The Analysis of Social and Situational Systems as Components of Human Errors Resulting in Navigational Accidents
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Marine Safety in Relation to Human Errors and Their Root Causes: Background, Literature Review and the Concept of Social and Situational Systems
2.1. Marine Safety as a Goal of Formal Organizations
- Implement a structured approach to the proper consideration of the human element.
- Conduct a comprehensive review of selected existing IMO instruments.
- Promote and communicate a maritime safety culture across the marine environment.
- Encourage the development of non-regulatory solutions.
- Implement a system to identify and disseminate human factor analysis and research.
- Provide educational material for seafarers on human factor issues.
2.2. Human Errors as Causes of Incidents
- Cargo ships—in more than 80% of cases, the human factor was the leading cause or at least a component.
- Fishing vessels—56.5% of accidents were related to human factors.
- Passenger ships—65.4%.
- Specialist, service vessels—65.5%.
- Other ships—71.1%.
2.3. Review of the Literature
2.4. Social and Situational Systems
2.5. Ship Safety: Training in Social and Situational Systems
- Collision and resulting oil spill. At dawn on 7 October 2018, approximately 15 nautical miles north of Cap Corse, in international waters, the ro-ro vessel, Ulysse, bound for Radès (Tunis), struck the starboard side of the unloaded Cypriot-flagged container ship, CSL Virginia, at anchor. Shortly after the collision, bunker fuel leaked from the damaged tank into the sea. The following conclusions are drawn from the report:
- The collision resulted from a lack of watchkeeping on the vessel m/v Ulysse and an unreasonable anchoring position by CSL Virginia.
- On the m/v Ulysse, the lack of proper observation was due to the lack of involvement of the officer on watch, who was occupied with his mobile phone. He was sitting in front of an unusable radar, depriving himself of the opportunity to make observations and correctly assess the situation. Using a second operational radar would have given him all the information he needed to evaluate the situation. Moreover, the place where he was sitting was lowered, which did not allow him to see the horizon line correctly.
- COLERG procedures and regulations were not carried out on both vessels.
- The situational factor was the main component that caused the collision. There were other factors involved such as boredom, routine, and monotony associated with the length of periods at sea, which certainly affected the commitment of watch officers to their duties [67].
- 2.
- Cruise ship incidents A blackout and loss of main engine power occurred on the cruise ship, Viking Sky, as it sailed towards Stavanger, Norway, in strong winds and very rough seas. According to maritime lawyer Jim Walker, the focus of Viking Sky’s accident report was whether the ship had any valid reason to sail during such bad weather conditions. In addition, Norwegian officials determined that low oil levels caused the engine to fail. Both social and situational factors led to the accident [68].
- 3.
- Fires on vessels lead to navigation difficulties or even vessel loss. According to statistics, almost 75% of such fires are caused by a simple error of the people working on the vessel. Twelve passengers went missing in a Greece ferry fire on Euroferry Olympia, near Corfu. A company representative stated that the fire started from a truck on the car deck. At the same time, relatives of the 12 missing were concerned and complained to the shipowner about the “miserable conditions” that prevailed on the Euroferry Olympia: there were not enough cabins and the ship was not designed for trucks, adding that the vessel was dirty and had bugs. Thus, again, a combination of both social and situational factors led to the accident [69].
- 4.
- Commercial fishing vessel accidents and navigation. The U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics collects information on occupations and lists commercial fishing as the most dangerous of all professions. From rough weather to falling overboard to being struck by heavy equipment, working on a fishing boat can harm workers in many ways. Working on a fishing vessel means long, hard hours; exposure to cold weather; and the risk of accidents and injuries. Fatigue is common, especially if workers are not allowed breaks to which they are entitled. A lack of adequate protective equipment against cold and wet weather can also be problematic as fishermen can experience hypothermia or frostbite. The Seiner capsized, causing the deaths of four fishermen. An investigation revealed that the boat was unsuitable for the rough waters in which it was operating, which is considered negligent. The boat should never have gone into these waters, and someone made a bad judgment in deciding to send it out. Four workers paid for this mistake with their lives. Social and situational factors played a part in this unfortunate incident [70].
- 5.
- Accidents on tugboats related to the maneuvering of vessels. Sometimes, accidents occur due to tugs’ visibility being blocked by larger ships. Additionally, human error on the skipper’s part can lead to unwanted and unexpected incidents. Two crew members died after CMA CGM Simba’s tugboat capsized [70]. The maneuver in which CMA CGM Simba’s departure plan was discussed between the pilot and Captain Domingue before commencement was too general. During the maneuver, no one on board CMA CGM Simba monitored the tug’s position. This accident resulted from a social system factor, the captain–pilot–tug skipper relationship, and a situational factor: failure to adapt the type of tug to the situation [71].
- 6.
- Explosions as a cause of accidents on tankers and cargo ships. The very nature of the materials carried on tankers is dangerous. Most ship fires and explosions are the result of human negligence. The fire on board the container ship, X-Press Pearl, which lasted for several days, appeared to be out of control after the explosion. According to Bloomberg, Sri Lankan authorities feared a severe oil spill. The vessel transported 1486 containers, including 25 tons of nitric acid and other chemicals. According to the Sri Lankan Navy, the fire was caused by chemicals on the Singapore-flagged container ship. The general manager of container ship operator MV X-Press Pearl confirmed that the vessel crew carrying the chemicals was aware of the spill. He added that Qatar and India had refused permission to unload the leaking container before a fire broke out on the vessel. The fire consumed most of the cargo, contaminating the surrounding waters and a long stretch of beaches, and the ship sank. There were undisputed social and situational errors [72].
- 7.
- Stranding of a ship. This type of marine accident has a significant impact not only on the ship’s hull but also on the entire ocean area around the incident. For the Shoei Kisena ship accident in the Suez Canal, the vessel’s owner argued that the Suez Canal Authority (SCA) was at fault for allowing the ship to enter the waterway during poor weather. Ahmed Abu Ali, a member of the legal team, told Reuters that the authorities had failed to prove any fault of the vessel. The evidence that was presented to the court showed disagreements between SCA pilots and its control center over whether the ship should enter the canal. Shoei Kisen suggested that the vessel should have been accompanied by at least two tugs suitable for the size of the vessel [73]. Thus, again, an unfortunate set of situational and social errors occurred.
- 8.
- Maritime accidents due to drugs and alcohol. Drug abuse is a severe problem across the world and, in the marine industry, it can cause irreversible damage. If the crew members abuse psychoactive substances or alcohol, this can result in unpredictable behavior and lead to an accident. The Dutch-registered general cargo vessel, Ruyter, ran aground off the north coast of Rathlin Island in the UK. An investigation revealed that Ruyter ran aground because no action was taken to correct the deviation from the ship’s intended track. According to the safety management system records, the shipowner should have arranged alcohol testing of the crew. However, the investigation found no evidence that alcohol testing was ever carried out on the vessel. Once again, we are confronted with problems inherent in social and situational systems as components of human error, resulting in navigational accidents [74].
- 9.
- Navigational accidents are indirectly linked to cargo-handling operations, which are integral to ship operations. One of the leading causes of crane accidents for loading and unloading marine cargoes is operator error. One known example happened when workers onshore were unloading aluminum bars from a ship using a crane. The workers were inexperienced in using a particular lifting system and needed to secure the load better. As the crane operator moved the load towards the quay, they struck the worker on the ground and killed him. A pattern of situational and social errors can be considered a cause of this accident [75].
- 10.
- Accidents in shipyards, where ship assembly and welding accidents are common, may spare workers’ lives but limit their overall ability to work. Similarly, the continuous inhalation of toxic fumes also becomes another cause of shipyard accidents [76].
- 11.
- Marine accidents on dive support vessels. Suppose a dive support vessel is not fully operational and the crew is not adequately qualified. In this case, they cannot effectively supervise and direct the entire operation, which can lead to a severe accident. In one documented case, a large steel frame, known as a cursor, fell from a height of two meters, trapping the rigger and resulting in fatal crush injuries to his chest. Following an investigation, the company noted the following:
- The control system was not fully commissioned before its use.
- The company’s internal project management systems were not fully utilized.
- Communications and reporting lines within the project team and with offshore and onshore management were neither fully utilized nor understood.
- Design intentions and pre-commissioning requirements for the safe operation of the new equipment had not been adequately communicated to the work team.
- There were no secondary means of securing the active cursor.
- A decision was taken to work under the cursor. The hazard of working under a suspended load was not recognized as it was not a typical load suspended from a crane [77].
- 12.
- Accidents on barges occur mainly because of their specific design and maneuvering capabilities. These problems can be caused by the inexperience of the person at the barge’s helm or by the improper use of mooring lines. Other causes involving severe injuries while working on board a barge include the following:
- Explosions, suffocation, and hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy caused by hazardous and noxious fumes and gases.
- Crushing while bunkering or mooring with a tug.
- Trips and falls due to cluttered decks and workspaces [78].
3. Materials and Methods
- Analysis of selected incidents at sea.
- Development of the Ishikawa diagram for the selected problem.
- Determining the importance of each cause.
- Diagram construction based on the stratification analysis and defining the main causes of incidents.
3.1. Analysis of the Causes of Maritime Accidents
3.2. Ishikawa Diagram
- Object-oriented, used when the effect is analyzed, e.g., of poor product quality, related to technical and organizational aspects, divisible into sub-components;
- Technological, considered by the list of technical process operations;
- Participating factors, which can be used at any stage and level of the investigation of the quality of a process or event.
- Man—every aspect of a person’s work, including routine, inexperience, monotony, and fatigue.
- Machine—whether it is working correctly, whether every part is in working order, whether it needs calibration, etc.
- Method (method/technology)—whether the process is as intended, whether the steps are performed correctly, whether the sequence of steps is optimal, etc.
- Material—hidden or visible material defects, product dimensions, missing holes, problems at the supplier, etc.
- Measurement—whether measurements have been carried out correctly, whether measuring instruments are operational and legalized, etc.
- Mother nature (environment)—what effect does the environment have on the process/event, i.e., humidity, temperature, lighting, but also, e.g., noise, dust?
- Management—whether the management of employees and crews is adequate and appropriate to the conditions, whether employees are given proper guidelines, etc.
- Maintenance—whether the maintenance of the machine and its components, facility, tools, networks, pipelines, etc., is being neglected.
- Product—physical aspects of the product.
- Price.
- Promotion—a type of promotion/advertisement.
- Place—place/location/environment.
- Process.
- People.
- Psychical evidence—physical aspects of customer interaction sites.
- Performance—results compared to the competition.
- Surroundings—surroundings, environment.
- Suppliers—suppliers, sub-suppliers.
- Systems—processes.
- Skills—staff skills.
- Each cause and sub-cause is assigned an appropriate weight.
- The absolute values of the sub-cause weights are determined.
- The Ishikawa diagram is completed with sub-weights [89].
4. Results
- Definition of first- and second-order causes.
- Definition of the relative weights of the causes at each level.
- Definition of the absolute value of the individual sub-cause weights.
- Stratification analysis.
- Definition of a set of critical causes.
- Wa.sn—Absolute weighting of sub-causes of n order,
- Wr.i.c.—Relative importance of the main cause,
- Wr. sn—Relative weighting of sub-causes of n order.
5. Discussion
- Problems of non-compliance with certified systems and reliability on port inspection, with too few inspections and errors in delegation.
- A whole range of components of situational and social systems, for example, stress in life caused by an external stimulus, worker fatigue that can be a consequence of awkward posture, too much strain on the hands, etc. Strenuous hydrometeorological and meteorological conditions and noise can also cause perceived pain, affecting one’s ability and efficiency in activities performed, exacerbating frustration and errors due to the desire to meet deadlines and speed up action. Illness or death of a loved one, lack of personal space, and social expectations are also examples of this.
- A lack of regular reviews.
6. Conclusions
- Improve safety culture.
- Improve training programs.
- Implement formal competence assessment programs.
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
IAEA | - | International Atomic Energy Agency |
IMO | - | International Maritime Organization |
ILO | - | International Labour Organisation |
IASCS | - | International Association of Ship Classification Societies |
ISM | - | International Safety Management Code |
HFACS-MA | - | Classification System Maritime Accidents |
SMAIC | - | Composition of the Commission and Commission Experts |
MAIB | - | Marine Accident Investigation Branch |
STCW | - | International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping |
SCA | - | Suez Canal Authority |
MLC | - | Maritime Labour Convention |
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Environment | Human | Machine | Management | Other Factor | Total | Ratio of Weight to Sum of Weights | Validity of Factors | |
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Environment | X | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.75 | 1.5 | 0.150 | 4B |
Human | 0.75 | X | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.75 | 3.0 | 0.300 | 1A |
Machine | 0.75 | 0 | X | 0.25 | 0.75 | 1.75 | 0.175 | 3B |
Management | 0.75 | 0.5 | 0.75 | X | 0.75 | 2.75 | 0.275 | 2A |
Other factor | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | X | 1.0 | 0.100 | 5B |
Total | 10 | 1.000 |
Main Causes | Sub-Causes of the First, Second, and Third Levels |
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Sub-Cause | Absolute Weight | Accumulated Weight | Reference Field |
---|---|---|---|
4.1.2. Non-compliance with certified system(s) | 0.206 | 0.206 | 11.124 |
4.4.2. Port inspections | 0.165 | 0.371 | 19.663 |
2.2. Inappropriate situational system | 0.150 | 0.521 | 27.092 |
2.2.1.2. Perceived pain | 0.150 | 0.671 | 34.221 |
2.1. Adverse social system | 0.150 | 0.821 | 41.050 |
4.2.3. Inadequate monitoring | 0.138 | 0.959 | 46.991 |
3.1.2. No regular inspections | 0.131 | 1.090 | 52.320 |
2.1.1.1. Expectation of punctuality | 0.125 | 1.215 | 57.105 |
2.1.1.2. Expectation of speed | 0.125 | 1.340 | 61.640 |
2.1.2. Life stresses | 0.125 | 1.465 | 65.925 |
2.2.1. Employee fatigue | 0.125 | 1.590 | 69.960 |
2.2.2. Stress caused by an external stimulus | 0.125 | 1.715 | 73.745 |
4.2.1. Errors in the delegation of tasks | 0.115 | 1.830 | 76.860 |
1.1. Adverse meteorological conditions | 0.113 | 1.943 | 79.663 |
2.1.2.1. Death of a loved one | 0.113 | 2.056 | 82.240 |
2.2.3.2. Hand strain | 0.113 | 2.169 | 84.591 |
2.2.3.3. Uncomfortable posture | 0.113 | 2.282 | 86.716 |
4.2. Errors in the management of the ship’s crew | 0.103 | 2.385 | 88.245 |
2.1.3. Social role | 0.099 | 2.484 | 89.424 |
2.2.1.3. Strenuous hydrometeorological conditions | 0.099 | 2.583 | 90.405 |
2.2.2.2. Noise | 0.099 | 2.682 | 91.188 |
2.1.2.2. Illness of a close relative | 0.090 | 2.772 | 91.476 |
2.2.2.4. Personal space | 0.088 | 2.860 | 91.520 |
3.1. Improper operation | 0.088 | 2.948 | 91.388 |
3.2. Ship failures | 0.088 | 3.036 | 91.080 |
2.1.1. Social pressure | 0.075 | 3.111 | 90.219 |
4.1. Voyage planning errors | 0.069 | 3.180 | 89.040 |
4.1.1. Incomplete documents | 0.069 | 3.249 | 87.723 |
2.2.2.3. Lighting | 0.062 | 3.311 | 86.086 |
4.3. Incomplete ship operating report | 0.058 | 3.369 | 84.225 |
5.1. Cargo shifting | 0.058 | 3.427 | 82.248 |
4.4.3. Flag state inspections | 0.055 | 3.482 | 80.086 |
4.4.1. Internal audits by the company or external audits by the charterer | 0.055 | 3.537 | 77.814 |
2.1.1.3. Expectation of responsibility | 0.050 | 3.587 | 75.327 |
2.2.1.1. Long working hours | 0.050 | 3.637 | 72.740 |
2.2.2.1. Air quality | 0.050 | 3.687 | 70.053 |
2.2.3. Ergonomic aspects | 0.050 | 3.737 | 67.266 |
2.2.3.4. Annoying vibrations | 0.050 | 3.787 | 64.379 |
4.4. Inaccurate inspection of the ship | 0.046 | 3.833 | 61.328 |
2.1.2.3. Harm (own) | 0.045 | 3.878 | 58.170 |
3.1.1. Non-compliance of operational activities with the requirements of the company and IMO regulations | 0.044 | 3.922 | 54.908 |
3.2.2. Loss of hull tightness | 0.044 | 3.966 | 51.558 |
1.2. Adverse hydrographical conditions | 0.038 | 4.004 | 48.048 |
2.1.2.5. Risk of dismissal | 0.038 | 4.042 | 44.462 |
3.2.4. Main engine failure | 0.035 | 4.077 | 40.770 |
5.2. Drifting wreck | 0.025 | 4.102 | 36.918 |
2.2.3.1. Repetitiveness of activities | 0.025 | 4.127 | 33.016 |
3.2.5. Failure of automatic equipment | 0.025 | 4.152 | 29.064 |
3.2.7. Damage to pipelines and fittings | 0.025 | 4.177 | 25.062 |
3.2.3. Damage to the deck equipment | 0.023 | 4.200 | 21.000 |
4.2.2. Inadequate staff appraisal system | 0.023 | 4.223 | 16.892 |
5.3. Terrorist attack | 0.017 | 4.240 | 12.720 |
2.1.2.4. Loneliness | 0.015 | 4.255 | 8.510 |
3.2.6. Failure of auxiliary machinery in the engine room | 0.012 | 4.267 | 4.267 |
3.2.1. Damage to the navigation system | 0.010 | 4.277 | 0.000 |
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Kasyk, L.; Wolnowska, A.E.; Pleskacz, K.; Kapuściński, T. The Analysis of Social and Situational Systems as Components of Human Errors Resulting in Navigational Accidents. Appl. Sci. 2023, 13, 6780. https://doi.org/10.3390/app13116780
Kasyk L, Wolnowska AE, Pleskacz K, Kapuściński T. The Analysis of Social and Situational Systems as Components of Human Errors Resulting in Navigational Accidents. Applied Sciences. 2023; 13(11):6780. https://doi.org/10.3390/app13116780
Chicago/Turabian StyleKasyk, Lech, Anna Eliza Wolnowska, Krzysztof Pleskacz, and Tomasz Kapuściński. 2023. "The Analysis of Social and Situational Systems as Components of Human Errors Resulting in Navigational Accidents" Applied Sciences 13, no. 11: 6780. https://doi.org/10.3390/app13116780
APA StyleKasyk, L., Wolnowska, A. E., Pleskacz, K., & Kapuściński, T. (2023). The Analysis of Social and Situational Systems as Components of Human Errors Resulting in Navigational Accidents. Applied Sciences, 13(11), 6780. https://doi.org/10.3390/app13116780