The Maturity of Strategic Networks’ Governance: Proposal of an Analysis Model
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1. Characteristics of SNs
2.2. Corporative Governance
3. Method
4. Artifact Development
4.1. Governance Maturity Levels
4.2. Testing the Model and Data Generated in the Testing Stage
5. Conclusions
5.1. Theoretical and Managerial Contributions
5.2. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Studies
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A. The Full Version of the Proposed Artifact
Fundamental Pillars of Governance and Themes (ESG) | Final Artifact | Based on |
---|---|---|
Transparency | (1) Despite the need for SN management transparency, managers recognize the importance of data protection and privacy and implement procedures to comply with the General Personal Data Protection Law (LGPD), Law No. 13,709. | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010); Return of the experts (2021). |
(2) SN Management—Formal disclosure of information related to SN management processes, rules, responsibilities, and attributions. | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010) | |
(3) SN Management—The members are aware of the requirements, criteria, and skills for selecting SN management members, which are decisive. | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010) | |
(4) Conflict resolution—SN members are constantly updated on any conflicts of interest arising in the SN and how these conflicts were resolved. | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010) | |
(5) SN Management—Membership—As part of pre-contractual clarification, SN management contributes to information transparency and entry and exit conditions for potential SN members. It allows potential SN participants to gain insight into the SN’s economic situation. | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010) | |
(6) SN Management—Information transparency from the SN to external stakeholders—SN management provides information to various external stakeholders relevant to their cooperation with the SN. | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010); GT Interagentes (2016) | |
Equity | (1) SN Management—Assembly and dialogue with members on the SN’s situation and development—The SN’s general meeting provides an open dialogue about the SN’s situation and development between members and the SN administration. | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010); GT Interagentes (2016) |
(2) SN Management—Elections of members of the Board of Directors and Fiscal Council—Members are aware of and have access to information about the criteria and requirements for participating in elections as members of the Board of Directors and Fiscal Council, allowing it to ensure equal rights to all members under the same conditions. | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010); GT Interagentes (2016) | |
(3) SN Management—Communication that allows for dialogue and alignment of activities with members’ interests—There is an open channel of communication that allows for dialogue between SN management and members to align SN activities with members’ interests. | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010); GT Interagentes (2016) | |
(4) SN Management—Compliance with the SN Bylaws and Regulations by its managers and members—They adhere to the SN Bylaws and Regulations. | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010); GT Interagentes (2016) | |
(5) SN Management—SN Committees: Other committees are formed to meet the mutual needs of participation and information, such as working groups or experience exchange groups, in addition to the control committees (board of directors, supervisory board) and advisory committees (advisory board that advises management). | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010); GT Interagentes (2016) | |
(6) SN Management—Member entry and exit conditions | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010); GT Interagentes (2016) | |
Accountability | (1) Trust and responsibility—The SNs’ management presents and provides transparency of the records of its acts performed to the board of directors and supervisory board, or, in their absence, to the members, as these actions are necessary to create the necessary environment of mutual trust, while always adhering to the duty of confidentiality regarding information. | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010); GT Interagentes (2016) |
(2) Risk management and information transparency—SN management acts with diligence (commitment) and accountability. | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010); GT Interagentes (2016) | |
(3) Risk Management—Risk assessment and management. A Risk Committee or Responsible Group meets regularly to analyze and manage risks, allowing the SN to monitor its effectiveness. | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010); GT Interagentes (2016) | |
(4) SN Management—Accountability of the Fiscal Council and Board of Directors—A fiscal council and board of directors accounts for its management acts and the exercise of its attributions regularly. | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010); GT Interagentes (2016) | |
(5) SN Management—Internal audit—The Fiscal Council performs the internal audit, and council members have the technical conditions for this attribution and sharing reports generated with SN management. | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010); GT Interagentes (2016) | |
(6) SN Management—External Audit—An independent external audit is hired, and the general meeting determines the audit’s remuneration. | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010); GT Interagentes (2016) | |
Corporate Responsibility | (1) SN planning and sustainability—SN management promotes value-aligned management and long-term strategic vision by reflecting on the cycles of growth, maturity, and reorientation of its activities. | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010); GT Interagentes (2016) |
(2) More collaborative and future-oriented SN leadership—Decision-Making Process—The SN management decision-making process is formalized and organized so that the SN can block decisions that meet individual interests but not common interests. | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010); GT Interagentes (2016) | |
(3) SN Planning and Longevity—Strategic plan development—SN management develops a strategic plan, which is discussed with the fiscal council and board of directors, establishing guidelines and strategic objectives. These objectives are monitored and disclosed, and, if necessary, action plans to improve results are prepared. | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010); GT Interagentes (2016) | |
(4) SN succession planning—The cooperation SN has succession planning in place for the board of directors and the presidency, which includes the identification of potential successors as well as the management transfer process. | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010); GT Interagentes (2016) | |
(5) SN Succession Planning—Creating a plan to deal with the departure of Board and Chair members. | Deutscher Franchiseverband (2010); GT Interagentes (2016) | |
(6) Conflict resolution—In businesses, conflicts of interest are resolved through hierarchical structures, whereas in SNs, conflicts are resolved through participatory processes. Internal conflict resolution procedures may be outlined in the SN’s Bylaws. | GT Interagentes (2016) | |
Environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) matters | (1) Opportunities related to the ESG theme—The SN considers the objectives and actions to be carried out concerning environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) themes in its strategic planning. | CVM (2021) |
(2) The SN creates a report or document that contains information about environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) topics. | CVM (2021) | |
(3) Disclosure—The SN discloses social, environmental, and corporate governance (ESG) information in an annual report or another specific document for this purpose and indicates where this document or information can be found on the institutional website. | CVM (2021) | |
(4) Environmental practices—SN members use renewable energy (e.g., solar panels). | CVM (2021) | |
(5) Environmental practices—The SN has a code of conduct or policy for working with suppliers (who use organic inputs or even those with environmental certifications). | CVM (2021) | |
(6) Environmental Practices—The chain has a policy of conduct or negotiation with suppliers who provide reverse logistics of products (e.g., collection of used light bulbs, batteries, and packaging). | CVM (2021) | |
(7) Social—Does the SN have a mission statement and strategic guidelines? If this is the case, it should accurately represent the SN’s performance and explicitly seeks to benefit society. | CVM (2021) | |
(8) Social—Training and Development (T&D) for SN directors and employees—The cooperation SN invests in training and development for its directors, president, and employees. | CVM (2021); GT Interagentes (2016) | |
(9) Social—Diversity—The SN has a specific policy or goals for gender, color, or racial diversity among its management bodies (board of directors, the presidency, and members of the management and supervisory boards). | CVM (2021) | |
(10) Governance—The SN has established communication channels through which critical issues in ESG matters and practices can be brought to the attention of the presidency or the board of directors, as applicable. | CVM (2021) |
Appendix B. Example of Artifact’s Outcome
1 | According to the European Commission (2023), medium-sized firms are defined as those with up to 250 employees or up to GBP 50 million in annual revenue. In emerging countries such as Brazil, medium-sized firms are defined as those with up to 99 employees (commerce) or 499 employees (industry)—(BNDES 2023). |
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Principle | Description | References |
---|---|---|
Transparency | Establishes that the corporate governance structure must ensure the disclosure of relevant information regarding the financial situation and performance to all interested parties, not just those mandated by laws or regulations. | Abu-Tapanjeh (2009); Bosáková et al. (2019); Cadbury (1992); Cheung et al. (2010); GT Interagentes (2016); OECD (2004). |
Equity | All partners/shareholders and other stakeholders must be treated fairly and equally by the corporate governance structure, with their rights, duties, needs, interests, and expectations safeguarded. In addition, the organization should ensure that its partners and shareholders have the right to participate in and influence the decisions made by the organization. | Abu-Tapanjeh (2009); Bosáková et al. (2019); Cadbury (1992); GT Interagentes (2016); OECD (2004). |
Accountability | Governance agents, represented by partners, administrators, fiscal councilors, and auditors, must account for their actions and accept full responsibility for any consequences resulting from their actions and omissions. They should act with diligence and responsibility within the scope of their roles. | Abu-Tapanjeh (2009); Bosáková et al. (2019); Cadbury (1992); GT Interagentes (2016); OECD (2004). |
Corporate Responsibility | Governance agents must ensure the organization’s economic and financial viability and sustainability while also reducing negative externalities and increasing positive ones. They should also consider the positive impacts of the organization’s activities, products, and services in the short, medium, and long term. | Abu-Tapanjeh (2009); Bosáková et al. (2019); Cadbury (1992); GT Interagentes (2016); OECD (2004). |
SN ¹ | Existence Time | Operation Region | Number of Associated Firms | Code ¹ | Manager Role | Manager Participation Time in the SN |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
A | 22 years | São Paulo—Brazil | 18 member firms and 33 stores | G01 | SN Manager | 4 years |
B | 22 years | Rio Grande do Sul—Brazil | 78 member firms and 108 stores | G02 | CEO | 6 years |
C | 20 years | 9 Brazilian states | 16 member firms and 17 stores | G03 | SN Manager | 10 years |
Scale Performance | Score |
---|---|
Fully complies | 3 |
Complies | 2 |
Partially complies | 1 |
Does not comply | 0 |
Level | Percentage | Description |
---|---|---|
Level 4 Mature | >80% to 100% | Congratulations, the SN structured its governance system and adopted good governance practices. These practices are based on the fundamental governance pillars and are applied within the context of SNs. Governance contributes to aligning the interests of all parties involved and promotes transparency in activities, with the ultimate goal of preserving the long-term value of the network. |
Level 3 Founded | >60% to 80% | The SN adopts good governance practices in a relatively structured manner. There is an opportunity to consolidate and improve the use of good practices while considering the SN’s context. Please note the specific dimensions that require further improvement. |
Level 2 Regular | >40% to 60% | The SN adopts some good governance practices, but there is room for improvement. There is an opportunity to develop and standardize governance practices across various pillars. The SN should analyze which pillars can provide the most value in the current context and for its current needs. |
Level 1 Incipient | >20% to 40% | The SN has incipient levels of good governance practices. There is an opportunity to formalize and institutionalize the adoption of good governance practices, and it is essential to consider the SN’s current context. The institutionalization of governance practices in the SN may provide greater transparency to members, restrict managers’ autonomy, and professionalize management. |
Level 0 Immature | 0% to 20% | The SN does not adopt good governance practices. The SN should begin to reflect on the importance of governance practices, considering the SN structure and characteristics. Governance helps to ensure transparency, protect members’ interests, and preserve the SN’s long-term value. The pillars considered are the foundation for governance practices and can be implemented by any organization, regardless of its size, legal structure, or type of control. |
Basic Pillars + ESG | Number of Items | Maximum Score Possible | Score Obtained in the Assessment |
---|---|---|---|
Transparency | 6 | 18 | 12 |
Equity | 6 | 18 | 18 |
Accountability | 6 | 18 | 12 |
Corporate Responsibility | 6 | 18 | 18 |
ESG | 10 | 30 | 12 |
Total | 34 | 102 points | 72 points |
100% | 71% |
Basic Pillars + ESG | Number of Items | Maximum Possible Score | Score Strategic Network A | Score Strategic Network B | Score Strategic Network C |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Transparency | 6 | 18 | 14 | 10 | 9 |
Equity | 6 | 18 | 15 | 13 | 11 |
Accountability | 6 | 18 | 12 | 10 | 8 |
Corporate Responsibility | 6 | 18 | 12 | 12 | 9 |
ESG | 10 | 30 | 6 | 8 | 4 |
Total | 34 | 102 | 59 | 53 | 41 |
Percentage | 100% | 58% | 52% | 40% | |
Maturity level | Level 2 Regular | Level 2—Regular | Level 1—Incipient |
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Winkler, M.; Wegner, D.; Macagnan, C.B. The Maturity of Strategic Networks’ Governance: Proposal of an Analysis Model. Adm. Sci. 2023, 13, 134. https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci13050134
Winkler M, Wegner D, Macagnan CB. The Maturity of Strategic Networks’ Governance: Proposal of an Analysis Model. Administrative Sciences. 2023; 13(5):134. https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci13050134
Chicago/Turabian StyleWinkler, Marione, Douglas Wegner, and Clea Beatriz Macagnan. 2023. "The Maturity of Strategic Networks’ Governance: Proposal of an Analysis Model" Administrative Sciences 13, no. 5: 134. https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci13050134
APA StyleWinkler, M., Wegner, D., & Macagnan, C. B. (2023). The Maturity of Strategic Networks’ Governance: Proposal of an Analysis Model. Administrative Sciences, 13(5), 134. https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci13050134