indeed “indispensable” (Thurston and Chester 1955, p. 68). According to Wu Yi-fang’s letter to Elizabeth R. Bender, the secretary of the GCC in New York, on 2 May, the inquiry was passed to the then vice minister of Education, Wu Lei-chuan, and the Director of Elementary and Secondary Education, King Chu (Zhu Jingchen 朱經農), who was trained at George Washington University and Columbia University and would become President of Cheeloo University (Qilu 齊魯大學) in 1931 (Who’s Who in China: Biographies of Chinese Leaders 1936, p. 62). During their informal consultation with all of Ginling’s faculty members in April 1929, Wu Lei-chuan and Chu affirmed that they would not shut down Ginling but deny some of its privileges if it refused to register. For instance, Ginling could not enjoy exemption from taxes on imported experimental apparatus and equipment. The degrees that Ginling granted would not be accredited by the government, which meant that its graduates could neither apply for government scholarships when studying abroad nor be employed in registered schools (Wu 1929b, p. 2; Thurston and Chester 1955, pp. 68–69). The GCC’s inquiry revealed that while they complied with certain government requirements, such as appointing a Chinese president, they remained hesitant to register Ginling until 1929.

However, the prevailing situation in China at that time compelled the GCC to make additional compromises and adhere to the centralized government’s directives, as shown in Wu’s caution to Bender. After listing the drawbacks of rejecting registration, such as the deprivation of certain privileges, Wu cautioned that Ginling’s enrollment would drop if it insisted on not registering. Three institutions, including Nanking, Shanghai, and Soochow, had already registered, which put them one step ahead of Ginling. Wu indicated that some students had already put pressure on the college to register by asking why it took more time for Ginling than other institutions to get ready to register (Wu 1929b, p. 2). In another letter to Bender, Wu conveyed that the situation became more challenging for Ginling. In the past, Ginling had the distinction of being the sole college admitting girls in the Yangtze Valley. However, with more coeducational institutions now open to women, Ginling’s enrollment was about to decline even further (Wu 1929c, pp. 1–2). Enrollment was critical for the maintenance and development of Ginling, while Wu’s mention of the well-known competition between Ginling and other coeducational Christian colleges would, she felt, prompt the GCC to “see things her way” (Feng 2009, p. 153).

Wu then proposed to alter Ginling’s mission statement. According to her account, Wu Lei-chuan and King Chu pointed out frankly that some terms in the present statement were unacceptable to the government.5 For instance, the phrase “Christian character” would convey only the “propagation of Christianity” to non-Christian educational leaders. The words “under Christian auspices” would also not be approved since the Ministry of Education demanded that religion should have no place in general education. Before attempting to persuade the GCC to delete these terms and accept an alternative statement, Wu emphasized that King Chu was Christian and could fully understand the concerns of Ginling. Chu had dealt with many cases of Christian school registration, which made his advice practical and valuable (Wu 1929b, pp. 1–2). Wu suggested that if the purpose of a college was conserved in “the literal wording” of its mission statement, then Ginling should fight for its constitution rather than cooperate with the government. The real battle for Ginling was, she argued, to preserve its “Christian character”. She quoted Wu Leichuan to explain the rationale behind her argument: while religion is essential to life, Chinese people preferred to preserve it in “the real spirit” rather than in “written words”. Wu Yi-fang claimed that this reflected the general attitude of Chinese, who did not attach “so much significance to words” as Westerners do (Wu 1929b, p. 2). As Feng suggests, Wu Yi-fang placed “pragmatism” over what she considered “American literal-mindedness”. By raising “accidental” cultural differences, she successfully downplayed the fundamental differences between the position of the missionaries and that of the Chinese faculty on registration. In this way, she paved the way for arguing in favor of a new statement (Feng 2009, p. 155).

Following discussions with Wu Lei-chuan and King Chu, the Ginling faculty drafted a new statement and submitted it to the Executive Committee of Ginling’s Board of Control (now renamed the Board of Directors) (Wu 1934):

The purpose of the Board of Directors is to conduct in Nanking a private institution of higher learning for women which shall conform to the highest standards of educational efficiency, promote social welfare and high ideals of citizenship, and develop the highest type of character, in accordance with the original purpose of the five Christian Mission Boards which were its founders (emphasis mine).

(Wu 1929b, p. 3)

In her proposal letter to the GCC, Wu stated that she did not consider the alternative “a compromise”, but rather that it revealed the difference between Western and Eastern conceptions of “the importance of stating literally what one intends to do”, both of which Wu herself could fully appreciate (Wu 1929b, p. 3). Feng Jin suggests that here Wu highlighted her ability to view the problems from both American and Chinese perspectives. Through her distinctive tact and leadership skills, Wu justified the amendments to the statement of purpose and persuaded the American benefactors to choose the right battle, that is, ensuring “the survival and prosperity of Ginling in contemporary China” (Feng 2009, pp. 154–56).

According to Wu’s letter to the Board of Directors, when Ginling presented this new statement to the Council of Higher Education in July 1929, however, the Ministry demanded that Ginling replace the last phrase with “in accordance with the educational policy of the Republic of China and the ordinances of the Ministry of Education”. Ginling’s Executive Committee voted against adopting the suggested phrase, citing concerns about potential changes in government authorities and, consequently, their educational policies. Nevertheless, the Committee agreed to delete the words “the five Christian Mission Boards” but kept them “in accordance with the original aim of the founders”. According to Wu’s explanation, by making some concessions, Ginling showed its willingness to cooperate and left a good impression, which might persuade the Ministry to reconsider the suggested phrase; by keeping the phrase “the original purpose of its founders”, Ginling can preserve “the real meaning” of its mission statement (Wu 1930a, p. 1).

Additionally, the Executive Committee voted to remove the clauses in the Constitution specifying that three-fourths of the Board of Directors, the President, Treasurer, and all others assuming leadership within the College must be “professing Christians”, as suggested by the Ministry of Education’s Division of Higher Education (Wu 1930b, p. 1). Wu reassured the Board of Directors that this was not “a real omission”, since provisions were made in the Constitution stipulating that the election of the Board shall be in alignment with the GCCs agreement. As long as the majority of the Board members were Christians, there would be no need to mandate that the President must also be a Christian (Wu 1930a, p. 2). To garner the Board’s approval for the vote, Wu highlighted how the Ministry had initially imposed additional limitations on the Board’s responsibilities, including placing the election of the treasurer and the appointment of officers and instructors under the President’s decision. Wu candidly communicated to the Ministry her preference for these responsibilities to remain with the Board rather than solely in her hands as President. She hoped that by conveying this, the Ministry would reconsider their demand (Wu 1930a, p. 1). Wu brought up this incident during discussions with the Executive Committee and in her letter to the Board, emphasizing her commitment to not seize authority from the Board. Her aim was to persuade them to consider a modest concession—specifically; the removal of the requirement that both the President and Treasurer must be Christians—as a potential trade-off to avoid compliance with more demanding requests.

While Wu affirmed her commitment to not usurping the Board’s authority, her growing power and autonomy in decision-making can also be seen in the final stages of Ginling’s registration. In her explanatory letter to the GCC on 26 November 1930, she reported the Annual Meeting of the Board of Directors, which was held on 31 October and 1 November. As per Wu, the Board members had endorsed the updated statement of purpose and the removal of the requirement for leaders to be in the Constitution. Nevertheless, when Ginling presented the revised Constitution to the Minister of Education, Chiang Monlin (Jiang Menglin蔣夢麟), he demanded further modifications to the Board’s responsibilities, specifically the centralization of appointment authority in the hands of the President, without any oversight from the Board. Wu again affirmed her lack of intent to seize from the Board, stating, “Personally, I feel that the responsibility is too heavy, but at the present time, there seems to be no other course open”. (Wu 1930b, p. 1) After careful deliberation, the Board chose to navigate around the regulations by appointing a treasurer who would be accountable to the Board while also serving as the College Treasurer. As for the appointment of officers and instructors, this responsibility is now in the hands of the President. Wu assured the GCC that faculty appointments would remain under the control of the GCC, as they would select candidates and grant formal approval for appointments in the USA (Wu 1930b, pp. 1–2).

Moreover, the Minister insisted on another modification to the Board’s composition in Ginling’s by-laws, requiring that Chinese members make up two-thirds of the Board instead of just a simple majority as originally proposed, which was then eleven Chinese members to ten Western missionaries (Thurston and Chester 1955, p. 69). In this context, Wu made a gesture of tribute to the GCC by proposing to change the number of members on the Board of Directors from twenty-one to twenty-four, with eight of them being Westerners. The adjustment both adhered to the government regulation limiting foreign members to one-third of the total and ensured representation from each of the five founding boards. Furthermore, Wu suggested that this change would accommodate one foreign representative from Smith College and two foreign representatives from the four partially cooperating groups (American Church Mission, London Missionary Society, Reformed Church, and the YWCA), with an equal split between Chinese and foreigners (Wu 1930b, p. 1; Feng 2009, pp. 155–56).

In addition, owing to its delay in registration, Ginling was not permitted to keep the Department of Religion nor form a combined Department of Philosophy and Religion but could only offer elective religious courses under the Department of Philosophy. The University of Nanking, by virtue of early registration, had received approval to maintain the Department of Religion (Thurston and Chester 1955, p. 69). Under these circumstances, Wu decided to comply with the Minister’s instructions before receiving official approval from the GCC. In her explanation to the GCC, she recognized … all of these changes in the Constitution and By-laws should be approved by the Ginling College Committee before their final adoption, but as I have stated above, these changes were all recommended by the Government and unless we comply with their instructions, it will be necessary to withdraw our registration. Therefore, the Board voted, authorizing me to complete the final registration of the College (Wu 1930b, p. 2).

Wu’s rhetoric emphasized that the unconventional decision was made due to extreme circumstances. Nevertheless, her bold action in delaying notification to the GCC for 25 days showcased her growing authority in managing Ginling’s affairs. With Chinese members forming the majority, the Board of Directors was now increasingly influenced by Wu.6 Subsequently, the GCC underwent a reorganization, becoming a “separate and independent” board and being renamed the “Board of Founders”. Its role was to provide ongoing “guidance and support” to the College’s work in the field after registration (Wu 1934). However, its previous ultimate authority in making decisions regarding Ginling’s affairs was now placed in the hands of the Board of Directors and Wu herself. Thus, through her skilled negotiations, Wu not only ensured Ginling’s survival and prosperity after the political upheavals in 1927 but also successfully claimed decision-making powers for herself.

According to Thurston’s memorial, Ginling’s registration was accomplished in December 1930, and the atmosphere on campus immediately improved, and student enrollment increased in the next academic year (Thurston and Chester 1955, p. 70). Nevertheless, she also voiced her apprehension regarding the waning Christian influence within Ginling and its shift towards secularism. As previously mentioned, ten credits in Religion were compulsory for graduation upon Ginling’s establishment. However, after registration, the religion department was disbanded, and religious courses were made elective. Previously mandatory daily morning prayers and Sunday services became optional, resulting in fewer than a third of all students attending, and chapel services were integrated with lectures and discussions on current events in society. The demographic makeup also changed significantly, with Christian students declining from a majority to 73.44% in 1931 and further dropping to only 49.58% in 1935. Thurston expressed her deep concern about the “comparative indifference and non-participation of Christian students and faculty in the Christian program” (Feng 2009, pp. 159–61). Hence, it became evident that school registration contributed to the decline of the Christian atmosphere at Ginling.

6. Conclusions

This paper utilizes Ginling College as a case study to scrutinize the influence of education registration on Christian Colleges in China, particularly in the realm of female higher education, from 1925 to 1930. Initially, the missionary faculty and the Ginling College Committee resisted registration due to their insistence on retaining the freedom to promote Christianity and offering compulsory religious courses. However, the Nanking Incident in 1927 forced the evacuation of missionaries and paved the way for the Chinese faculty to assume leadership in the Executive Committee. It was this body that nominated Wu Yi-fang as the first Chinese president.

This paper highlights how Wu’s negotiation strategies were pivotal in facilitating Ginling’s successful registration and its sustained strength. Through her exceptional negotiation skills, Wu effectively downplayed disagreements between the missionaries and the Chinese faculty regarding registration. She successfully persuaded the Board of Directors to adopt a new mission statement that distanced the college from its original purpose of Christianizing China and downplayed its relationship with its Christian founding boards. While Wu acquired the authority to appoint officers and instructors, she portrayed herself as uninterested in power. Her rhetoric reassured the Board of Directors, leading them to grant her more autonomy in decision-making. Additionally, she successfully used the extraordinary circumstances of the time to persuade Ginling College to “approve” the registration, even though it had already been completed. Wu’s contribution to Ginling’s registration underscores how Christian schools and liberal education nurtured the personalities of Chinese female leaders and prepared them for leadership roles. Furthermore, it illustrates how these schools benefited from the accomplishments of their graduates. After Ginling’s registration, Wu’s influence on the college continued, notably during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), the Civil War (1946–1949), and its subsequent integration into Nanjing Normal University in 1952. However, delving extensively into these discussions and exploring Wu’s contributions to female education in China exceeds the current scope of this paper and calls for dedicated further research.