A Framework for Risk Evolution Path Forecasting Model of Maritime Traffic Accidents Based on Link Prediction
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Accident Sample
2.1. Accident Location
2.2. Accident Level
2.3. Type of Accident and Number of Casualties
3. Methods
3.1. Node Importance Calculation Method
- (1)
- Node degree
- (2)
- Betweenness centrality
- (3)
- Closeness centrality
- (4)
- PageRank value
3.2. Traditional Similarity Index Calculation Method
- (1)
- CN index
- (2)
- RA index
- (3)
- Jaccard index
3.3. Node Similarity Index of Node Importance
- (1)
- CN index based on node importance
- (2)
- RA index based on node importance
- (3)
- Jaccard index based on node importance
- (4)
- Area Under Curve (AUC) indicator
3.4. Risk Evolution Path Analysis Framework
4. Risk Evolution Path Analysis
4.1. Accident Risk Factors and Accident Chain Extraction
4.2. Construction of Accident Risk Evolution Model
4.3. Network Node Importance
4.4. Accident Risk Evolution Directed Network Construction
4.4.1. Node Similarity Index Accuracy Comparison
4.4.2. Risk Evolution Directed Network Matrix
4.5. Analysis of Accident Risk Evolution Path Characteristics
- (1)
- In the risk evolution path of grounding accidents, the two risk factors—”improper operation” and “improper route selection”—are directly associated with the occurrence of grounding accidents, with relatively short evolution distances of 1.4605 and 1.5195, respectively. Moreover, over 95% of all identified risk paths pass through the “improper operation” node. These findings indicate that enhancing the operational proficiency of crew members can effectively reduce the likelihood of grounding accidents.
- (2)
- In the case of stranding accidents, the risk factors “improper route selection” and “underestimation of risk” exhibit relatively short evolution distances to the accident node, at 1.6705 and 1.7727, respectively. This suggests that insufficient anticipation of stranding risks and course deviations during navigation are key contributors to such incidents. Therefore, maintaining accurate vessel positioning and avoiding deviations during navigation are essential measures for mitigating stranding accidents.
- (3)
- For collision accidents, multiple risk nodes are directly connected to the collision node with short evolution distances, indicating the diversity of risk factors contributing to such events. This complexity increases the difficulty of prevention and control. Additionally, most risk nodes require only two evolutionary steps to lead to a collision incident, highlighting the rapid progression of risk evolution in such scenarios and the likelihood of swift accident occurrence following risk activation.
- (4)
- In the risk evolution path of fire/explosion accidents, “illegal operation” and “improper on-duty” are associated with relatively short evolution distances to the accident node, measured at 2.0413 and 2.3089, respectively. Furthermore, in other risk paths, the evolution towards fire and explosion incidents often passes through these two risk nodes. Although “lack of management” and “equipment failure” frequently appear in the paths, they are not directly connected to the accident node. This is likely because poor management often induces the emergence of other risk factors, and the coupling of these risks amplifies the overall hazard, eventually leading to fire or explosion events. Consequently, improving ship and crew management practices, as well as refining operational and watchkeeping protocols, are effective approaches to reducing the occurrence of fire and explosion accidents.
- (5)
- In the risk evolution path of collision accidents, the risk nodes “weak safety awareness” and “lookout negligence” exhibit relatively short evolution distances to the collision accident node, measured at 0.533 and 0.5372, respectively. Moreover, negligent lookout is present in the vast majority of collision incidents. Therefore, enhancing crew members’ safety awareness and maintaining proper lookout during navigation are critical measures for reducing the occurrence of collision accidents.
- (6)
- In the case of sinking accidents, ship factors appear with high frequency across the risk paths. The overall evolution distances in sinking accident paths are relatively short, with an average path length of 1.66—the shortest among all accident types. Furthermore, sinking accidents result in the highest fatality rates per incident. Consequently, daily management should prioritize the maintenance of ship structures and the proper stowage and securing of onboard cargo. These measures can effectively prevent scenarios such as unseaworthiness and flooding, which may compromise vessel stability. Simultaneously, improving crew safety awareness and ensuring vigilant watchkeeping can facilitate the early detection of anomalies and interruption of risk propagation, thereby reducing the likelihood of sinking incidents.
- (7)
- In the risk evolution path of wind damage accidents, the “heavy wind and waves” factor shows a relatively short evolution distance to the accident node, at 2.3853. Due to the inherent nature of such accidents, the risk evolution paths are relatively simple and concentrated, with the vast majority of paths passing through the “heavy wind and waves” node before leading to a storm-related accident. From the perspective of risk evolution, storm-related accidents are comparatively easier to prevent. Timely forecasting and early warning of extreme weather, along with avoiding navigation under heavy sea and strong wind conditions, are effective strategies to mitigate the occurrence of such incidents.
- (8)
- For other accidents, the risk factor “weak safety awareness” has the shortest evolution distance to the accident node, measured at 0.4663. This is closely related to the nature of these accidents, which typically involve injuries or fatalities during crew operations. Such incidents are often directly linked to insufficient safety awareness and inadequate use of protective measures. Therefore, strengthening safety awareness training for crew members is an effective approach to preventing these types of accidents.
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
- Fu, S.S.; Yu, Y.R.; Chen, J.H.; Xi, Y.T.; Zhang, M.Y. A framework for quantitative analysis of the causation of grounding accidents in arctic shipping. J. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 2022, 226, 108706. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Shu, Y.Q.; Han, B.Y.; Song, L.; Yan, T.; Gan, L.X.; Zhu, Y.X.; Zheng, C.M. Analyzing the spatio-temporal correlation between tide and shipping behavior at estuarine port for energy-saving purposes. J. Appl. Energy 2024, 367, 123382. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Xin, X.R.; Liu, K.Z.; Li, H.H.; Yang, Z.L. Maritime traffic partitioning: An adaptive semi-supervised spectral regularization approach for leveraging multi-graph evolutionary traffic interactions. J. Transp. Res. Part C Emerg. Technol. 2024, 164, 104670. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Gan, L.Q.; Gao, Z.Y.; Zhang, X.Y.; Xu, Y.; Liu, W.R.; Xie, C.; Shu, Y.Q. Graph neural networks enabled accident causation prediction for maritime vessel traffic. J. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 2025, 257, 110804. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Chen, X.; Wu, S.B.; Shi, C.J.; Huang, Y.G.; Yang, Y.S.; Ke, R.M.; Zhao, J.S. Sensing Data Supported Traffic Flow Prediction via Denoising Schemes and ANN: A Comparison. IEEE Sens. J. 2020, 20, 14317–14328. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Chen, X.Q.; Wei, C.X.; Xin, Z.G.; Zhao, J.S.; Xian, J.F. Ship Detection under Low-Visibility Weather Interference via an Ensemble Generative Adversarial Network. J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2023, 11, 2065. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Yu, Y.R.; Liu, K.Z.; Fu, S.S.; Chen, J.H. Framework for process risk analysis of maritime accidents based on resilience theory: A case study of grounding accidents in Arctic waters. J. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 2024, 249, 110202. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Wan, C.P.; Liu, Y.F.; Wu, B. Study on risk identification and accident evolution mechanism of maritime traffic accidents based on complex network. J. Saf. Sci. Technol. 2023, 19, 165–171. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Ziaul, H.M.; Michael, A.S.; Hyungju, K.; Ilan, A. Predicting maritime accident risk using Automated Machine Learning. J. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 2024, 248, 110148. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Hu, S.P.; Li, F.M.; Xi, Y.T.; Wu, J.J. Novel Simulation on Coupling Mechanism of Risk Formation Segments for Marine Traffic System. J. Basic Sci. Eng. 2015, 23, 409–419. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Liu, K.Z.; Yu, Q. A systematic analysis for maritime accidents causation in Chinese coastal waters using machine learning approaches. J. Ocean Coast. Manag. 2021, 213, 105859. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Bye, R.J.; Aalberg, A.L. Maritime navigation accidents and risk indicators: An exploratory statistical analysis using AIS data and accident reports. J. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 2018, 176, 174–186. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Yan, K.; Wang, Y.H.; Jia, L.M.; Wang, W.H.; Liu, S.L.; Geng, Y.B. A content-aware corpus-based model for analysis of marine accidents. J. Accid. Anal. Prev. 2023, 184, 106991. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
- Zhou, D.Y.; Hu, F.N.; Chen, J. Robustness analysis of power system based on a complex network. J. Power Syst. Prot. Control 2021, 49, 72–80. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Yue, R.T.; Li, J.W.; Han, M. Aviation accident causation analysis based on complex network theory. J. Trans. Nanjing Univ. Aeronaut. Astronaut. 2021, 38, 646–655. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Shao, F.B.; Li, K.P. A Complex Network Model for Analyzing Railway Accidents Based on the Maximal Information Coefficient. J. Commun. Theor. Phys. 2016, 66, 459–466. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Hong, W.T.; Clifton, G.; Nelson, J.D. Railway accident causation analysis: Current approaches, challenges and potential solutions. J. Accid. Anal. Prev. 2023, 186, 107049. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Jiao, L.D.; Luo, Q.D.; Hao Lu, H.; Huo, X.S.; Zhang, Y.; Wu, Y. Research on the urban rail transit disaster chain: Critical nodes, edge vulnerability and breaking strategy. Int. J. Disaster Risk Reduct. 2024, 102, 104258. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Yang, Y.L.; Jin, L.H.; Bo Shao, B.; Chen, S.; Jiang, X.; Chen, Y. Research on causes of coal mine fire and explosion based on complex network. China Saf. Sci. J. 2023, 33, 145–151. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Wei, M.; Xu, J.G. Assessing road network resilience in disaster areas from a complex network perspective: A real-life case study from China. Int. J. Disaster Risk Reduct. 2024, 100, 104167. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Yang, J.F.; Wang, P.C.; Liu, X.Y. Analysis on causes of chemical industry accident from 2015 to 2020 in Chinese mainland: A complex network theory approach. J. Loss Prev. Process Ind. 2023, 83, 105061. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Cao, D.Q.; Cheng, L.H. Risk accumulation assessment method for building construction based on complex network. J. Eng. Constr. Archit. Manag. 2025, 32, 1522–1545. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Wang, L.D. Dynamic risk assessment of hybrid hydrogen-gasoline fueling stations using complex network analysis and time-series data. Int. J. Hydrogen Energy 2023, 48, 30608–30619. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Sui, Z.Y.; Wen, Y.Q.; Huang, Y.M.; Song, R.X.; Piera, M.A. Maritime accidents in the Yangtze River: A time series analysis for 2011–2020. J. Accid. Anal. Prev. 2023, 180, 106901. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Deng, J.; Liu, S.Y.; Shu, Y.Q.; Hu, Y.C.; Xie, C.; Zeng, X.H. Risk evolution and prevention and control strategies of maritime accidents in China’s coastal areas based on complex network models. J. Ocean Coast. Manag. 2023, 237, 106527. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Ma, J.; Wan, J. Multiplitudinous correlations in the causative relationship assessment of human errors. J. Saf. Environ. 2017, 17, 2257–2262. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Ma, J.; Wan, J. Research on human factor accident based on link prediction. J. Chem. Pharm. Res. 2014, 6, 1433–1440. [Google Scholar]
- Gan, L.X.; Ye, B.Y.; Huang, Z.Q.; Xu, Y.; Chen, Q.H.; Shu, Y.Q. Knowledge graph construction based on ship collision accident reports to improve maritime traffic safety. J. Ocean Coast. Manag. 2023, 240, 106660. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Liu, H.D.; Wu, C.J.; Li, B.; Zong, Z.C.; Shu, Y.Q. Research on Ship Anomaly Detection Algorithm Based on Transformer-GSA Encoder. J. IEEE Trans. Intell. Transp. Syst. 2025, 1–12. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Weng, J.X.; Yang, D. Investigation of shipping accident injury severity and mortality. J. Accid. Anal. Prev. 2015, 76, 92–101. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Chen, J.H.; Bian, W.T.; Zheng Wan, Z.; Wang, S.J.; Zheng, H.Y.; Cheng, C. Factor assessment of marine casualties caused by total loss. Int. J. Disaster Risk Reduct. 2020, 47, 101560. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Chen, F.Y.; Lei, S.Y.; Wei, Y.C. Risk analysis of construction accidents with a weighted network model considering accident level. J. Qual. Reliab. Eng. Int. 2022, 39, 1–22. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Xiao, Q.; Fan Luo, F. Safety Risk Evolution of Amphibious Seaplane During Takeoff and Landing——Based on Complex Network. J. Complex. Syst. Complex. Sci. 2019, 16, 19–30. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Zhu, D.R.; Wang, H.F.; Wang, R.; Duan, J.D.; Bai, J. Identification of Key Nodes in a Power Grid Based on Modified PageRank Algorithm. J. Energ. 2022, 15, 797. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Li, Y.L.; Zhou, T. Local Similarity Indices in Link Prediction. J. Univ. Electron. Sci. Technol. China 2021, 50, 422–427. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Yu, Y.; Wang, Y.G.; Luo, Z.G.; Yang, Y.; Wang, X.K.; Tao, G.; Qian, Y. Link prediction algorithm based on clustering coefficient and node centrality. J. Tsinghua Univ. (Sci. Technol.) 2022, 62, 98–104. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Gao, Y.; Yanping Zhang, Y.P.; Qian, F.L.; Zhao, S. Combined with Node Degree and Node Clustering Coefficient of Link Prediction Algorithm. J. Chin. Comput. Syst. 2017, 38, 1436–1441. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Tom, F. An introduction to ROC analysis. J. Pattern Recognit. Lett. 2003, 27, 861–874. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
Type | Node Number | Node | Node Number | Node |
---|---|---|---|---|
Human factors | 1 | Weak safety awareness | 11 | Drowsy driving |
2 | Improper operation | 12 | Lookout negligence | |
3 | Captain’s failure to perform | 13 | Illegal operation | |
4 | Unfamiliar hydrological environment | 14 | No early avoidance | |
5 | Underestimation of risk | 15 | Driving without caution | |
6 | Improper route selection | 16 | Unused safe speed | |
7 | Insufficient skill level | 17 | Improper on-duty | |
8 | Inexperienced | 18 | Poor communication | |
9 | Drunk driving | 19 | Improper avoidance measures | |
10 | Improper anchoring method | 20 | Improper emergency response | |
Ship factors | 21 | Not displaying the AIS signal | 27 | Improper cargo stowage |
22 | Overload | 28 | Lack of maintenance | |
23 | Unairworthiness | 29 | Equipment failure | |
24 | Unballasted | 30 | Device missing | |
25 | Insufficient watertightness of the cabin | 31 | Unsealed cabin trimming | |
26 | Ship compartment flooding | 32 | No signal type shown | |
Environmental factors | 33 | Heavy wind and waves | 36 | Poor visibility |
34 | Complex navigation environment | 37 | Rainstorm | |
35 | Unfavorable water flow | 38 | Lack of warnings and lighting | |
Management factors | 39 | Failure to implement main responsibility | 43 | Lack of training |
40 | Insufficient shore-based support | 44 | Understaffed | |
41 | Incompetent crew | 45 | Lack of management | |
42 | Lack of rules and regulations | 46 | Lack of emergency drills | |
Accident type | 47 | Grounding | 51 | Collision |
48 | Stranding | 52 | Sinking | |
49 | Contact | 53 | Wind damage | |
50 | Fire/ Explosion | 54 | Other |
Serial Number | Time | Type | Accident Chain |
---|---|---|---|
1 | 2 April 2015 | Sinking | Insufficient watertightness of the cabin—Ship compartment flooding—Sinking |
2 | 11 June 2015 | Collision | Lookout negligence—No early avoidance—Collision |
3 | 24 July 2015 | Other | Weak safety awareness—Other |
4 | 17 April 2016 | Fire/Explosion | Equipment failure—Underestimation of risk—Fire/Explosion |
5 | 5 October 2016 | Contact | Driving without caution — Weak safety awareness—Contact |
6 | 31 December 2017 | Collision | Unused safe speed—Driving without caution—Lookout negligence—No early avoidance—Collision |
7 | 29 July 2018 | Grounding | Incompetent crew—Device missing—Insufficient skill level—Grounding |
8 | 9 April 2019 | Stranding | Lookout negligence—Complex navigation environment—Underestimation of risk—Stranding |
9 | 5 July 2020 | Fire/Explosion | Equipment failure—Improper on-duty—Fire/Explosion |
10 | 2 June 2021 | Sinking | Lack of management—Underestimation of risk—Heavy wind and waves—Sinking |
Serial Number | Degree | Betweenness Centrality | Closeness Centrality | Pagerank Value | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Node Number | Value | Node number | Value | Node Number | Value | Node Number | Value | |
1 | 12 | 33 | 12 | 0.084867 | 12 | 0.726027 | 12 | 0.059338 |
2 | 1 | 33 | 1 | 0.08364 | 1 | 0.726027 | 1 | 0.058595 |
3 | 13 | 32 | 13 | 0.068689 | 13 | 0.716216 | 13 | 0.056326 |
4 | 2 | 30 | 17 | 0.054446 | 2 | 0.697368 | 2 | 0.051428 |
5 | 5 | 28 | 5 | 0.046187 | 5 | 0.679487 | 5 | 0.045726 |
6 | 17 | 26 | 33 | 0.045794 | 17 | 0.6625 | 17 | 0.037438 |
7 | 33 | 24 | 2 | 0.042661 | 33 | 0.638554 | 33 | 0.032926 |
8 | 29 | 23 | 6 | 0.039557 | 6 | 0.630952 | 29 | 0.032111 |
9 | 20 | 23 | 23 | 0.034172 | 20 | 0.630952 | 20 | 0.03137 |
10 | 7 | 22 | 45 | 0.026698 | 29 | 0.630952 | 45 | 0.029854 |
CN | D.CN | PR.CN | BC.CN | CC.CN | |
Degree | PR | Betweenness Centrality | Closeness Centrality | ||
AUC | 0.7785 | 0.7707 | 0.7589 | 0.7301 | 0.7813 |
Optimize ratio (%) | / | −0.78 | −1.96 | −4.84 | 0.28 |
RA | M.RA | ||||
Degree | PR | Betweenness Centrality | Closeness Centrality | ||
AUC | 0.7956 | 0.8176 | 0.8170 | 0.7641 | 0.7749 |
Optimize ratio (%) | / | 2.20 | 2.14 | −3.15 | −2.07 |
Jac | M1.Jaccard | ||||
Degree | PR | Betweenness Centrality | Closeness Centrality | ||
AUC | 0.6542 | 0.6888 | 0.6486 | 0.6230 | 0.6967 |
Optimize ratio (%) | -- | 3.46 | −0.56 | −3.12 | 4.25 |
Jac | M2.Jaccard | ||||
Degree | PR | Betweenness Centrality | Closeness Centrality | ||
AUC | 0.6542 | 0.6661 | 0.6521 | 0.6344 | 0.6651 |
Optimize ratio (%) | / | −0.78 | 1.19 | −0.21 | −1.98 |
Serial Number | Grounding | Stranding | Contact | Fire/Explosion | ||||
Path | Distance | Path | Distance | Path | Distance | Path | Distance | |
1 | 2–47 | 1.4605 | 5–48 | 1.6705 | 1 | 1–49 | 13–50 | 2.0413 |
2 | 6–47 | 1.5195 | 6–48 | 1.7727 | 12 | 12–49 | 12–13–50 | 2.2763 |
3 | 1–2–47 | 1.7093 | 12–5–48 | 1.9391 | 13 | 13–49 | 17–50 | 2.3089 |
4 | 12–2–47 | 1.7112 | 23–5–48 | 2.0714 | 5 | 5–49 | 5–13–50 | 2.3545 |
5 | 13–2–47 | 1.7327 | 45–5–48 | 2.0964 | 2 | 2–49 | 23–13–50 | 2.3921 |
6 | 33–2–47 | 1.7786 | 29–5–48 | 2.1439 | 6 | 6–49 | 45–13–50 | 2.4139 |
7 | 5–2–47 | 1.7946 | 1–12–5–48 | 2.1652 | 17 | 17–1–49 | 43–13–50 | 2.4884 |
8 | 23–2–47 | 1.8347 | 16–5–48 | 2.1896 | 23 | 23–12–49 | 16–13–50 | 2.4955 |
9 | 45–2–47 | 1.858 | 35–5–48 | 2.2116 | 45 | 45–1–49 | 1–12–13–50 | 2.5024 |
10 | 7–47 | 1.882 | 17–12–5–48 | 2.219 | 20 | 20–49 | 41–13–50 | 2.5721 |
Average path distance | 2.8780 | 3.3376 | 1.8511 | 3.6577 | ||||
Serial number | Collision | Sinking | Wind damage | Other | ||||
Path | Distance | Path | Distance | Path | Distance | Path | Distance | |
1 | 1–51 | 0.533 | 13–52 | 0.4298 | 33–53 | 2.3853 | 1–54 | 0.4663 |
2 | 12–51 | 0.5372 | 17–52 | 0.4861 | 5–53 | 2.5058 | 13–54 | 0.5103 |
3 | 13–51 | 0.5832 | 33–52 | 0.5022 | 1–33–53 | 2.6962 | 33–54 | 0.5963 |
4 | 5–51 | 0.7159 | 1–52 | 0.5265 | 17–33–53 | 2.7701 | 5–54 | 0.6264 |
5 | 2–51 | 0.7303 | 5–52 | 0.5275 | 12–5–53 | 2.7744 | 2–54 | 0.639 |
6 | 17–1–51 | 0.8128 | 2–52 | 0.5381 | 23–33–53 | 2.853 | 12–13–54 | 0.7453 |
7 | 6–12–51 | 0.8595 | 23–52 | 0.5908 | 45–5–53 | 2.9316 | 17–1–54 | 0.7462 |
8 | 23–12–51 | 0.8773 | 20–52 | 0.6638 | 13–1–33–53 | 2.9436 | 20–54 | 0.7883 |
9 | 45–1–51 | 0.8943 | 12–13–52 | 0.6648 | 29–5–53 | 2.9792 | 7–54 | 0.8234 |
10 | 20–51 | 0.9009 | 7–52 | 0.6934 | 16–5–53 | 3.0249 | 45–1–54 | 0.8277 |
Average path distance | 1.8001 | 1.6600 | 3.9360 | 1.7439 |
Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content. |
© 2025 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Share and Cite
Liu, S.; Deng, J.; Xie, C. A Framework for Risk Evolution Path Forecasting Model of Maritime Traffic Accidents Based on Link Prediction. J. Mar. Sci. Eng. 2025, 13, 1060. https://doi.org/10.3390/jmse13061060
Liu S, Deng J, Xie C. A Framework for Risk Evolution Path Forecasting Model of Maritime Traffic Accidents Based on Link Prediction. Journal of Marine Science and Engineering. 2025; 13(6):1060. https://doi.org/10.3390/jmse13061060
Chicago/Turabian StyleLiu, Shaoyong, Jian Deng, and Cheng Xie. 2025. "A Framework for Risk Evolution Path Forecasting Model of Maritime Traffic Accidents Based on Link Prediction" Journal of Marine Science and Engineering 13, no. 6: 1060. https://doi.org/10.3390/jmse13061060
APA StyleLiu, S., Deng, J., & Xie, C. (2025). A Framework for Risk Evolution Path Forecasting Model of Maritime Traffic Accidents Based on Link Prediction. Journal of Marine Science and Engineering, 13(6), 1060. https://doi.org/10.3390/jmse13061060