Abstract
Civil defence shelters constitute an essential component of safety systems in emergency situations. The aim of this article is to assess the modernization potential of existing civil defence shelters in Poland, using a representative facility located in Olsztyn (Poland) as a case study. The analysis is based on a review of the current legal framework and identification of legislative gaps that affect the implementation of effective protective solutions. Within the case study, a detailed technical assessment of the protective structure was carried out, focusing on construction, protection against radiation and contamination, fire safety, and user ergonomics. Based on this assessment, a comparative analysis was performed between the surveyed facility and current as well as proposed technical requirements. The results revealed partial compliance with regulations while identifying significant deficiencies. To address these issues, measures such as replacing ventilation units with modern systems featuring automatic control, installing EI120-certified doors, improving emergency exit dimensions, and adding emergency lighting were proposed. Subsequently, risks associated with modernization were identified in accordance with ISO 31000. The findings highlight the need for systematic modernization of existing protective structures, clarification of legal regulations, and increased investment, which are key conditions for improving civilian safety.
1. Introduction
Collective protection facilities can be divided into temporary shelter areas and protective structures, the latter including shelters and hideouts. In the context of a rapidly changing geopolitical situation, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, protective structures are regaining importance as a key element of critical infrastructure [1,2]. The armed conflict beyond Poland’s eastern border, rising international tensions, and increasing risks of natural disasters and civil threats make the provision of safe spaces for the population a priority for national and local policies. This aligns with global trends aimed at enhancing the resilience of built structures to extreme impacts, as highlighted in the literature, which emphasizes the necessity for comprehensive modernization and adaptation of existing infrastructure in the face of increasing risks associated with military threats and natural disasters [3,4,5,6,7]. This study is the first systematic compliance and risk-based modernization assessment of Polish civil defence shelters under evolving regulations. Specifically, it integrates current legal provisions with the draft technical requirements applicable to protective structures in Poland, offering a unified compliance-and-risk framework. The approach is readily transferable to other facilities by tailoring the compliance checklist (legal/technical criteria) and adjusting the risk evaluation parameters to local construction typologies and operational contexts. Recent studies emphasize advanced approaches to blast resistance and protective coatings for civil structures. Rehman et al. [8] analyzed blast-induced damage in tunnels using 3D finite element modelling, while Leite et al. [9] investigated polyurea coatings to enhance building blast protection. Despite the growing need to ensure adequate protection conditions for society, the current state of shelter infrastructure in Poland remains insufficient. According to a report by the State Fire Service (PSP), published by the Supreme Audit Office (NIK) in January 2024, only about 4% of Poland’s population had access to places in shelters and hideouts. Moreover, the report revealed that as many as 80% of urban residents were unaware of the location of the nearest shelter relative to their place of residence [10]. Under the Act of 5 December 2024 on Civil Protection and Civil Defence, it is currently required to provide places in all collective protection facilities for at least half of the urban population (including at least 25% in protective structures—shelters and hideouts) and for a minimum of 25% of the population outside city limits (including at least 15% of the projected civilian population) [11]. Due to non-compliance with these requirements, Poland has implemented the Civil Protection and Civil Defence Program (OLiOC) for 2025–2026, allocating over €1.0 billion to local government units [12]. One of the primary objectives of the program is to counteract the progressive degradation of protective structures. Most existing facilities are in poor technical condition, and some pose a risk to health and life. According to published studies [13,14,15], inadequate operational conditions and material ageing significantly reduce the resistance of structures to dynamic loads and explosions. Therefore, modernization measures are necessary to restore functionality and ensure compliance with applicable regulations. In cases where the technical condition of facilities prevents adaptation, demolition and construction of new structures should be considered.
2. Background
2.1. Evolution of Civil Defence Regulations
Different countries adopt varying approaches to sheltering, which is reflected in legal frameworks, technical standards, and the availability of protective infrastructure [16,17,18]. Shelter engineering in Poland began in wartime during the early 20th century when threats to civilians emerged. Polish designers initially drew on German experience, while during the Cold War (1947–1991) technical solutions were improved using Soviet documentation [19,20]. Domestic factories produced essential equipment for these facilities, such as hermetic doors and filter-ventilation units, although their number was insufficient [21]. For decades, protective structures were marginalized in Poland’s spatial planning and public investment system. Large-scale construction was planned only during periods of heightened national defence readiness, using reinforced concrete prefabricates typical of large-panel building technology. Between 1944 and 1989, their construction was mandatory in public buildings and workplaces. However, after the political transformation of the 1990s, many were degraded, repurposed, or completely dismantled [22]. Following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, military threats were replaced by natural disasters and terrorism. This shift introduced a new perspective on hazards and led to the enactment of the Crisis Management Act [23]. At the same time, many defence-related legal acts were repealed without replacement, resulting in a lack of continuity in civil defence policy and vague regulations. Consequently, a significant portion of existing facilities no longer meets modern technical and functional standards. In response to the deteriorating condition of protective structures, in 2012 the Chief Commander of the State Fire Service established a team to develop the “Concept of Directions for Protective Construction in Poland” [24]. The document was officially approved by the Ministry of the Interior and Administration in 2017 [25]. Based on this, in 2018 the “Guidelines on the Management of Protective Construction Resources” were issued [26]. This document had internal applicability only and did not impose obligations on private entities. The timeline of the evolution of protective construction regulations in Poland is presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1.
Timeline of the evolution of regulations concerning protective construction in Poland. Source: own work.
2.2. Current and Proposed Legal Regulations
For a long time, Poland lacked comprehensive and consistent legal regulations concerning protective construction. Only recent events have prompted policymakers to take legislative action in this area. The Homeland Defence Act of 2022 was the first to generally indicate the need to develop a civil protection system, including shelter infrastructure, but it did not include detailed provisions regarding protective structures [27]. The Act of 5 December 2024 on Civil Protection and Civil Defence introduced definitions of protective structures and specified obligations related to their design, maintenance, and registration [11]. However, many aspects remain unclear—particularly regarding responsibility for financing, maintenance, and management of protective structures. Ownership issues and related obligations also remain problematic [28]. Following this, implementing regulations were issued, including those on the criteria for recognizing building structures as protective structures [29] and on the Central Register of Civil Protection and Civil Defence Resources [30]. These documents set new standards for structural resistance, airtightness, technical equipment, and rules for operation and maintenance, as well as methods of registration.
2.3. The Importance of Protective Structures and Legislative Gaps
Tracing the history of protective structures in Poland clearly shows how their development depends on geopolitical and technological contexts, state policy, and the evolution of national and international legal regulations. It is noteworthy that during periods of heightened threat and political tension, interest in protective structures increases. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Poland began paying particular attention to protection against such incidents. In the public sector, the construction of shelters ceased due to the lack of legal foundations in this area. Although legislation concerning protective structures has recently been developed, there is still a shortage of implementing acts that would specify technical conditions for their use. Only a draft regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration on technical conditions and operational requirements for protective structures has been prepared, but it has not yet been officially adopted or published [31]. This situation makes it impossible to clearly define technical standards for protective structures and creates difficulties in assessing the compliance of existing facilities with requirements, resulting in interpretative discrepancies in design, modernization, and operation.
3. Materials and Methods
The aim of this article is to conduct a systematic analysis of the possibilities for modernizing existing shelters in Poland (using as an example a facility located in the city of Olsztyn, PL) considering current and proposed technical regulations. Particular attention is focused on the analysis of structural integrity, airtightness, fire protection, filtration and ventilation systems, and user ergonomics. A key issue addressed by the authors is the assessment of the extent to which shelters built in the second half of the 20th century can be adapted to contemporary civil protection standards. It is also essential to determine the scope of modernization and organizational measures required to ensure their full functionality and user safety.
The study adopts an interdisciplinary approach, combining a review of literature, standards, and legal acts with an analysis of design documentation, on-site inventory, and technical assessment of the facility.
The scope of the work includes an analysis of a protective structure which—due to its construction solutions, equipment, and intended use typical of its era—can be considered representative of most shelters built in Poland during the second half of the 20th century. The analysis begins with an evaluation of the compliance of the facility’s technical and operational aspects with the Regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration of 21 February 2025 on the criteria for recognizing building structures as protective facilities, as well as the Draft Regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration on technical requirements for protective structures and conditions for their use. To ensure transparency, each requirement was scored on a 0–10 compliance scale, where 0 denotes full non-compliance, 10 full compliance, and intermediate values reflect partial fulfilment or uncertainty. Scores were assigned by the authors using a standardized checklist derived from the current regulation and the draft technical regulation, supported by on-site measurements, inventory photos, and archival documentation, to reduce subjectivity and increase transparency. Based on this evaluation, conclusions were drawn regarding the modernization potential of this shelter and similar facilities, along with recommendations for designers, managers, and decision-makers concerning future modernization directions and legislative needs.
4. Protective Structure in Poland—Case Study
4.1. Characteristics of the Inventoried Protective Structure
As part of the preliminary assessment of protective infrastructure in Poland, the resources of protective structures were analyzed using the city of Olsztyn, PL as an example. According to publicly available records, the city contains 61 shelters, including 40 designated for residents with a total capacity of 3395 people and 21 for workplaces accommodating 2890 people. This means that only about 3.78% of the city’s population has access to shelter space, as shown in Figure 2. Such a level of civil protection is inconsistent with legal requirements (at least 25% of the city’s population should have a secure place) [11]. The total area of these facilities amounts to 6.871 m2, while the usable area is estimated at 4511.6 m2. Most of them were built in the 1940s and 1950s, with the oldest dating back to 1926. Its last modernization took place in 1992 [32].
Figure 2.
(a) Location of the city of Olsztyn (Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship, Poland), (b) Situation regarding the availability of shelters for the civilian population in Olsztyn. Source: own work.
For the purpose of the analysis, an inventory was carried out for one of the facilities located in the city centre. The shelter under consideration is situated in the underground part of a multi-family residential building (Figure 3). The building has four above-ground floors and two staircases located on the courtyard side. Its height, measured from ground level to the roof surface, is 14.40 m.
Figure 3.
Multi-family residential building with underground shelter infrastructure. Source: own photograph.
The inventoried shelter is dual-purpose, as it currently houses tenant storage rooms. The inventory survey indicates that its total area is 93.78 m2, while the usable area is 58.91 m2. The total area includes all rooms measured along the internal outline, whereas the usable area covers only those parts directly serving users, namely the shelter chambers and sanitary facilities. According to data from the previously cited public register, the facility is intended for 79 people. The structure was built in 1958. It is equipped with an RM-150 filter-ventilator (Poland) with both electric and manual drive, as well as four FP-75 filter-absorbers (Poland) (see Figure 4, left). An important functional element is the air intake, which takes the form of an emergency exit tunnel ending with an escape shaft (see Figure 4, right). The layout of the shelter rooms in the inventoried protective structure is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 4.
Filter-ventilation unit and emergency exit shaft in the surveyed protective structure. Source: own photographs.
Figure 5.
Plan of shelter rooms in the surveyed protective structure (all dimensions are given in cm). Source: own work.
Structurally, the vertical protective zones consist of external walls with a thickness of 85 cm (courtyard side) and 55 cm (street side), as well as internal walls ranging from 25 cm to 51 cm, made of solid ceramic brick with cement mortar. An emergency exit tunnel leads from the shelter room to the courtyard. The tunnel walls are made of solid ceramic brick with a thickness of 51 cm. Partition walls are 12 cm thick, also made of solid ceramic brick. Beneath the walls are reinforced concrete strip footings approximately 30 cm thick, and under the escape shaft, a reinforced concrete slab about 20 cm thick. The horizontal protective zones consist of monolithic reinforced concrete slab ceilings above the basement, approximately 45 cm thick, supported along the perimeter by load-bearing walls. In the escape shaft, the ceiling is a reinforced concrete slab 20 cm thick.
As a result of the inventory and review of documentation, it was found that the shelter is in good technical condition; however, it requires several significant repairs. To determine specific actions, an attempt was made to compare this facility with current standards and draft regulations, which constitutes the core of this article.
4.2. Analysis of Compliance with Current and Proposed Requirements
The review of existing technical documentation made it possible to determine information regarding the original layout of the facilities, their intended purpose, equipment, and changes that occurred during their use. Regulatory thresholds cited in this study (e.g., EI120/120 min for fire resistance and K ≥ 100 for radiation protection) are derived from the Regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration of 21 February 2025 and from the draft Regulation on technical conditions for protective structures and their use [29,31].
The analysis began with a comparative assessment of the inventoried shelter in Olsztyn (PL) against the current requirements set out in the Regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration of 21 February 2025 on the criteria for recognizing building structures as protective structures [29], as presented in Table 1.
Table 1.
Comparative analysis of the condition of the surveyed shelter against the current requirements set out in the Regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration of 21 February 2025 on the criteria for recognizing building structures as protective structures [29].
The comparative analysis was supplemented with an assessment of the degree of compliance, allowing a visual identification of which requirements are met. Additionally, the requirements presented in Table 1 were grouped into four categories: structural integrity and mechanical resistance, protection against radiation and contamination, fire resistance, and ergonomics and evacuation. This classification enables a synthetic evaluation of the facility’s compliance with regulations from a functional perspective. The average compliance level for each category was calculated by converting the 0–10 compliance scores from Table 1 and Table 2 into percentage values, averaging them within the category, and presenting the results graphically in Figure 6.
Table 2.
Comparative analysis of the condition of the surveyed shelter against the requirements specified in the draft Regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration on technical conditions for protective structures and their use [31].
Figure 6.
Compliance level by category: structure, radiation, fire, ergonomics, based on the Regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration on criteria for recognizing building structures as protective structures. Source: own work.
Currently, there is only a draft regulation on technical requirements for protective structures and their operational conditions—the regulation has not been officially adopted [31]. Consequently, it is difficult to determine whether a given structure fulfils the function of a shelter, a hideout, or a temporary refuge, as defined in the Act of 5 December 2024 on Civil Protection and Civil Defence. The regulation on criteria for recognizing buildings or their parts as protective structures specifies resistance categories, dividing them into shelters—S-0, S-1, S-2, S-3—and hideouts U-1, U-2, U-3. It does not include information on temporary refuges. In contrast, the draft technical requirements distinguish the following resistance categories for protective structures:
- shelters of category P with basic resistance,
- shelters of category A with enhanced resistance,
- hideouts of category III, i.e., fragmentation protection,
- hideouts of category II,
- hideouts of category I (the highest resistance among the listed hideouts).
Despite these legislative gaps, the authors decided to refer to the draft regulation, comparing the elements of the inventoried facility with the provisions contained therein (Table 2).
The requirements presented in Table 2, similarly to those in Table 1, were grouped into the same four categories: structural integrity and mechanical resistance, protection against radiation and contamination, fire resistance, and ergonomics and evacuation, and are graphically illustrated in Figure 7.
Figure 7.
Compliance level by category: structure, radiation, fire, ergonomics, based on draft Regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration on technical conditions for protective structures and their use. Source: own work.
Based on the compliance analysis with the Regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration of 21 February 2025 on the criteria for recognizing buildings or their parts as protective structures (Table 1), the inventoried facility meets the requirements for shelters and can be classified as category S-0 (basic resistance). In relation to the categories according to the designed technical conditions (Table 2), the described protective structure can be classified as category P (basic resistance), with modernization potential to category A after eliminating non-compliances (ventilation, fire resistance, ergonomics).
Considering the above classification and based on the compliance analysis of the inventoried shelter with the current and proposed technical requirements, it was concluded that the facility demonstrates significant modernization potential. Most structural, spatial, and protective requirements have been met. Particular attention was paid to the load-bearing walls made of solid ceramic brick (thickness up to 51 cm) and the monolithic reinforced concrete ceiling slabs. During the inspection, no major mechanical damage or deformations compromising the structural integrity or usability of the facility were observed. At the same time, several non-compliances and areas requiring technical intervention were identified.
The most critical issues concern:
- filtration and ventilation systems,
- the fire resistance rating of the existing doors—which is not confirmed in archival documentation and is only estimated based on door type and installation period
- inadequate dimensions of the emergency exit tunnel.
The proposed technical regulations introduce more stringent ergonomic and spatial requirements, which are not fully met by the analyzed facility. This necessitates adaptation or obtaining formal exemptions during the modernization process. In the following section of this paper, specific modernization measures are proposed.
4.3. Assessment of Modernization Potential
Based on the technical compliance analysis of the inventoried shelter with current and proposed requirements, it is possible to identify specific modernization measures that will enable the facility to meet contemporary civil protection standards. These measures cover structural, installation, and operational aspects, and their implementation can significantly enhance the functionality and safety of the facility. The main modernization areas and technical actions are presented in Table 3.
Table 3.
Main areas of modernization and technical measures in the surveyed protective structure.
It is worth noting that the contemporary approach to the modernization of protective infrastructure should consider not only safety and technical aspects but also the principles of sustainable development [33]. This means striving to minimize the negative impact on the natural environment, ensuring efficient resource use, and integrating facilities with the social and urban context [34,35,36]. Taking these aspects into account, modernization should include the use of low-carbon materials, the application of renewable energy sources, recycling, and the reuse of structural components. Equally important is the integration of facilities into urban space by adapting them for everyday use [37]. Such modernization aligns with global climate goals and sustainable development policies. In the long term, it can contribute to reducing operating costs, increasing resilience to climate change, and improving the quality of life for users.
The implementation of modernization measures listed in Table 3 will not only ensure compliance with formal requirements but, above all, provide real safety for the users of the protective structure. Modernization should be carried out in stages, taking into account available financial resources and priorities resulting from risk identification, which will be discussed in detail in the following section.
5. Risk Management Aspects in Shelter Modernization
In the process of modernizing protective structures, it is crucial to apply a risk management-based approach. Considering risk enables better investment decision-making, as well as cost optimization and increased public trust in the civil protection system. In Poland, the commonly adopted risk management approach follows the ISO 31000 standard, with its Polish equivalent being PN-ISO 31000:2018 [38]. According to this standard, the following stages are distinguished:
- establishing the context (purpose, scope),
- risk assessment (identification, analysis, and evaluation of risk),
- risk treatment (responding to risk).
Based on the compliance analysis of the shelter with current and proposed technical regulations, risks associated with its use in emergency situations have been identified. These risks were divided into three groups: technical, spatial and structural, and legislative, as illustrated in Figure 8.
Figure 8.
Identified risks in the surveyed shelter resulting from non-compliance with requirements. Source: own work.
The risk identification carried out reveals key areas requiring modernization. This makes it possible to plan actions in a phased, cost-effective manner and focus on elements that have the greatest impact on user safety. It also allows for assessing the risks associated with implementing modernization works. Improper fastening of equipment, insufficient fire resistance, or malfunctioning filtration and ventilation systems can pose threats to the health and lives of shelter occupants, limiting the protective function of the facility. Inadequate dimensions of doors and the emergency exit tunnel, as well as excessively low communication corridors, may hinder or even prevent rapid evacuation, consequently increasing the risk of panic and injuries. Incomplete technical documentation and legislative gaps create difficulties in clearly classifying the facility as a shelter or a hideout, leading to delays in the modernization process and in obtaining financial resources.
In the next step, a qualitative risk assessment was carried out in accordance with PN-ISO 31000:2018. Each risk was rated on two dimensions—probability (P) and consequence (C)—using a 1–5 ordinal scale, where 1 denotes very low likelihood or minor impact, and 5 denotes very high likelihood or severe impact on life safety or modernization feasibility. These ratings were derived from:
- technical condition observations during on-site inventory,
- expert judgement based on design documentation and operational context.
Risk level determined by the product PxC and classified as low (1–6), medium (7–12), or high (13–25), which is a widely accepted partitioning for 5 × 5 matrices because it: preserves a balanced spread of outcomes across the grid, differentiates clearly between risks with immediate life-safety implications (red zone) and those manageable within planned modernization (yellow/green zones), and supports transparent, replicable prioritization. The resulting ratings are presented in Table 4, and their distribution is visualized in Figure 9, enabling clear prioritization of technical, spatial, and legislative risks.
Table 4.
Qualitative risk ratings for the analyzed shelter.
Figure 9.
Risk matrix for the nine identified risks (T—technical, S—spatial/structural, L—legal). Source: own work.
The highest risk relates to malfunctioning filtration and ventilation systems (, ), which directly affects occupant safety. Medium/high risks include insufficient fire resistance of doors and inadequate emergency exit dimensions, while medium risks concern emergency lighting, equipment anchorage, and geometric constraints. Legislative and documentation gaps were rated as medium or low/medium, as they primarily impact the modernization process rather than immediate life safety.
Through systematic risk identification, designers can address hazards already at the conceptual stage of modernization, facility managers gain knowledge of necessary corrective actions, and decision-makers receive arguments for developing more precise technical regulations.
6. Discussion, Summary and Recommendations
The conducted analysis confirmed that a significant portion of existing civil defence buildings in Poland, despite the passage of time, possesses real modernization potential. The examined facility meets most requirements regarding structural resistance and radiation protection; however, deficiencies were identified in filtration and ventilation systems, fire resistance, and evacuation ergonomics. These issues are typical for many such facilities, which calls for comprehensive action. Modernization should be carried out in stages, also based on risk analysis, focusing on elements with the greatest impact on user safety. Incorporating sustainable solutions, such as low-emission materials and renewable energy sources, will not only enhance the resilience of protective structures but also align them with contemporary environmental and social standards.
Protective construction in Poland faces numerous barriers, including legislative gaps, limited funding, and low public awareness. Integrating protective structures with urban infrastructure poses both design and organizational challenges. Additionally, the need to adapt existing facilities to new threats requires an interdisciplinary approach and cooperation between designers, administration, and emergency services.
7. Conclusions
- The existing protective infrastructure in Poland demonstrates modernization potential, allowing for its adaptation to contemporary standards instead of requiring complete demolition.
- Key areas requiring improvement include ventilation systems, fire resistance, and pevacuation solutions, which have a direct impact on user safety.
- Future protective structures should be designed as multifunctional and integrated with urban infrastructure.
- Legislative gaps and imprecise legal regulations constitute a significant barrier; therefore, clarifying them is essential.
- Systematic modernization, supported by risk analysis, is an important element in creating efficient and fully functional protective facilities.
The recommendations formulated in this study are intended to support designers, facility managers, and decision-makers in the development and modernization of contemporary, durable, and multifunctional structures that meet current safety and regulatory requirements. It should be emphasized, however, that the present research is based on a single case study, which does not allow for a quantitative assessment of the effectiveness of the proposed evaluation framework. Although the results confirm the methodological feasibility and practical applicability of the approach, further investigations involving a larger and more diverse sample of facilities are required to enable a robust statistical validation of its reliability, reproducibility, and external validity.
A critical review of the available literature indicates that, to date, no comprehensive and systematic framework has been established for assessing the modernization needs of Polish civil defence shelters that simultaneously integrates regulatory compliance analysis with a structured, risk-based assessment, while accounting for both current and forthcoming legal requirements. By addressing this methodological gap, the present study proposes an integrated approach that combines technical condition assessment, regulatory compliance verification, and multi-criteria risk evaluation. In doing so, it provides a coherent and evidence-based foundation for prioritizing modernization measures and supports more informed, transparent, and defensible decision-making processes in the field of civil defence infrastructure management.
Author Contributions
Conceptualization, M.T.; methodology, M.A.J. and M.T.; software, M.A.J.; validation, M.A.J. and M.T.; formal analysis, M.A.J.; investigation, M.A.J. and M.T.; resources, M.A.J. and M.T.; data curation, M.A.J.; writing—original draft preparation, M.A.J. and M.T.; writing—review and editing, M.A.J. and M.T.; visualization, M.A.J. and M.T.; supervision, M.A.J. and M.T.; project administration, M.A.J. and M.T. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding
This research received no external funding.
Institutional Review Board Statement
Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement
Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement
Data are contained within the article.
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
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