What Can God Do? What Should God Do?
Department of History, Philosophy, and Judaic Studies, Open University of Israel, Ra’anan 4353701, Israel
Religions 2022, 13(12), 1178; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13121178
Submission received: 30 September 2022
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Revised: 29 November 2022
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Accepted: 29 November 2022
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Published: 2 December 2022
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to defend James Sterba’s version (2019) of the logical argument from evil against the existence of God from two objections that have been raised against it: that God cannot “logically” prevent all evils and that the moral requirements that the argument poses for God may not apply to God. I argue that these objections do not refute the claim that God can prevent and should prevent any evil and do not undermine Sterba’s argument from evil to the effect that God does not exist.
Keywords:
God; evil; Sterba; logical argument from evil
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MDPI and ACS Style
Horowitz, A. What Can God Do? What Should God Do? Religions 2022, 13, 1178. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13121178
AMA Style
Horowitz A. What Can God Do? What Should God Do? Religions. 2022; 13(12):1178. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13121178
Chicago/Turabian StyleHorowitz, Amir. 2022. "What Can God Do? What Should God Do?" Religions 13, no. 12: 1178. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13121178
APA StyleHorowitz, A. (2022). What Can God Do? What Should God Do? Religions, 13(12), 1178. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13121178
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