Types of Knowledge Transferred Within International Interfirm Alliances in the Nigerian Oil Industry and the Potential to Develop Partners’ Innovation Capacity

Abstract

This study focuses on exploring the nature of inter-organizational learning and the types of knowledge that are transferred/shared between foreign multinational companies (MNCs) and their local partner firms within international interfirm alliances in developing countries, particularly those operating in the Nigerian oil industry. The aim is to identify/examine the types/quality of knowledge transfer and the viability of interfirm knowledge transfer for boosting the knowledge base and innovation capacity of the alliance partner firms, particularly of the local partner firms, in such a distinctive type of international alliances. Using a qualitative case study research method, four cases of international interfirm collaborative arrangements between foreign and local companies in the Nigerian oil industry were studied. The findings of this study show that the local partner firms in the alliances were able to access and acquire mainly technological and international market knowledge through the collaborations, but not managerial knowledge. Contrary to the extant theory/literature, the foreign partner firms did not seek to acquire local market knowledge from the local firms but clearly demonstrated “knowledge transfer willingness” that facilitated the acquisition of knowledge by the local firms in the alliances. However, the technological and international market knowledge acquired by local firms were limited to mainly the explicit dimension of the knowledge. In effect, the local partners in this study mainly acquired explicit technological and international market knowledge with limited tacit knowledge. A key implication of this finding can be a reduced ability to develop innovation capacity through alliances. This paper, therefore, highlights the necessity for an increased focus on tacit knowledge acquisition by local partner firms and the importance of utilizing appropriate learning mechanisms to achieving tacit knowledge acquisition through the collaborations.

1. Introduction

The literature on business, economics, and management is awash with “knowledge” as a major topic of research and analysis (e.g., Rammal et al., 2023; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Godin, 2006; Brenner, 2007). The importance of “knowledge” as a strategic resource and a basis of innovation in firms has also been abundantly emphasized in the literature (e.g., Grant, 1996a; Inkpen, 2008; Fores & Camison, 2016; Boadu et al., 2018; Park et al., 2022). Consequently, learning and knowledge transfer, both within a firm and between firms, is seen as a source of superior performance and competitive advantage for firms (e.g., Yang et al., 2008; Gamble, 2020). Particularly, interfirm collaborative arrangements, such as strategic alliances and networks, are seen as important vehicles through which firms access, acquire, transfer, share, and/or exploit knowledge resources that are otherwise unavailable within the firm (e.g., Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; Inkpen, 1998; Lavie, 2006; Sammarra & Biggiero, 2008; C.-S. Kim & Inkpen, 2005).

Until recently, strategic alliances and opportunities for the learning/acquisition of knowledge through them have been largely utilized by firms in the advanced industrialized countries of the West, transitional countries of the East, and newly industrialized countries in Asia. The use of strategic alliances in the less developed countries (LDCs) of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was limited mainly to few joint venture arrangements formed between state-owned enterprises and multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in those countries (see, e.g., Beamish, 1988). However, since recent times, local indigenous firms in LDCs, particularly those from sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), are increasingly relying on collaborative arrangements with foreign firms from more developed industrialized countries to access and/or acquire knowledge and skills (e.g., see Okonkwo, 2018; Ado et al., 2017; Osabutey et al., 2014; Narteh, 2008). As the local firms are often constrained by low levels of skills and technologies, which makes internal knowledge development very difficult, it is assumed that collaborating with foreign firms provides the local firms with an opportunity to leverage their partners’ knowledge bases in order to develop their own capacities and enhance their competitiveness (Narteh, 2008; Okonkwo, 2018). Yet, these types of interfirm collaborations in LDCs and the learning that takes place in them have been described as very “asymmetric” due to divergent motives of collaboration and divergent intentions of learning between the partners (Okonkwo, 2018; Tsang, 1999). It remains to be ascertained whether or not strategically valuable knowledge is transferred or acquired through such “asymmetric” collaborative arrangements.

Although a large amount of studies exist on alliance learning and knowledge transfer in the literature (e.g., Hamel, 1991; Mowery et al., 1996; Pérez-Nordtvedt et al., 2008; Lawson & Potter, 2012; Park et al., 2015; Kohtamäki et al., 2023), with a growing number of them focusing on developing countries (e.g., Kale & Anand, 2006; Osabutey et al., 2014; Ado et al., 2017; Okonkwo, 2018), we know little or nothing about the nature or types of knowledge/skills that are transferred in this type of developed–developing country interfirm collaborations, particularly those operating in SSA. No studies—neither conceptual nor empirical—have focused on identifying and evaluating the nature, types, and/or quality of knowledge/skills that are transferred in this type of asymmetric alliances in SSA. As local indigenous firms in SSA are increasingly relying on learning and knowledge transfer through these kinds of collaborative arrangements to develop their capacities and enhance their competitiveness, it is pertinent to systematically study and evaluate the types and quality of knowledge exchanged in these alliances in order to support firms in their alliance learning decisions.

This paper intends to address this research gap by presenting the results of empirical research conducted in the context of the Nigerian oil and gas industry. The main research questions focused on the nature of learning and the types of knowledge transferred/acquired: What is the nature of inter-partner learning in the alliances and what types of knowledge are transferred/acquired by partner firms through the alliances? Using a qualitative case study research method, four cases of interfirm collaborations between foreign and local indigenous oil companies in the Nigerian oil and gas industry were studied, exploring the nature of learning that occurred in the alliances and the types and quality of knowledge transferred between the partner firms. The explorative study was guided by the two-dimensional classification of organizational knowledge into “technological, managerial, and market knowledge”, as well as into “explicit and tacit knowledge”.

A major contribution of this study/paper is that it extends the theory of organizational knowledge types and learning to a distinctive type of international interfirm collaborations in LDCs and provides practice-relevant recommendations to encourage local firms to acquire strategically valuable knowledge and skills through asymmetric alliances. Furthermore, our study is one of the only few studies that researched all three knowledge areas in the same study while projecting the argument empirically that each of the knowledge areas (technological, managerial, and market) consists of both explicit and tacit dimensions. Previous studies have focused on only one knowledge area, with most of them focusing on technology or technological knowledge transfer, while few have focused on either market knowledge or managerial knowledge. By considering all the three knowledge areas and their explicit–tacit dimensions, our study aligns with key theoretical approaches in innovation research with a knowledge-based view of firms that have been neglected in interfirm innovation collaboration studies. These approaches assume that successful innovation often requires a strong linkage/combination between technology, market knowledge, and the right organizational/managerial process (e.g., Kogut & Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996b) as well as the application of tacit knowledge. Therefore, understanding partner firms’ potentials for the development of innovation capability through interfirm knowledge transfer would require the study of the three knowledge areas and their tacit–explicit dimensions concurrently.

2. Interfirm Collaborations in the Nigerian Oil Industry

The Nigerian oil and gas industry, where an increasing trend of interfirm alliances between foreign international oil companies and local oil companies has been witnessed in recent years, provides a veritable empirical context for such asymmetric market exploitation alliances. The increasing trend of interfirm alliances was stimulated indirectly by the Nigerian government’s policies encouraging local participation in the industry. These include the indigenous oil licencing policy, the marginal oilfield policy, which awards marginal oilfields to the local Nigerian oil companies to operate, and the local content policy (IGF—Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development, 2018; UNCTAD—United Nations Conference on Trade and Development & CALAG Capital Limited, 2006; Agoro, 2001). Faced with the challenges of inadequate financial resources and technical capabilities, many local Nigerian oil companies in the industry increasingly entered various kinds of equity and non-equity partnerships with oil multinational companies (MNCs) in the industry, in order to jointly operate their acquired oil licences or execute oil services contracts. Although current statistics relating specifically to the number of these partnerships in the industry are not readily available, it has been widely reported that 40 local oil companies were awarded oilfield licences between 1990 and 1999 through the indigenous oil licencing policy while about 111 local companies were successfully awarded a total of 81 marginal oilfields between 2003 and 2021 through the marginal field policy (IGF—Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development, 2018; UNCTAD—United Nations Conference on Trade and Development & CALAG Capital Limited, 2006; Oladipo, 2022). Most of these awardees often take the option of foreign technical partnerships (equity or non-equity) to raise capital, expertise, and tools, and gain advice to develop their acquired oilfields (Hindle & Woldemichael, 2009; Tsourakis, 2022; Oladipo, 2022). Also, in the oilfield services sector of the industry, the share of the local (Nigerian) content of over USD 10 billion expended yearly in the industry rose from 5% pre-1996 to 56% in 2024, mainly due to Nigerian local content legislations and the various types of collaborative arrangements between international oilfield services companies and local services companies induced by the legislations (Nwankwo & Iyeke, 2022; Oladipo, 2025). The foreign oil companies in the partnerships usually provide the key technical capabilities and capital funds required for the operations, while local partners often provide their acquired oilfields or blocks and other minor capabilities. Apart from “risk sharing” and “access to oil and gas assets”, learning and knowledge transfer constitutes an important goal in the partnerships, particularly for the local partner companies. However, the partnerships are characterized by a large gap in technological and managerial capabilities between the foreign oil companies and their local partners in the alliances. The foreign partners in the alliances usually possess superior capabilities in terms of cutting-edge technology, financial resources, and organizational know-how, while the local partners are no match for their foreign partners in terms of these capabilities. The local partner companies are mostly locally based small and medium-sized oil companies, while their foreign partner companies are mainly large and medium-sized international oil companies from more developed and industrially advanced countries. With such asymmetry, it is most likely that the foreign partners may perceive little or nothing to learn from their local partners and thereby possess no intent to acquire knowledge from their local partners. On the contrary, the indigenous partners lacking the requisite knowledge and capabilities may perceive the foreign partners as a reservoir of superior knowledge and technologies and thereby exhibit explicit learning intent to acquire knowledge from their foreign partners. The question of which partner learns from which partner and what types of knowledge and technologies are acquired through the learning process is the subject of the empirical study reported in this paper.

This context of interfirm alliances between foreign and indigenous firms in the Nigerian oil industry exemplifies the growing trend of international interfirm alliances between foreign developed country firms and local firms in the LDCs, particularly in sub-Saharan African countries, in which local firms increasingly seek to develop their capacities and competitiveness through learning and knowledge acquisition. These alliances in the Nigerian oil industry provides an ideal context to explore the nature of learning and the types of knowledge that are transferred through such international asymmetric alliances.

3. Literature Review

3.1. Interfirm Collaboration and Knowledge Transfer

Interfirm collaborations (or alliances) are voluntary agreements between two or more independent companies to engage in business activities in order to pursue common goals and achieve mutual economic gains. These can range from non-equity cooperation arrangements, which do not involve equity exchange between the alliance partners, to equity joint venture agreements with a separate jointly owned entity (Harrigan, 1988). The motives for engaging in interfirm collaborations are numerous. However, one of the most cited motives is the acquisition/transfer of knowledge and skills from/between alliance partners (Inkpen, 1998; Sammarra & Biggiero, 2008; Kohtamäki et al., 2023). This motive is often justified by/with the argument that firms are embodiments of heterogeneous knowledge bases, which are built up and continually developed through learning efforts involving the generation, sharing, and transfer of knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1992).

According to the knowledge-based view (Kogut & Zander, 1992, 1996; Grant, 1996b; Grant & Baden-Fuller, 1995), the capacity of any firm to generate, develop, and deploy distinctive, firm-specific knowledge is considered a source of competitive advantage. This view (unlike the resource-based view) also recognizes that firms do not often possess the complete bundle of knowledge and capabilities they need, and therefore, may need to acquire or transfer knowledge from/to the outside of the firm in order to overcome possible skills deficiencies or to complement the generation and exploitation of firm-specific capabilities (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 1995). Yet, external acquisition through market transactions (e.g., buying knowledge embodied within a product) is difficult and often unsuccessful due to the embedded/tacit nature of organizational knowledge (Grant, 1996a; Kogut, 1988). Interfirm collaborations offer a better platform (over market transactions) through which collaborating firms can transfer and share organizational knowledge, which is difficult to imitate or acquire through the market (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 1995, 2004; McEvily & Marcus, 2005). According to this rationale, interfirm alliances provide firms with better opportunities to access, transfer, or acquire new knowledge, if purchasing the whole firm that owns the knowledge is not an option.

Based on this argument, the learning and knowledge transfer motive of interfirm collaborations has been sufficiently highlighted in the literature and the advantages of interfirm collaborations over other alternative institutional arrangements for the learning, sharing, and transfer of knowledge, particularly tacit knowledge, have been well stressed and documented (e.g., Kogut, 1988; Hamel, 1991; Inkpen & Crossan, 1995; Inkpen, 2000; Grant & Baden-Fuller, 1995, 2004; C.-S. Kim & Inkpen, 2005; etc.). A number of different factors are considered to influence the process and outcome of knowledge transfer or acquisition in interfirm alliances. These can be categorized into three areas, namely the characteristics of the alliance partners—i.e., the knowledge source and the knowledge recipient (Hamel, 1991; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Lawson & Potter, 2012; Pérez-Nordtvedt et al., 2008); the nature and characteristics of the relations between them (Bengoa & Kaufmann, 2016); and the nature and characteristics of knowledge as an object of learning/knowledge transfer (Inkpen, 2008; Simonin, 1999; Szulanski, 1996). While most of the extant literature is concentrated on interfirm alliances between firms in developed industrialized countries, a growing number of studies are now focusing on those operating in developing countries. For the scope of this article, the literature review will be concentrated on the nature/characteristics of knowledge as the object of learning/transfer.

3.2. Knowledge as the Object of Learning/Knowledge Transfer in Interfirm Collaborations

Knowledge and skills, which are often the objects of the learning intent of alliance partner firms, have been categorized based on knowledge properties such as “tacit” and “explicit” dimensions (Dhanaraj et al., 2004; Becerra et al., 2008; Park et al., 2022; Kucharska & Erickson, 2023), and into knowledge areas such as “technological”, “managerial”, and “market” knowledge (Sammarra & Biggiero, 2008). The explicit dimension of knowledge refers to knowledge that can be written, codified, and embedded in objects such as books, manuals, procedures, reports, etc., while tacit knowledge has been defined as knowledge that is non-verbalized and context-specific (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Kogut & Zander, 1992). Tacit knowledge is action-orientated knowledge based on practice and is often acquired through practical experience and face-to-face interactions with the knowledge sender (Park et al., 2022). Due to its context-specific nature, tacit knowledge is often considered the basis of strategically valuable “firm-specific” knowledge and capabilities (e.g., Barney, 1991; Grant, 1996b; Dhanaraj et al., 2004; Boadu et al., 2018) that is very difficult to be copied/imitated by competitors. The consideration of tacit knowledge as being of strategic importance is not unconnected to the perceived effect that it has on organizational performance, particularly on improved innovation performance (Kucharska & Erickson, 2023). Tacit knowledge has been associated with creativity in innovation processes (see Liu & Han, 2012) and is argued to more likely generate innovation ideas than explicit knowledge (Kucharska & Erickson, 2023). In contrast, explicit knowledge can be easily understood and applied by other firms with similar a knowledge base, making it “non-specific” to the firm possessing it (Lei et al., 1997, p. 215; Manhart & Thalmann, 2015). Nevertheless, explicit knowledge contributes to the operational capability of a firm (Gamble, 2020). In the context of interfirm alliances, the acquisition/transfer of explicit and tacit knowledge between the alliance partners has been studied/analyzed in the literature and found to differ. While tacit knowledge transfer requires more relational embeddedness in the form of strong ties, trust, shared values, shared systems, and a shared knowledge base between the partners, explicit knowledge transfer can occur through the exchange of information and artefacts/objects (Dhanaraj et al., 2004; Collins & Hitt, 2006; Becerra et al., 2008; Park et al., 2022). However, most of these studies/evaluations are limited to mainly the literature focusing on interfirm alliances in the developed economies of the West and transitional economies of eastern Europe and China. Whether or not and how tacit and explicit knowledge are acquired/transferred in international interfirm alliances in LDCs is yet unknown as no study has focused on this. Considering the huge asymmetry between alliance partners in alliances and the necessity for the development of capacity/competitiveness for local firms in LDCs, the study of the types of knowledge transferred in this type of alliances becomes pertinent, which is the focus of this present paper.

In terms of knowledge areas, technological knowledge refers to knowledge and competencies that are necessary for the design and development of products and services as well as for their production and delivery processes (Sammarra & Biggiero, 2008, p. 805; Howells et al., 2003, p. 395). This includes both scientific knowledge (e.g., the knowledge of petroleum chemistry) and experimental knowledge (e.g., reservoir simulation skills) as well as application-based practical knowledge (e.g., the knowledge for operating oil drilling equipment). Managerial knowledge refers to the knowledge and skills necessary for the efficient and effective coordination and supervision of a firm’s resources and processes. This includes both applied managerial knowledge, such as management techniques, concepts, or systems (e.g., total quality management, accounting standards), and more abstract and cognitive-based managerial knowledge, such as strategic management knowledge or knowledge pertaining to specific management philosophy and culture. Managerial knowledge has been described as more complex and a sort of meta-knowledge as it implies the capability to integrate and coordinate multiple types of knowledge and competencies, including technological and market knowledge (e.g., Sammarra & Biggiero, 2008, p. 805). Finally, market knowledge has been defined as “organized and structured information about the market” (T. Li & Calantone, 1998, p. 14), which generally includes information and knowledge about customers’ characteristics, preferences, and needs in a particular market. However, at the international business level, market knowledge includes both general knowledge about international operations, i.e., “international market knowledge”, and knowledge about specific host country markets, i.e., “local market knowledge” (see also, e.g., Eriksson et al., 1997). While “international market knowledge” generally refers to competencies and resources necessary to engage in international operations, “local market knowledge” refers to knowledge about local business networks, clients, customers, and competitors as well as knowledge about local institutional frameworks, rules, norms, values, and government relations in a host country (Eriksson et al., 1997). Market knowledge in terms of international and host country market knowledge has been emphasized in the international business literature as being crucial for the success of a firm’s internationalization (e.g., Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Erramilli & Rao, 1990; Eriksson et al., 1997, 2000; Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2022).

Generally, the literature relating to “knowledge types” has so far tended to hold quite clearly separate analyses of the knowledge areas (i.e., technological, managerial, and market) and the knowledge properties (i.e., tacit and explicit). In this context, some studies have attempted to categorize each knowledge area as either tacit or explicit (e.g., Shenkar & Li, 1999; Lane et al., 2001; Dhanaraj et al., 2004). For instance, “managerial” and “market” knowledge, which are often perceived as being more cognitively and behaviourally based (Child & Markórczy, 1993; Geisler, 2007), have been categorized by some researchers as more tacit than “technological” knowledge, which is often categorized as relatively explicit (Shenkar & Li, 1999; Lane et al., 2001; J. Li & Shenkar, 2003; Dhanaraj et al., 2004; Geisler, 2007). However, a strict categorization of the knowledge areas into tacit or explicit knowledge is very problematic. This is because each of the knowledge areas can be argued to contain its own fair share of both tacit and explicit knowledge components. For example, applied managerial knowledge such as standardized management techniques and procedures are more explicit in nature than managerial knowledge in terms of abstract and cognitive-based management skills, which are highly tacit in nature. Market knowledge such as those relating to products, industry trends, and key industry participants (i.e., customers, suppliers, and competitors) are explicit in nature (Becerra et al., 2008), whereas marketing knowledge in terms of culture-specific knowledge such as customer preferences are tacit in nature (Simonin, 1999). Moreover, technological knowledge, which is generally classified as relatively explicit knowledge, often has components interwoven with the firm’s culture and product development routines that are more tacit in nature (Lei et al., 1997). Therefore, it can be clearly argued that technological, managerial, and market knowledge comprise both tacit and explicit components. Any study or analysis of the acquisition/transfer of these knowledge areas would need to consider both their tacit and their explicit components. In this study/paper, the focus is on both tacit and explicit components of the knowledge areas—technological, managerial, and market knowledge.

3.3. Knowledge Acquisition/Transfer in International Interfirm Collaborations

In the context of international interfirm collaborations, the acquisition of “local market knowledge” from a local collaborative partner has often been construed to constitute an object of the learning intent of foreign partner firms entering collaborative arrangements with local firms in the host countries. The local partner firms are assumed to be interested in acquiring the “technological” and “managerial knowledge” possessed by their foreign partners, particularly, when the international collaborations involve firms from developing and developed countries as alliance partners (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; Yan & Child, 2002; Kale & Anand, 2006). This assumption has often been grounded in the knowledge-based view of interfirm alliances, which in conjunction with international business theory, emphasizes the acquisition of location-specific knowledge such as “local market knowledge” as the motive of foreign partner firms in international interfirm alliances (Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2022; Makino & Inkpen, 2003; Makino & Delios, 1996; Barkema et al., 1996; Beamish, 1988; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; etc.). It has been argued that this often leads to a “learning race” (competitive) type of relationship between the foreign and local alliance partners, in which the faster learning partner wins the race and gains more bargaining power in the alliance. However, although the importance of “local market knowledge” generally to foreign firms in international interfirm collaborations cannot be disputed, “local market knowledge” may be redundant and less important in cases where foreign partner firms already possessed local knowledge of the host country prior to their collaborations with local firms or acquire local knowledge independent of their local alliance partners during the alliances. The great emphasis laid on “local market knowledge” as a distinctive contribution of local partners and as a learning objective of the foreign partners can also be traced to the overwhelming focus of the existing studies/analyses on international alliances used solely as “foreign market entry strategies” of foreign MNCs in developing countries. International alliances used as “market exploitation strategies” of the subsidiaries of MNCs in the host countries are rarely focused on in those studies. H. Kim et al. (2024) found that existing studies have focused so much on examining knowledge transfer between MNCs and their international joint ventures (IJVs) and paid less attention to the knowledge transfer between the IJVs and the local partners. Many of the international interfirm alliances in the Nigerian oil and gas industry fall into this category, where many of the foreign oil MNCs engage in collaborations with local indigenous firms through their local subsidiaries to exploit local market opportunities in the industry.

The assumption that the acquisition of “technological knowledge” constitutes a major learning objective of local firms in international alliances in developing countries has been traditionally premised on the low level of technological development of the developing country firms and the need to improve through learning from their foreign developed country partners. However, the assumption that the acquisition of “managerial knowledge” constitutes a learning objective of local firms has been made mainly in empirical studies/analyses focusing on international alliances between Western-developed country firms and local firms in transition economies of Eastern Europe and China (e.g., Lin, 2005; Tsang, 2001; Yan & Child, 2002; Lyles & Salk, 1996; Child & Markórczy, 1993). This has been linked to the acute need for modern management techniques and know-how in the transformation of former state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and in the continued economic development of the transition countries (Tsang, 2001, p. 30). However, this assumption is yet to be made/confirmed in any studies relating to international interfirm alliances in the less developed countries (LDCs) of sub-Saharan Africa such as those operating in the Nigerian oil and industry. Hence, this current study is focused on exploring this assumption in the Nigerian context.

Despite the arguments and assumptions regarding intention/motivation for the acquisition and/or transfer of technological, managerial, and local market knowledge, no research has studied the nature and quality of the knowledge transferred in this type of interfirm collaboration. This current study focuses on exploring the types and quality of knowledge transferred between the partner firms in international interfirm collaborations in a developing country, particularly those used as market exploitation strategies. This would enable an understanding of the viability of interfirm knowledge transfer for boosting the knowledge base and innovation capacity of the alliance partner firms in such a distinctive type of international alliance.

4. Empirical Research Method

4.1. Research Strategy and Operationalisation

This study was aimed at examining the learning and knowledge transfer activities in selected cases of interfirm collaborations between local indigenous firms and their foreign partners in the Nigerian oil and gas industry to identify the nature/types of knowledge transferred/acquired by the collaborating partners. For this purpose, this study focused on the concepts of “learning intent” (LI), “knowledge transfer willingness” (KTW), and “knowledge protectiveness” (KP) as important determinants of knowledge transfer, and on the concept of “knowledge types” as the object of knowledge transfer. Learning intent (LI) has been defined as the degree of the deliberate desire of a partner firm to learn/acquire knowledge through its alliance (Hamel, 1991; Inkpen, 2000; Pérez-Nordtvedt et al., 2008). Without a deliberate intention to learn/acquire knowledge in an alliance, learning/knowledge transfer would be left to chance; that is, it may or may not take place (Okonkwo, 2018). Therefore, the stronger the intention to learn, the higher the chances that learning/knowledge transfer will occur in the alliance. To study the degree of the LI, we adopted Okonkwo’s (2018) differentiation between “indicated learning intent” and “formalized learning intent”. Indicated learning intent (ILI) denotes the mere declaration of alliance learning intentions by a partner firm’s top management without further articulation and communication of the intentions to the employees. Formalized learning intent (FLI) involves the declaration of a firm’s alliance learning objectives by the top management of the firm with clear articulation and communication to the employees that translate the objectives into actions to capture external knowledge. FLI, therefore, denotes a higher degree of LI than ILI. Similarly, the degree of a firm’s KTW in an alliance is reflected by the level of articulation and implementation of support systems (e.g., the training of recipient firm’s personnel) by the firm that helps the recipient partner to acquire knowledge/skills from the source partner (Szulanski, 1996). Conversely, KP is reflected by intentional policies and procedures put in place by a partner firm to restrict access to, and the sharing of, relevant information concerning its technology and processes (Simonin, 1999, 2004).

In terms of “knowledge types”, our study uses a two-dimensional approach to the categorization of knowledge namely between the “knowledge areas”—technological, managerial, and market—and the dimension—"explicit-tacit”. Our definitions of the knowledge areas as well as explicit and tacit knowledge are the same as defined in Section 3.2 of this paper. Our study also projects the argument that each of the knowledge areas consists of both tacit and explicit components, where explicit and tacit dimensions are a continuum on a spectrum of two extreme points.

Table 1. Knowledge types—knowledge areas dimension.

Knowledge Areas Dimension
Knowledge Areas	Components
Technological	Scientific knowledge (e.g., petroleum chemistry) Experimental knowledge (e.g., reservoir simulation skills) Practical knowledge (e.g., operating oil drilling equipment)
Managerial	Applied management techniques (e.g., accounting standards) Cognitive-based managerial knowledge (e.g., management philosophy)
Market	Local market knowledge International market knowledge

and

Table 2. Knowledge types—explicit–tacit dimension.

Explicit–Tacit Dimension
Knowledge Areas	Explicit	Tacit
Technological	General scientific and technical standards, techniques, and quantifiable technologies	Technological knowledge components interwoven with the firm’s culture and product development routines and processes
Managerial	Applied management techniques (e.g., accounting standards)	Cognitive-based managerial knowledge (e.g., management philosophy)
Market	Market knowledge relating to products, industry trends, and key industry participants (e.g., customers, suppliers, and competitors)	Marketing knowledge relating to culture-specific knowledge such as customer preferences

below show the two dimensions of knowledge types that are focused on in this study.

4.2. Data Collection and Analysis

Although it appears that much has been written about knowledge transfer in/through interfirm alliances in general, and that a few studies exist regarding learning in international interfirm alliances in developing countries, the types of knowledge transferred or acquired through international interfirm alliances in less developing countries, particularly those operating in the Nigerian oil industry, has not been studied. Therefore, our study of the types of knowledge acquired/transferred in these alliances was very exploratory in nature, and was designed to extend, rather than test, alliance learning/knowledge transfer theory. Consequently, qualitative case study research was considered as an appropriate research approach (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). In this regard, four cases of interfirm collaborations between foreign and local firms in the Nigerian oil industry were selected for the study (see Table 3 and Figure 1 below). Qualitative case study research relies on theoretical sampling rather than statistical sampling, and in a multiple-case study, cases are selected to fill theoretical categories and provide examples of the diversity of the context (Eisenhardt, 1989; Stake, 2006). As such, four cases are deemed an appropriate amount to achieve a diverse range and gain an understanding of the similarities and differences between cases in a multiple case design (Yin, 2009). The benefits of a multiple-case study will be limited if fewer than four cases are selected, while the complexity and volume of data may become overwhelming to the researcher if the number of cases increases to beyond ten (Eisenhardt, 1989; Stake, 2006; Käss et al., 2024). The four cases in the current study were selected according to the logic of literal and theoretical replication (Yin, 2009) but subject to the constraint of research access. All foreign partners in this study were international companies based in Western Europe and North America but differed in size and industry positions. All foreign partners had their local subsidiaries in the industry prior to engaging in the focal alliances, or in the case of alliance case 4, had executed projects in the industry before the focal alliance.

The data collection for this study was carried out between August 2018 and January 2019 as a supplementary to data collected previously in 2010. It consisted of mainly semi-structured, in-depth interviews conducted with representatives of the partner companies in the selected cases of interfirm collaborations, and archival data was collected from the partner companies and the regulatory agency of the state in the sector. A total of 28 interviews were conducted with all the partner companies, comprising three or four representatives (a top manager, a middle manager, and one/two employee/s) from each of the local partner firms and three representatives (an alliance manager and two other employees) from each of the foreign partner firms. Twenty-eight informants is above the number needed to reach theoretical saturation (see Bengoa & Kaufmann, 2016). The interview sessions lasted on average between 40 and 60 min and were recorded with a voice recorder. The data from the interview responses were combined with the information obtained from archival data to enrich the findings since this is case study research. Archival data were obtained from (a) partner companies’ annual reports, profile brochures, and newsletters reflecting information on their partnerships/collaborative arrangements, (b) government regulatory agency’s industry review reports highlighting issues of foreign–indigenous partnerships in the industry that relate to the partner firms in our selected cases, (c) field trip/observation notes. This database was further enriched with information from other secondary sources such as various industry-focused news articles from local and foreign newspapers publishing information regarding the selected cases of alliances.

The process of analyzing the data followed the steps recommended by Eisenhardt (1989) and Miles and Huberman (1994). The first step was presenting and organizing the data (i.e., data reduction and data display). All interviews recorded in the voice recorder were transcribed to create interview transcripts. The data from the interview transcripts were combined with information from the archival data and other secondary sources to create a raw database. This was followed by “coding,” which is a process of condensing qualitative data into analysable units (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The process of coding was guided by the key theoretical themes focused on in this study. On this basis, the key objects of enquiry in our study (namely “learning intent” and “knowledge types”) provided a sort of framework upon which codes and subcodes were created and adjusted or refined over the course of the analysis. For instance, the code “LI” (i.e., learning intent) and the subcodes “LI-INDI” (i.e., indicated learning intent) and “LI—FORM” (i.e., formalized learning intent) as well as the code “KT” (i.e., knowledge types) and the subcode “KT-Int.MK” (i.e., international market knowledge) are examples of the descriptive codes created/used in this study. In the process of coding, relevant statements or clauses were systematically searched for in the raw database and assigned to the listed descriptive codes and to the subcodes that were developed during the process. Subsequently, a further step was taken by developing inferential codes based on the identified and assigned statements or clauses under descriptive codes. At this level, typical patterns, themes, or features about learning and knowledge acquisition in the alliances were explored and identified based on the frequencies, patterns, and clarity in the statements or clauses assigned under descriptive codes. For instance, “knowledge protectiveness” is an example of an inferential code that was developed through this process in our study. The entire process of data analysis was aided by the data analysis software called NVivo.

To ensure reliability, the data analysis process was supported by two peer debriefing sessions in the form of research workshops, where interpretations of our research data/coding outcomes were presented to knowledgeable colleagues and then reviewed based on their feedback comments to minimize personal biases. In addition, the use of multiple data sources in our data collection process as described in this section provided a great deal of triangulation that also ensures the reliability of our study.

5. Findings

5.1. The Four Cases of Interfirm Collaborations

Table 3 and Figure 1 provide an overview of the findings of this study—the four cases of interfirm collaborations, the learning/knowledge transfer and protection intentions of the partner firms, and the types of knowledge acquired/transferred in the collaborations. Cases 1, 2, and 4 of the collaborations were non-equity alliances, in which the foreign and local partners agreed to jointly develop and operate the oilfields owned by the local partners. In the case of case 4, the partners jointly bid to execute oilfield service projects for clients in the industry and share profits after cost recovery. However, case 3 was an equity alliance, in which the foreign partner owns 40% equity in the oilfield originally owned by the local partner firm. But, irrespective of equity ownership, the practical alliance process was similar in all the four cases: the foreign partner provides financial assistance and key technical capabilities for the operation, while the local partner provides its oil assets and other minor capabilities, including meeting the local content regulatory requirements. None of the four cases had a separate third entity (in the form of a joint venture) jointly owned by the partners. However, each of the four cases had a formal alliance interface, through which the partner firms meet to take decisions regarding the operations of their collaborative arrangements. This interface was called a “joint operating team” in cases 2 and 3, and a “joint technical team” in case 1. In case 4, it was called a “joint-project team.” The interface comprised a team of key personnel (including top and middle managers) from the foreign and local partners, who met regularly to take operational decisions. Employees of the foreign and local partners in each of the four cases also worked together on the fields.

Table 3. Cases and findings.

Cases and Findings
Cases of Interfirm Alliances	Knowledge Transfer/Acquisition Activities
	Local Alliance Partner	Foreign Alliance Partner
Case 1 Non-equity alliance (joint operation agreement) Operates in the exploration and production (E&P) subsector of the oil industry Foreign partner is a medium-sized multinational company (MNC) and had a local subsidiary prior to the alliance	Demonstrated “indicated learning intent” (ILI) Acquired international market knowledge (i.e., exposure to international customers, contractors, vendors, financial institutions, etc.) Acquired no technological knowledge Acquired no managerial knowledge	Demonstrated no learning intent Acquired no knowledge through the alliance Demonstrated no “knowledge transfer willingness” (KTW)
Case 2 Non-equity alliance (joint operation agreement) Operates in the E&P subsector of the oil industry Foreign partner is a medium-sized MNC and had a local subsidiary prior to the alliance	Demonstrated ILI Acquired international market knowledge (exposure to international oil markets and customers) No technological knowledge acquired No managerial knowledge acquired	Demonstrated no learning intent Acquired no knowledge through the alliance Demonstrated no KTW
Case 3 Equity alliance (joint operation agreement) No jointly owned separate third entity Operates in the E&P subsector of the oil industry Foreign partner is a large MNC and had a local subsidiary prior to the alliance	Demonstrated “formalized learning intent” (FLI) Acquired technological knowledge (reservoir simulation and modelling techniques, facility fabrication and construction competencies) Acquired international market knowledge (international oil markets exposure and experience) No managerial knowledge acquired	Demonstrated no learning intent Acquired no knowledge through the alliance Demonstrated KTW to support local partner’s knowledge acquisition Demonstrated “knowledge protectiveness” (KP) to limit the extent of knowledge transfer
Case 4 Non-equity alliance (joint project partnership) Provides oilfield service to the oil industry Foreign partner is a large MNC and had no local subsidiary, but had executed projects in the industry prior to this alliance	Demonstrated “FLI” Acquired technological knowledge (engineering design techniques—FEED and DED, engineering services standards and best practices) Acquired international market knowledge (international oil markets exposure and experience) No managerial knowledge acquired	Demonstrated no learning intent Acquired no knowledge through the alliance Demonstrated KTW to support the local partner’s knowledge acquisition Demonstrated KP to limit the extent of knowledge transfer

Table 3. Cases and findings.

Cases and Findings
Cases of Interfirm Alliances	Knowledge Transfer/Acquisition Activities
	Local Alliance Partner	Foreign Alliance Partner
Case 1 Non-equity alliance (joint operation agreement) Operates in the exploration and production (E&P) subsector of the oil industry Foreign partner is a medium-sized multinational company (MNC) and had a local subsidiary prior to the alliance	Demonstrated “indicated learning intent” (ILI) Acquired international market knowledge (i.e., exposure to international customers, contractors, vendors, financial institutions, etc.) Acquired no technological knowledge Acquired no managerial knowledge	Demonstrated no learning intent Acquired no knowledge through the alliance Demonstrated no “knowledge transfer willingness” (KTW)
Case 2 Non-equity alliance (joint operation agreement) Operates in the E&P subsector of the oil industry Foreign partner is a medium-sized MNC and had a local subsidiary prior to the alliance	Demonstrated ILI Acquired international market knowledge (exposure to international oil markets and customers) No technological knowledge acquired No managerial knowledge acquired	Demonstrated no learning intent Acquired no knowledge through the alliance Demonstrated no KTW
Case 3 Equity alliance (joint operation agreement) No jointly owned separate third entity Operates in the E&P subsector of the oil industry Foreign partner is a large MNC and had a local subsidiary prior to the alliance	Demonstrated “formalized learning intent” (FLI) Acquired technological knowledge (reservoir simulation and modelling techniques, facility fabrication and construction competencies) Acquired international market knowledge (international oil markets exposure and experience) No managerial knowledge acquired	Demonstrated no learning intent Acquired no knowledge through the alliance Demonstrated KTW to support local partner’s knowledge acquisition Demonstrated “knowledge protectiveness” (KP) to limit the extent of knowledge transfer
Case 4 Non-equity alliance (joint project partnership) Provides oilfield service to the oil industry Foreign partner is a large MNC and had no local subsidiary, but had executed projects in the industry prior to this alliance	Demonstrated “FLI” Acquired technological knowledge (engineering design techniques—FEED and DED, engineering services standards and best practices) Acquired international market knowledge (international oil markets exposure and experience) No managerial knowledge acquired	Demonstrated no learning intent Acquired no knowledge through the alliance Demonstrated KTW to support the local partner’s knowledge acquisition Demonstrated KP to limit the extent of knowledge transfer

Figure 1. Overview of the findings. † positive; − negative.

Figure 1. Overview of the findings. † positive; − negative.

5.2. Learning Intent, Knowledge Transfer Willingness, and Knowledge Protectiveness

The findings of this study show that foreign partner firms in the four cases did not possess “learning intent” in the alliances. Although the interviewed managers of the foreign partner firms acknowledged the learning opportunities inherent in the collaborations for any alliance partner wishing to learn/acquire knowledge, they argued that learning/knowledge acquisition was not a motive for their companies’ participation in their respective alliances. Contrary to the assumptions/claims in the literature that foreign partners in international interfirm alliances in developing countries often seek to obtain “local market knowledge” from their local partners in the alliances, the managers and employees of the foreign partners agreed in the interviews that their companies had no need to obtain knowledge from their local partners. The presence of the foreign partners’ local subsidiaries in the Nigerian oil industry prior to the alliances may have rendered “local market knowledge” from the local partners redundant, hence there was no learning intent from the foreign partners. The foreign partners in all the cases were mainly interested in accessing the oilfields/oil licences of their local partners and jointly exploiting these oil assets with their local partners through the alliances, or in case 4, jointly bidding for and executing oilfield services contracts with their local partner to fulfil the regulatory requirements of the “local content” policy of the Nigerian state.

In contrast, the local partner companies in all four cases obviously had a learning intent to acquire knowledge from their foreign partners through the alliances. However, the degree of the learning intent differs across the cases. The local partners in cases 3 and 4 demonstrated “formalized learning intent” (FLI), which is a stronger learning intent than “indicated learning intent” (ILI), which was demonstrated by the local partners in cases 1 and 2. For example, in case 3, the local partner’s FLI was reflected by a written “declaration of alliance objectives” by the top management of the firm. This highlighted, among other things, the importance of learning and skills development through the alliance and the desire to access, and acquire, technical expertise in deepwater offshore oil and gas operations. The learning objective was also frequently communicated within the company through the periodic evaluation of the activities of employees sent to the alliance interface based on their weekly reports, which the employees were required to submit on a regular basis. Similarly, in case 4, the local partner had a written “general statement of alliance objectives”, which included learning and career development objectives for its collaborations with foreign firms in the industry. Based on the “statement of objectives”, learning targets were regularly set for the employees sent to work on “joint projects,” and/or to participate in “joint training programmes” with the foreign partner. These employees were also regularly appraised on the progress made in skill development. However, in contrast to cases 3 and 4, the ILI of the local partners in cases 1 and 2 was reflected by a mere declaration of learning desires by their top management, which was neither articulated nor communicated companywide. There were no clearly defined learning objectives available to their employees sent to the alliance interfaces, and no deliberate actions were taken to implement the learning intention declared by management. The interviewed managers stated desires to learn but did not identify any efforts that were made to acquire knowledge through the alliance.

Although foreign partners in all the four cases had no learning intent, the foreign partners in cases 3 and 4 demonstrated a willingness to support knowledge transfer to their local partners in their respective alliances. These two foreign partners were large multinational oil and gas companies in the industry. The foreign partners’ KTW was reflected by their deliberate deployment of measures and resources that facilitated the learning and knowledge acquisition efforts of their local partners in the alliances. For example, the foreign partner in case 3 provided project-based “internet and intranet” facilities through which technical information/expertise, field operational reports, and technical questions and answers could be accessed and shared by employees of both foreign and local partner companies. Also, various professional training and workshop sessions were offered to employees of the local partner by the foreign partner in its role as the technical advisor of the collaborative arrangement. The foreign partner supported the establishment of an alliance-based “secondment programme”, through which employees of the local partner were regularly attached to the offices and facilities of the foreign partner in various locations locally and abroad for specified periods of time. This enabled the employees of the local partner to work and learn on the job with the state-of-the-art facilities of the foreign partner. Similarly, in case 4, the elements of the foreign partner’s KTW included the following: support for the local partner’s engineering facilities’ upgrade at the initial alliance stage through the provision of financial resources and physical assets, such as engineering hardware and software; the deployment of the foreign partner’s engineering personnel to the local partner’s offices; and the establishment of a secondment programme through which the local partner’s employees were sent to the foreign partner’s facilities abroad for international project experience. While the foreign partner in case 3 emphasized its desire to the support growth of indigenous capacity in the Nigerian oil industry as the justification for its demonstration of KTW in the alliance, the foreign partner in case 4 referred to its strategy of maintaining high quality standards in projects jointly executed with local partners as the rationale behind its clear demonstration of KTW to the local partner.

However, in contrast to cases 3 and 4, the foreign partners in cases 1 and 2 showed no willingness to transfer knowledge or deliberate support for their local partners’ learning in the alliances. The respondent managers of the foreign partners in both cases insisted that the alliances have a purely commercial purpose rather than learning, and therefore, the issue of transferring knowledge to local partners did not arise. A manager in the foreign partner company in case 2 specifically stated that the local partner “…have not informed us of their interest in learning or technology transfer….” (2FP-Managing Director, Qu: 3:28).

However, despite their demonstration of KTW, the two foreign partners in cases 3 and 4 also adopted cautious measures that limited the extent of knowledge transfer to the local indigenous partners through the alliances. For instance, the foreign partner in case 3 ensured that the exchange of information and expertise with its local partner, whether through the intranet and internet or through professional training and workshops, remained strictly project based. This means that exchanges were strictly restricted to information and expertise relevant to the specific oil and gas project of the alliance. No expertise or skills beyond the competencies needed for their joint operation were transferred. Moreover, the activities of the local partner’s employees during secondment to the foreign partner’s offices and facilities were carefully monitored and limited to the specific project of the alliance, even though the foreign partner had several other oil and gas projects running simultaneously in the industry either solely operated or in alliance with other oil companies. In its demonstration of protectiveness, the foreign partner in case 4 ensured that certain sensitive engineering and design templates and procedures were not fully accessed by or released to the local partner. In some high-competence phases of the joint projects, which were often executed in the foreign partner’s facilities abroad, the local partner and its employees were sometimes tactically excluded from the work process (and instead received only work results) to prevent unintended access to critical expertise and information. Durations of secondment postings were deliberately kept very short and posting approvals were given on a case-by-case basis.

5.3. Knowledge Types

In line with their lack of demonstration of any intentions to learn/acquire knowledge through the alliances, none of the foreign partner companies in all the four cases acknowledged the acquisition of any type of knowledge through the alliances. As stated in the findings on LI above, “local market knowledge”, which would have been a learning target of the foreign partners for acquisition through the alliance, may have been rendered redundant and unattractive due to the presence of the foreign partners’ local subsidiaries in the Nigerian oil industry prior to the alliances.

In contrast, local partner firms in all the four cases of alliances acknowledged that they have acquired some useful knowledge and experiences through their collaborative arrangements with the foreign partners (see Table 3 and Figure 1). However, the types and extent of knowledge acquisitions by the local partners differ across the four alliances. While the local partners in cases 1 and 2 acquired mainly “international market knowledge” through their collaborations, the local partners in cases 3 and 4 acquired “international market knowledge” and “technological knowledge’ through their alliances. For instance, in case 1, the “international market knowledge” acquired by the local partner comprised knowledge pertaining to key international customers for crude oil and gas, knowledge about international oil and gas contractors and equipment vendors, and knowledge pertaining to key foreign financial institutions and investment agencies. One of the managers of the local partner firm in case 1 stated that

“[…] in terms of international (market) knowledge, we now know where and where we can sell our crude oil, because we have done that with our technical partners before, and we are doing it now on our own. Now we can go to AIM market in London to get investment, all those are part of international knowledge. Now we can go to Citibank, HSBC, or Barclays bank in London to source for fund, all these are part of the international knowledge we acquired”.

(1LP-Manager (Op.), QU: 2:45)

Similarly, the local partner in case 2 also acquired knowledge pertaining to international crude oil markets and international customers of crude oil and gas products. A manager of the local partner firm confirmed that the local partner was able to achieve its first international sales agreement with a prominent international buyer through its alliance with the foreign partner.

“[…] the company currently handling our crude was not too keen to have a sale agreement with us. But they were keen to have agreement with our technical partner, who is a publicly quoted company in ‘North America’ [……] it was easy to do due diligence on ‘our technical partner’. So, the sales contract we have now is through ‘the technical partner’. So, from that point of view, my company is gaining from that kind of knowledge and this exposure to international market”.

(2LP-Managing Director, QU: 1:45)

Apart from gaining international market knowledge, the local partner companies in case 1 and case 2 did not acquire any technological or managerial knowledge through their alliances. However, in contrast, the local partners in case 3 and case 4 acquired technological knowledge in addition to the international knowledge acquired through their alliances. For instance, in case 3, the local partner company acquired technological knowledge pertaining to “reservoir simulation and modelling” and “facility fabrication and construction”. The interviewed manager of the local partner confirmed that

“[…] yes, in terms of ‘Boeing construction and fabrication’, we have learned a lot […]. And, also, in the area of ‘reservoir studies’ too; we have also gained practical experience in “reservoir determination” and things like that […]”.

(3LP-Manager, QU: 1: 46–48)

The results from the document analysis show that the local partner firm in case 3 did not possess any appreciable knowledge base or capabilities in reservoir management prior to this focal alliance. However, after some few years of collaboration with the foreign partner and of spirited learning efforts in the alliance, the local partner can now boast some capabilities in reservoir management, which include skills in reservoir studies and development as well as reservoir operations and recovery techniques. The technological knowledge acquired by the local partner in case 4, which was an oil services company, comprised knowledge and competencies pertaining to engineering design. The respondents in the local partner confirmed that the local company had been able to acquire skills and competencies regarding the general techniques, standards, systems, and best practices in “Front-End Engineering Design” (FEED) and “Detailed Engineering Design” (DED). Prior to the alliance, the local partner company’s engineering design capability was very limited; it merely supported small-scale construction and maintenance services executed for its local clients in Nigeria. However, through this focal alliance, the local partner has been able to increase its capacity and capabilities in engineering design.

“[……] we have acquired good knowledge from the relationship, because before then, you see, we have been doing engineering design, but we do it just to support our in-house maintenance work and small construction work. But today, we have a complete outfit, that first, boasts over 100 design engineers, [……], and the partnership has really pushed to the international standard. So, whatever we are designing today, we are not only designing for small operators here; we are designing something that even in Houston (USA) will be applicable. And the thing is that we have even the opportunity to do detailed engineering for HHI (HYUNDAI) based in Korea……”.

(4LP-Deputy Director, QU:1:46)

In the area of managerial knowledge, none of the local partners in all the four cases acknowledged the acquisition of any specific knowledge or capability. Most of the interviewees in the local partner firms were unanimous in their responses that no intention or deliberate efforts were made to acquire managerial knowledge in their alliances. However, only a director in the local partner firm in case 4 pointed out the likelihood of his company deciding to do more for acquiring and developing managerial knowledge in “project management”.

“[……] but knowledge and technology are transferred more at the technical level, at the management (level) not much. You can see, if you look at it, everybody is silent about the top, but the top controls everybody; so the focus on management training has not been very much, everybody is talking about the technical, but I see a situation that we need to do more on management side also, so that the two would move together”.

(4LP-Deputy Director, QU: 1:50)

6. Analysis, Discussion, and Propositions

The purpose of the empirical research reported in this paper was to examine the learning activities of the partner firms in the four selected cases of international interfirm alliances in the Nigerian oil and gas industry, with the aim of identifying the types and quality of knowledge sought and acquired/transferred by the partner firms in the alliances and consequently analyze the viability of the knowledge/skills transfer/acquisition in supporting the innovation capacity of the local partner firms. The results of this research show that, contrary to the extant theory/argument in the literature, the foreign partner firms in the alliances did not seek to acquire “local market knowledge” from the local partner firms and did not possess any learning intent in the alliances. This could primarily be attributed to the fact that “local market knowledge” may have become redundant and less important for the foreign partners in the alliances due to the alliances constituting “market exploitation strategies” rather than “foreign market entry strategies” for the foreign partners. The foreign partners participated in the collaborations through their local subsidiaries in the Nigerian oil industry to exploit local market opportunities in the industry. The local market knowledge that would have been sought was already available in the foreign partner firms prior to the focal alliances. In fact, the foreign partners were more well connected in the industry than their local partners, particularly in terms of relationships with the government/regulatory agencies, links to relevant local networks, and other industry linkages. Although the extant literature/theory had linked the “bargaining power” of local firms in international alliances to their contribution of “local market knowledge” in the alliance and suggested that the rationale for such an alliance would be eliminated once the foreign partner acquires “local market knowledge” from the local partner (see e.g., Kale & Anand, 2006; Inkpen & Beamish, 1997), the findings of our study have shown that this may not be the case with international alliances operating as “market exploitation strategies”, such as those in the Nigerian oil industry. With foreign partners’ possession of local market knowledge in such alliances, the rationale for the alliances or local partners’ bargaining power will not be eliminated as foreign partners may have different strategic objectives (e.g., access to oil assets) than learning/knowledge acquisition objective for the alliance.

Foreign partners’ lack of intent to acquire knowledge through the alliances could also be attributed to a possible negative perception of the value of knowledge possessed by the local partners. The literature has shown that the perception of the value of a firm’s knowledge by its partners can influence the partner’s decisions to set learning objectives in the alliance (e.g., Pérez-Nordtvedt et al., 2008). Hamel (1991) argued that the relative resource position of a firm in comparison to its partners or other firms in the industry can determine the learning intent in an alliance. The knowledge-advantaged foreign partners may have perceived their knowledge-disadvantaged local partners in the Nigerian oil industry as less endowed or lacking valuable knowledge, and therefore, set no learning objective. Thus, the first proposition can be stated as follows:

Proposition 1.

Foreign partners in asymmetric interfirm alliances in a less developed country of SSA are less likely to seek to acquire “local market knowledge” from their local partners, particularly if the alliance is a market exploitation strategy.

The findings of our research also emphasize the importance of the partner’s prior learning intent in the learning and knowledge acquisition process in interfirm alliances. The foreign partner firms possessed no learning intent, and therefore, did not learn/acquire knowledge through the alliances. The local partner firms that demonstrated “formalized learning intent” (FLI), which is a stronger form of learning intent, made more learning efforts and acquired more knowledge than the local partner firms that demonstrated “indicated learning intent” (ILI), which is a weaker form of learning intent. This finding confirms the findings of other studies and the dominant theory/argument in the alliance learning literature that “prior learning intent” drives learning and knowledge acquisition (Hamel, 1991; Inkpen, 2000; Pérez-Nordtvedt et al., 2008). The stronger the learning intent, the higher the chances that learning will occur/knowledge will be acquired through the alliances (Simonin, 2004; Okonkwo, 2018).

Another key finding from this research is the obvious lack of preference/focus of the local partner firms for/on the acquisition of “managerial knowledge” through the alliances. The local partners that had a stronger learning intent targeted and acquired “technological knowledge” and “international market knowledge”, while local partners that demonstrated a weaker learning intent acquired only “international market knowledge”, which was achieved mainly through experiential learning. The targeting and acquisition of “technological knowledge” by local partner firms clearly confirms the dominant narrative in the literature that the low level of technological development of the developing country-based firms and the need to improve on this often leads to the keen interest of these local firms to learn and acquire technological knowledge from their foreign partners (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; Kale & Anand, 2006). However, the same cannot be said of the lack of targeting and acquisition of “managerial knowledge” by the local partner firms in our study. Managerial knowledge as a learning target has not been previously studied in the context of international alliances in less developed countries until our current study. However, studies focusing on the transition economies of Eastern Europe and China had previously linked the acquisition of “managerial knowledge” by local firms in international alliances to the acute need for modern management techniques and know-how in the transformation of former state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and in the continued economic development of the transition countries (Tsang, 2001, p. 30). The finding from our study suggests that this argument may not be valid in the case of local firms in less developed countries (LDCs) of SSA. The local firms in LDCs may not necessarily need modern Western managerial knowledge for the transition or transformation of former SOEs. The lack of focus on or preference for the acquisition of managerial knowledge can be attributed to a possible lower priority ascribed to “managerial knowledge” by local firms in the alliances due to more focus on technology/technological knowledge. The response of one of the interviewed local managers (see quote “4LP-Deputy Director, QU: 1:50” on page 16 above) clearly alluded to this. Unlike the keen interest in improving the level of technological development in LDCs and the eagerness to gain international market exposure, managerial knowledge development may be sitting at a much lower level in the priorities of the local firms in LDCs, and therefore, was not made a learning objective in the alliances. In addition, the technology-intensive and demanding nature of oil and gas industry operations may have also contributed to the local partner firms perceiving “managerial knowledge” as being relatively less valuable, and therefore, did not target it in the alliance learning. A further likely reason for this lack of preference for the acquisition of “managerial knowledge” by the local firms in the context of our study may be the increasing doubt regarding the adequacy of Western management models in Africa due to cultural differences (Seny Kan et al., 2015). The distinctiveness of the context and the difficulty of applying Western management models could be a reason for the lack of focus on managerial knowledge acquisition through the alliances. Perhaps, further studies may be able to confirm these explanations and/or identify more reasons why managerial knowledge is not targeted and acquired by the local firms in the LDCs. Our second proposition can be postulated as follows:

Proposition 2.

Local partners in asymmetric interfirm alliances in a less developed country of SSA are more likely to seek to acquire “technological knowledge” rather than “managerial knowledge” from their foreign partners.

Our findings about local partner firms’ targeting the acquisition of “international market knowledge” is relatively novel as no study has previously identified it. Previous studies have identified and concentrated analyses on the targeting and acquisition of “local market knowledge” by foreign partner firms in international alliances in developing countries. However, the findings from our study show that all local partner firms in the study acquired “international market knowledge” through their alliances. The lack of the international exposure of the local partner firms may have made the acquisition of “international market knowledge” from the internationally more exposed foreign partners very attractive for the local firms. The importance of “international market knowledge” in boosting the competitive advantage for local firms from emerging markets has been emphasized in the growing literature on emerging market firms’ internationalization. Outward investments and international strategic positioning made possible through increasing international market exposure have been identified as factors boosting emerging markets firms’ global competitive advantage (Casanova & Miroux, 2018; Bıçakcıoğlu-Peynirci, 2023). International market knowledge acquisition by the local firms in LDCs, particularly those in the Nigerian oil industry, can support the development of their capacity to innovate and position themselves in the global oil industry. Thus, our third proposition can be postulated as follows:

Proposition 3.

Local partners in asymmetric interfirm alliances in a less developed country of SSA are more likely to target and acquire knowledge “international market knowledge” from their foreign partners in the alliances.

Finally, a further key finding from our research is the apparent dominance of the explicit knowledge acquisition/transfer in the studied interfirm collaborations. The technological and international market knowledge acquired by the local partner firms were limited to mainly the explicit dimension/type of knowledge. The technological knowledge acquired was mainly knowledge relating to general technical standards and techniques pertaining to crude oil exploration and oilfield services, while the international market knowledge acquired was mainly knowledge relating to industry trends and key industry participants such as customers/buyers of crude oil, suppliers/vendors, sources of fund/capital, etc. These are clearly aspects of mainly the explicit dimension/type of technological and international marketing knowledge (see, e.g., Becerra et al., 2008, p. 699; Shenkar & Li, 1999; Dhanaraj et al., 2004). The tacit dimension of technological and international market knowledge, such as technical knowledge components interwoven with the foreign partner firms’ specific cultures/processes/routines and international market knowledge relating to customer behaviours and preferences, was not reported to have been acquired by the local partner firms through the alliances. This limitation with regard to the lack of acquisition of tacit knowledge can be attributed primarily to the knowledge-protective measures of the foreign partner firms in the alliances. While the intangible, idiosyncratic, and complex nature of tacit knowledge is widely acknowledged to make its transfer/sharing very difficult (Chen et al., 2018; Simonin, 1999), the knowledge transfer literature has shown that interpersonal interactions between the knowledge sender and the knowledge receiver can reduce/remove this difficulty (e.g., Inkpen & Dinur, 1998). Strong social and relational capital built through trust is required for tacit knowledge transfer between alliance partners (Collins & Hitt, 2006; Dhanaraj et al., 2004; Inkpen & Tsang, 2005). This capital may have been insufficiently available in the alliances examined in our study. This may explain the fact that, although the local partner firms in cases 3 and 4 of the studied alliances employed physically interactive measures such as secondment programmes in the alliances, the knowledge protection measures adopted by their foreign partners limited the knowledge acquired by the local partners through the alliances to mainly explicit knowledge and prevented any significant acquisition of the tacit dimension of knowledge. While the knowledge protection measures of the foreign partners may have been motivated by the need to counter the risk of the potential loss of competitive position due to knowledge loss to the local partner firms (Norman, 2002; Hamel, 1991), it has been shown that knowledge protection can also undermine the success of alliances/collaborative arrangements (Larsson et al., 1998). The knowledge protection activities of foreign partners in our study can undermine the objective of the long-term development of local firms’ capacities in the oil industry through the prevention of tacit knowledge flow to local firms. Thus, our fourth proposition can be stated as follows:

Proposition 4.

Foreign partner’s knowledge protective measures in asymmetric interfirm alliances in a less developed country are likely to limit or prevent tacit knowledge acquisition by local partners.

One implication of this finding is the confirmation of the argument that each of the knowledge areas (technological, managerial, and market) does have its own fair share of both tacit and explicit components, in contrast to the strict categorization of knowledge areas as being either more explicit or more tacit in nature (Shenkar & Li, 1999; Lane et al., 2001; J. Li & Shenkar, 2003; Child & Markórczy, 1993). A further implication of this finding is the fact that alliance partners in asymmetric alliances in developing countries may need to do more to help remove barriers and facilitate the acquisition of the tacit dimension of knowledge that is adjudged to be of strategic importance in organizations, particularly for innovation capacity (Gamble, 2020; Muthuveloo et al., 2017; Ambrosini & Bowman, 2001; Acharya et al., 2022). “Tacit knowledge contributes significantly toward sustainable competitive advantage in organizations on account of the implicit barriers to competitor duplication within its organizational role” (Gamble, 2020, p. 1126).

7. Conclusions and Recommendations

7.1. Conclusions

The knowledge-based view of interfirm strategic alliances, in conjunction with international business theory, often emphasizes the acquisition of location-specific knowledge such as “local market knowledge” as the motive of foreign partner firms in international interfirm alliances, while the local partner firms in such alliances are assumed to be interested in acquiring the “technological” and “managerial knowledge” possessed by their foreign partners, particularly when the international collaborations involve firms from developing and developed countries as alliance partners. However, this empirical case study research conducted within the context of international “market exploitation” alliances in the Nigerian oil and gas industry shows that the acquisition of “local market knowledge” may not be a motive/target of foreign partner firms in such alliances in less developed countries. Rather than seeking knowledge to acquire, the foreign partners may be willing to support the learning and knowledge acquisition efforts of their local partner firms in the alliances. Moreover, the findings of our research show that, while local partner firms in the alliances sought and acquired “technological” and “international market knowledge”, rather than managerial knowledge, the type/quality of knowledge acquired by these local partner firms was limited to mainly the explicit dimension of knowledge, due to, among other things, the knowledge-protective measures adopted by the foreign partners.

In conclusion, it can therefore be argued, based on our study findings, that while substantial levels of learning and knowledge transfer do occur in the international interfirm alliances in LDCs, the nature of learning and the types/quality of knowledge transferred in the alliances appear insufficient to support local partner firms’ development of innovation capacity and the enhancement of competitiveness through the alliances. Although great potential does exist, a lot more needs to be improved in the learning and knowledge acquisition mechanisms in such alliances to achieve the potential.

7.2. Policy/Managerial Implications

These findings have both policy and research implications. In terms of general policy on the facilitation of knowledge acquisition by local firms in LDCs, the implications are twofold: Firstly, our research underscores the importance of the sincere consideration of the “knowledge transfer willingness” of the foreign partners as an important criterion at the stage of alliance partner search, negotiation, and selection. It is clear from our research results that those local partner firms that received learning support from their foreign partners were able to acquire a substantial level of knowledge through the alliances. Our findings show that these alliances are not a “learning race” between foreign and local partners, but rather they are a knowledge transfer relationship between knowledge-advantaged foreign partners and knowledge-disadvantaged local partners. Local firms should ensure that they select and collaborate with foreign partners that are able and willing to support the local firms’ desire to acquire knowledge through the alliances. Moreover, it would be beneficial for the local indigenous firms if institutional support was provided by the Nigerian state. This can be, for example, in the form of the establishment of an “alliance promotion agency” that supports local firms in the process of searching for, negotiating with, and selecting appropriate foreign partners. Secondly, our research underlines a great need for local firms in the Nigerian oil and gas industry engaging in inter-partner learning to lay more emphasis on the facilitation of tacit knowledge acquisition. While explicit knowledge can be very useful and valuable, tacit knowledge is more valuable and strategically important as it forms the basis for a firm’s creation of a competitive advantage and superior performance (Gamble, 2020; Muthuveloo et al., 2017; Ambrosini & Bowman, 2001) as well as for innovation capability (Sikombe & Phiri, 2019; Acharya et al., 2022). The acquisition of mainly the explicit type of technological and international market knowledge may help local firms in the Nigerian oil industry to build operational capacity, but the acquisition of the tacit dimension of these knowledge areas in addition to the explicit dimension is required to develop mastery and create competitive advantage and innovation. To be able to acquire tacit knowledge, local partner firms should endeavour to develop and deploy relational capital to the alliances, both in terms of “structure” and “relationships.” The “structural dimension” refers to the formal interfirm connections that exist independently of the individuals involved in the alliance (Collins & Hitt, 2006). For instance, well-crafted “secondment programmes” that would see employees of local partner firms spending a specified period working at the foreign partner’s facilities should be created/used to facilitate tacit knowledge acquisition. This would facilitate the “on- job” transfer of experiences between employees of the local and foreign partners. Moreover, IT-based interactive applications, such as “discussion boards” or “discussion forums” that facilitate exchanges of work-relevant ideas/issues between employees of both local and foreign partner firms, can be used to support tacit knowledge acquisition by local partner firms.

However, the structural dimension should be complemented by the relational (inter-personal) dimension. Strong or close inter-partner (inter-personal) relationships support tacit knowledge acquisition (Dhanaraj et al., 2004). Strong or close relationships generally rely on mutual trust, mutual commitment, and frequent interactions and communications, which are key characteristics that facilitate tacit knowledge acquisition. As the findings of this empirical research have suggested that the knowledge-protective measures of foreign partners limit the extent of local partners’ knowledge acquisition through the alliances, local partner firms should endeavour to negotiate and deploy measures that can develop mutual trust, commitment, and strengthen relationships with foreign partners also at the individual employees/managers levels. For instance, creating opportunities for informal networking, frequent meetings, and interactions between executives/employees of both local and foreign partner firms would enhance trust and a better understanding of the knowledge needs of the local partner firms (this may perhaps reduce/eliminate the frequent decisions of some foreign partner firms to execute sensitive stages of joint projects in their own country of origin, away from the reach of the local partners’ employees/managers), and therefore support the transfer of tacit knowledge.

7.3. Research Implications

In terms of research implications, the results of our empirical research highlight the need to take the distinctive nature of “asymmetric market exploitation alliances” into account when theorizing about alliance learning and knowledge transfer in the literature, especially as it relates to the nature of learning and the types of knowledge targeted and acquired in the alliances. Although the results of our empirical research are not generalizable, they offer insights that can be tested in future quantitative research studies. For instance, a clear consideration of the distinctiveness of asymmetric market exploitation alliances would confirm the redundant nature of “local market knowledge” as a learning/knowledge acquisition target of foreign alliance partners, and the importance of “international market knowledge” as a learning target of local partner firms in such alliances. Moreover, it could also establish that the learning/knowledge transfer relationships in such alliances are not necessarily “competitive learning races” between foreign and local partner firms. Furthermore, a keen consideration of the specific context of LDCs, particularly in the sub-Saharan African (SSA) context, as distinctive from other developing country contexts such as transition countries and newly industrialized countries of Asia, would confirm the attractiveness of “international market knowledge” as a learning/knowledge acquisition target of local firms and provide insight on the lack of preference for managerial knowledge acquisition in the context.

7.4. Limitations of the Study

Nevertheless, it is necessary at this juncture to acknowledge possible limitations to our research. Firstly, the Nigerian context, within which this study was carried out, is characterized by widespread corruption and very substantial state involvement in the oil industry. These factors may have influenced events that were not acknowledged by the respondents in this study. Secondly, this study covers only a subset of interfirm alliances, that is, those that did not create a separate entity such as a joint venture (JV). It remains to be seen as to what extent more formal structures such as JVs may affect the types of knowledge transferred/acquired differently. Thirdly, this research was conducted with a sample of four cases of alliances. It is arguable whether studying a greater number of alliances could impact the research results differently.