Risk Assessment and Virological Monitoring Following an Accidental Exposure to Concentrated Sabin Poliovirus Type 3 in France, November 2018
Centre National de Référence des Entérovirus et Parechovirus, WHO National Poliovirus Laboratory, Institut des Agents Infectieux, Groupement Hospitalier Nord, Hospices Civils de Lyon, 69317 Lyon, France
Santé publique France, 94410 Saint Maurice, France
Public Health Emergency Operations Centre, Division of Surveillance and Health Security, General Directorate for Health, Ministry of Solidarity and Health, 75350 Paris, France
Laboratoire Virpath, Centre International de Recherche en Infectiologie (CIRI), Université de Lyon, Inserm U1111, CNRS UMR 5308, ENS de Lyon, UCBL, 69372 Lyon, France
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Vaccines 2020, 8(2), 331; https://doi.org/10.3390/vaccines8020331
Received: 9 June 2020 / Revised: 19 June 2020 / Accepted: 19 June 2020 / Published: 22 June 2020
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Vaccination and Public Health: Optimizing Vaccine Uptake through the Application of Social and Behavioral Science Theory, Principles, and Strategies)
The safe and secure containment of infectious poliovirus (PV) in facilities where live PV are handled is the condition to achieve and maintain poliomyelitis eradication. Despite precautions to minimize the risk of release of PV from such facilities to the environment, breaches of containment have already been documented. Here, we report the management of an incident that occurred on 30 November 2018 in a French vaccine manufacturing plant. Five adequately vaccinated operators were exposed to a Sabin poliovirus type 3 (PV3) spill. A microbiological risk assessment was conducted and the operators were monitored for PV shedding. On day 5 after exposure, Sabin PV3 was detected only in the stool sample of the most exposed worker. Shedding of Sabin PV3 (as detected by viral culture) was restricted to a very short period (less than 15 days). Monitoring of this incident was an opportunity to assess the relevance of our national response plan. We concluded that the measures undertaken and reported here were appropriate and proportional.